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Abstract 
 
Between positive structuralism and post-modernism lies an epistemological gap in 
which much understanding is lost.  This is particularly true of the study of government 
policies.  The National Competition Policy was one such: a vast program of change of 
Australian law, governmental processes and regulation; it changed thousands of pieces 
of legislation, brought new institutions of government into being, ruled governments 
and cost livelihoods.  Thinking about the National Competition Policy falls into that 
epistemological gap.   
 
This thesis sets about rendering the National Competition Policy thinkable by 
developing an epistemology: thick reflexive description.  It proceeds to describe the 
National Competition Policy in that way, bearing in mind the Scylla of theory 
contingent abstraction and the Charybdis of volume.  It starts by defining in precise 
terms what the National Competition Policy is taken to mean including its institutional, 
constitutional and legal context, and its prior history.  Finally the thesis sets out 
accounts, both by year and by topic, of the National Competition Policy’s 
implementation and also of reactions to it.   
 
A thick study does not seek to prove or disprove.  Its results are simply observations, 
which may run counter to alternative descriptions.  Questions may be answered and it 
may provide the opportunity for reflection.  It may throw up hypotheses for later testing 
or even for measurement against evaluative criteria.  This thesis concludes with such 
responses.   
 
It asks whether the National Competition Policy achieved change and answers that it did 
very little that was not in train already, although it overcame some barriers due to the 
federal/state vertical fiscal imbalance.  On the point of whether the National 
Competition Policy was good for Australia, it concludes that despite much official 
literature, no study has been able to demonstrate that it did.  On the theoretical point of 
whether the National Competition Policy implemented neo-liberalism it concludes that 
it was the expression of pre-existing neo-liberal politics but conceded the place of the 
public interest to a greater degree than erstwhile.  There was a price for even that in the 
rise of irrational politics.  When applied to the question of whether the National 
vi 
 
Competition Policy rewrote federalism, it suggests that while it further developed 
techniques of its working, albeit at the cost of democracy and accountability, it did not 
rearrange its fundamentals.   
 
Many observations are made possible by the thick reflexive description of the National 
Competition Policy.  For example, it is surprising how uncritical the various estates of 
the Australian polity have been of the Productivity Commission.  That body was 
mistaken about the benefits in the beginning and concealed its inability to evaluate at 
the end.  It was deployed as a partisan tool of government to defeat political critique.   
 
Most importantly, this thesis observes how ill-researched the basic thrust of competition 
policy is.  The goodness of competition is assumed and any wrongs committed in its 
name attributed to implementation of the policy.   
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Australia’s National Competition Policy was a unique program of reform of 
governmental presence and intervention in Australia’s national economy. It lasted from 
the early 1990s to the mid-2000s.  Even then it did not really finish: strands of it were 
maintained to date in the guise of the ‘National Compact on Regulatory and 
Competition Reform’1 Moreover, a comprehensive review of competition laws and 
policy was announced on 4 December 20132 explicitly referring to ‘changes resulting 
from the Hilmer Review’ –  in other words, the National Competition Policy.   
 
Under and in association with the National Competition Policy there was substantial 
law reform, and considerable governmental and bureaucratic activity. Billions of dollars 
were involved in the form of intergovernmental transfers, administrative expenditure 
and private investment. It was the subject of substantial public resistance and protest, 
both generally and in particular instances.  Moreover, at least one, and perhaps two, 
Governments lost office because of it3 and it is being taken as a model for competition 
policies in a number of other countries.4  
                                                 
1 Available at <http://www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/Signed%20Compact.pdf> (accessed 23 April 
2014). 
2 http://bfb.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/014-2013/ (accessed 23 April 2014) 
3 Robyn Hollander, ‘National Competition Policy, Regulatory reform and Australian Federalism’, (2006) 
65(2) Australian Journal of Public Administration 33, 38 & 44. 
4 See for example OECD, Competition Assessment Toolkit (English Veresion) (OECD, 2010) (available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3699,en_2649_40381664 _1_1_1_1_37463,00.html> (last accessed 27 Jult 
2014) 3-4; World Trade Organization Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition 
Policy, Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of Trade and Competition Policy to Development and 
Economic Growth, WTO Doc WT/WGTC/W/80, 18 September 1998 and World Trade Organization 
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, The Fundamental Principles of 
Competition Policy, WTO Doc WY/WGTCP/W/127, 7 June 1999, both of the latter, according to 
Morgan, being drafted by a group of six advocates of competition policy, two of which were Australians: 
Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition, (Ashgate, 2003), 11.  See also the 
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A ‘National Competition Policy’ 
 
What, then, was the ‘National Competition Policy’?  Conventionally it is taken to have 
been the program more or less effecting the recommendations of the Hilmer Report.5  
That report was submitted to all the heads of Australian Governments, including those 
of every State, Territory and the Commonwealth, on 25 August 1993.  
 
The program of reform recommended by the Hilmer Report had six elements.  They 
were: 
1. To slightly modify and broaden the application of existing generally applicable 
competition conduct rules.6  
2. To reform regulatory restrictions on competition; the report outlined the 
applicable principles and processes. 
3. To reform the industrial structure of existing public monopolies. 
4. To impose conditions of competitive neutrality between governments and 
private businesses. 
5. To provide a general access regime. 
6. To more narrowly focus the existing prices oversight mechanism. 
The report identified a number of implementation issues, including the necessity for 
new government institutions, the resolution of constitutional impediments to reform, 
transitional arrangements, and resource requirements.7   
 
The whole was formulated with the federal nature of the Australian polity in mind.  As 
the Report stated: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
more direct proselytization of Gary Banks (Chairman of the Productivity Commission), Structural 
Reform Australian-Style: Lessons for Others?, Presentation to the IMF, World Bank and OECD, 1995. 
5 National Competition Policy Review Independent Committee of Enquiry (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), 
National Competition Policy, AGPS, 1993 
6 Found in Part IV of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth)). 
7 Hilmer Report, above n 5, xxi. 
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… full implementation of this report will require a level of cooperation 
between the Commonwealth, States and Territories which has only rarely 
been achieved in the past. The Committee, and most of the groups with 
which it consulted during this Inquiry, would encourage governments to 
see these recommendations in a positive light and reach early agreement 
on their implementation. Failure to do so will forgo urgently needed 
benefits for the Australian economy and community.8 
 
Despite appearances, the National Competition Policy was not simply the result of the 
genius of the Hilmer Committee.  Even then competition policy had a history.  Going 
backwards in time, the Hilmer Committee, properly the National Competition Policy 
Review Independent Committee of Enquiry, was established by the then Prime 
Minister, Mr Paul Keating, by specific and quite determinate terms of reference dated 
October 1992 and setting out what it was supposed to conclude.9  This was subsequent 
to considerable discussion at an intergovernmental level in the Australian federation and 
was pursuant to a communiqué issued after the 1991 Premiers and Chief Ministers 
Meeting.10  And even that was after these matters had been a subject of much discussion 
at a variety of levels throughout the preceding decade.  In particular, the Australian 
economy had come to be seen as a single integrated national market, rather than local or 
State-based, and many sectors of the economy were seen as sheltered from international 
and, indeed, domestic competition.  That is to say nothing of the long gestation of the 
intellectual framework underpinning the understandings of government, society and 
economy upon which the policy was built.   
 
The intellectual framework underpinning the recommendations of the Hilmer 
Committee represented a global movement in the way the relation between government 
and business was configured, away from state-centred governance.  There are many 
words and phrases depicting this, including ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘economic rationalism’ or 
‘economic liberalism’ – even ‘economic fundamentalism’, ‘micro-economic reform’, 
                                                 
8 Ibid xxxix. 
9 Ibid 361-3. 
10 Premiers and Chief Ministers Meeting of 21-2 November 1991, Communique.  Interestingly, this 
meeting was not attended by the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, as his position was under an ultimately 
successful challenge by Paul Keating, 
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and the time and location specific ‘Thatcherism’ or ‘Reagonomics’.  Mostly it has been 
said to have involved corporatisation and privatisation, contracting out, strengthened 
competition laws and non-specific ‘regulatory reform’.  In turn, these depend on a 
resurgent interest in the economic analysis of state actions, corporations law and 
governance, and a substantial strengthening in the sophistication of analysis of the ways 
markets worked.  In particular, there was considerable acceptance of the view that 
Australia was losing its position in global rankings of wealth and that this could be 
addressed by improving local competitiveness.11 
 
Various governments within Australia had ready implemented many aspects of 
competition policy, most stringently by the Kennett Government in Victoria.  As the 
Hilmer report noted,12 some utilities had already been restructured to minimize 
monopoly, various statutory marketing arrangements reformed, and competition in the 
provision of professional services and occupations enhanced.  Since 1974, Part IV of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) had provided a substantively comprehensive 
competition law, regulating the conduct of competition, although its coverage was 
limited in a variety of ways.  It itself was the last, albeit the only effective one, of a 
series of attempts at such regulation.13  Despite this quite expansive list of pro-
competitive reforms, these activities were seen by the Hilmer committee as having been 
patchy and inconsistent. 
 
                                                 
11 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Free Press, 1990) was highly influential 
although little cited in much of the discussion surrounding the National Competition Policy.  In this 
Porter argued that a nation’s prosperity depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade. 
He identified four attributes of national advantage in achieving prosperity: the availability of skilled 
labour and infrastructure, an appropriate demand, related or supporting industries, and, relevantly, firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry.  The role of government is argued to be to create the environment in which 
companies can gain competitive advantage. This is mostly taken to imply that competition at home leads 
to competitiveness abroad, although to say so is to stretch Porter’s argument. 
12 Hilmer Report, above n 5, xvi-xviii, 8-13. 
13 In order: Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906; Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1965; Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1971.  In the States a variety of attempts were enacted: NSW Monopolies Act 1923 
(NSW); Profiteering Prevention Act 1948 (Qld); Unfair Trading & Profit Control Act 1956 (WA) – 
replaced by the Trade Associations Registration Act 1959;and Collusive Practices Act 1965 (Vic). 
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Moreover, in the early 1990s there was a renewed interest in treating Australia as a 
single market and in fixing perceived difficulties with the federal system under the 
Australian Constitution.  In particular, the financing model, where tax revenue is raised 
mostly by the federal or Commonwealth government but spent by the States and 
Territories, distorted the ability of governments to undertake national projects.  
Mechanisms to coordinate government arrangements were under development, resulting 
in the establishment of the Council of Australian Governments.   
 
Accordingly and fairly promptly after the publication of the Hilmer Report, the Council 
of Australian Governments set about working at implementing its recommendations.  
By February 1994, after substantial negotiation, the various governments had agreed to 
the principles upon which it was to be implemented, and on 11 April 1995 they agreed 
to a program for implementation.  Three agreements setting out the whole program were 
signed on behalf of the respective Governments on the latter date, 11 April 1995.14 
 
The three agreements are: 
 The Competition Principles Agreement, which set out the principles under which 
the six elements of competition policy are to be undertaken.  They were 
                                                 
14 ‘Competition Principles Agreement’ (hereafter ‘Competition Principles Agreement’), ‘Conduct Code 
Agreement’ (hereafter ‘Conduct Code Agreement’, and ‘Agreement to Implement the National 
Competition Policy and Related Reforms’(hereafter ‘Implementation Agreement’) in National 
Competition Council, Compendium of National Competition Policy Agreements, 1997. This collection  
could, until 2012, be found reproduced at <http://www.dtf.wa.gov.au/cms/uploadedFiles/ 
Compendium_NCP_Agreements.pdf>  or (sans title page) at <http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/ 
pdf_file/0007/ 18277/ncpagreement.pdf> but has now disappeared. The Implementation Agreement may 
be found reproduced on the Council of Australian Governments website at 
<http://archive.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/1995-04-11/docs/attachment_a. cfm> (last accessed 
18 July 2014), but not the others.  There are a number of sources for the post 2007 version of the 
agreements: see especially <http://ncp.ncc.gov.au /pages/about#agreements>. All three competition 
policy agreements were tabled in Parliament on 30 June 1995 by Mr George Gear on the return from the 
Senate of the Competition Policy Reform Bill 1995: Commonwealth House of Representatives, 
Parliamentary Debates, 30 June 1995, 2793, and by Senator Cook on 8 June 1995:  Commonwealth 
Senate, Parliamentary Debates, 8 June 1995, 1065, but they do not appear in the Parliamentary Papers 
series.  Accordingly, there appears to be no ‘official’ version on the public record.  In any event, a copy of 
the original (found in a box in the Western Australian Parliamentary library – thank you Dennis Warren 
of the La Trobe Library) is appended to this thesis.   
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 Prices oversight of government-owned business enterprises 
 Competitive neutrality of government-owned business enterprises 
 Structural reform of public monopolies 
 Legislative Reviews 
 An access regime for essential facilities. 
 The Conduct Code Agreement: this is rather technical, setting out a Competition 
Conduct Code in much the same terms of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth.), but which would be applied by way of application legislation to all 
persons not subject to that Act by reason of the division of powers set out in the 
Australian Constitution.  It also set out rather complex arrangements for 
consultation on and the process of amendment of the Conduct Code. Further, it 
provided for consultation for appointments to the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, the administrative body responsible for the Trade 
Practices Act.  
 The Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related 
Reforms (hereafter the ‘Implementation Agreement’).  This set out what the 
various State Governments agreed to do and what they would get from the 
Commonwealth for doing so.  They agreed to: 
 Conduct legislative reviews according to a schedule set out in various 
intergovernmental agreements. 
 Participate in the establishment of a competitive national markets in 
electricity, gas and water 
 Reform road transport 
They were to get, divided between them on a population basis and in 1994 
prices, the substantial incentive of 12 billion (Australian) dollars over nine years.  
Payment was conditional on performance: the arbiter was to be a body called the 
National Competition Council. 
 
For reasons to be explained in Chapter 2, the making of these agreements is a 
convenient marker for the beginning of the National Competition Policy.  They were 
amended in 1997 and again in 2000, although the changes are all but imperceptible to 
the casual observer.  Around 2000 there was substantial upheaval in the implementation 
of the Agreements, as political pressure protecting rural, regional and remote interests 
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forced the hobbling of the National Competition Council and a more rigorous definition 
of the important public interest test.   
 
Ten years later, at the end of 2005, the following was said by the National Competition 
Council15 to have been the product of the policy: 
 A competition law applying to all persons, including government businesses, 
within all jurisdictions in Australia; 
 Price oversight mechanisms for all Australian government businesses; 
 Competitive neutrality principles applied to varying extents in all states and 
territories; 
 A fairly general removal of regulatory functions from government business 
enterprise; 
 Reasonably extensive restructuring of public monopolies by separating out 
monopoly elements from government businesses, and privatising and 
introducing competition where possible; 
 About 85% of all government legislation (Commonwealth, State and Territory) 
reviewed with restrictions on competition not justifiable in the public interest 
removed. 
 A third party access regime to essential infrastructure established; and 
 Structural reform to enhance and promote competition in the electricity, gas, 
road transport, and water industries implemented. 
Moreover, between 1997 and 2006 the Commonwealth had transferred some $5.7 
billion to the States and Territories pursuant to the Implementation Agreement under 
which the States and territories undertook to implement the National Competition 
Policy.16 An extensive bureaucracy, including a completely new government body, the 
National Competition Council, had been created, with other personnel and institutions at 
almost every level of every government.  A variety of powers had been conferred on a 
number of bodies, including substantial new powers to the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission.   
 
                                                 
15 National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National 
Competition Policy and related reforms, 2005, pp ix-xvii. 
16 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, 29 
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Less positively, two governments had lost power in elections in which competition 
policy had been a major electoral issue and a new political party, One Nation, had risen 
on a platform of reversing the National Competition Policy.  As mentioned above, the 
exercise of its powers by the National Competition Council had caused considerable 
controversy resulting in it being reined in by the then Government.  Hundreds of 
speeches were given in Parliament and some millions of words appeared in the media. 
 
The National Competition Policy thus wrought substantial change on Australian society 
and also the economy, if one wants to separate the two.  It changed the law, the way 
government was done, and even what government was supposed to do.  It changed the 
social geography of Australia; for example, restructuring in the Latrobe valley driven by 
the National Competition Policy led to the loss of 18,000 jobs in a community of 70,000 
people.17  The Productivity Commission claims that it improved the economy by some 
2.5%, down from the 5.7% the Industries Assistance Commission, its immediate 
predecessor, projected in 1994, but still something it thought substantial.   
 
Literature Review 
 
In view of the dramatic changes outlined above, it is surprising that there is no overall 
assessment of the National Competition Policy from outside government, although its 
implementation was, of course, assessed by government itself.18  The literature review 
                                                 
17 Evidence of Mr A Stephens, Latrobe Shire Council, to the Senate Select Committee on the Socio-
Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy, Committee Hansard, 16 July 1999, 519-
523; quoted in Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, 
Commonwealth Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000, 77-82. 
18 For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, consideration of Government material, of which there is a vast 
amount, is deferred until the relevant point in the story this thesis tells.  To foreshadow the argument: 
Government material is considered to be a matter of implementation and not of external assessment. The 
main government texts considered later providing an independent assessment are: Standing Committee on 
Family and Community Affairs, Commonwealth House of Representatives, What Price Competition? 
1998, which was one of the most critical of government reports into the implementation of competition 
policy albeit substantially limited to contracting out; and Socio-Economic Consequences of the National 
Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000 and its 
interim report Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, 
Commonwealth Senate, Competition Policy: Friend or Foe.  Economic Surplus, Social Deficit?, Interim 
Report, 1999.  Other assessments, less independent but also considered later are: Industry Commission, 
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following considers the available non-government material.  It demonstrates that there 
are ellipses, elisions and aporias, as well as theory contingency in the literature on the 
National Competition Policy.  This finding is crucial to the legitimacy of the theoretical 
approach adopted in this thesis.  That approach is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Because there is no reference to ‘competition policy’ in the sense used here in 
Australian19 literature before the Hilmer Committee Report, the focus here is on post-
Hilmer works.  In that sense, contrary to what is said at the beginning of the section 
immediately prior to this one, the Report does create the National Competition Policy 
because it names a category of proposed government actions.  On this basis we can 
forgive many commentators. Yet a name and a category do not construct a policy and in 
what follows the Hilmer Committee Report and the National Competition Policy itself 
are kept separate. 
 
No law text does more than either briefly describe the National Competition Policy20 or 
annotate the law effecting it.21  While there is considerable material in more general 
                                                                                                                                               
The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms. A Report by the Industry 
commission to the Council of Australian Governments (Industry Commission Research Report) 1995; 
Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Report on the Consideration of the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill 1995, 1995; Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration, 
Commonwealth House of Representatives, Cultivating Competition. Report of the Inquiry into Aspects of 
the National Competition Policy Reform Package, 1997; Standing Committee on Financial Institutions 
and Public Administration, Commonwealth House of Representatives, Review of the National 
Competition Council Annual Report 1996-7, 1998; Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Resources, Commonwealth House of Representatives, The Effect of certain Public Policy Changes on 
Australia’s R & D, 1999; various National Competition Commission Annual Reports and progress 
Assessments; Productivity Commission reports, including Productivity Commission, Impact of 
Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Report No 8, 1999 and Productivity 
Commission Review of National Competition Policy Reform, Report No 33, 2005. 
19 There is some prior reference to ‘competition policy’ in relation to European jurisdictions, however it is 
there confined to discussion of competition law.  International institutions are vague in the delineation of 
terminology:  while competition law is regularly defined in terms of restrictive trade practices, there is 
very little consensus as to what in the range of policies and rules affecting competition and contestability, 
including trade and regulatory policies, are or would be included in such a concept.   
20 For example, the most thorough textbook, S G Corones, Competition Law in Australia (Lawbook Co., 
5th ed, 2010) (also 4th ed, 2004), has a bare seven pages. 
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sociology in which competition policy is a part of the periodised transition from welfare 
state to neo-liberalism, most of those texts are not directly concerned with competition 
policy as such, let alone the specifics of Australia’s National Competition Policy.22  In 
that little explicitly concerned with it, the argument is that the National Competition 
Policy is a means by which neo-liberalism – unquestioned as a Bad Thing – is imposed 
on Australian society.  This, it is there argued, restructures social relations on 
individualistic grounds, denies the proper role of the state, and destroys the intrinsic 
self-worth and dignity of the individual.23  Further, dominant groups deploy neo-
liberalism to secure power and, in particular, the control of wealth.24  Unfortunately the 
texts mounting the argument and its variants are short on the detailed analysis necessary 
to convince.  Not only are the details wrong or misleading, but the way in which the 
processes do those very Bad Things is not worked through.  And, finally, the argument 
on the other side is not considered well at all: efficiency is seen only as a theoretical 
construct and the political arguments are ignored or, at least, considered 
unexceptionable. 
 
Oddly enough for a program inspired by economics, there is very little critical 
assessment of its economic benefits.25  As King put it in 2003: 
                                                                                                                                               
21 See in particular, Russel V Miller, Annotated Competition Policy Law and Practice (LBC, 2000). An 
‘annotation’ generally sets out the statute and provides material such as a general description, legislative 
history, interpreting or applying cases on most chapters, parts and sections.  It is quite an ancient form of 
legal writing – the Institutes of Justinian are in this form, and much more prevalent in Civil Law 
jurisdictions.  It carries very little evaluation. 
22 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism.  How it Work, Ideas for Making it Work Better (Edward 
Elgar, 2008) 1-16, provides a different periodisation and shunts neo-liberalism (and hence competition 
policy) into a program rather than a description of what is.  Here a program is taken to be as much a part 
of reality as the static description of institutions.  Comp. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics.  
Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-9 (Michel Senellart ed; Graham Burchell tr) (Palgrave, 2008) but 
Foucault talks of reality as programmes. 
23 Bruce Valentine, ‘National Competition Policy: Legitimating Economic Rationalism’ (1999) 52 
Australian Social Work 25, 30. 
24 John McDonald, ‘Legitimating private interests: Hegemonic control over “the public interest” in 
National Competition Policy’ (2007) 43 Journal of Sociology 349, 363.  
25 Of course, there is a set of hagiographic studies, such as Rex Deighton-Smith, ‘National Competition 
Policy: Key Lessons for Policy-making from its Implementation’ (2001) 60 Australian Journal of Public 
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The debate over the gains from the Hilmer reforms reflects a lack of 
input from economic research into parts of the reform process, and the 
need for further research into how competition policy interacts with the 
wider economy.26 
 
Little of that further research has been published.  Even in government circles, it was 
entirely left to the Productivity Commission.   King himself argues that the National 
Competition Policy is not just about competition; rather, it is ‘simply the latest wave in 
an on-going process of interaction between government and markets’.  It was ‘partially 
successful’, mainly due to ‘a failure of the initiators of the reform process to consider 
the underlying economics or to have a naïve and simplistic view of the economics’.27   
 
Another exception is the work of John Quiggin.  In a series of articles in the press, in 
academic circles and by way of submission to various inquiries, Quiggin mounted 
strong opposition to the National Competition Policy. His arguments boil down to three: 
that the benefits of microeconomic reform and hence the National Competition Policy 
were overestimated,28 free market policies are a danger to social democratic values,29 
and the National Competition Policy consisted of a number of ill-considered policy 
positions which could reduce social welfare.30  Amongst the last is the argument that 
competition payments are a threat to democracy and also, amalgamating and perhaps 
                                                                                                                                               
Administration 29. Just as similar government reports are inconsequential for this thesis, so also are these 
studies. 
26 Stephen P King, ‘Competition Policy and Regulation’, in Ian McAllister, Steve Dowrick and Riaz 
Hassan, The Cambridge Handbook of Social Sciences in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
31, 40.  See also …  ‘The Economics of National Competition Policy’, in Christopher Arup and David 
Wishart, Competition Policy with Legal Form (Federation, 2002) 6. 
27 Ibid 29. 
28 John Quiggin, ‘Estimating the benefits of Hilmer and related reform’ (1997) 30 Australian Economic 
Review 256. 
29 John Quiggin, ‘Social democracy and market reform in Australia and New Zealand’, (1998) 14 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 76. 
30 John Quiggin, Submission to Productivity Commission, Inquiry into the Socio-economic consequences 
of National Competition Policy, 1998. 
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reading in too much, that what is business and what is government function needs to be 
further distinguished.31  These, amongst many other arguments, are all taken up at 
various points in this thesis.  Moreover, in Chapter 7 the furious reaction of the National 
Competition Council to Quiggin’s arguments is noted as its own position came under 
threat and as proselytization of competition policy became the chief defence against 
critique.   
 
Various other economists critiqued aspects of competition policy as formulated by the 
Hilmer Committee. These included Ted Kolsen, who argued that higher levels of 
competition may not necessarily lead to greater efficiency even within existing 
economic theory.  He pointed to the theory of second best, externalities and tax and 
subsidy policies as necessary elements in the calculus of whether competition will 
enhance efficiency.32 Gavan Butler examined the ‘downside’ of opening up public 
enterprises to contestation, including the problem of natural monopoly, the 
disproportionate effect of these processes on labour and the definition of community 
service obligations.33 
 
Policy-making in Australia has long been studied and there is a rich literature 
surrounding it.  ‘Competition policy’ can be found within this literature, but once again 
its details are not explored.  It is generally located as a specific instance of ‘economic 
rationalism’ or ‘neo-liberalism’, which in turn is a description of a particular 
transformation of Australia’s political economy.  Economic analysis is treated as sets of 
policy recommendations. There is little interest in the specifics of what is done.  
Occasionally general concepts or ideas are thrown up for consideration.  In one such 
article, Geoff Edwards reflects on the meaning of competition itself and provides the 
sketch of a genealogy of the term.34   With that he mounts a strong critique of the 
                                                 
31 Ibid 2. 
32 Ted Kolsen, ‘Microeconomic Reform and National Competition Policy: Misconceptions and 
Problems’, (1996) 55 Australian Journal of Public Administration 83, 84-5. 
33 Gavan Butler, ‘National Competition Policy, The Downside’ (1996) 55 Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 104. 
34 Geoff Edwards, ‘Competition: Useful Means or Invariable End’, (2001) 100 Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration 32.  As to a genealogy of the terms see also Kenneth Dennis, Competition in the 
History of Economic Thought (PhD Thesis, Oxford University, 1975). 
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National Competition Policy: that it has ‘elbowed out’ other ways of doing things to the 
detriment of policy generally. 
 
Kain, in a Parliamentary Library Research Paper,35 sought to discuss some of the 
‘underlying assumptions and recommendations’ of the Hilmer Report.  His discussion, 
albeit published prior to even the finalisation of the Agreements, followed a sequence 
which is replicated in almost every later comprehensive assessment within Government 
circles.36  Setting it out explicitly: 
1. There are divergent views on competition policy.  Some say monopolists should 
be controlled, other say this is radical right wing economics. 
2. Competition is a Good Thing37 and therefore we need not debate it. 
3. Disagreement with competition policy’s foundations in economics is mere 
philosophical quibbling and need not be pursued. 
4. The sole questions for consideration then lie in the policy’s means and effects.   
Such a logic is ridden with inconsistency and unsupported assertion.  If 1, why 2?  
Surely we would need some evidence of general support for competition?38  That the 
‘foundations in economics’ are laissez-faire economics may be so, but exactly how, and 
surely, if it is so, it is not mere ‘philosophical debate’ to question them and to ask for a 
fully articulated rationale as to why a policy should be founded in them?  It may not be 
drawing too long a bow to see here a thinly veiled reference to ‘workable competition’ 
from competition law, which was and is universally deployed to overcome to 
difficulties with meeting the requirements of micro-economics for markets to be 
                                                 
35 John Kain, National Competition Policy: Overview and Assessment, Research Paper No 1, 
Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Canberra, 1994. 
36 Ibid 31-4. 
37 Sellar and Yeatman deploy the taxonomy of Good Thing and Bad Thing in their spoof of British 
history: W C Sellar and R J Yeatman 1066 and All That (Methuen, 1970) (first published 1932). The 
irony they deploy is that the distinction between Good and Bad is assumed, there is no moral framework 
to justify it. 
38 That competition is a Good Thing in the Sellar and Yeatman sense (ibid) echoes a passage in the 
Hilmer Report at p 206 referring to ‘the new consensus over the proper role of competition ...’  However, 
it is probable that this ‘new consensus’ in the Hilmer Report is between Australian governments, rather 
than more generally, because it is in relation to competition being the default position in legislative 
reviews and the degree to which the State governments would resile from that principle. 
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‘pure’.39  The call is, therefore, ‘Let’s be practical here!’  That may be an appropriate 
response, but only if whether it is so is worked through.  After all, the means of 
implementation may be derived from the theory behind the policy, and the effects may 
be viewed through the lens of the purposes as defined by the theory.  In other words, 
that competition is a Good Thing is considered by the logic to be a truism when that is 
the nub of an acknowledged debate either in general or in particular circumstances.  
This argument signals a major theme in this thesis: That competition is a Good Thing 
has not been substantially challenged and that the lack of such a debate represents a 
major flaw in Australia’s democratic processes. 
 
The Kain paper moved onto to consider with some broader issues, most of which did 
indeed become substantially problematic during the currency of the National 
Competition Policy.  These included the issue for democracy in Executives binding 
future Parliaments, the place of efficiency in assessment of public benefit, and the status 
of competition as metaregulatory.   
 
Moving away from the focus on competition policy as such, the strands of analysis of 
how policy, including the National Competition Policy, has been or is formulated 
provide a context for the study of implementation of specific individual or institutional 
action.  One such action is the formation of Council of Australian Governments within 
the context of federalism and in this the study of the National Competition Policy forms 
a critical part.40  The National Competition Policy is seen as one of the chief, even 
formative, activities of Council of Australian Governments.  Yet, again, the National 
Competition Policy is seen as little more than its legislation reviews, although this time 
because the State and Territory governments were bound to the Agreements by the 
                                                 
39 Originating in J M Clark, ‘Towards a Concept of Workable Competition’ (1940) 39 The American 
Economic Review 241.   
40 See Martin Painter, ‘The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case 
of Cooperative Federalism’ (1996) 26(2) Publius 101; Gareth Griffith, Managerial Federalism – COAG 
and the States, Briefing Paper No 10/09, Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of New South Wales, Sydney 2009; Geoff Anderson, ‘The Council of Australian 
Governments: A New Institution of Governance for Australia’s Conditional Federalism’, (2008) 31 
University of New South Wales law Journal 493; Robyn Hollander, ‘National Competition Policy, 
Regulatory Reform and Australian Federalism’, (2006) 65 Australian Journal of Public Administration 
33. 
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conditional nature of substantial competition payments under the Implementation 
Agreement.  This is seen to impact on the way the Australian federation works. 
 
In contrast to the paucity of research into the National Competition Policy as policy, as 
a thing in itself, there is a huge mass of material on specific features and 
implementations of competition policy.  Corporatisations and privatisations,41 the 
reform of utilities,42 legislative reviews, industry specific reform and regulation,43 
contracting out,44 access regimes, competition law, administrative procedures, the 
constitutional context, and the nature of the government institutions all have substantial 
literatures.  Debates and argument swirl.  Many of these mention the National 
Competition Policy, but few explore it.  They limit themselves to the particular and 
frequently are theory-contingent. 
 
One exception to this is Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of 
Competition.45  It is an extensive, if narrowly focussed, review: from a regulatory 
perspective it considers competition policy to be ‘meta-regulatory’ – regulation of the 
form of regulation.  For that reason the other elements of and the rationale for 
                                                 
41 For example, Moazzem Hossain and Justin Matheson (eds) Who Benefits from Privatisation? 
(Routledge, 1998); Berna Collier and Sally Pitkin, Corporatisation and Privatisation in Australia (CCH, 
2001); Wendy James, ‘The impact of corporatisation and national competition policy’, (2005) 26 
Leadership and Organisation Development Journal 26; John Farrar, ‘Corporatisation, Corporate 
Governance and the Deregulation of the Public Sector Economy’, (1995) Public Law Review 24;  Janet 
McLean ‘Contracting in the Corporatised and Privatised Environment’, (1996) 7 Public Law Review 223; 
John Qiggin, ‘Privatisation’ in Ian McAllister, Steve Dowrick and Riaz Hassan, The Cambridge 
Handbook of Social Sciences in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 17. 
42 For example, Stephen Rix, ‘National Competition Policy: Parliamentary Democracy, Public Policy and 
Utilities’, (1999) 7 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 170.  
43 For example, as to electricity, Lynee Chester, ‘The Conundrums Facing Australia’s National Electricity 
Market’, (2006) 25 Economic Papers 362; Ann Wardrop, ‘Competition, Regulation and the California 
Electricity Market’, in Christopher Arup and David Wishart (eds), Competition Policy with Legal Form 
(Federation, 2002) 141.  
44 For example, Rachel Bacon, ‘Rewriting the Social Contract? The SSAT, the AAT and the Contracting 
Out of Employment Services’, [2002] Federal Law Review 2; Terry Carney, Gaby Ramia and Anna 
Yeatman (eds), Contractualism and Citizenship (Federation, 2001). 
45 (Ashgate, 2003). 
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competition policy are invisible in Morgan’s analysis, other than as they become 
significant in the constitution of the subject of regulation.  Morgan’s account is 
therefore a description of one of the processes of legality construction and useful as 
such, yet abjuring, like much sociological literature, steps towards evaluation.46  In 
more recent efforts in regulation studies, steps are indeed taken towards evaluation, yet 
they are tentative, for the point of regulation theory is ‘How?’ not ‘What?’47  This 
literature will be referred to extensively in the chapters that follow. 
 
Another exception to the conclusion that there is little written on the National 
Competition Policy as such, is that there were, during the curse of its implementation 
innumerable48 speeches in Parliament and newspaper articles on the topic.  However, 
due to their nature they are best treated as a measure of impact rather than as analysis: 
they tend to be reaction to specific events or proposals, rather than attempts at overall 
critique or even analysis.  Indeed, the rise of the One Nation political party was 
cotemporaneous with the National Competition Policy and accordingly much of the 
coverage viewed the events of the day through the lens of its nationalist and rural-
centred politics.  There is little substantial assessment amongst this reportage of 
rhetoric.   
 
                                                 
46 This is the governmentalist’s retreat: see below n 60. 
47 Starting in 1990, efforts have been made to bring some sort of ethical evaluation into regulation studies.  
Thus John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit brought a republican notion of liberty or freedom into Criminal 
Justice studies in Not Just Deserts.  A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Clarendon Press, 1990) ch 
5.  Later, in John Braithwaite Regulatory Capitalism.  How it Works, Ideas for Making it Better (Edward 
Elgar, 2008) ch 8, a more encompassing effort at evaluating, not regulatory theory, but what such a theory 
describes as ‘regulatory capitalism’ is made.  The conclusion is that the ‘vibrant capitalism fostered by 
more enabling metagovernance of competition’ does not of itself lead to a better world because ‘[m]arkets 
do not make moral judgements’.  But understanding of regulatory capitalism does enable deliberative 
democracy to do its work.  Again, this represents somewhat of a retreat. Moreover the argument of this 
thesis is that competition in itself might have morally unsustainable characteristics but that these 
remained and remain ill-considered.  
48 An attempt at numeration is made at the outset of Chapter 7. 
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A Thesis Question 
 
The general conclusion of the literature review is that independent and rigorous study of 
the National Competition Policy is lacking.  This, then, is the preliminary contention of 
this thesis: that the National Competition Policy, as both significant in Australia and as 
a model for policies elsewhere, should be made known, analysed and assessed.  Further, 
it argues that thinking about the National Competition Policy, or even Australia’s 
competition policy, has either been left to its proponents or has become lost in the detail 
of all the particular instances.  The result is that there has been no evaluative thinking of 
it as a reasonably unified policy approach. The consequence is irresponsible and 
unaccountable social change.  The lack of analysis, or even of a rational framework for 
thinking, has led to social frustration and anger, mostly manifesting itself in violent 
protest.  We need in this regard only think of Billy Elliot in musical49 or film50 version, 
the novel Three Dollars,51 or protests against the G20 or other meetings at which such 
matters are considered.   
 
How, then, is the National Competition Policy to be ‘made known, analysed and 
assessed’?  Indeed, are the contentions set out above – that the National Competition 
Policy is a thing in itself, that there has been no coherent evaluative framework, that 
there has been unaccountable and irresponsible social change – maintainable?  And 
what would the results of an assessment be?  This thesis pursues these questions by 
formulating and adopting a process nominated as ‘thick description with reflexivity’.  It 
is a comprehensive approach or rationality comprehending theory contingency.  It 
points to directions for future research and evaluation.   
 
The Approach 
 
Ever since Kant, and Hume before him, it is conventional that there can be no 
observation without a theory.  De Certeau talks of the inevitable abstraction of the 
                                                 
49 Billy Elliot the Musical (Music by Elton John, script and lyrics by Lee Hall) first produced 2005. 
50 Billy Elliot (directed by Stephen Daldry) 2000 
51 Elliot Perlman, Three Dollars, (Picador, 1998); filmed Three Dollars (directed by Robert Connolly) 
1998. 
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map.52  Indeed it is accepted that it is not honest to describe as if there were discourse-
independent facts.  However, as the literature review above illustrates, the result is that 
analyses either talk past one another or render things invisible leading to gaps and 
elisions.  Obvious matters simply escape critical attention.  Examples are: the 
constitutional role of intergovernmental agreements; the relation between the National 
Competition Policy as implemented policy and competition law, and the relation of 
either or both with economics; the ends of competition policy, other than simply as 
‘competition’ leading to ‘economic benefit’ and whether the means adopted were the 
appropriate ones; whether there were gaps between what was intended and what 
happened; even something as basic as whether a competitive society is an important 
social matter. Other matters are of course considered, but there is no collection of such 
considerations.  We do not see the whole for the particular.  This is the thorny problem 
of the theory-contingency of description.53   
 
Scientific structuralism, particularly in the form of Popper’s hypothesis refutation 
model, is designed to deal with theory contingency.54 One postulates a hypothesis and 
the task of science is to refute; there is no absolute knowledge only unverifiable 
conjecture. Yet there are far too many hypotheses about questions that are far too small 
to grasp what was happening in the National Competition Policy itself.  The problem 
here is the Kuhnian one of the state of chaos when no one paradigm can be thought to 
triumph.55  Yet Kuhn does not tell us how to think when there is no paradigm of 
thinking.56  The solution adopted in this thesis is rather old-fashioned: like Archimedes, 
to simply observe and shout ‘Eureka!’ when something happens. 
                                                 
52 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (University of California Press, 3rd ed, 2011) Part III 
‘Spacial Practices’. 
53 See Raymond A Morrow, Critical Theory and Methodology, (Sage Publications, 1994); Anthony 
O’Hear, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Clarendon, 1989). 
54 Karl Popper published his theories in many versions, directed at diverse ends. The book I am familiar 
with is Objective Knowledge (Clarendon, 1972). More often cited are The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
(Basic Books, 1959); Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 2nd ed, 1969). 
55 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1970).  
56 We could move to Lakatos’ ‘research programmes’ – Imre Lakatos, Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes (Cambridge University Press, 1978) – to simply work within a paradigm of 
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Yet to describe without theorizing still leaves the description open to the challenge of 
hidden theory contingency.  A constituting discourse is inevitable.  While not perceived 
as a crisis in most studies in law, regulation or policy, anthropology has met the matter 
head on.  The question, ‘How do you study cultures without just talking about one’s 
own culture?’ is similar to the question, ‘How do you talk about an economic policy and 
not just talk about what matters to one’s own discipline (especially if you are an 
economist)?’ or ‘How do you talk about law without adhering to the “inside” and 
“outside” dialectic?’57  
 
The approach adopted here, ‘thick description58 with reflexivity’59 is a rough and ready 
way out of the dilemma of theory contingency.60  ‘Thick’ in the context of a study of the 
                                                                                                                                               
knowing. Yet, working within this paradigm is to acknowledge the existence of other paradigms of 
knowing and the fact that each describes in its own way. Each paradigm leaves elements of society out in 
what it recognises.   That is the problem faced in respect of the National Competition Policy. 
57 Margaret Davies, asking the law question  (Law Book Company, 1994) 10-21 
58 Neil Andrews, ‘Information in late capitalism illustrated : the MBO of Elders IXL’, (1999) 6 Canberra 
Law Review, 77-166;other examples include S. Wheeler, ‘Capital fractionalized: the role of insolvency 
practitioners in asset distribution’, in Maureen Cain and Christine B. Harrington, Lawyers in a 
postmodern world, (Open University Press, 1994); see also S. Wheeler, ‘The Business Enterprise: A 
Socio-legal Introduction’, in S. Wheeler (ed), A Reader on The Law of the Business Enterprise, (Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 
59 Exemplified by Clifford Geertz, in his famous and engaging study of the Balinese Cockfight: ‘Deep 
Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’ in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays, 
Basic Books, New York, 1973, pp. 412-53. 
60 See also Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process. An Anthropological Approach (Routledge and Kegan Paul) 
ch 1, where the idea of the semi-autonomous social field is developed as the relevant heuristic device.   
There is a complex relationship between ‘thick description’ and ‘governmentality’, a strand of 
postmodern sociology and now arguably subsumed into risk.  (See especially Mitchell Dean, 
Governmentality : power and rule in modern society, (Sage, 1999); P Miller and N Rose, ‘Governing 
Economic Life’, (1990) 19 Economy and Society 1.  Its origins lie in M Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in G 
Burchell, C Gordon and P Miller (eds) The Foucault effect.  Studies in Governmentality, 
(Harverster/Wheatsheeaf, 1991), 87; Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Towards a 
Constitutive Theory of Law (Routledge, 1993).  As to risk, see Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and 
Government,  (Glass House, 2004).  While this thesis concludes that a governmental analysis is a useful 
direction for future research, and noting that the Literature Review above shows signs of a governmental 
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National Competition Policy means that distinctions between important and trivial must 
be made with extreme caution and therefore as much material as possible should be 
included; ‘reflexive’ implies a consciousness that, while those distinctions are 
inevitable, they are made out of pre-existing understandings which should be exposed.   
 
While the second stricture is quite feasible, the first, ‘thick’, is more problematic.  The 
sheer volume of material61 does not lend itself to a comprehensive account.  Of course 
this is one of the reasons why there has not been a comprehensive study before this one: 
some culling mechanism is necessary.  The problem is that culling mechanisms infringe 
the second stricture.  Disciplinary discourses, case study selection, tightly defined 
purposes and so forth have all been deployed by others to cull material yet all render 
invisible material which alternative discourses find vital.62  As mentioned before, 
                                                                                                                                               
approach, for the reasons set out below at this stage it is unnecessary to pursue it.  This footnote, in 
particular what follows in it, is purely for completeness and prophylaxis.  
An admission: the research for this thesis commenced under the influence of governmentality, especially 
as set out by Alan Hunt, above.  It would have been a broader version of Bronwen Morgan, Social 
Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003).  While the researcher inhabited the 
governmental world, it became apparent to him, somewhat belatedly, that pursuing governmentality as 
the express theoretical orientation for this work would be limiting.   In particular, just as Foucault needed 
to set out matters fully in his studies of the prison and of sex, so the whole structure of policy formation 
and implementation must be knowable before aspects of competition policy itself can be described in 
terms of governmentality.  Governmentality has gaps in coming to grips with actual policies.  Thus 
‘purpose’ and ‘effect’ are terms clearly present in analysis, policy documents and conventional discourse 
but absent from governmentality (comp. Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a 
Sociology of Law as Governance, (Pluto, 1994), 6-7).  More relevantly, evaluation is abjured when 
evaluation is the point.   
However, it is more than merely possible that the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis has adopted a 
metatheoretical stance more governmental than the above admits.  In particular it accepts the 
displacement of the individual, the fall of law as the central government action (Brendan Edgeworth, 
Law, Modernity, Postmodernity (Ashgate, 2003)), the fragmentation of the state and the focus on 
techniques of government as the central concern in understanding society.. 
61 The website <ncp.ncc.gov.au> is an example.  Some thousands of documents are available.  It contains 
most of the government-originated documents relating to the National Competition Policy.   
62 A subtle example is the way in which law texts write the law as at a date. In them the National 
Competition Policy is a fixed thing, change is just a matter of history.  Sequence and co-temporaneity are 
ignored.  Thus Russell V Miller above n 21. 
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another and less violent metaphor is that of the map: there can be no perfect map as it 
would be the thing itself.  (Then it would be a thing which itself would have to be 
mapped and so ad infinitum.)  All maps render things invisible in a variety of ways.  
The point of a map is to select what is important.63 
 
How, then, does this study select what is important?  It takes a number of approaches. 
First, it tightly defines the topic.  It is about evaluating a particular program of 
government action, explicitly nominated as a thing in itself, and confined in time. 
Indeed, the National Competition Policy was chosen for this study because it is discrete 
and limited, this enabling the study of a policy as such.  Second, the merely repetitive is 
ignored, except where the fact of repetition is important.  Third, it accepts the primacy 
of the text, not so much as a result of some abstruse Derridean stricture, but because 
there seems to be no point at this stage to going beyond what is already written.   
 
There is a consequent question as to whether the description presented here should 
delve into personal accounts of what happened. Surely, it might be argued, if the 
description is ‘thick’ they are necessary. However, there are a number of reasons why 
this is not the case.  First, sufficient such research has already been done.  Morgan, for 
example, pursued this approach extensively in her study of the processes of 
implementation.  Further, a great deal of material as to impact was gathered by 
Parliamentary enquiries.64 Second, apart even from the dangers of confabulation, 
individual purpose in or memory of the construction of a policy seems irrelevant when 
the subject of the examination, the policy, is the record of decisions in a set of texts. 
Finally, personal accounts are in this context more a matter of testing descriptive 
propositions derived from that material rather than creating alternative visions.  As the 
likelihood of substantial error is slight (the details are more susceptible), because this is 
an initial study and as there is much to do apart from correcting the trivial, the texts will 
take centre stage.   
 
A final, but in some ways dangerous, possible technique for managing the material is a 
distinction between primary and secondary material. It says that there is material which 
                                                 
63 De Certeau, above n 52. 
64 Especially Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, 
Commonwealth Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000.   
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is actually expressive of the policy and other material which describes, analyses and 
comments on the policy.  The first is important for the description and the latter for 
what follows.  In practice this would mean that the description would draw on the 
Hilmer Report and the subsequent Council of Australian Government Communiqués, 
intergovernmental agreements, legislation, and governmental action (including National 
Competition Council assessments and reports) and law reforms. Having a category of 
secondary literature enables a later informed focus on the certain texts as analysis 
without denying the importance of those not so much the subject of that analysis.   
 
The primary/secondary distinction is dangerous because it assumes a pre-existing 
analysis to determine what is constitutive and what is secondary, and it refuses the 
mutuality of texts, that secondary texts maintain and reinscribe meaning on what is done 
and therefore are no less primary that those that come before.  The trap represented by 
this assumption is carefully negotiated at critical points in the argument that follows; 
indeed, the trap is a product of the circumstance which impels this thesis and which the 
analytical methodology it adopts is designed to overcome.   The argument asserts that 
the difference is not one of categorization of documents, rather is one between 
perspectives of a particular document.  Every document is primary in the sense that it 
inscribes meaning and is therefore constitutive, and secondary in that it inscribes 
meaning on something, is about texts and actions that have gone before. 
 
In summary, the approach adopted in this thesis is to describe, in as much detail as 
feasible, what happened as a result of the adoption by government of a particular policy.  
It simply observes and then comments, reflecting on what others have said and what the 
description throws up that is contrary or new.  Of course it is an imperfect 
epistemology, but it is least bad.  Moreover, answers to existing questions are made 
possible, much that is different is found and many new hypotheses can now be 
imagined.  Much of this is done en passant in the description; the Conclusion in Chapter 
8 merely and, given the above, somewhat dangerously, summarises.  
 
Thesis Structure 
 
Bearing these issues in mind, the thick description of the National Competition Policy 
comprises the bulk of this thesis.  After pinning down the National Competition Policy 
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as a topic in Chapter 2, ‘The National Competition Policy 1995-2005’, there are five 
chapters setting out its story.  On the way, the answers to questions are identified, 
observations are made and hypotheses constructed.  The commentary of the 
Productivity Commission, the discursive inadequacies of the Australian polity, the 
characterisation of the National Competition Policy as a matter of federalism and so 
forth come to mind.  Chapter 8, ‘Conclusion’ simply summarises all this: it sets out the 
approach – a ‘thick study’, condenses the story of the National Competition Policy 
1995-2005, and outlines the answers and observation, concluding with a reflection on 
the significance of the thesis for our understanding of the National Competition Policy, 
for competition policy, for policy studies and for the epistemology of research. 
 
Chapter 2, ‘The National Competition Policy 1995-2005’, is about the policy itself.  It 
defines the field of study.65  It involves discussing what a ‘policy’ is both in general and 
in the particular, where it can be found and how it may be distinguished both from its 
‘context’ and from its ‘implementation’. For the purposes of the instant study, it is 
commonly asserted that the National Competition Policy was established by the Hilmer 
Committee and is set out in the Report of that committee.66  However, this is to 
misapprehend the processes of government involved.  If a ‘policy’ is a description of a 
course of action that has been proposed, adopted or carried out, even if the proposals of 
the Hilmer Committee were more or less adopted, they are not the policy itself.  What 
the government proposed was the policy and what it did was more or less the result of 
it. Given that ‘policy’ is a concept or descriptor, the referent is somewhat elusive; how 
to pin it down is thus a more precise description of the subject of Chapter 2.  There the 
Agreements themselves are taken to be a defining statement of the policy but not for any 
theoretical reason, rather out of convenience.  That it is mere discursive convenience is 
borne in mind for the balance of the thesis.  The Agreements are then explored as texts 
of the policy.    What the Agreements as the text of the policy implies for the idea of the 
policy as an object of study is considered: what is implementation in terms of the record 
of actions and how to legitimately select from its vast mass.   
 
                                                 
65 Or, in terms of Salk Moore, above n 60, the semi-autonomous social field. 
66 Comp. Valentine, above n 23, who finds the National Competition Policy in Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) Meeting 11 April 1995, Communique. 
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Chapter 3, ‘How the National Competition Policy Came to Be’, relates the policy’s 
social and political history, and its surrounding established constitutional, 
governmental, institutional and legal structures, although this latter is somewhat limited 
lest the thesis be seduced into a general sociological analysis of 1990s society.  Taking 
the policy to be the set of agreements signed in April 1995 is most useful here, as it 
enables a focus without necessarily structuring the discussion.   In doing so, it explores 
the policy’s stated rationale in economics. 
 
Chapters 4-7 set out what happened by way of implementing those agreements both in 
terms of the general assessments made by the National Competition Council, the 
Productivity Commission and various Parliamentary Committees, and in terms of case 
studies of specific implementations of the National Competition Policy.  For the latter, it 
draws on some existing case studies, provides a couple of previously unpublished 
others, and synthesizes accounts from situations where there has been a number of 
studies.   
 
The first chapter dealing with implementation, Chapter 4, ‘Institutional Context’, is 
concerned with context in the sense of developments in the institutional structure in 
which implementation took place over the period of the policy.  Chapter 5, 
‘Implementation: Sliced by Time’ takes the reader through 1995-2005, from the signing 
of the Agreements to the final Assessment by the National Competition Council, 
concentrating on generality and the flow of events.  The third chapter as to 
implementation, Chapter 6, ‘Implementation Diced: the Elements’, looks at each of the 
elements of the National Competition Policy as set out in the Agreements (reform of 
competition law, prices oversight of government businesses, access, competitive 
neutrality, legislation reviews and structural reform) and drills into specific action as 
much as time permits.  It is here the case studies can be found. 
 
The final chapter about implementation, Chapter 7, ‘Responses and Defences’, deals 
with reactions to what was done, and responses to those reactions.  It considers the 
various protests against and critical assessments of the National Competition Policy 
made during its course, and the defences to such criticism.  Notable amongst the 
defences were the ‘duck’, the ‘weave’ and ‘the falling man’ defences.  To some extent 
adjustments were made to the National Competition Policy and these are traced.   
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Naturally, the final chapter, Chapter 8, ‘The Conclusion’, sums all that up, drawing 
together identification of previously neglected aspects of the National Competition 
Policy, threads of critique, new ways of looking at it and techniques of evaluation.  It 
sets out in summary form a new and different story of the policy.   
 
This story set out in Chapter 8 challenges all the academic perspectives on the National 
Competition Policy to date. It presents the National Competition Policy as the product 
of ego and federal structure, and of rationalities in politics and the Public Service.  It 
views it as damaging to individuals, communities and society in many ways, some 
perceptible by econometric evidence but many not. Politics, it argues, was irremediably 
changed.  It may have increased the material wealth of some Australians but no 
convincing assessment of even that has or can be made.  
 
This thesis further argues that the National Competition Policy can be seen as a trope 
for policy generally.  Some of the matters identified in relation to the National 
Competition Policy are more generally applicable; for example, the constitutional 
stature of intergovernmental agreements, the legitimacy of the work of the Productivity 
Commission, or the identification of the techniques of evasion of critique and hence of 
responsibility.  Even more abstractly, this thesis represents an attempt at a 
reconceptualisation of how governmental policy may be thought and how the researcher 
should go about thinking it.  It develops the ‘reflexive thick study’ as a technique of 
research.  It finds that extant ways of analysing policy development fail to cater to this 
instance of it. 
 
The final, overriding argument of this thesis is that there has been a failure in the 
processes of responsible government which has allowed social engineering to proceed 
without restraint.  While this point has often been made in respect of the National 
Competition Policy, this thesis identifies exactly how this happened and argues for a 
way of thinking which may help prevent reoccurrence. 
 
 
  
26 
 
 
  
27 
 
Chapter 2 
‘The National Competition Policy 1995-2005’ 
 
 
Quotation marks surround the heading of this chapter to highlight an irony that might 
otherwise escape the reader.  The irony lies in the topic selected for this thesis: 
Australia’s National Competition Policy 1995-2005.  As established in Chapter 1, 
‘National Competition Policy’1 is constantly referred to as a known particular thing and 
is chosen as a topic for this thesis for that reason, with dates to confine it further. Yet, 
on closer examination, every element of the phrase is blurry, in part polemic, and the 
whole is only as definitive as it is constructed to be; the consequences of this ambiguity 
are the basis of perhaps the most important conclusion of the thesis, that there is no 
established way to think about it.   This chapter sets this argument out, and proceeds to 
define and describe the policy as best might be, thus quelling the irony. It also describes 
the changes that were made to the policy as so defined. Finally it deals with the 
implications of this choice: what would be considered as implementation of the 
Agreements and where evidence of those things is to be found. 
 
Dealing with Ambiguity: Constructing Certainty 
 
The overall task of this chapter is one of definition: just what is Australia’s National 
Competition Policy 1995-2005?  What do the words of the topic mean?  To what do 
they refer?  
 
‘Australia’s National’ refers to an Australia-wide applicability and its settlement by the 
Council of Australian Governments. ‘Australia’s National’ is therefore both a political 
and constitutional2 phrase, a statement that it is a policy of all governments, 
                                                 
1 ‘Australia’ was a late addition to the title.  It is only there to locate the jurisdiction to which the National 
Competition Policy applies.  
2 This thesis assumes the reader has a basic understanding of Australian constitutionalism and 
constitutional law.  For the record, the relevant core understandings are: that the Australian federation 
preserves the sovereignty of the States (but not of the Territories); that residual power inheres the States; 
that there is a federal/State fiscal imbalance whereby the Commonwealth taxes far more than it spends 
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differentially autochthonous as they may be, and hence contains a clear claim of 
legitimacy for all ‘Australians’.  It resonates with the polemic of being above politics. 
 
‘Competition’ is what is being aimed for, yet also inferentially is the theoretical basis 
for the action.3  ‘Competition’ is thus both a purpose and effect, inviting a problem of 
evaluation: what is the nature of competition such that it can be achieved and what is it 
that makes it a thing worth doing?  Moreover just what it is, how you get it and how 
much of it is desirable are highly debateable issues.  As such, it is not the policy itself 
and the policy here is not described as implementing competition.  Thus the policy is a 
statement of intention that certain things will be done and the word in the title merely 
asserts that those things may be about competition. That they are not or do not 
implement it well may be a matter of critique, although there are but few critics who 
make the argument.4   
 
‘Policy’ is the vaguest word of the lot.  A policy is not action, although its development 
and adoption is so, rather it is a commitment to action.  It concedes there may be 
countervailing alternative reasons for action but maintains that it is at least a reason for 
some actions and is involved in the rationalisations of others.  It presupposes reasons for 
                                                                                                                                               
and the States depend on the Commonwealth for much of their income; and that the Australian 
Constitution does not structure Australian society, rather it performs just three functions: sets up a new 
government, called the ‘Commonwealth’, divides governmental power between the Commonwealth and 
the States, and constructs Australia as a free trade zone. 
3 For a useful history of the concept, one referred to in the Hilmer Report (Committee of Inquiry into 
National Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, National Competition Policy, 
1993), see Kenneth Dennis, Competition in the History of Economic Thought (PhD Thesis, Oxford 
University, 1975). 
4 Those that do so are referred to in the literature review in Chapter 1: Stephen P King, ‘Competition 
Policy and Regulation’, in Ian McAllister, Steve Dowrick and Riaz Hassan, The Cambridge Handbook of 
Social Sciences in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 31, 40.  See also Stephen King, ‘The 
Economics of National Competition Policy’, in Christopher Arup and David Wishart, Competition Policy 
with Legal Form (Federation, 2002) 6; John Quiggin, ‘Estimating the benefits of Hilmer and related 
reform’ (1997) 30 Australian Economic Review 256; John Quiggin, Submission to Productivity 
Commission, Inquiry into the Socio-economic consequences of National Competition Policy, 1998; Ted 
Kolsen, ‘Microeconomic Reform and National Competition Policy: Misconceptions and Problems’, 
(1996) 55 Australian Journal of Public Administration, 83; Geoff Edwards, ‘Competition: Useful Means 
or Invariable End’, (2001) 100 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 32 
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itself and perhaps even the legitimacy of the manner by which it was adopted.  There is 
no agreement as to whether it refers to simply the substance of what is intended or also 
includes the processes and procedures.  For some it includes a rationale.  In the context 
of legislative drafting it is often taken to be the particular documents which convey the 
wishes of Cabinet and from which drafting instructions are drawn. 
 
‘1995-2005’ are beginning and end dates.  They are the dates agreed in Council of 
Australian Governments as the start and termination of certain agreements which are 
often said to be the embodiment of the National Competition Policy.  Yet few would 
say that 1995 is its beginning – most would count the Hilmer Report as such, even 
though governmental action was not commenced as the National Competition Policy 
until after the start date agreed to.  Moreover much counted in the National Competition 
Policy was done years earlier and it has been continued subsequent to its agreed end 
date. 
 
‘National Competition Policy’, then, has many dimensions and can be viewed narrowly 
or broadly in most of them.5  It has a history and context, and a postscript, which vary 
according to the perspective.  Moreover, while there is a relatively coherent set of 
actions considered by commentators to be within the category of those nominated as 
done pursuant to the National Competition Policy, the phrase is often deployed to point 
to particular aspects of its elements; for example, to the theory, to particular actions by 
governments – such as legislation reviews or privatisation, or to the agreements 
themselves. 
 
                                                 
5 Comp. Stephen Rix, ‘National Competition Policy: Parliamentary Democracy, Public Policy and 
Utilities’, (1999) 7 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 170, who notes that ‘National Competition 
Policy’ is something that is underpinned by a policy direction with a ‘hegemonic nature’ and refers to a 
‘brief and accurate’ description in a government report (Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and 
Public Administration, Commonwealth House of Representatives, Cultivating Competition. Report of the 
Inquiry into Aspects of the National Competition Policy Reform Package, 1997, 1) but doesn’t otherwise 
define it.  In a response to Rix, Simon Cohen, then a project manager for the National Competition 
Council, precisely located the National Competition Policy in the Agreements,as does this thesis: 
‘National Competition Policy: Parliamentary democracy, public policy and utilities – a response to 
Stephen Rix’, (2000) 7 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 281. 
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Yet the irony inherent to the argument of this thesis is that it takes the National 
Competition Policy as a thing in itself in order to evaluate and critique.  The means to 
this end in a context of vague and undisciplined terminological usage is to define 
exactly what is meant, to stick with this, and to tease out when alternative definitions 
are used and what their use implies.  In other words, to be conscious of the issue even to 
the point of preciousness.  With this approach nothing much except practicality hangs 
on exactly what is to be taken to be the meaning of the National Competition Policy, 
provided that it and its contiguous referents are precisely defined.  The result should be 
a relevant terminology that is as value free as possible.  Of course, if a different thing is 
chosen to describe, evaluate and critique, the results of the latter two processes might be 
different.  However, they would be visibly different and the divergence would be 
interesting in itself.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, then, the ‘National Competition Policy’ is taken to be 
that which the Governments of Australia agreed to undertake in on 11 April 1995 as set 
out in three intergovernmental agreements:6 the ‘Competition Principles Agreement’, 
the ‘Conduct Code Agreement’, and the ‘Agreement to Implement the National 
Competition Policy and Related Reforms’ (hereafter the ‘Implementation Agreement’).7 
(Collectively hereafter in this thesis they will be the ‘Agreements’.)  These agreements 
set out ideas and concepts, intentions, processes and procedures. They were amended in 
2000 and again in 2007 after the expiry of their original term of operation.  1995 is thus 
the commencing date and the agreements were expressed to run until 2000, whereupon 
they would be reviewed.8 They were extended and final assessments were conducted in 
2005.9  This study runs only to 2005 because the implementation processes changed 
after that date, including the cessation of the tranche payments to the States and the 
mandated assessments by the National Competition Council.   
                                                 
6 This is the approach taken by the whole High Court of Australia in Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia 
(2008) 234 CLR 418, 452.  This reference is provided here not to say that it is an authorised approach or 
somehow legally legitimate, for such legality is irrelevant to the argument, rather it is to provide the 
imprimatur of learned people: simply to say it is not such a stupid move after all. 
7See Chapter 1, n 12.. 
8 While no termination date is expressed, the final payment of competition payments under the 
Implementation Agreement was to be assessed in 2000 and paid in 2001-2. 
9 See Chapter 6. 
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The debates, arguments and protests surrounding the National Competition Policy are 
taken to be ‘context’, although dealt with separately in a dedicated chapter (Chapter 7, 
‘Responses and Defences’); governmental action for the same purposes beforehand, the 
development of and rationale for the policy, and the aftermath and the continuations are 
also all ‘context’ or ‘history’ and are dealt with in Chapter 3, ‘How the National 
Competition Policy came to Be’.  ‘Implementation’ is the governmental actions taken as 
a result of those agreements.  It is worth noting that this definition includes the agreed 
means of effecting agreements in the policy itself while other processes deployed are 
considered to be implementation. 
 
Many other writers appear to conceptualise the National Competition Policy as 
otherwise – perhaps it is encapsulated in the recommendations of the Hilmer 
Committee,10 or maybe it is some abstraction of a series of governmental activities 
under the rubric of ‘competition policy’, or even that set out in the Council of 
Australian Governments Communiques from time to time.  Nevertheless, here the 
contrasting approach is adopted: to anchor the discussion on particular text or texts.  
Doing so renders the policy particular, identifiable and comprehensible, and enables 
many discussions defined away or otherwise rendered invisible.  Competition theory no 
longer dominates; nor, on the other hand, does what was done and reactions to it.  Both 
theory and implementation are implied as matters involved in the particular instance of 
competition policy and each has its own place: what they are and their place are matters 
discussed in later chapters.   
 
In other words, this study takes seriously the title case of ‘Policy’: as a result of a 
fortuitous constitutional framework there is, in the form of the agreements setting out 
the National Competition Policy, the text of a statement of intent. It can be studied as a 
thing in itself.  This is the task of this chapter.  How it came to be, including precursors 
and the context of the policy, is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
10 See National Competition Policy Review Independent Committee of Enquiry (Fred Hilmer, Chairman) 
National Competition Policy 1993. 
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The Policy 
 
The three agreements were signed at a Council of Australian Governments meeting on 
11 April 1995.11 They will hereafter collectively be referred to as the ‘Agreements’.  
Naturally there had been much negotiation in the Council of Australian Governments 
before this; indeed one of the Bills intended to implement a National Competition 
Policy had been introduced into Commonwealth Parliament more than a year 
previously, although amendments were made after the 11 April meeting, and a draft 
package was released for public comment in September 1994.  However, as discussed 
above, the three agreements are here taken to be the National Competition Policy.12   
Discussion of what each entails follows, prior to which is a description of the nature and 
features of intergovernmental agreements as such. 
 
                                                 
11 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 11 April 1995, Communique, 
12 The Communiqué itself is a little confused as to the relative statuses of the Agreements, the ‘legislative 
package’ and the Communiqué itself.  It said, ‘The Council agreed to a national competition policy 
legislative package providing for uniform protection of consumer and business rights and increased 
competition in all jurisdictions’ which seems to imply the Communique itself represents the agreement, 
yet goes on to say ‘The Competition Policy Reform Bill was introduced into the Commonwealth 
Parliament on 29 March 1994. The two Inter-governmental Agreements which complete the package 
were tabled at the same time. Further amendments to the Bill were agreed by the Council and will be 
incorporated in the Bill following the Council meeting’ which seems to suggest that the Bill plus the 
Agreements represent the agreement. However, perusal of the Agreements reveals that they themselves 
set out all that the Communique represents as the agreed National Competition Policy package, although 
they tend to assume that the Bill is already law.  The approach taken here is that the Agreements provide a 
tidy solution to the problem of exactly what the National Competition Policy can be taken to be.  But 
there is no quibble about adding in matters like the mechanism for voting on amendments of the 
Competition Code.  Most importantly, such a solution fixes the National Competition Policy as 
statements and agreements, and distinguishes it from reasons, context and implementations, thereby 
ensuring that there is a language with relatively fixed referents.  Without plunging into the (stormy) 
waters of hermeneutics, the emphasis here is on relatively: better than others.  It is a matter of language: 
that if we deploy a very precise language formalised against a metatheoretical approach we can align 
disciplinary discourses and make them talk to one another.  
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Intergovernmental Agreements 
 
At the heart of Australia’s federal system lie intergovernmental agreements.  There is 
evidence of their existence from the first decades of the twentieth century13 and since 
then such agreements have proliferated.14  It is not surprising then that the National 
Competition Policy took the form of (or, if a different definition of the National 
Competition Policy is used, involved) intergovernmental agreements: its national 
operation at all levels of government was a key, even defining, feature 
 
There are many types of intergovernmental agreements, they take many forms and 
involve differing elements.  They differ in the governments that sign them:  they can be 
between two or more States and may include the Commonwealth.  Clearly treaties with 
other countries fall into the category but for obvious reasons are not further considered 
here.  Neither are putative agreements between any Australian government or 
governments and indigenous mobs, peoples or communities, although this part of this 
thesis draws upon research by its author in that area.15 Finally, also falling outside the 
                                                 
13 Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 100, identifies a 1914 
agreement between the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia to establish joint 
institutions of governance of the Murray River as one of the first although his source, Roger Wettenhall, 
‘Intergovernmental Agencies: Lubricating a Federal System’, (1985) 61(11) Current Affairs Bulletin 28, 
32-3, is actually talking about intergovernmental agencies, identifying the River Murray Commission as a 
very early one.  In South Australia v Commonwealth (1961-2) 108 CLR 130, the dispute originated in a 
1907 agreement between the Commonwealth and South Australia, by which the Northern Territory was 
surrendered to the Commonwealth and inter alia arrangements were made for a railway from Darwin to 
Adelaide (it was completed on 17 September 2003).  Indeed it is highly unlikely that there were no such 
agreements prior to federation. 
14 By 1935, the late Sir W Harrison Moore could write, ‘In Australia, the [inter-government] agreements 
are numerous and of vast scope, detailed and complicated’: ‘The Federations and Suits between 
Governments’, (1935) 17 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 3rd Ser.  163.  Given 
their importance, one would have thought considerable effort would have been put into maintaining the 
record of their existence.  However, this is not the case.  There is but one compendium; it is of agreements 
operating in 1986 (Advisory Council for Inter-government Relations, Compendium of Intergovernmental 
Agreements (1986)), and the Council of Australian Governments  maintains a record of current 
intergovernmental agreements signed under its auspices: (<http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_ 
agreements> (last accessed 7 November 2011)). 
15 As compared to the United States of America where the indigenous peoples are ‘First Nations’ with a 
measure of sovereignty or New Zealand where the Treaty of Waitangi preserved te tino rangartiratanga 
34 
 
category are agreements between governments and other16 legal persons, although the 
binding force of these agreements are similarly constrained, 17 since the National 
Competition Policy was between Commonwealth, State and Territory governments.18   
 
Intergovernmental agreements can be signed by many individuals, despite being 
confined by ‘intergovernmental’.19  They can be signed on behalf of the governments by 
the Governor-General on the part of the Commonwealth or one or more Governors on 
the part of the States, by the Prime Minister or Premiers, by Ministers, or even by heads 
of relevant administrative organisations (departments and such like). Indeed, they need 
not be signed: they may be adopted into legislation by participating governments or may 
simply be as expressed in the charters or other constitutive documents of joint bodies.20  
They can come in a variety of forms:21  formal documents, appended to legislation, 
approved by legislation, enacted as law by joint legislation, or given binding force by 
legislation.  They are sometimes tabled in Parliament but often not.  They can exist as 
mere memoranda of understanding or perhaps as simply an exchange of letters: an 
example of the most informal of these is the agreement to set up the Council of 
Australian Governments itself, which was simply an announcement in a Communique.22  
                                                                                                                                               
to the Maori; see David A Wishart, ‘Contract, Oppression and Agreements with Indigenous Peoples’ 
(2005) 28 The University of New South Wales Law Journal 780. 
16 The legal personality of the government as contracting party is itself an issue:  Sir Harrison Moore, 
‘Suits between Commonwealth and State and State and State’ (1925) 7 Journal of Comparative 
Legislation and International Law 3rd Ser. 155; Dennis Rose, ‘The Government and Contract’ in (ed.) P. 
D. Finn, Essays on Contract (Law Book Co., 1987), 233. 
17Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54; see Tony 
Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory.  Commentary and 
Materials (Federation, 5th ed., 2010), 449. 
18 Local Government is sidelined at this stage, not being signatory to the Agreements.  Clause 7 of the 
Competition Principles Agreement ‘appl[ies]’ that agreement to local government, although it makes 
‘[e]ach State and Territory … responsible for applying those principles to local government’. 
19 Rose, above n 16, 246-52. 
20 Compendium, above n 14, viii-ix. 
21 Painter, above n 13 , 100-1. 
22 Heads of Government Meeting 11 May 1992, Communique.  For further on the formation of the 
Council of Australian Governments, see Chapter 3, ‘Federalism’.. 
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Relevantly, the 2000 alterations to the Agreements were made by simple letter from the 
Prime Minister to the other Heads of Government, without recorded assent although no 
later dissent either.23 
 
Intergovernmental agreements have no template,24 contain a great variety of 
arrangements25 and are put to a variety of purposes.26  At core, whatever their objective 
or substance, they evince an intention to bind, not necessarily legally, the other parties 
to the negotiated position.  Accordingly, their terms will be designed to prevent breach 
or abandonment of voluntary commitments to future action or inaction.  Of course, it is 
easy to overstate this last point.  The vertical fiscal imbalance skews bargaining power, 
meaning that the States and Territories, and local government for that matter, may have 
no option but to accept the terms on offer.  Second, it is a mistake to consider that 
‘government’ is unitary.  That one signature appears (if there is one)  may have 
symbolic meaning and there may be constraints on the exercise of the power to sign, but 
government itself is only a concept or idea and is comprised of a multiplicity of persons, 
agencies, institutions and so forth.  Hence what suits one person, agency or institution 
may not suit or even be contemplated by another.27  This is so at any one point in time 
as well as over time, and also in respect of levels of government.  And that the objective 
of government is to be able to do things when there are a multiplicity of citizens 
involved does not diminish the point: agency issues are a necessary concomitant of 
decision-making. 
 
If there is a problem with assuming that commitment is implied by agreement, it can be 
solved by reference to legality: contract law.  Thus, the question of whether 
intergovernmental agreements bind governments.  It is commonly thought not, or at 
least as Blackshield and Williams put it, ‘the principle that agreements with obvious 
implications for matters of government policy, such as intergovernmental agreements, 
                                                 
23 See Appendix 2. 
24 <http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/> (last accessed 7 November 2011). 
25 Painter, above n 13, 100. 
26 Moore, above n. 14, 181-2; Painter, above n 13, 102. See also, for example, the list at <http:// 
www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/> (last accessed 7 November 2011) or the 1986 Compendium. 
27 Rose, above n 16, 246-52. 
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may be construed as not intended to create legal relations at all’.28  Saunders qualifies 
this by stating ‘although this depends ultimately on the terms of an agreement, including 
the character of the undertakings.’29  The question is complex and subject to the usual 
judicial casuism.30 
 
Whatever the position, those negotiating intergovernmental agreements manoeuvre in a 
context of probable unenforceability.  There is no strangeness about this: the 
marginality of law is a commonplace.31   Moreover, apart from the Commonwealth’s 
obligation as to just compensation under Constitution sec 51(xxxi), Parliaments are not 
bound by the executive nor even by themselves, the latter apart also from manner and 
form requirements which are not in point here.32  The questions that parties face are 
practical: if officials sign them and legislation is required for implementation, how 
compelled will Parliaments feel?  Assuming under the Westminster system that the 
executive is a creature of the Lower House, an Upper House may demur.  Perhaps it is a 
minority Government.  Maybe parliamentarians will feel dragooned into compliance.  
On the other hand, agreements are often reached amongst publicity and fanfare and this 
can supply a deal of political pressure to comply.33  Moreover, there may be a change in 
Government, raising real issues of how to bind a later Parliament. 
                                                 
28 Blackshield and Williams, above n 17, 449. 
29 Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia. A Contextual Analysis (Hart, 2011) 251. 
30 The relevant authority in relation to intergovernmental agreements is South Australia v Commonwealth 
(1962) CLR 130. The contentious issue is whether the question is of enforceability or justiciability – is a 
matter of private or public law.  See also The Administrator of the Territory of Papua new Guinea v 
Leahy (1961) 105 CLR 6, 11 per McTiernan J. 
31 ‘Marginality’ is a term taken from David Trubek, ‘Where the Legal Action Is: Critical Legal Studies 
and Empiricism’ (1981) 36 Stanford Law Review 576.  The seminal research is Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ [1963] 28 American Sociological Review 55.  
See also Wishart, above n 15, 802-5.  
32 There is some discussion about the entrenchment of government contracts in statutes with manner and 
form provisions protecting them: K. D. MacDonald, ’The Negotiation and Enforcement of Agreements 
with State Governments Relating to the Development of Mineral Ventures’, (1977) 1 Australian Mining 
and Petroleum Law Journal 29.  The effectiveness of such processes is to be doubted: West Lakes Ltd v 
South Australia (1980) 25 SASR 389; Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v Attorney-General 
[1976] Qd R 231. 
33 Painter, above n13, 103. 
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Recalcitrant Parliaments have a point:  as Saunders puts it: 
 
Intergovernmental arrangements have clear and identifiable effects on 
the institution of parliament which detracts from its role as a component 
in a system of responsible government.  This is not to deny that 
intergovernmental co-operation is a useful and in some instances 
essential technique in the operation a modern federal system.34 
 
If Parliaments are compelled to comply with decisions made by the executive, a real 
problem in accountability arises.  Parliaments are not legally bound to comply with 
agreements, as discussed above, yet the compulsion to do what is required of them by 
the executive may be strong.  Hence, if the parties have manoeuvred to attain some form 
of binding force, a conscious act to deploy financial and other powers effectively 
subverts independent parliamentary decision-making.  More broadly, if the 
arrangements restructure the federal system, the High Court as the body entrusted with 
the determination of the line between the powers of the States and of the 
Commonwealth is effectively subverted. It may be that there has been a shift in the 
matter to the, at best, political and this may be no bad thing.35  Yet it is more likely that 
intergovernmental agreements are the creature of executive branches of government 
seeking to bind Parliaments to their will. 36 
 
This discussion applies in relation to the National Competition Policy in the following 
way.  The Agreements are relatively detailed, providing for most of the matters listed on 
the Council of Australian Governments website.  They were tabled in the 
Commonwealth Senate on 8 June 1995 and signed by the Heads of Government of the 
States and the Commonwealth.  They required legislative action by the Commonwealth 
in order to amend the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to provide for access 
                                                 
34 Cheryl Saunders, The Impact of Intergovernmental Arrangements on Parliament (Intergovernmental 
Relations in Victoria Program, Law School, University of Melbourne, 1985) 24. 
35 Cheryl Saunders, The Federal System (Intergovernmental Relations in Victoria Program, Law School, 
University of Melbourne, 1985, 27-8. 
36 Painter, above n 13, 103. 
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arrangements and establish or reform the three key administrative bodies;37  the States 
and Territories to legislate in order to apply the Competition Code within the various 
States38 and to establish access regulators and prices oversight apart from Western 
Australia.39 Considerable quantities of legislation were envisaged to come out of 
legislative reviews.  Such legislation as came out of the agreements was, therefore, as a 
consequence of the agreements as agreed, not as a matter of their consideration as an 
accountability measure.  Of course, the agreements were debated to a more or less 
extent when the Competition Policy Reform Acts 1997 (Cth) was debated, although 
mostly there was effective bi-partisan agreement to what was proposed.40  
Consideration in the Commonwealth Parliament was diverted to a Parliamentary 
Committee, although no report was forthcoming until 199741 and no change in the 
National Competition Policy resulted. 
 
The Conduct Code Agreement 
 
The Conduct Code Agreement is best read in conjunction with the then Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) because it assumes 
that the changes to that Act provided for in the Competition Policy Reform Bill had been 
implemented.42  The Agreement deals with competition laws as they then existed, 
                                                 
37 Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
38 Uniform legislation under the name Competition Policy Reform Act ([Name of State]) 1995 (NSW, 
Vic.) or 1996 (ACT, NT, Qld, SA, Tas). 
39 Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission Act 1997 (ACT); Government Pricing Tribunal 
Act 1992 (NSW) which became the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992(NSW) after 
amendment in 2000; Utilities Commission Act 2000 (NT); Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 
(Qld); Independent Industry Regulator Act 1999 (SA); Government Prices Oversight Commission Act 
1995 (Tas); Office of the Regulator-general Act 1994 (Vic). 
40 See, generally, Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition, (Ashgate, 2003), ch 
3. 
41 Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration, Commonwealth House of 
Representatives, Cultivating Competition  Report of the Inquiry into Aspects of the National Competition 
Policy Reform Package, 1997. 
42 For example, it refers in clause 1, ‘Interpretation’, to the ‘Competition Code’ as the ‘Schedule version 
of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act’, when that schedule was to be inserted by the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill.  There are many other examples.  It is acknowledged in clause 1(2), where it is stated ‘Where 
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assuming no substantive change, and provides for their application within jurisdictions 
where until then the Commonwealth’s legislative competence could not 
comprehensively apply those laws.  The method ratified by the Agreement is a familiar 
one within the Australian federation:43  The Commonwealth was to pass legislation 
providing for a set of laws to be adopted by the States and Territories as amended from 
time to time.  This was the ‘Conduct Code’ provided for in the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill 1995.  Clause 5(1) sets this out and also the procedure to be undertaken if a 
State or Territory decided to make significant alterations to the Code.  No such thing 
has happened.   
 
The rest of the Agreement serves the adoption process: clause 2 controls the exemption 
process provided for in section 51 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), provides 
in clause 4 for consultation with and approval from all State and Territory governments 
when appointments were to be made to the main administering and enforcing body for 
competition law, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and deals 
with modifications to the Competition Code by providing for a voting procedure.   
 
In essence this Agreement was about remedying what had been seen as a defect of the 
then coverage of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth,): it did not extend 
beyond the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth, extensive though they had 
become after the Tasmanian Dams Case.44  The States and Territories still preserved 
competence over non-corporate bodies such as partnerships, trusts and sole traders, and 
also a variety of government organisations in the right of the States or Territories.  The 
price paid by the Commonwealth for the extension was to be consultation on 
appointments to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and loss of 
complete control in relation to amendments to the competition law. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
this Agreement refers to a provision in legislation which has not been enacted at the date of 
commencement of this Agreement, or to an entity which has not been established at the date of 
commencement of this Agreement, this Agreement will apply in respect of the provision or entity from 
the date when the provision or entity commences operation.’ 
43 See the discussion in Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and 
Theory (Federation, 3rd ed, 2002) 255-270. 
44 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 
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The Competition Principles Agreement 
 
In contrast to the Conduct Code Agreement which extended the application of known 
rules, the Competition Principles Agreement sets out rules and principles, and also more 
or less tightly prescribed processes for their implementation.  It too takes the 
Competition Policy Reform Bill 1995 as implemented, controlling some more of its 
ambiguities in a federal context.  In particular, it provides for the National Competition 
Council: its funding (clause 8: a Commonwealth responsibility), appointments to it 
(clause 9: by the Commonwealth but subject to State or territory veto), and its ‘work 
program’ (clause 10: to be agreed by the parties).  The operation of the National 
Competition Council was to be reviewed after 5 years. 
 
The Agreement was between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories.  No 
local government nor any representative of any or all of them signed the Agreements, 
although representatives of Local Government have been part of the Council of 
Australian Governments since its inception – even participating in the Special Premiers’ 
Conference of 30 July 1991.45  Local government thus was a part of the negotiation and 
finalisation of the Agreements, representation being through the Australian Local 
Government Association.46  Nevertheless, with perhaps the exception of Lord Howe 
Island, local government is the creature of the States and Territories, entirely subject to 
their superior law-making powers.  Hence, the Agreement extended to local government 
only by virtue of the obligations taken on by the States and Territories.  The Agreement 
reinforces this in clause 7, simply requiring the States and Territories publish a 
statement, prepared in consultation with local government (without defining what body 
that term implicates) and specifying the ‘application of the principles [in clauses 3, 4 
and 5, 6 being as to access regimes and not applicable to local government] to particular 
local government activities and functions.’  Whatsoever the formal position of local 
government, it became a significant battle ground for the National Competition Policy.  
                                                 
45 Special Premiers’ Conference 30 July 1991 Communique <http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-
outcomes/archive.cfm> (last accessed 12 June 2011). 
46 This body itself consists of representatives of the local government associations of the various States 
and Territories.  It has existed since 1947, establishing a secretariat in Canberra in 1976, which, as its 
website avers, ‘reflect[s] growing links with the Australian Government and an awareness of local 
government's emerging national role’ <http://www.alga.asn.au/>.   
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In its first assessment of implementation of the National Competition Policy, the 
National Competition Council identified ‘greater recognition of the importance of 
applying the reforms to local government businesses’ as one of five key achievements 
in the first two years of the operation of the policy.47  It was sufficiently important to be 
the subject of a supplementary assessment – the only one for the first tranche payment.  
Consistently thereafter ‘local government reform’ was a matter for specific notice by the 
National Competition Council.  Moreover, much of the resistance to reforms under, at 
least nominally,48 the National Competition Policy derived from their impact on the 
local and personal.  Local government bore much of the disapprobrium. 
 
The Agreement is expressed in terms of what can loosely be described as competition 
policy application topics: prices oversight of government business, competitive 
neutrality policy and principles, structural reform of public monopolies, legislation 
reviews and access to services. Each application topic has its own processes and 
procedures. There are separate parts of the Agreement for federal regulation of the 
National Competition Council, a body to be established by the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth.) as amended by the Competition Policy Reform Bill 1975, and for the 
application of the Agreement’s provisions to local government.  Prior to the defined 
topics are explanatory statements – although they are a little stronger than that – about 
the meaning or import of particular terms: ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’, ‘merits’ or ‘effective 
means’; and an exclusion of consideration of the nature or form of ownership of 
business enterprises from the impact of the competition principles.  At the end of the 
Agreement are some further explanations – as to what ‘consultation’ requires (clause 
12), how to whom notices were to be sent, how new parties could join and existing ones 
withdraw.  The Agreement was, under clause 15, to be reviewed after five years. 
 
                                                 
47 National Competition Council, Assessment of State and Territory Progress with Implementing National 
Competition Policy and Related Reforms 1997, iv. 
48 At times there were doubts as to whether certain actions, especially at the local level, were a product of 
competition policy or other changes in technology or society.  This was examined in Socio-Economic 
Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth Senate, Riding the 
Waves of Change, 2000. 
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Prices oversight of Government business enterprises 
 
The first application topic, prices oversight of government business enterprises, starts 
from its opening proposition (clause 2(1)): ‘Prices oversight of State and Territory 
Government business enterprises is primarily the responsibility of the State or Territory 
that owns the enterprise.’  It proceeds to hedge that responsibility with a series of 
recommendations and strictures about the way in which oversight is to be conducted.  
 
The only firm commitments a State or Territory makes under the Agreement in this 
respect is to ‘work cooperatively to examine issues associated with prices oversight of 
Government business enterprises’ and to be subject to a ‘prices oversight mechanism’ in 
the circumstances described in clause 2(6).  The latter is, in brief, where one 
Government refuses, even when asked, to subject one of its businesses to prices 
oversight and that that dereliction is ‘adversely affect[ing]’ another Government, then if 
the National Competition Council agrees that there is a problem for ‘constitutional trade 
or commerce’ and the Commonwealth Minister declares it, then the National 
Competition Council will administer a prices oversight mechanism for that business. 
 
The Agreement is remarkably coy about just what is required by way of prices 
oversight.  Not only is there no definition of ‘government business enterprise’, there is 
no indications at all about what mechanism should be deployed.  It is variously called a 
‘source of price oversight advice’ (clauses 2(3), (4) and (6)) and a ‘prices oversight 
mechanism’ (clause 2(5).  Clearly Governments are free to decide how prices oversight 
is to be done.  If they do not want to decide they can ask the National Competition 
Council to do it if the Commonwealth agrees, or another Government (clause 2(5)).  
The only strictures (‘an independent source of price oversight advice should have the 
following characteristics’) are contained in clause 2(4).  They are that the ‘mechanism’ 
or ‘source’ should: 
 
(a) be ‘independent from the Government business enterprise whose prices are 
being assessed’; 
(b) have ‘efficient resource allocation’ as its ‘prime objective’, but that should be 
‘with regard to any explicitly identified and defined community service 
obligation’; 
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(c) apply to ‘all significant Government business enterprises that are monopoly, or 
near monopoly, suppliers of goods or services (or both)’; 
(d) take submissions from all interested persons; and 
(e) give reasons for its pricing recommendations. 
 
(a), (d) and (e) are anodyne, if not obvious, but (b) and (c) are more substantial.  Both 
are the product of the normative concept of ‘competition’ explored as the legitimating 
discourse of competition policy in Chapter 3, ‘How the National Competition Policy 
Came to Be’: that monopoly is the opposite of competition are therefore the thing to be 
dealt with; that, notwithstanding clause 1(5) that the nature and form of ownership of 
business enterprise is not a matter for the Agreement, Government business enterprises 
are the ones that require prices oversight; that prices are about ‘efficient resource 
allocation’ more than anything else; and that the only acceptable derogation from the 
principle of efficient pricing in its resource allocation sense is a community service 
obligation that is explicit.  
 
Competitive Neutrality Policy and Principles 
 
In contrast to the coy approach to the concept of prices oversight, the Agreement 
provides a comprehensive description of exactly what is meant by implementing 
‘competitive neutrality’, although it remains restrained in its prescription of the 
processes of implementation.  Dealing with the latter first, the Agreement simply says 
that each Governments is ‘free to determine its own agenda for the implementation of 
competitive neutrality principles’ (clause 3(2)), with some reporting requirements – a 
‘policy statement’ within a year and an annual report on implementation (clauses 3(8), 
(9) and (10)).   
 
The Agreement avoids defining ‘competitive neutrality’ but does define ‘the objective 
of a competitive neutrality policy’: it says what should be done rather than what the 
state of being competitively neutral is.  The definition of the state that was to be sought 
is negative – the ‘elimination of resource allocation distortions’ or the absence of ‘net 
competitive advantage’.  Net competitive advantage ‘aris[es] out of public ownership of 
entities engaged in significant business activities’ despite the specific statement in 
clause 1(5) that ‘This agreement is neutral with respect to the nature and form of 
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ownership of business enterprises ... is not intended to promote public or private 
ownership’.   An exception is made for ‘non-business, non-profit activities’. 
 
In the absence of a precise formulation of what competitive neutrality is, other than 
what it is not, the Agreement is prescriptive of what competitive neutrality implies for 
Government business enterprises.  It divides them into two categories: those classified 
as Public Trading Enterprises,49 and other agencies.  Governments commit themselves 
in both cases to implement certain principles, but only in so far as ‘the benefits to be 
realised from the implementation outweigh the costs’.  A critical feature is that the 
distinction between them is not formulated other than be reference to categories 
nominated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  These categories are not supported by 
any argument or theory; as will be discussed in Chapter 3 there is very little to support 
the distinction and this comes to be the subject or critique later in the period in question. 
 
Those Government business enterprises nominated as either Government Trading 
Enterprises or Government Financial Enterprises by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
are subject to a set of substantive principles.  Governments are, first, to adopt a 
‘corporatisation model’50 for the former Government business enterprises, but only 
‘where appropriate’ (clause 3(4)(a)).  Second, Governments are to impose on them the 
taxation and the regulations to which private sector businesses are normally subject.  
Finally, they are to pay fees for any Government guarantee of their debts. 
 
In respect of Government agencies which do not fall into the categories of Government 
Trading Enterprise or Government Financial Enterprise but which ‘undertake significant 
business activities as part of a broader range of functions’, Governments are only 
enjoined to implement the principles ‘where appropriate’; alternatively they are 
enjoined, again ‘where appropriate’, to ensure prices charged for goods or services 
                                                 
49 This appears to refer to the adoption by the Australian Bureau of Statistics of the Standard Institutional 
Sector Classification of Australia, itself ‘based primarily on the institutional sectors recommended by the 
United Nations in “A System of National Accounts”’: Australian Economic Indicators (2 August 1993) 
(available at www.abs.gov.au/ausstats, last accessed 13 May 2011). 
50 The Agreement provides a suggested approach to corporatisation by referring to the ‘model developed 
by the intergovernmental committee responsible for GTE National Performance Monitoring: clause 
3(4)(a).   
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reflect full cost attribution for tax, relief from regulation or government guarantees of 
debt 
 
While the Agreement is directed at removing ‘net competitive advantages’ from 
Government business enterprises, as noted before it does not attend to any such 
advantages deriving from ownership other than by Governments.  This is despite the 
injunction in clause 1(5) not to distinguish between forms of ownership.  That 
competitive neutrality as an implementation of competition policy is targeted at a public 
ownership, despite the rhetoric, is reinforced by clause 3(7).  This provision preserves 
from consideration as a matter of competition policy any regulations to which a 
Government business enterprise may be subject but which does not apply to the private 
sector.  Not stated, but no doubt implied, is that whether such regulation is an 
exceptional burden on the Government business enterprise is not a concern of the 
National Competition Policy. Nevertheless, in implementation competitive neutrality 
was taken to require the evening up of competitive positions, including regulation 
particular to Government business enterprises. 
 
Structural Reform of Public Monopolies 
 
This element is perhaps that most commonly associated with competition policy 
generally, even though it is but one of several elements in the National Competition 
Policy as defined in the Agreements. Structural reform of public monopolies has four 
parts in the Competition Principles Agreement: first, excising any industry regulatory 
functions of a public monopoly; second, ensuring that any publicly owned entities are 
subject to other aspects of competition policy; third, ensuring the public interest is not 
prejudiced by the changes; and fourth, introducing competition into those elements of 
the public monopoly which are susceptible to it.  Of these, only the first – the removal 
of industry regulation functions from the monopoly itself – is mandatory (clause 4(2)).  
Nevertheless, the National Competition Council in assessing progress in the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy, took account of the degree to which 
all elements were put into practice. This extended beyond the Agreements and came to 
be one of the chief reasons for dissatisfaction with its activities in the resistance 
experienced in and around 2000. 
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Beyond removal of regulatory functions, the various Governments are free to 
‘determine their own agenda’ in reforming public monopolies (clause 4(1)).  Yet while 
the ‘agenda’ is not fixed, the process of reform is controlled, albeit by the simple 
requirement of a review prior to the introduction of competition into the sector 
traditionally supplied by, or the privatisation of a public monopoly. The subjects of the 
review are two of the three remaining parts of structural reform as described by the 
Agreement.  
 
The first of these is the imposition of other elements of competition policy; particularly 
competitive neutrality (clause 4(3)(e)), although that imposition is softened by the 
requirement of the review to consider only the best means of effecting them.  
Competitive neutrality elements are illustrated by clause (h) following, which requires 
the investigation of the financial relationship, including rate of return targets, dividends 
and capital structure, between the owner of the public monopoly and the public 
monopoly itself.  The removal of regulatory functions can also be seen as an aspect of 
competitive neutrality.  In this, the idea of ‘public monopoly’ is not precisely 
delineated.  It is not quite the economic concept of monopoly.  Rather it appears to be 
the business or entity carrying on the monopolistic business, from which regulatory 
functions and competitive elements are to be excised, leaving only ‘natural monopoly 
elements’ for the public monopoly to supply.  The public monopoly is assumed to have 
commercial objectives in the endeavour, although what they are to be is left for the 
review (clause 4(3)(a)). 
 
The second aspect of the review is the protection of the public interest, although that 
phrase is not used.  Rather, the Agreement talks of reviewing the ‘merits of’ four things: 
the separation of natural monopoly elements of the business from the areas where 
competition could be introduced, of creating competing businesses in the latter, of the 
imposition of community service obligations, and of the best means of funding and 
delivering them.  The Agreement also mandates, as a fifth matter, consideration of price 
and service regulation.  These call into play clause 1(3), which sets out what should, 
where relevant, be taken into account.  The list includes (‘[w]ithout limiting the matters 
that may be taken into account ...’) government initiatives as to ‘ecologically sustainable 
development’ – rather than protection of the environment or sustainability simpliciter; 
social welfare and equity considerations, including community service obligations – 
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although that is a process rather than a consideration; occupational health and safety, 
industrial relations and access and equity; economic development; the consumer 
interest; and, as if it were not taxonomically contradictory, economic efficiency.  The 
fact of this list perhaps more than the items in it later comes to be one of the most 
critical features of the National Competition Policy, both (the difference is marginal) in 
respect of structural reform and in respect of legislative reviews. 
 
Exactly how competition is to be introduced is not the subject of the review.  It is this, 
presumably, which in addition to timing is substantively what is meant by ‘agenda’ in 
clause 4(1).  Undoubtedly consideration of the merits of proposed structural changes is 
implied by the review, but nothing appears to be agreed as to the outcomes.  In contrast 
to legislation reviews, the public interest was not stated to be preferred.  Of course, 
mandating outcomes is the subject of the third Agreement and hence are defined by the 
economics of the assessing institution, the National Competition Council. 
 
Legislation Review 
 
Often mistaken for the National Competition Policy itself, legislation reviews are a 
unique aspect of Australia’s competition policy.51  The legislation review process is 
frequently taken to be an exemplar of good governmental practice in international 
circles concerned with competition issues: it is highlighted in the ‘Forward’ of the 
OECD’s Competition Assessment Toolkit in the following terms: 
 
In fact, one of the most successful examples of pro-competitive reform 
occurred in a federal system when Australia implemented broad, pro-
competitive reforms at both national and state level in the mid-1990s. 
Since that time, Australia has experienced strong economic performance, 
with high and steady growth that has raised Australia’s economy from a 
mid-level performer to one of the top performing OECD economies.52 
                                                 
51 Morgan almost makes this mistake: Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition 
(Ashgate, 2003). 
52 OECD, Competition Assessment Toolkit (English Veresion) (OECD, 2010) (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3699,en_2649_40381664_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html, accessed 17 May 2011) 
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Clause 5(3) sets out the objective of the legislation review process: that all then existing 
legislation that restricts competition be reviewed and, ‘where appropriate’, reformed.  
The Agreement extends the control (or metaregulation, to use the regulatory theory 
term) to new legislation ‘that restricts competition’ in clause 5(5), although the review 
process was not deployed for that purpose, rather the Agreement simply required that 
proposals for new legislation be accompanied by evidence that legislation was 
consistent with the principles on which the reviews were to be based.  This was to 
become the regulatory impact statement process after 2005.  Meanwhile, it was agreed 
in clause 5(6) that all reviewed legislation was to be ‘systematically’ re-reviewed once 
every ten years.   
 
Governments were again free to determine their own agendas for this process, subject 
only to the requirement in clause 5(3) to develop a timetable of reviews.  However, 
Governments committed themselves to an annual report of progress towards reviewing 
all legislation that restricted competition; the National Competition Council was to 
publish a consolidation of all the reports of the Governments. 
 
Three subclauses of clause 5 ((7), (8) and (9)) deal with ‘national dimension[s] or 
effect[s] on competition’ of reviews.  Rather than some externally generated procedure, 
the process relies on the Government responsible for the review nominating the review 
as national, consulting other interested Governments and referring the matter to a body 
of its choosing with terms of reference it determines.  The National Competition 
Council is stated to be able to undertake such national reviews, if asked and in 
accordance with its work program. 
 
The placing of responsibility for reviews on the Government responsible for the 
legislation to be reviewed was inevitable, as it is doubtful that Governments would 
surrender sovereignty over the subject matter.  However, out of the division of 
responsibility came much confusion which permitted the defences of the ‘duck’ and the 
‘weave’.  Those defences were frequently deployed as reviews proved to be the most 
                                                                                                                                               
3-4.  For an alternative point of view, see David Wishart, Competition Policy: The Reform of Laws and 
Regulation [2011] LAWASIA Journal 39. 
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controversial and divisive competition policy application process, at least one review 
leading to street protest marches.53 
 
The source of that controversy lay in what the reviews were to determine and 
recommend.  The ‘guiding principle’ for the reviews was set out in clause 5(1) and is 
repeated here, as it will be considered frequently in what follows: 
 
The guiding principle is that legislation (including Acts, enactments, 
Ordinances or regulations) should not restrict competition unless it can 
be demonstrated that: 
(a) the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh 
the costs; and 
(b) the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting 
competition. 
 
Clause 5(9) sets out what this entails: a review should 
 
(a) clarify the objectives of the legislation; 
(b) identify the nature of the restriction on competition; 
(c) analyse the effect of the restriction on competition and on the 
economy generally; 
(d) assess and balance the costs and benefits of the restriction; and 
(e) consider alternative means for achieving the same result including 
non-legislative approaches 
 
Reviews conducted in accordance with this are in contrast to the other review 
procedures set out in the Agreement.  Clause 1(3) demands a balancing of benefits and 
costs yet, while clause 5(9)(d) refers to balancing of benefits and costs, that balancing 
serves clause 5(1) where the benefits of a restriction must outweigh its costs.  
Legislation restricting competition is required to be justified by benefits greater than 
costs, those benefits being not otherwise achievable, and the net benefits being greater 
                                                 
53 The review of the office of the Victorian Auditor-General: see later, in Chapter 7.  For a full 
explanation of the defences, see below 352-3. 
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than the benefits of competition both in terms of the purpose of the legislation and the 
economy at large. It is this that makes the legislation review procedure radical: the 
status quo has to be justified.  Moreover, competition is assumed to be a Good Thing: 
the benefits that flow from it are not required to be rendered explicit, whereas the 
benefits of the restriction must be set out and weighed against its costs.  This comes to 
be the touchstone of resistance to the National Competition Policy.  Surprisingly, there 
was no pulling back from its rigours, despite that resistance, even though other elements 
of the National Competition Policy did not require it.  
 
Access to Services Provided by Means of Significant Infrastructure Facilities 
 
The longest clause of the Agreement is about access and it lead to one of the longest and 
most complicated parts of Australia’s competition law, Part IIIA of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).  It, as will be seen, was the product of a choice not to pursue 
the route most other jurisdictions have chosen to deal with the problem of access to 
infrastructure facilities – to rely on core competition law provisions dealing with use of 
monopoly power – rather, a complete regime was to be formulated.  Clause 6(1) sets out 
the Commonwealth’s obligation to legislate what became Part IIIA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), later the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth.). The 
envisaged legislation was to apply to the following circumstances, as set out in clause 
6(1): 
 
(a) it would not be economically feasible to duplicate the facility; 
(b) access to the service is necessary in order to permit effective competition in a 
downstream or upstream market; 
(c) the facility is of national significance having regard to the size of the facility, its 
importance to constitutional trade or commerce or its importance to the national 
economy; and  
(d) the safe use of the facility by the person seeking access can be ensured at an 
economically feasible cost and, if there is a safety requirement, appropriate 
regulatory arrangements exist. 
 
This mutated into a complex two-step regime involving a declaration, with attendant 
appeal mechanisms, by the Minister that the service was essential; and, second, a 
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process to be used when agreement of the terms of access could not be achieved and 
under which the terms and conditions of access were to be determined.  The first step is 
about clause 6(1) and the determination of which infrastructure facilities were to be 
subject to the access regime, and the second was to deal with negotiated settlements and 
to determine prices and conditions in the absence of the much preferable, from the point 
of competition policy, negotiated settlement.  
 
An access regime was nothing new, as the economics of natural monopolies was well 
and truly established in 1995, hence the States and Territories already had quite a few 
access regimes in place.  Naturally, then, the respective provinces of the 
Commonwealth generic regime and State and Territory arrangements were delineated.54  
The Commonwealth regime was not to apply to access arrangements as to facilities 
within a State and Territory and which conformed to agreed principles.  Moreover, the 
Commonwealth regime could override the State arrangements where the either the 
facility was situated in more than one jurisdiction and ‘substantial difficulties’ arose 
from that, or had influence beyond a jurisdictional boundary and the National 
Competition Council determined the arrangements were ‘ineffective’.  Where access 
arrangements existed in more than one State or territory to a single service, those 
Governments were to come up with a procedure under which a person seeking access 
only needed to utilise a single process.55  
 
The facilities to be subject to a State or Territory access regime were described in the 
Agreement in the same terms as those subject to the Commonwealth regime, barring the 
requirement of national significance.  However, in contrast to the absence of any 
requirement beyond the description of those facilities to which the regime was to apply, 
State and territory regimes had a rigorous set of ‘principles’ to which they had to 
adhere.  These principles set out in detail what should be incorporated in a regime.   
 
As it turned out, after negotiation all governments agreed to some variation on these.  
However, the structure mostly survived into Part III of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth). What eventuated is considered in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
54 Clause 6(2). 
55 Clause 6(4)(p). 
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The Implementation Agreement 
 
The third and last agreement comprising the National Competition Policy was the 
Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms.  It sets 
out financial arrangements ‘in relation to’ the National Competition Policy and related 
reforms’.  ‘[I]n relation to’ is somewhat euphemistic: it conceals the importance of the 
financial arrangements as incentive structures ensuring compliance with the program set 
out in the other agreements.  In summary, it promises that the Commonwealth would 
pay the States and Territories large sums of money if they carried out the Agreements. 
 
As a promise to pay money it does all the usual things: it says how much, when, and for 
what.  It does this in a considerably more informal document than the other two 
agreements; the Commonwealth simply promises to pay.  However, concealed in the 
bland format is the considerable, if well-known and understood, institutional complexity 
of Australian federalism.  The particular features of this implicated by the 
Implementation Agreement are the relations between the States and the Commonwealth 
which within which the agreements were negotiated and signed, and the Federal/State 
vertical fiscal imbalance. 
 
The Federal Context 
 
For present purposes, the most important feature of the Australian federal structure is 
that the States hold plenary powers subject to the Australian Constitution.56 There is no 
delegation from the Commonwealth to the States; rather, the States were first conferred 
rather circumscribed plenary powers by the imperial government, the United Kingdom, 
at various times in the nineteenth century, then a later-created statute of the United 
Kingdom Parliament, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900,57 further 
                                                 
56Section 106.  The Australian Constitution (hereafter the Constitution) is provided for in sec. 9 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (U.K.) 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12 
57 Ibid. 
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limited the powers58 of the States under their Constitutions by taking some powers from 
the States and giving them to the Commonwealth.59  Hence governmental powers under 
the Constitution are divided between the States and the Commonwealth, with defined 
powers going to the Commonwealth and the pre-existing residue to the States.  The 
Commonwealth cannot legislate where it has no head of power to do so or for which 
power has been referred by the States under s 51(xxxvii).60  
 
Section 92 of the Constitution creates something approaching a free trade area within 
Australia’s borders.61  To say this is, of course, to vastly oversimplify an incredibly 
complex62 series of cases; although it must be said that that such oversimplification 
                                                 
58 These limitations were the colonial law doctrines of extraterritoriality and repugnancy, somewhat 
constrained by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (28 & 29 Vict., c. 63) and various other Imperial 
Statutes. 
59 See Commonwealth v Cigmatic Pty Ltd (in liq.) (1962) 108 CLR 372, particularly per  Dixon J. at 530. 
60 The Commonwealth is also constrained from legislating by the guarantee of freedom of religion in s 
116 of the Constitution, the express guarantee of non-discrimination on the basis of State of residence in s 
117,  and various implied ‘immunities’, such as the implied guarantee of political communication, the 
most authoritative statement as to which is in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 
CLR 520 although Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (!994) 182 CLR 104 is more frequently 
cited, and implied limits resulting from Australia’s federal nature as set out in Melbourne Corporation v 
Commonwealth (the State Banking Case) (1947) 74 CLR 31; re Australian Education Union; ex parte 
Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188; Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185. 
61 Although one hesitates to cite High Court judgments as authoritative history (about which see Rob 
McQueen, ‘Why High Court Judges Make Poor Historians: The Corporations Act Case and Early 
Attempts to Establish a National System of Company Regulation in Australia’, (1990) 19 Fed. L. R. 245), 
the judgment of the whole Court in Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 385-392 provides a useful and 
easily accessible summary. 
62 There are numerous excoriations of the Privy Council and High Court of Australia’s attempts to 
interpret the section.  Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan Federal Constitutional Law. A Contemporary 
View (LawBook, 3rd ed. 2010)) quote Sir Robert Garran: ‘More than fifty years ago in Australia we issued 
clean from the press a beautiful constitution.  A choice bit was section 92 – and look what a mess we have 
made of it!  I have been musing over the judgments upon it, and frankly, I want to burn the lot!’ from R. 
Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth (Butterworths, 2007) 351.  As the Full Court of the High Court itself 
said in Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 383-4, ‘No provision of the Constitution has been the 
source of greater judicial concern or the subject of greater judicial effort than s 92. That notwithstanding, 
judicial exegesis of the section has yielded neither clarity of meaning nor certainty of operation. Over the 
years the Court has moved uneasily between one interpretation and another in its endeavours to solve the 
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appears to have a deal of currency in discussions of competition policy in Australia.  
These latter focus on whether there is a national market in Australia as if that is a matter 
of econometrics and barriers to trade rather than also a question of regulatory 
competence and a federal balance.63  On the other hand, the latest interpretation of s 92 
has cited the National Competition Policy, inter alia, as providing an element of a new 
context for understanding the prevailing ideology within which s 92 should operate.64 
                                                                                                                                               
problems thrown up by the necessity to apply the very general language of the section to a wide variety of 
legislative and factual situations. Indeed, these shifts have been such as to make it difficult to speak of the 
section as having achieved a settled or accepted interpretation at any time since federation.’ Or  the 
plaintiff vice of Deane J in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556, 615, ‘This is 
another case about the operation and effect of s. 92 of the Constitution. Both sides argued with apparent 
conviction on the basis of existing authority to support diametrically opposed conclusions. Perhaps that 
should not be seen as surprising since the more one becomes immersed in the decisions of the Privy 
Council and this Court on the subject of s. 92, the plainer the impression becomes that one has entered an 
area where the ordinary processes of legal reasoning have had but a small part to play and where judicial 
exegesis has tended to confuse rather than elucidate. Indeed, it is as if many voices of authority have been 
speaking differently at the same time with the result that, putting to one side some basic propositions, it is 
all but impossible to comprehend precisely what it is that authority has said.’  Both of the latter two 
quotes were identified from Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and 
Theory.  Commentary and Materials (Federation, 5th ed., 2010) 1208-9. 
63 See Anne Twomey, ‘Reforming Australia’s Federal System’, (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 57, for a 
general discussion. 
64 Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418, 452-3.   The Court said this: 
The third development [in the legal and economic milieu in which s 92 operates] is the emergence 
since 1995, and by inter-government agreement under the auspices of the Council of Australian 
Governments, of a National Competition Policy. Elements of that policy include as a "guiding 
principle" that legislation should not restrict competition, unless it can be demonstrated that the 
benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs and that the objectives 
of the legislation "can only be achieved by restricting competition". [cited: Competition Principles 
Agreement]  Further, provision of financial assistance by the Commonwealth to the States is made 
conditional upon progress in the implementation of the National Competition Policy.[cited: 
Implementation Agreement] Counsel for the plaintiffs emphasised that the greater the degree of 
implementation of the National Competition Policy, the less the occasion for recourse to s 92. 
This is somewhat opaque especially as Counsel for the plaintiff’s arguments are, in this respect, not 
reported.  The best sense seems to be start from the tautology that where there is a free market there is no 
regulation and proceeds to the obvious yet ideologically insignificant point that given that the National 
Competition Policy seeks to extend the reach of markets into erstwhile government monopolies, there will 
be less regulation to infringe s 92.  Mind you, it ignores the acceptance of the limits on the reach of 
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That case, Betfair,65 has been taken to possibly ‘signal some changes to the Cole test, to 
the end of promoting a national economy free of divergent State legislation’.66 
 
Section 92 is as follows: 
 
92   Trade within the Commonwealth to be free 
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and 
intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or 
ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free. 
 
Legislation infringing this stricture is unconstitutional and therefore void. The current 
test is set out in Cole v Whitfield:67  most commonly (and it can be put in a number of 
ways68) a law is contrary to s 92 if it imposes ‘discriminatory burdens of a protectionist 
kind’.69  The Commonwealth has power under s 51 to ‘make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:  (i) trade and commerce 
with other countries, and among the States’, but that is ‘subject to this Constitution’ and 
hence to s 92 (and s 117 for that matter). 
 
The upshot of these constitutional complexities is that the Commonwealth Government 
has severe restrictions on its powers to force the State Governments to change the form 
of their laws.  (The Territories are in a somewhat different position as they take their 
legislative powers from the Commonwealth and are subject to its laws: s 122.)  For that 
reason if there is to be a national policy with regard to laws, including competition laws, 
within the States plenary powers it has to be implemented by the respective 
                                                                                                                                               
Commonwealth power in the Conduct Code Agreement and that competition law needs a head of 
Commonwealth power if the Commonwealth is to legislate it. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan  Federal Constitutional Law. A Contemporary View (LawBook, 3rd 
ed. 2010) 377.  The ‘Cole’ test is discussed in the text immediately below. 
67 (1988) 165 CLR 360. 
68 See Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory.  Commentary 
and Materials (Federation, 5th ed., 2010) 1215-6 
69 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 394. 
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Governments.  The strategy generally deployed to achieve the implementation of a 
policy, whether or not it was a matter of imposition by the Commonwealth or some 
more universal imperative, was agreement.  Yet in the case of the National Competition 
Policy, while electoral pain was foreseen in its implementation, offsetting gain was 
hypothesised from greater economic activity; however the gain would be received by 
the Commonwealth through taxation rather than the States: the Federal/State vertical 
fiscal imbalance.  There was also the matter of some Governments being more 
committed to others and the possibility of game-playing between Governments.  The 
very same Federal/State vertical fiscal imbalance as created the problems provided an 
opportunity to address these concerns. 
 
It is a truism in Australia’s constitutional framework that the Commonwealth has almost 
the whole power to tax with limited powers to spend,70 and the States and Territories 
have the obligation to spend with very little concomitant power to tax.71  The shortfall 
in State and Territory revenue is made up by Commonwealth grants under its financial 
assistance power.72  Oddly enough, only customs and excise duties, historically an 
expanding category,73 are exclusive to the Commonwealth,74 the States retaining power 
to levy taxation in all other respects under s 107 of the Constitution.  However, the 
history of the taxation power has so far concentrated power to tax in the hands of the 
Commonwealth.75 In particular, income taxation is levied solely by the Commonwealth, 
any threat by the States to impinge on this being met with counter-threats to the level of 
financial assistance to them by way of Commonwealth grant.76 
                                                 
70 The Commonwealth’s power to spend is limited to powers specified in the Constitution or statutes 
made under it: Pape v FCT  (2009) 238 CLR 1; [2009] HCA 23.   
71 One of the better analyses of the extent of the fiscal imbalance is Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers, 
Federalist Paper 1.  Australia’s Federal Future: Delivering Growth and Prosperity (Council for the 
Australian Federation, 2007) 34-39. 
72 Commonwealth Constitution, s 96. 
73 See, for example, Parton v Milk Board (Vic) (1949) 80 CLR 229; Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v 
Victoria (Pipeline Tax Case) (1983) 151 CLR 599. 
74 Ibid,  s 90.  
75 See, in particular, Victoria v Commonwealth (Uniform Tax Case (No 2)) (1957) 99 CLR 575. 
76 Halsbury’s Laws of Australia [90-6070] 
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Under section 96 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth may grant financial assistance 
to any State on any terms and conditions the Commonwealth Parliament thinks fit.77  
The grants may be conditional: they may be for particular purposes, such as to build a 
road,78 or as an inducement to exercise legislative powers in one way or another79 – 
even not to exercise them at all.80  While not coercive,81 such grants may bind the State 
(although what ‘binding’ means is not entirely clear), be for objects outside the powers 
of the Commonwealth,82 and be at the discretion of a Commonwealth Minister.83  These 
possible characteristics come to the fore in the competition payments under the 
Implementation Agreement.   
 
Payments 
 
As was described above, the Implementation Agreement sets out a table of payments to 
be made by the Commonwealth, in addition to that which the States and Territories – 
indeed, also local government –  would have otherwise received as calculated under the 
Financial Assistance Guarantees, provided the National Competition Council 
recommends to the Minister that no deductions are to be made.  This is clearly the sort 
of grant which is constitutional within s 96 according to test set out by Dixon C J in 
                                                 
77 Currently these are divided into National Specific Purpose Payments, National Partnership Payments of 
three types (project payments, facilitation payments and reward payments) and general revenue 
assistance, consisting mainly of a share of GST: see Gareth Griffith, Managerial Federalism – COAG and 
the States, Briefing Paper No 10/09, Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of New South Wales, Sydney 2009, 18.   
78 Victoria v Commonwealth (Federal Roads Case) (1926) 38 CLR 399 
79 South Australia v Commonwealth (Uniform Tax Case (No 1)) (1942) 65 CLR 373 at 417. 
80 South Australia v Commonwealth (Uniform Tax Case (No 1)) (1942) 65 CLR 373; [1942] ALR 186; 
(1942) 16 ALJ 109; Victoria v Commonwealth (Uniform Tax Case (No 2)) (1957) 99 CLR 575; [1957] 
ALR 761; (1957) 31 ALJ 369. 
81 Victoria v Commonwealth (Uniform Tax Case (No 2)) (1957) 99 CLR 575, 605 per Dixon J: ‘It is but a 
power to make grants of money and to impose conditions on the grant, there being no power of course to 
compel acceptance of the grant and with it the accompanying term or condition.’ 
82 Deputy Federal Commisioner of Taxation (NSW) v W. R. Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735. 
83 Ibid, 606, per Dixon C.J. 
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Victoria v Commonwealth (Uniform Tax Case (No 2).84  It does not matter that no 
power in the Constitution enables the Commonwealth to legislate for competition as 
such or in respect of all the legislation subject to the Competition Principles Agreement.  
The Implementation Agreement does not tempt suit in relation to deductions by vesting 
the discretion to make them otherwise than in accordance with Dixon C. J.’s dictum: the 
National Competition Council merely was to report to the Commonwealth its 
assessments as to whether the conditions for payment have been met.  When the time 
for deductions came with the commencement of third tranche payments in 2000, the 
procedures were clarified by amendment to the Agreements: the National Competition 
Council was to make recommendations, notify them to the State and Territory 
Governments for comment, and to advise the Commonwealth Treasurer accordingly.  
That Minister would then formally decide on the level of payments to be made.   
 
The Implementation Agreement was the key to ensuring implementation.  It bound the 
States and Territories by promising extra money and governments are always short of 
money.  The sums were large enough for the States and Territories to continue 
complying no matter electoral results.  Indeed, given that it was probable that at least 
some implementations would cause electoral opprobrium and many did in fact do so,85 
it can only be said that it was a very effective strategy.  The vast proportion of the 
promises made by the States and Territories were carried out.  Predictably, given that 
there was no financial incentive to comply, the Commonwealth Government proved the 
laggard (with Western Australia) in implementation.86   
 
The incentive was not all or nothing; the reward was only for as much as was done.  
Decisions therefore had to be made as to the extent of non-compliance.  The decisions 
                                                 
84 (1957) 99 CLR 575; [1957] ALR 761; (1957) 31 ALJ 369; 607. 
85 While it cannot be determined with certainty, the Kennett Government in Victoria lost office in part 
due to excessive zeal in competition policy reforms, although it must be said that the Kennett government 
no doubt would have carried out such reforms whether or not it got paid for them.  
86 As the National Competition Council wrote in its 2005 Assessment, ‘The Australian Government does 
not receive competition payments.  As in previous assessments, the Council notes that the Australian 
Government is still to appropriately address some legislative restrictions.’ National Competition Council, 
Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National Competition Policy and related 
reforms’,  Melbourne, 2005, xxxvii. 
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clearly could not be made by interested parties – any of the Governments would fall into 
that category – hence an independent body, the National Competition Council, was set 
up for the purpose.  Just as important as an appearance of disinterest between payer and 
payee, the Council also had to act fairly as between the States and Territories.   
 
The National Competition Council was provided for in the Conduct Code Agreement 
and was established by amendment, enacted by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 
(Cth.), inserting Part IIA of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), later for the 
purposes of competition law renamed as the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth.).87  The Conduct Code Agreement ensured that appointments were made by 
consent and various provisions in all the Agreements ensured workload and workflow 
were regulated.  Given that the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth.) was already 
extant in bill form, other provisions as to termination and conflicts of interest were 
agreed to by virtue of consent to the bill in draft form.88 
 
How much? And when? The Commonwealth promised to make a series of 
‘Competition Payments’ to the States and Territories in three tranches: the first of $200 
million in each of two years, commencing in July 1997, paid quarterly; the second of 
$400 million in each of two years, commencing in July 1999 and also paid quarterly; 
and the third and last of a total of $600 million with an unstructured payment schedule.  
The sums were indexed in real terms.  They were conditional on satisfactory 
                                                 
87 A more expansive discussion of the National Competition Council as a creature of statute, that is as the 
National Competition Policy was implemented, rather than as a matter of the three agreements, is found 
in Chapter 5. 
88 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 19 August 1994, Communique, where Council of 
Australian Governments agreed to ‘the establishment of the Australian Competition Commission and the 
Australian Competition Council (previously the National Competition Council) to exercise 
recommendatory powers in relation to access and pricing surveillance issues and advisory powers on 
matters determined by governments’.  At the next meeting the Council of Australian Governments 
‘supported’ the Commonwealth’s Competition Policy Reform Bill and the amendments made to it.  These 
included a thinning down of the National Competition Council’s function.  The Bill was noted to provide 
that ‘appointments to the ACCC and NCC will be a matter of close consultation between the parties and 
will require the support of the Commonwealth and a majority of the parties’; see Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) Meeting 11 April 1995, Communique. 
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implementation progress, as described below, and were subject to review if Australia 
experienced a major deterioration in its economic circumstances.   
 
The Agreement contains, indeed commences with promises by the Commonwealth to 
‘maintain the real per capita guarantee of the FAG pool on a rolling three year basis.’  
This somewhat arcane formula represents a foil to the possibility of the Commonwealth 
reducing payments generally or of the Commonwealth discriminating between States or 
Territories by changing payments made under its financial assistance to the States and 
Territories.  That financial assistance was and is de rigueur as a result of the 
Federal/State vertical fiscal imbalance under the Constitution.  In order to be able to 
make the promise that extra funds were to be made over to the States and Territories as 
a result of compliance, the Commonwealth had to reassure the other Governments that 
it was not going to claw back funds by reducing any other payments it might have 
made.  Hence it created a ‘Financial Assistance Guarantee’ fixing grants to a per capita 
basis and promising to maintain their real value on a rolling three year basis.  It 
extended the purview of these arrangements by setting up a separate Local Government 
Financial Assistance Guarantee pool, in doing so recognising the third tier of 
government not otherwise constitutionally acknowledged. 
 
The payments were to be conditional on ‘satisfactory progress’, as the opening clause 
states.  The text of the Agreement sets this out tranche by tranche, and an attachment 
provides ‘full details’.  The progress was to be measured in relation to implementation 
of the Agreements, and implementation of further Council of Australian Governments 
agreements with regard to electricity, gas, water and road transport.  The final payments 
were to be conditional on full effect and implementation of all the agreements.  The 
attachment sets out all the commitments made by the States and Territories in the three 
formal Agreements, and gives a little more detail about the other matters: progress in 
electricity meant’ transition to a fully competitive National Electricity Market’, for gas 
it was ‘implementation of free and fair trading in gas between and within the States’, 
and for road transport it was ‘effective observance of the agreed package of road 
transport reforms’.  Water industry reform received treatment only in relation to the 
second tranche where the specified reforms included ‘implementation of the strategic 
framework for the efficient and sustainable reform of the Australian water industry and 
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future processes’89  Without preamble or warning, the third tranche is also conditional 
on the setting of national standards in accordance with the Principles and Guidelines for 
National Standard Setting and Regulatory Action and also advice from the Office of 
Regulation Review.  This is not as far-reaching as it seems: the standards are simply 
about the principles of good regulation, although they do introduce particular notions of 
the purpose of regulation, its justification, its features and methodologies of assessing 
these things.90 
 
The conditions on which the Competition Payments were to be made reveal that more 
than simply the obligations under the first two formal National Competition Policy 
agreements were to comprise competition policy in Australia for the time being.   The 
third Agreement thus extends the National Competition Policy into industry reform.  
The unifying feature of these latter reforms was their perceived national character, 
either in terms of the way the industry crossed borders and hence was a matter of a 
national market (water and road transport) or where a national market was sought 
(electricity and gas). 
 
The changes made in 2000 
 
The National Competition Policy Agreements were changed twice: once in 2000 and 
again in 2007.  The last falls outside the timeframe determined by the topic of this 
thesis, and hence will be considered later.  The first was prompted by a provision in 
both the Conduct Code Agreement (clause 10) and the Competition Principles 
Agreement (clause 15) agreeing that the operation of the Agreements be reviewed after 
five years, and by a further provision (clause 11) in the latter agreeing that the operation 
of the National Competition Council be reviewed after five years also.  Accordingly, in 
                                                 
89 The future process were stated to be those ‘endorsed at the February 1994 Council of Australian 
Governments meeting and embodied in the Report of the Expert Group on Asset Valuation Methods and 
Cost-Recovery Definitions’. 
90 A version from 2004 can be found at < http://archive.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2004-06-
25/docs/coagpg04.pdf> (last accessed 18 July 2014). 
62 
 
its Communique resulting from the Council of Australian Governments meeting 3 
November 2000,91 the following agreement was noted: 
 
Heads of Government agreed to several measures to clarify and fine-tune 
implementation arrangements for NCP as set out in the Prime Minister’s 
letter of 27 October 2000 to Premiers and Chief Ministers. The adoption 
of these changes will establish a practical framework for the ongoing, 
effective implementation of NCP, while demonstrating our ongoing 
commitment to this policy and safeguarding the flow of benefits it is 
delivering to Australians as a whole. The changes will also serve to 
address a number of community concerns regarding the application of 
NCP which were identified in the recent Productivity Commission and 
Senate Select Committee inquiries into competition policy.92 
 
The actual changes were the product of agreement between ‘COAG Senior Officials’ 
and were set out in an attachment to a letter from the Prime Minister (then John 
Howard) addressed to all Premiers of States and Chief Ministers of Territories  In the 
words of the Communique, the amendments were: 
 
that the National Competition Council (NCC) determine its forward 
work programme in consultation with COAG Senior Officials; that 
COAG Senior Officials continue to clarify and specify NCP reform 
commitments and assessment benchmarks for the NCC; that the deadline 
for completing the NCP legislation review and reform program be 
extended from 31 December 2000 to 30 June 2002; and that the NCP 
Intergovernmental Agreements be amended to provide further guidance 
to the NCC on how to assess whether jurisdictions have complied with 
their legislation review commitments. 
 
                                                 
91 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 3 November 2000, Communique, 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm (last accessed 27 May 2011) 
92 Ibid 4-5. 
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Oddly enough, neither the letter nor the actual alterations as stated in its attachment 
were appended to the Communique.93  Fortunately Hon. Dee Margetts raised the matter 
of what was agreed in the Legislative Council of the Parliament of Western Australia in 
Question Time on 11 September 2003 and the letter was tabled.94  The attachment 
reveals that the changes were mostly expressed to be to the National Competition Policy 
arrangements, rather than the Agreements themselves.  Even so, given that they were the 
subject of agreement, albeit subterraneously recorded, and given also that much of the 
Agreements was about procedure and processes, as a matter of definition they can be 
viewed as adding to the National Competition Policy.  That they are called ‘Changes to 
National Competition Policy Arrangements’ reveals the fluidity and ambiguity of 
understandings of what comprised the National Competition Policy.  Further 
complicating the picture is that some matters were considered important enough to 
demand alterations to the Agreements, rather than simply being recorded in the letter to 
which the Council of Australian Governments Communique refers.  These amendments 
were as to the assessment of progress of governments in meeting their commitments as 
to legislation reviews and the deletion of the Table of Payments from the 
Implementation Agreement.95   
 
While the wording of the changes to the Competition Principles Agreement represented 
by the first of the amendments is quite clear, exactly where it was to be inserted is not.  
In the post 2007 version of the Agreements as recorded on the National Competition 
Council’s National Competition Policy website,96 it is a note to clause 5.  In any event, 
it is as follows: 
 
In assessing whether the threshold requirement of Clause 5 has been 
achieved, the NCC should consider whether the conclusion reached in 
the report is within the range of outcomes that could reasonably be 
reached based on the information available to a properly constituted 
review process.  Within the range of outcomes that could reasonable be 
                                                 
93 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003) 204 
94 For convenience, it is included as Appendix 2. 
95 There were a couple of others due to drafting errors in the Agreements.. 
96 < http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/cpa%20amended%202007.pdf> (last accessed 31 May 2011). 
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reached, it is a matter for Government to determine what policy is in the 
public interest. 
 
This is quite odd, as clause 5 has no mention of a threshold requirement.  However, the 
proposed amendment is followed by instructions as to how the National Competition 
Council was to distribute the third tranche of competition payments.  The procedure was 
that the National Competition Council would assess each Government’s performance in 
meeting reform obligations, casting the process as determining what penalties should be 
applied to a particular State or Territory’s payment.  The penalty was to be assessed by 
taking into account: 
 
The extent of overall commitment to the implementation of NCP by the 
relevant jurisdiction; the effect of one jurisdiction’s reform efforts on 
other jurisdictions; and the impact of failure to undertake a particular 
reform. 
 
The process that then was to follow was that the National Competition Council would 
confidentially notify the relevant State or Territory Minister and the Commonwealth 
Treasurer of its recommendation.  After one month, during which the State or Territory 
Minister could make representations, the Commonwealth Treasurer was to decide on 
the level of competition payments to be made.   It was to be a purely bilateral process.  
The National Competition Council was to publish its reasons for its assessments in its 
Annual Assessment.  Counteracting the increased rigour represented by these processes, 
was an extension of time for completion of legislation reviews. 
 
Why the Table of Payments in the Implementation Agreement was deleted is not made 
clear.  Certainly it was somewhat redundant due to the change in competition payment 
assessment procedures and had been rendered out of date due to inflation. 
 
The changes and addition to the arrangements which did not merit amendment of the 
Agreements were as to transparency, governance of the work program of the National 
Competition Council, methodologies of assessment of competitive neutrality, and 
further cordoning off Community Service Obligations from competitive neutrality.  The 
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impact of the High Court of Australia in R v Hughes97 was mentioned as a matter to 
which should be given ‘early consideration’ and the Agreements were set down for 
further review in 2005. 
 
The motivation for these changes will be made apparent in Chapter 7, suffice it for now 
to say that there had been considerable criticism of various implementations of the 
National Competition Policy and the overriding solution to such voices was thought to 
be information: people would accept the difficulties if they knew what was going on 
and the good that would flow.  Hence, under ‘Transparency’, Governments agreed to 
fully document public interest reasons supporting a decision or assessment, to ‘give 
consideration to explicitly identifying the likely impact of reform measures on specific 
industry sectors and communities, including expected costs in adjusting to change’, and 
also exhorted the National Competition Council to better explain and promote the 
National Competition Policy.  The National Competition Council was also subjected to 
the guidance of ‘Senior Officials’ in interpreting the Council of Australian 
Governments’ guidance.  Presumably they are the same anonymous group who 
formulated the proposed changes in the first place. 
 
After 2005 
 
While the Agreements did not provide for a termination date, the programs therein set 
out, especially in respect of legislation reviews, generally ran on until 2005.  The 
National Competition Council was to provide its final assessment of progress in that 
year and there were no more competition payments provided for after that year in the 
Implementation Agreement.  For those reasons, this thesis is expressed to cover only the 
period 1995 to 2005.  However, the importance of a thing should not be measured only 
by its history: what happens as a result of it is perhaps even more relevant.  
Accordingly, as a matter of context, the continuation, albeit in partially expired and 
somewhat mutated form, of the Agreements is here considered.  Just as significant is the 
accretion of policy and reform activities around the Agreements and these also are 
traced. 
 
                                                 
97 (2000) 202 CLR 535. 
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In 2000 the Council of Australian Governments had agreed that all Agreements would 
be reviewed in 2005.  In accordance with this, the Council of Australian Governments 
agreed in its meeting on 3 June 2005 to have Senior Officials (the same ones, 
presumably, as in 2000) from the Council of Australian Governments review the 
National Competition Policy, reporting to the Council by the end of 2005.98  The review 
was not only to ‘assess the effectiveness of the existing NCP arrangements’; it was to 
focus on a ‘possible new reform agenda’, including ‘practical options for 
implementation, monitoring and assessment’.   
 
Meanwhile, on 23 April 2004, the Commonwealth Treasurer commissioned the 
Productivity Commission to conduct an independent review of the National 
Competition Policy arrangements.  This review was to ‘inform’ the Senior Officials’ 
Council of Australian Governments review to take place in 2005, which indeed required 
to ‘draw from, but not [to] be limited by, the recommendations of the Productivity 
Commission report’.99  As a result, on 10 February 2006 Council of Australian 
Governments agreed to a ‘new National Competition Policy reform agenda’, which was 
located in a broader ‘National Reform Agenda’.  The other two aspects of the latter 
agenda were health and regulatory reform.  Thus, from 2006 National Competition 
Policy is no longer a thing in itself as funding arrangements, implementation 
arrangements and even program-setting become integrated in a broader governance 
program.100  It is a ‘stream of the COAG national reform agenda’, albeit ‘a substantial 
addition to, and continuation of, the highly successful National Competition Policy 
reforms.’101  Thereafter national competition policy was to focus on ‘further reform and 
initiatives in the areas of transport, energy, infrastructure regulation and planning and 
climate change technological innovation and adaptation.’102  Competition payments 
were no longer a matter of agreement, rather: ‘[t]he Commonwealth has indicated that it 
will provide funding to the States and Territories on a case-by-case basis once specific 
                                                 
98 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 3 June 2005, Communique, 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm> ( last accessed 31 May 2011), 5. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 10 February 2006, Communique, 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm>  (last accessed 1 June 2011), 4-5.  
101 Ibid 4. 
102 Ibid 4-5. 
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implementation plans have been developed if funding is needed to ensure a fair sharing 
of the costs and benefits of reform.’   
 
One area not mentioned in the Communique from the 10 February 2006 meeting, but 
prominent in an Attachment referred to in that document103 is the continuation of the 
legislation reviews.  In clause 5(5) of the Competition Principles Agreement 
governments had agreed that ‘[e]ach Party will require proposals for new legislation that 
restricts competition to be accompanied by evidence that the legislation is consistent 
with the principles set out in subclause (1)’.  Decision 1.2 set out in the Attachment was: 
 
Each jurisdiction will: 
(a) continue and strengthen gate-keeping arrangements established in the 
National Competition Policy (NCP) arrangements to prevent the 
introduction of unwarranted competition restrictions in new and 
amended legislation and regulations; and 
(b) complete outstanding priority legislation reviews from the current 
NCP Legislation Review Program in accordance with the NCP public 
benefit test. 
 
The Attachment set out further decisions under the heading of ‘Legislation Review’.  
They were that all jurisdictions were to ‘recommit’ to the Principles of the Competition 
Principles Agreement, that State and Territory governments were to publicise how those 
principles apply to local government activities and functions by preparing a statement 
specifying the application of the principles – the statement had to be prepared in 
consultation with local government; and, even less in relation to legislation reviews, that 
processes of appointments (presumably to the National Competition Council and 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) and processes of amendments to 
Australia’s competition law104 were to be streamlined. 
 
The balance of the 2006 decisions relating to competition devolve into consideration of 
particular industries, most notably energy, transport and infrastructure.  Certainly, there 
                                                 
103 Attachment B, available at < http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2006-02-10/docs/ 
attachment_a_reform.rtf>  (last accessed 1 June 2011). 
104 In Part IV of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.). 
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had been a mention of ‘related reforms’ in the original Implementation Agreement – 
even in its title, ‘Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related 
Reforms’ – and from the very earliest competition policy was seen to encompass more 
than simply the Agreements.  The Attachment to the Implementation Agreement 
specifies progress in implementation of Council of Australian Governments Agreements 
in relation to the electricity, gas, water and road transport industries, as well as the 
rather anomalous matter of national standards, as being assessable for the purpose of 
deductions from tranches of competition payments.   
 
By the July 2006 Council of Australian Governments meeting, competition had sunk 
further into being but a ‘stream’ of the National Reform Agenda.  Such note as was 
made was directed at ‘the good progress in developing and implementing the 
competition stream of the National Reform Agenda, which incorporates reforms aimed 
at boosting Australia’s productivity, competition and the efficient functioning of 
markets.’105 ‘Important milestones’ were noted: the establishment of an Implementation 
Group and the release of an issues paper for the energy industry, the commencement of 
work on urban congestion, and the release of a Productivity Commission paper on the 
transport industry.  Eight months later in April 2007 comment on the competition 
stream of the National Reform Agenda devolved into the noting of progress in reforms 
to electricity, gas transport and nationally significant infrastructure.106  There was a 
change of Government before the next meeting and thereafter consideration of 
competition policy took a different form.  This is not to say there was no competition 
policy, merely that the National Competition Policy as something to be implemented as 
such had fizzled out.   
 
With the election of a Coalition Government in 2013 came renewed emphasis on 
competition policy.  A review of competition policy, the Competition Policy Review, 
was announced on 4 December and on 27 March 2014 the Minister for Small Business 
released Terms of Reference.107  These are not structured as the National Competition 
                                                 
105Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 14 July 2006, Communique, 7. 
106 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 13 April 2007, Communique, 1. 
107 Available at http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2014/02/Competition-Policy-Review-TOR. 
pdf> (last accessed 21 May 2014). 
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Policy was, especially in respect of the elements of competition policy, however, they 
are clearly included in the ‘key areas of focus for the review’ (which are articulated in 
greater detail).  The key areas of focus are: 
 
 identify regulations and other impediments across the economy that 
restrict competition and reduce productivity, which are not in the 
broader public interest;  
 examine the competition provisions of the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (CCA) to ensure that they are driving efficient, competitive 
and durable outcomes, particularly in light of changes to the Australian 
economy in recent decades and its increased integration into global 
markets;  
 examine the competition provisions and the special protections for 
small business in the CCA to ensure that efficient businesses, both big 
and small, can compete effectively and have incentives to invest and 
innovate for the future;  
 consider whether the structure and powers of the competition 
institutions remain appropriate, in light of ongoing changes in the 
economy and the desire to reduce the regulatory impost on business; 
and  
 review government involvement in markets through government 
business enterprises, direct ownership of assets and the competitive 
neutrality policy, with a view to reducing government involvement 
where there is no longer a clear public interest need.  
 
The first and last of these are clear, even explicit, references to legislation reviews and 
competitive neutrality although most of the other elements as defined in the Agreements 
can be found in the detail.  The last defies the clear statement in the Competition 
Principles Agreement that who owns an enterprise is not significant in competition 
policy terms.   Moreover, special protection for small business, although a frequent 
concomitant of competition policy,108 is generally regarded as antithetical to it.   
 
                                                 
108 H. Hovenkamp,  ‘Antitrust Policy after Chicago’ (1985) 84 Michigan Law Review 213. 
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There are, in the detail, clear references to some of the more contentious aspects of 
competition policy over the last ten years or so, including the aforesaid protection for 
small business, the lack of impact of competition law on industries such as groceries, 
fuel and utilities, critique of the access regime, criticisms of Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission power, and enforcement. It is difficult to say for certain, but 
there even appears to a reference to disaggregation of monopolies as in the Enterprise 
Act 2002 (UK) Chapter 1, Part 4 or even the Sherman Act 1980 (US) which was 
notoriously deployed to disaggregate AT&T into the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies (the ‘Baby Bells’).  The terms of reference state, inter alia, that the 
Commission should ‘consider alternative means for addressing anti-competitive market 
structure, composition and behaviour currently outside the scope of the CCA 
[Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)].  Finally, there is only muted reference to 
the federal structure of Australia as a matter to be taken into account in the 
Commission’s investigation of the effectiveness of regulatory agencies even though this 
was one of the major pillars of the National Competition Policy.   
 
Summary 
 
The three Agreements between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories taken 
together provide for a ‘National Competition Policy’ as a set of intended agreed 
modifications to law, and a set of obligations defined in varying specificity.   
 
The obligations set out in the agreements were to: 
 extend the operation of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
 implement prices oversight of government business;  
 apply competitive neutrality policy and principles;  
 implement structural reform of public monopolies;  
 legislation reviews; and  
 access to services;  
 plus a number of reforms defined in terms of the subject industry.  
All were embedded in a complex of procedures and involved considerable institutional 
reform.   
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Considerable transfers of money from the Commonwealth to the States and Territories 
were conditional on performance by the States and Territories of these obligations.  
Determination of the extent to which Governments complied with the agreements and 
hence whether deductions from agreed payments to States and Territories were to be 
made was to be the function of an independent body, the National Competition 
Council, set up for the purpose.  The payment-for-compliance procedures did not apply 
to the Commonwealth. 
 
The Agreements were entered into in April 1995 and fizzled out from around mid-2005.  
There was no formal termination, simply a lapse into desuetude, apart from the 
obligation to assess the impact on competition of any new legislation.  However, there 
is presently (2014) renewed emphasis in competition policy, an emphasis explicitly 
harking back to the Hilmer Committee Review, albeit without reference to the 
Agreements. 
 
Accordingly the implementation of the Agreements forms a suitable subject for an 
examination of the National Competition Policy.  It is a mere analytical convenience, 
but to do otherwise would be to increase complexity with little benefit of explanatory 
power.  Thus to focus on the economic theory would be to subordinate the politics or to 
focus on the Hilmer Committee review would be to force the repetition of the gap 
between those recommendations and what was done.  Both of these aspects are apparent 
in the course chosen, but they are simply accomplished. 
 
Implications 
 
If the implementation of the Agreements is taken to be the subject of this thesis’ 
examination of the National Competition Policy 1995-2005, and if the examination is 
‘thick’, the things that are examined are the actions taken in pursuance of it.  Yet, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, creating a simple record of the actions implementing the 
National Competition Policy is not a simple task: there are simply far too many of them.   
 
The actions which comprise the implementation of the National Competition Policy 
include: speaking, investigating, reporting, meeting, making payments, denying requests 
and recording things.  This list is of what people do.  People can be said in doing so to 
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engage in transactions or relationships, legislate, regulate, set up institutions, engage in 
routines, and make contracts and arrangements.  The actions may be abstracted further, 
such as review, corporatise, privatise, functionally separate, contractualise, implement a 
provider/suppler model, marketise, propertise, compensate, and so forth.  Yet as we 
abstract we incorporate concepts and ideas which limit what we observe.   
 
Even in the first two lists in the previous paragraph there are ways of thinking and 
assumptions narrowing the observable. Thus a series of questions follow: What does it 
mean to legislate – is it simply a particular procedure in a special room, followed by 
other procedures and if so, are the multifarious intentions and purposes of the legislators 
conflated and rendered irrelevant?  What is an institution and does it have a group 
intention or will (as is implied when this thesis looks at the institutions of the 
administration of government, including those established to or tasked with the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy).  Yet to not abstract renders the 
account irrelevant to, not to mention too unwieldy for, our purpose: the critical 
examination of the National Competition Policy.  This involves discovering and 
considering the ideas and concepts behind it, and its intended and unintended 
consequences, a process to which full knowledge of what was involved is a prerequisite.  
Such is, of course, the issue continually plagues this thesis yet which paradoxically 
enables it.   
 
However, all is not so bleak for the endeavour as the preceding paragraph intimates.  
That paragraph is an argument against assuming concepts and principles, against 
abstracting without considering the basis on which the matter is abstracted.  Previous 
accounts of the National Competition Policy have done just that.  However, the present 
purposes of making a debate possible are satisfied if the commonly held ideas of the 
procedures of government are assumed.  It may be that later research will press the 
boundaries further; for now describing comprehensively within conventional thought 
suffices.  Most importantly, it is all that can be done within the length and time 
constraints of a thesis such as this one. 
 
Nevertheless the problem of summarizing or picturing a huge number of individual 
actions without imposing a framework remains.  Five substantial versions of the story of 
the implementation of the National Competition Policy as a whole exist: from the 
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National Competition Council, the Productivity Commission, by Bronwen Morgan,109 
in Hansard and in the media.  There is a multiplicity of partial versions.  And, of course, 
there is the record of the vast number of actual actions from which a story might be 
devised and which can be used to test the established ones. 
 
The first two substantial versions are much the same, each drawing on the other 
extensively and repeatedly.  They present a very detailed account of events and actions 
from beginning to end.  The National Competition Council published, as required by the 
Agreements, assessment reports in 1997, 1999 and then yearly from 2001 until a final 
report in 2005. It also delivered yearly Annual Reports. The Productivity Commission 
generated a number of reports in which events and actions are detailed, and also issued 
major assessments in 1999 and 2005.110  These assessments and reports provide a 
wealth of detail as to what was done and attributed to the National Competition Policy 
and do in fact form the core of the historical account below.  Yet to rely extensively on 
such a source raises the possibility of some bias.   The rationale for so doing is that the 
National Competition Council had the role, provided for in the Implementation 
Agreement, of assessing what the States and Territories had done.  Were its descriptions 
and data not to be correct it would have lost credibility as an arbiter between the 
Commonwealth and the States.  This is subject to the caution that it took upon itself the 
role of convincing the Australian public that competition policy was a societal good and 
that the National Competition Policy should be carried out in full.  Thus the detail of 
assessments should be privileged over the rhetoric of progress. 
 
Bronwen Morgan conducted a series of interviews and conducted a deal of research on 
the National Competition Policy considering mainly implementation between 1997 and 
2001. She drew substantially on the Commonwealth House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration Inquiry into Aspects of 
                                                 
109 Morgan, above n 93. 
110 Productivity Commission, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, 
Report No 8, 1999; Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reform, Report No 
33, 2005. 
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the National Competition Policy Reform Package,111 conducting an extensive analysis 
of the submissions.  Her book112 focuses particularly on the discourses within which the 
National Competition Policy as a program happened, so adopting a quasi-governmental 
approach in which the discursive framework of economics, particularly competition, is 
compared to the rule of law.  This work, subject to the qualifications expressed in 
Chapter 1 about relying on interview evidence, provides a deal of material about the 
bureaucratic processes and discursive frameworks generated within them. 
 
Hansard is, of course, the record of Parliamentary proceedings.  During the period of 
this study, there is considerable discussion of the National Competition Policy and 
associated reforms.  Of course, every piece of legislation, whether passing a new Act or 
amending a pre-existing one and in whichever legislature within Australia, and to the 
extent that they related to the National Competition Policy, was subject to debate.  
Moreover every tabled report and assessment received attention of some sort which may 
have demanded a governmental reply and perhaps even further debate.  This is 
compounded by the usual processes of questions and so forth which at particular periods 
extensively dealt with the National Competition Policy.  Within this mess of speeches, 
tablings, questions and responses, there are three discernible elements.  The first is of 
speakers and documents acting as or emanations of the Government. In that respect 
there is little beyond the account as set out by the National Competition Council and 
Productivity Commission.  The second is of Parliamentarians purportedly acting as 
representatives of their electorate, in which the content is mostly a matter of the effect 
of implementation on individuals and communities.  This is summarised effectively in 
the Senate Select Committee Report on the Socio-Economic Consequences of the 
National Competition Policy.113  The third respect is again of speeches and documents 
as emanations of the Government, but in this respect is a matter of responding to 
critique.  These second and third respects will be dealt with in Chapter 7. 
 
                                                 
111 Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration, Commonwealth House of 
Representatives, Cultivating Competition. Report of the Inquiry into Aspects of the National Competition 
Policy Reform Package, 1997. 
112 Morgan, above n 93. 
113 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000. 
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The fifth source of accounts of the implementation of the National Competition Policy 
is the media.  It is perhaps a sad reflection on the state of the Australian media that little 
can be found in the extensive reporting of various implementations of National 
Competition Policy related actions or of the rise of One Nation (both of which form part 
of the account below) adds to the material about what actually happened.  There appears 
to be no incisive account or any comprehensive analysis.   
 
Within these accounts, such as they are, there is very little that conflicts.  The story is 
consistent and matches the evidence.  That story follows in Chapters 4 to 6.  Chapter 4 
deals with the establishment of the agreed institutional framework for the National 
Competition Policy. Chapter 5 provides an account of its implementation as ordered by 
time and Chapter 6 an account ordered by the elements of the National Competition 
Policy.  By way of testing the reliability of the account provided and in order to 
illustrate the processes and procedures involved in implementation, some brief case 
studies are included in the last of these. In doing so, possible biases in their selection as 
discussed in Chapter 1 are reflexively considered.  Chapter 7 deals with reactions to 
what was done.  Before all of this, in the chapter following this one, the National 
Competition Policy is located in time and context in  Chapter 4, ‘How the National 
Competition Policy Came to Be’, with the development of the National Competition 
Policy into the Agreements  and its constitutional, administrative and legal context. 
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Chapter 3 
How the National Competition Policy Came to Be 
 
 
The Map 
 
This chapter attempts a history of how the National Competition Policy came to be 
formulated as intergovernmental agreements signed in the Council of Australian 
Governments.   
 
History is no less subject to contingent explanation than any other discipline.  As argued 
in Chapter 1, a ‘thick’ account, a refusal of linkages assumed to be necessary, and an 
exploration in full of the textual evidence without discrimination on the basis of pre-
existing analyses, is a means of avoiding it. Yet the possible influences and causes of 
any particular event or text exponentially multiply as one retreats in time, even if one is 
to reject the postmodern approach of the denying determinable cause and effect.  A 
government policy, such as is the focus of this chapter, has a multiplicity of sources and 
originating influences.  This is so even when the choice has been made, as it has here, of 
nominating particular texts (the Agreements1) as its reality, and not merely its 
expression.  Other histories are made observable.  Thus the policy can be viewed as a 
product of the Council of Australian Governments, in a particular form, exposing 
certain theories and views.  It can also be seen to have been implemented and changed.  
These can each be the subject of a separate account that when all taken together provide 
a richness of analysis approximating a unitary thick account.  Moreover, the 
inconsistencies between the accounts can reveal that which might otherwise be hidden 
in the interstices of assumed epistemologies. 
 
In accounting for a government policy a pedantic analyst would provide an 
undiscriminating account going backwards from the expression of the policy, detailing 
all possible formative events and texts.  Unfortunately this is awkward, prolix and 
probably uninformative.  The alternative is to gamble in choosing events and texts, 
taking the chance as to what is important and what not.  If an analyst makes it clear that 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1, n 14. 
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they are gambling and that what they say may be misguided or wrong, and has made 
their choices in as transparent a manner as possible, a more comprehensible sense of 
what was happening should be forthcoming.  This is the ‘reflexive’ approach; it is, 
albeit somewhat apologetically, adopted here.   
 
What, then, might have been important in the development of the National Competition 
Policy?  As was illustrated in Chapter 1, in this academic disciplines differ.  One set of 
political scientists seems to have focussed on the Council of Australian Governments; 
economists tend to start with the Hilmer Report;2 lawyers, in dealing with the changes 
to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), start with Commonwealth attempts in the early 
twentieth century to enact Sherman Act style legislation and, on the rare occasion the 
other elements of competition policy are considered, with the Agreements; other 
political scientists have given us accounts of the processes within the State and 
Commonwealth bureaucracies through which the Hilmer Report was translated into the 
Agreements and thence into particular implementation strategies.   
 
Going backwards from 11 April 1995, then, according to writers other than this one but 
without regard to their disciplinary discourses, the following have been nominated by 
them as important in the development of the National Competition Policy: 
 The process by which the recommendations of the Hilmer Report were 
translated into the Agreements; 
 The Hilmer Report itself; 
 The politics of federalism (which upsets the instant timeline somewhat as it is 
part of the process of translation of the Hilmer Report); and 
 Legislative interventions in Australia since the US Sherman Act 1890. 
 
This leaves some questions unanswered.  Is there more than federalism in the origin of 
the Hilmer Report?  Is there more than political and bureaucratic exigencies in the 
process by which the Agreements were formulated?  What is the thinking behind the 
policy and how did it come to be in the form implemented?  Is the US Sherman Act 
                                                 
2 Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, 
National Competition Policy (1993); hereafter ‘Hilmer Report’. 
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1890 part of that thinking?  What is the importance of legislation to the policy or the 
Agreements?  Clearly there is both too much (pre 1974 legislation is of marginal 
relevance to the policy) and too little (previous policies) in the histories of the National 
Competition Policy to date. 
 
Given that a policy is a matter of government, its history can be confined to what made 
it in particular happen.  At some point in time a need to implement certain reforms was 
recognised within government with the result that they were set out as obligations in the 
Agreements.  Of course it is impossible to say when that was, even were it possible to 
say that there is a government entity which ‘recognises’.  Further, each element of the 
policy would have a different timeline: access to services was indeed a concern deriving 
from early competition law, legislation reviews as a process were relatively novel while 
structural reform had its origin in the 1970s.  Yet there is an identifiable point in time 
where the will to reform coalesces into action.  This is coincident with the federalism 
debates of the early 1990s. 
 
With the starting point so nominated, the history of the Agreements may be restructured 
under the following headings: 
1. ‘Precursors’, which deals with the various governmental actions of similar ilk to 
those agreed and occurring before the speeches in which the need to reform was 
recognised. 
2. ‘Recognition of Need’, the nominated ‘identifiable point in time where the will 
to reform coalesces into action’. 
3. ‘The Hilmer Committee’, the report of which was seminal to the National 
Competition Policy and is in this section analysed in terms of its contribution to 
the National Competition Policy in the form of the Agreements.   
4. ‘Post Hilmer Negotiations’ is which the process of the adoption of the 
recommendations of the Hilmer Report and the extent to which they were 
deviated from or adopted in the Agreements are discussed.  
This, then, is a map of a period of time, projected to show most detail between the early 
1990s and 1995, yet sketching in events beforehand. It is the map presented in this 
thesis.  Its map key reveals the features mapped are, in the main, speeches, reports and 
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legislation.  There is no claim that this is the only map possible, merely that it suffices 
for the purposes at hand. 
 
Precursors 
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the elements the National Competition Policy were: 
 an extension of competitive conduct regulation  
 prices oversight of government business,  
 competitive neutrality,  
 structural reform of public monopolies,  
 legislation reviews, and  
 access to services;  
In addition, a number of reforms defined in terms of the subject industry were appended 
to the general policy.  All were embedded in the Agreements in a complex of procedures 
and processes, and institutional reform.  As will be described below, they were each 
viewed by the Hilmer Committee as a matter of the promotion of ‘competition’ and thus 
all could be dealt with together as the subject of a single wide-ranging policy.  A viable 
question arises from that as to whether alternative or additional rationales for them were 
crowded out: the extent to which these are visible is considered in the discussion of 
implementation over the chapters following this one. 
 
Most, if not all, of the nominated elements of the National Competition Policy had 
already been the subject of government attention prior to the Agreements, although 
sometimes in a different context and frequently not explicitly considered as a matter of 
competition policy.  They are the subject of this section of the chapter.  Moreover, the 
first three elements are directed at ‘government business enterprises’; in the Agreements 
this concept is defined for the purposes of  competitive neutrality, although assumed for 
the purposes of prices oversight and avoided for structural reform.3 In the immediately 
prior decades ‘government business enterprise’ had come to the fore as the operative 
concept mediating government participation in markets.  It is considered first. 
 
                                                 
3 Competition Principles Agreement, cl 4.See Chapter 2. 
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‘Government Business Enterprise’ 
 
Starting this discussion of the matter at the extreme of breadth, between the grundnorm 
of executive government and the unregulated actions of individuals lies a vast array of 
institutions.  These can be spontaneous or planned, the consequence of law or merely 
the effluxion of time, concerned with government or with private benefit for good or 
evil, recognised or secret.  Indeed, simple private agreement is an institution 
conceptually not that far from ‘company’.4  It is not surprising, then, that there has been 
considerable discussion of the vehicles of government action.  Within that discussion 
there are a number of themes and considerable terminological confusion. 
 
The themes which arise within the literature are as to accountability and responsibility,5 
matching purpose or function with form, the technicalities of form, and the relationship 
between these things.6  The terminological confusion lies not so much in the description 
of form, but in the labelling of the processes of change; in particular, ‘corporatisation’ 
and ‘privatisation’ vary in meaning from being descriptive of mere organisational 
change to referring to specific legal forms of institutions.7  The focus on ‘government 
business enterprise’ arises in this context. 
 
In 1954, Harold Seidman, speaking at a United Nations conference on Organisation and 
Administration of Public Enterprises in the Industrial Field, while acknowledging that 
countries seek organisational solutions with varying organisational and legal status, 
                                                 
4 Ian R Macneil: ‘Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neo 
Classical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854; Oliver E 
Williamson, for example, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 233. 
5 Stephen Bottomley, Government Business Enterprises and Public Accountability through Parliament, 
Research Paper No 18 of 1999-2000, Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000; See Michael Taggart, 
‘Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public Law’, (1991) 2 Public Law Review 77; Margaret Allars, 
‘Private Law but Public Power: Removing Administrative Law Review for Government Business 
Enterprises’, (1995) 6 Public Law Review 44. 
6 For an overview, see Roger Wettenhall, ‘Corporations and Corporatisation: An Administrative History’ 
(2005) 6 Public Law Review 7. 
7 Ibid 11-12. 
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operational authority and financial independence according in accordance with their 
own constitutional system, political tradition government structure and economy, 
identified three ‘separate and distinct stages of institutional development’: 
 
1. Organisation on the same basis as other government activity; 
2. Autonomous corporations with almost complete freedom from executive and 
legislative controls; and 
3. Public corporations subject to executive and legislative controls of a new type 
specially devised to meet the needs of a business enterprise.8 
 
In almost every country, Seidman states, somewhat undercutting his developmental 
argument, there are (at least in 1954) examples of each stage.  His first stage is one 
where no distinction was made between ‘between public enterprises and traditional 
government functions’.9  His argument was that the exigencies of business enterprise 
lead to the perception that where there is no distinction ‘public enterprise often became 
synonymous with excessive red tape, inexcusable delays, inadequate service, and 
general insensitivity to consumer needs.’10  The pendulum then swings to the freedom 
from control of the second stage, yet that inevitably lead to the perception that public 
accountability is lacking.  And so to the hybrid form persisting as the normative ideal 
until the 1980s.   
 
The concerns of Seidman’s essay, accountability, form and efficiency, have been 
repeatedly echoed since then.  However, he did not start at the conventional point in the 
argument, that there are government interventions in business and the form of these is 
problematic.  Seidman is careful to distinguish between the ‘general run of government 
programs’ and ‘public enterprises’.11 His criteria for making the distinction are: 
 
                                                 
8 Harold Seidman, ‘The Government Corporation: Organisation and Controls’, (1954) Public 
Administration Review 183, 183.  See also Wettenhall, above n 6, 13. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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1. the government is dealing with the public as a businessman rather than a 
sovereign;  
2. users, rather than the general taxpayer, are to pay for the cost of goods 
and services; 
3. expenditures necessarily fluctuate with consumer demand and cannot be 
predicted accurately or realistically kept within annual limitations; 
4. expenditures to meet increased demand should not in the long run 
increase the net outlay from the treasury; and 
5. operations are being conducted within areas in which there are well 
established commercial trade practices.12 
 
In contrast to Australian competition policy, these criteria do not assume the nature of 
‘business’, ‘commercial activity’, or ‘the private sector’.   
 
The Competition Principles Agreement refers to ‘significant Government business 
enterprises which are classified as “Public Trading Enterprises” and “Public Financial 
Enterprises” under the Government Financial Statistics Classification’.13   While now 
outdated,14 the intention of the reference is clear: to determine which institutions should 
be subject to competitive neutrality principles and which not by applying some set of 
definitive criteria.  Given that compliance would necessarily increase the prices charged 
by the institutions, bright line distinctions between those institutions to which they 
applied and those they did not were critical if all governments were to be held 
accountable for the application of the principles.  In respect of prices surveillance and 
structural reform, the requirements of the Agreement were subject to the discretion of 
the various governments and thus the need for definition lessened.   
 
A firm idea of exactly what a government business enterprise is (or was) was not 
formulated for Australian polities until the late 1980s, although later, during the 
                                                 
12 Ibid, 183-4. 
13 Competition Principles Agreement, cl 4 (see Chapter 1, n 14). 
14 The Government Financial Statistics Classification, if it ever existed under that heading, is now the 
Standard Economic Sector Classification (SESCA) issued by the Australian Bureau of Statistics from 
time to time.  It can be found at <www.abs.gov.au> (last accessed 31 July 2014). 
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currency of the National Competition Policy, many such definitions came to be 
articulated, generally around market orientation, sourcing income or recovering costs 
from individual consumers, and absence of regulatory functions.15  Most jurisdictions 
resiled from defining that to which the disciplines of competition policy would be 
applied by reserving that function for specific nomination by legislation or regulation.   
 
There are examples of both approaches: in a report to the Special Premiers’ Conference 
of July 1991,16 the predecessor of the Council of Australian Governments, the Task 
Force on Monitoring Performance of Government Trading Enterprises made no attempt 
at all to determine the subject (‘Government Trading Enterprises (GTEs)’) of what it 
was talking about, nor did the Joint Committee of Public Accounts in 1992 in its Report 
315 Social Responsibilities of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government 
Business Enterprises.17  On the other hand, the new 1987 New South Wales 
Government commissioned a series of reports exploring corporatisation as an 
instrument for the improvement of the public sector in New South Wales.  Two 
significant reports, from 1988 and 1989 respectively, deal with the issue of 
classification of state organisations for the purpose of identifying their appropriate form 
were A Policy Framework for Improving the Performance of Government Trading 
Enterprises,18 and Classification and Control of State Organisations.19  The latter report 
                                                 
15 Financial Management Act 1996 (ACT), s 3;  
16 Task Force on Monitoring Performance of Government Trading Enterprises, A Framework for National 
Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, 1991. In the Communique issues by the 
July 1991 Special Premiers’ Conference, the alternative, nomination approach is exemplified:  
‘Recognising these factors, leaders and representatives have agreed that a framework for national 
performance monitoring be established for GTEs.  The system will initially concentrate on a core 
of larger and more significant enterprises in each jurisdiction.  At the State/Territory level the 
enterprises will include those involved in energy, rail, water, major ports and urban public 
transport. Commonwealth enterprises to be covered include Telecom/OTC, Australia Post, 
Australian National Line, the Federal Airports Corporation and the Pipeline Authority.  This core 
group will be expanded progressively once the system is operational and may, in due course, 
extend to Local Government enterprises. 
17 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Commonwealth Parliament, Report 315 Social Responsibilities of 
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises, 1992. 
18 The Steering Committee on Government Trading Enterprises, A Policy Framework for Improving the 
Performance of Government Trading Enterprises, 1988 
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of the Classification Task Force set up for the purpose classified government 
organisations on the basis of the source of their income – whether it was from user 
charges or government tax revenue, and on their market status – whether they were 
operating in a market characterised by competition or monopoly. 
 
This was applied to identify the following types of government organisation 
 
A. Public Service:  Fully or almost fully subsidised monopolistic 
bodies such as the Department of Mineral 
Resources, Business and Consumer Affairs, 
Department of Main Roads, or central agencies 
such as Treasury and the Premier's Department. 
B. Community Service:  Partly subsidised monopolistic bodies such as 
Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages. 
C. Community Business:  Partly subsidised semi-competitive bodies such 
as the SRA (passenger service), UTA or Home 
Care Service. 
D. Commercial Service:  Self-sufficient monopolistic bodies such as the 
Sydney Water Board, Elcom or Maritime 
Services Board. 
E. Commercial Business:  Self-sufficient semi-competitive bodies such as 
the County Councils or the TAB. 
F. Commercial Enterprise: Self-sufficient fully-competitive bodies such as 
the GIO, State Bank and State Brickworks.20 
 
Notable within this approach is that government is taken to subsist as a function within 
markets; that is to say that there is no idea of government as outside the discourse of 
market.21  This can be contrasted with Seidman’s first and fifth criteria, where 
                                                                                                                                               
19 Classification Task Force, Classification and Control of State Organisations 1989 
20 Policy Framework, above n 18, 6.  The organisations nominated are New South Wales state 
organisations. 
21 The New South Wales Classification Task Force appended a discussion of ‘theory’, all of which was 
explicitly economic theory: above n 19, 39, Appendix “C”.  
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government is distinguished from the discourse of market.  They are incommensurable 
concepts within Seidman’s analysis, whereas the Classification Task Force and the 
Steering Committee before it (although it used a discussion paper issued by the former) 
abandon the idea of government function.  The function of the body becomes 
subordinated to its location within society conceived of as a set of markets. 
 
The reconsideration of the structures, functions and performance of government 
organisations that took place in New South Wales developed its ‘five principles of 
corporatisation’ as a set of propositions indicating when ‘the full benefits of GTE 
[Government Trading Enterprise] reform [would be] realised’.22  These provided the 
foundation for structural reform by establishing the nature of the bodies which could be 
deployed to break up the vertical structure of integrated industries in which 
governments had stakes, and set the scene for the establishment of competitive 
neutrality principles.  
 
Regulation of Competitive Conduct 
 
The National Competition Policy operated on Australia’s competition law as it was in 
1995.  This was defined by sec 1(1) of the Conduct Code Agreement to be Part IV and 
related sections of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.). Nowadays that is Part IV 
of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) plus Part IIIA and includes the 
Competition Code and state legislation – all of which were the result of changes 
implemented under the aegis of the National Competition Policy.   
 
In 1995, and it has not varied much since then, Part IV set out a series of proscribed 
business practices, some ‘per se’ as having a deleterious effect on competition, and 
others proscribed only if they ‘substantially lessened competition’.  Appropriately it was 
titled ‘Restrictive Trade Practices’, distinguishing it from ‘Unconscionable Conduct’ in 
Part IVA, ‘Consumer Protection’ in Part V and ‘Liability of Manufacturers and 
Importers for Defective Goods’ in Part VA.   
 
                                                 
22 Ibid ii.   
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The proscribed practices23 included (loosely) acting as a cartel,24 misusing market 
power,25 and acquiring too much market power.26  There were a number of exceptions 
                                                 
23 The version of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) here being summarised is as amended, taking 
account of amendments up to Act 141 of 1994.  It is version C2004C07655, prepared on 31 Dec 1994. 
24 This includes:  
 Making or giving effect to a contract, arrangement or understanding that substantially lessens 
competition (s 45(2)(a)(ii)).  
 Providing, in a contract, arrangement or understanding between competitors plus maybe others, 
for a boycott in acquiring or supplying (s 45(2)(a)(i), referring to s 4D which defines 
‘exclusionary provision’). 
 Fixing or controlling prices in a contract, arrangement or understanding (s 45A)  which, together 
with bid rigging, restricting output, allocating customers and bid-rigging were shifted to a 
separate division, Division 1, Cartel Conduct, ss 44ZZRB-44ZZRV, and criminalised in 2009 by 
the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth).  
 Engaging in conduct with someone else, which causes a third person to boycott a fourth person, 
and which causes a substantial lessening of competition in the market in which that fourth person 
operates (a ‘secondary boycott’) (s 45D).  Due to their close relation to industrial law, the 
secondary boycotts provisions have always been controversial.  They have been amended on a 
number of occasions, most recently in 1996 by the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) in which causing substantial loss or damage or affecting international 
trade were added as proscribed purposes for secondary boycotts. 
25 Sections 46, 47, 48 and the old version of s 49.   
Under s 46, ‘misuse’ means to take advantage of that market power for the purpose of damaging or 
eliminating an existing or potential competitor, or deterring or preventing entry into a market or 
competitive conduct.  Section 46 has long been thought a difficult provision and it too has been frequently 
amended, most recently in order to explicitly provide for predatory pricing: Trade Practices Legislation 
Amendment Act (No 1) 2007 (Cth) and Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth), the latter 
in order to settle issues to do with recoupment.  There have been other changes, early on to the degree of 
market power the exercise of which was the subject of proscription and also to guide Courts in their 
assessment of market power.   
‘Exclusive dealing’ under s 47 is where a person sells or refuses to sell unless the person to whom they 
are selling  
 accepts restrictions which substantially lessen competition on  
– from whom they acquire other goods or services or 
– to whom they can resupply, or 
 acquires goods or services from someone else (‘third line forcing’), 
or buys or refuses to buy unless the person from whom they are buying accepts some restriction on their 
right to sell to someone else. 
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and exemptions from enforcement, including specified exemptions in s 51,27 
authorisation on public interest grounds for some, but not all, of the practices,28 
notification of exclusive dealing under s 4729 or conduct relating to the export of goods 
or services30 and informal clearance for acquisitions and mergers subject to s 50. 
Administration was placed in the hands of the Trade Practices Commission, which was 
established by the Act.  This comprised administrative action, court enforcement and 
                                                                                                                                               
The drafting of s 47 is notoriously bad; it was excoriated as follows by Kirby J in Visy Paper Pty Ltd v 
ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 1 at 24: 
The language of the provisions of the TPA applicable to this case is obscure. Indeed, it represents 
a significant challenge for interpretation. It is in need of redrafting by reference to concepts and 
purposes. It requires the negotiation of too many cross-references, qualifications and statutory 
interrelationships. This imposes an unreasonable burden on the corporations and their officers 
subject to the TPA, the ACCC enforcing the Act and courts with the responsibility of assigning 
meaning to, and applying, its provisions.  
It is in the context of such legislative opacity and unwieldiness that it is essential, in my view, to 
adopt a construction of the TPA that achieves the apparent purposes of that Act by furthering the 
objectives of Australian competition law. Keeping such purposes in mind helps to shine the light 
essential to finding one’s way through the maze created by the statutory language. Even then, there 
is a substantial danger of losing one’s way in the encircling gloom. 
Section 48 provides for resale price maintenance, which is not selling something to a reseller unless 
the reseller does not resell that thing below a certain price (the practice is defined in ss 96-100); 
Unjustifiable discrimination in the prices charged for goods or services provided in respect of those 
goods, or even the prices charged for the services provided in respect of those goods (s 49) – this was 
not enforced and was repealed in 1995 by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth).  A new 
provision as to dual listed company arrangements was inserted as s 49 by the Trade Practices 
Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2006 (Cth) 
26Section 50: Acquiring shares or assets if substantial lessening of competition would result. 
27 Matters specifically authorised or approved by legislation of the Commonwealth, the States or the 
Territories, contracts, arrangements or understandings relating to employment matters, agreed restrictions 
on work post employment (the common law restraint of trade’, partnerships, protection of goodwill, and 
licensing or assignment of intellectual property rights, apart from misuse of the market power such 
intellectual property rights conferred. 
28 S 88. 
29 S 93, which merely allowed the practice to continue unless and until the Trade Practices Commission 
intervened. 
30 S 51((2)(g). 
89 
 
other compliance measures, and information dissemination.  The Trade Practices 
Commission also had the roles of determining applications for authorisation, research 
and law reform advice.31  In many respects the actions of the Trade Practices 
Commission were reviewable by a tribunal set up for the purpose: the Trade Practices 
Tribunal (now the Australian Competition Tribunal).32   
 
Naturally, there were many further machinery provisions, extensions for particular 
reasons (such as Trans-Tasman Trade), and definitions (notably of market power). The 
whole can be dense and complicated,33 a tendency made worse by the necessity of 
complying with the Constitution.  Commonwealth laws regulating markets in Australia 
must be made within the powers conferred by the Constitution.34  Section 51, which 
provides for the legislative powers of the Commonwealth, does not confer a specific 
power to do so.35  Accordingly, the validity of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), and the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) subsequently, rest on other powers; namely, 
s 51(i) trade and commerce with other countries and amongst the States, (xx) foreign 
corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth, and (xxix) external affairs.  The consequence was considerable 
complexity36 as drafters strove to connect particular provisions with one or more of 
these subject matters.  It also meant that considerable portions of market activity were 
                                                 
31 Part 2. 
32 Part 3. 
33 See above n 25 with regard to s 47. 
34 See Chapter 2, ‘The Federal Context’, above. 
35 Australia’s first attempt at competition law, the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906(Cth) was 
rendered ineffective by a combination of restrictive interpretation and, relevantly here, constitutional 
invalidity: see, in respect of the former, Adelaide Steamship Co v AG (Cth) (1912) 15 CLR 65 (HCA); 
[1913] AC 781 (PC); and of the latter, Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330.  
Reliance for constitutionality was placed on the corporations power, s 51(xx).  The second attempt, Trade 
Practices Act 1965(Cth), also relied on the corporations power and although the case overruled Huddart, 
Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead, the High Court of Australia nevertheless found the Act 
unconstitutional: Strickland v Rocla Pipes Limited (1971) 124 CLR 468. 
36 Although complexity was disciplined by the refusal of the High Court to allow the constitutional 
validity of the Trade Practices Act 1965(Cth) due to the lack of severability of the complex provisions 
providing the link between the provisions of the Act and s 51(xx) of the Constitution: Strickland v Rocla 
Pipes Limited (1971) 124 CLR 468. 
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left unregulated; for example, that conducted within a State or Territory by non-
corporate bodies.  Removal of these gaps was the subject of some aspects of the 
National Competition Policy, although clarification was not. 
 
Looking at the history37 of these provisions reveals that the position taken by the Hilmer 
Committee on competition policy in its distinction between banned practices and 
assessment of the public interest was already inherent to the law.  The immediate 
inspiration for the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was a statement by Sir Garfield 
Barwick, read in Parliament on 6 December 1962.38  The statement set out a scheme ‘to 
control monopoly and restrictive practices in the business community of Australia’.39  It 
explicitly rejected the American and British approaches of concentrating on monopoly 
power, the former with the comment, ‘[i]ndeed, one suspects that behind the original 
American legislation was the fear that industry, if it obtained sufficient dimension, 
would be a threat to government and likely to overawe and control the legislature.’40  
The Barwick statement went on to broadly outline the philosophy of the proposed 
                                                 
37 This history starts relatively recently with the origins of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).  
Useful accounts of earlier epochs can be found in Robert Merkin and Karen Williams, Antitrust Policy in 
the UK and the EEC (Sweet and Maxwell, 1984) 4-8; J H Agnew,  Competition Law (Allen and Unwin, 
1985) 1-6.   
38 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 6 December 1962, 3102 (Mr Freeth, 
Acting Attorney-General, reading a statement of Sir Garfield Barwick, Attorney General). 
39 Ibid.   
40 Ibid, 3104.  This is a substantial understatement.  There is no doubt at all that the motivation for the 
Sherman Act was at least as much political as economic: Hovenkamp, H. ‘Antitrust Policy after Chicago’ 
(1985) 84 Michigan Law Review 213; or even the delightful R. Hofstadter, ‘What Happened to the 
Antitrust Movement?’ in The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Vintage, 1967) 188.  
Hofstadter identified ‘three kinds’ of ‘goals of antitrust’: economic goals seeking maximum efficiency 
through competition, the political goals of ‘block[ing] private accumulations of power and protect[ing] 
democratic government’, and the social and moral goals where ‘the competitive process was believed to 
be a kind of disciplinary machinery for the development of character, and the competitiveness of the 
people the fundamental stimulus to national morale’: 199-200.. As Giorgio Monti puts it in EC 
Competition Laws (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 4: ‘it is helpful to think about the factors that 
influence the shape of competition law and the decisions that stem from those rules on the basis of the 
interaction of three components: a political decision about the aims of competition law; and economic 
theory about how markets behave, how and when they fail, and how market failure may be remedied; and 
an institution in charge of enforcing competition law.’ 
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legislation: ‘The Government believes that practices which reduce competition may 
endanger those benefits which we properly expect and mostly enjoy from a free-
enterprise society’, thus focussing the proposal on competition.  Yet it also 
acknowledged that there were some restrictive practices which would be in the public 
interest either generally or in the particular case.   
 
This approach of distinguishing proscription of the practice from consideration of the 
public interest in maintaining the practice was that adopted in the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth).41  While the recommended notification and registration system was not 
adopted, a bureaucratic solution to exempting the public interest was, through 
‘authorisation’ and ‘notification’.  The difference was in the strength of the proscription: 
practices under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) were prohibited unless they could be 
shown to be justifiable in the public interest, whereas under the Barwick proposal the 
reverse was true.  Moreover in the Act the courts were given the role of enforcement of 
the prohibition, whilst the exemptions were to be conferred by an administrative body.42   
 
Oddly enough, it was a bastion of the other side of politics, Sir Lionel Murphy, who 
steered the 1974 Act into being.43  His rhetoric has a very similar sound to that of Sir 
Garfield Barwick’s statement, even mentioning the latter with approbation, but not 
                                                 
41 Between Sir Garfield Barwick’s statement and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)  an attempt at the 
same sort of thing was made in the form of the Trade Practices Act 1965(Cth).  Ultimately failing the 
constitutionality test (see n 35 above) it was a ‘considerably diluted’ version of the statement’s proposals: 
Maureen Brunt, ‘Lawyers and Competition Policy’, in D Hambly and J Goldring (eds) Australian 
Lawyers and Social Change, (Law Book, 1976) 266, 266.  See also David Merrett, Stephen Corones and 
David Round, ‘The introduction of Competition Policy in Australia: The Role of David Bannerman’, 
(2007) 47 Australian Economic History Review 178.  Meanwhile Sir Garfield Barwick made, between the 
time of his statement and his appointment to the High Court of Australia, a ‘stimulating and impressive 
contribution’ to the development of trade practices legislation and the philosophy behind it in a series of 
papers: Maureen Brunt, ‘Legislation in Search of an Objective’, (1965) The Economic Record 357; 
reprinted in her Economic Essays in Australian and New Zealand Competition Law (Kluwer, 2003) 51.   
42 A more detailed, yet still conceptual, comparison is provided in Brunt (1976) above n 41, 87-89. 
43 For an account of the course of development of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) between 1962 and 
1974, see David Merrett, Stephen Corones and David Round, ‘The Introduction of Competition Policy in 
Australia: The Role of Ron Bannerman’ (2007) 47 Australian Economic History Review 178. 
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focussing on competition as an unquestionable good.  Nevertheless, the distinction 
between competition and the public interest was maintained: 
 
the Bill deals in a comprehensive way with those practices which have 
been injuring the community and which have led to private price fixing, 
to contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, to 
monopolisation, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, anti-competitive 
mergers and conduct which is recognised all round the world as being 
against the proper operation of the economy. These practices were dealt 
with by Sir Garfield Barwick when he was Attorney General. He is now 
Chief Justice of the High Court.44 
 
Between its enactment 1974 and 1993, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) changed 
little.45  Maureen Brunt, the doyen of Australian trade practices law, in reviewing the 
operation and effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in 199446 identified 
as the most important interpretive developments that it became an ‘economic law’.  That 
meant it became a law where the objects are economic and not moral, yet where 
specification of admitted economic concepts is subject to the statute and the usual 
procedures of statutory interpretation.47  In other words, while there is a complex 
                                                 
44 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 24 October 1973, 1 (Senator Lionel Murphy)  
45 Possibly the most radical changes were: 
1. The extension of the Act to bind the Crown (Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977 (Cth)). 
2. Tightening up the anti-cartel provisions in s 45, especially by adding a per se prohibition on 
price fixing is s 45A (Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977 (Cth)). 
3. The criteria for prohibition of secondary boycotts were shifted around in 1978 (Trade Practices 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1978 (Cth)) and 1980 (Trade Practices (Boycotts) Amendment Act (No 2) 
1978 (Cth)) as they have since then. 
4. The test for the prohibition of mergers shifted from substantial lessening of competition to 
market dominance in 1977 (Trade Practices Amendment Act (No 2) 1978 (Cth)) and back again 
in 1993 (Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 1992(Cth)). 
46 ‘The Australian Antitrust Law after 20 years – A Stocktake’, (1994) 9 Review of Industrial 
Organisation 483, reprinted in her Economic Essays in Australian and New Zealand Competition Law 
(Kluwer, 2003) 297. 
47 Ibid, 311-2, citing Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd 
(1989) ATPR 40-925, esp Deane J at 50-0111. 
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interplay between economics and interpretive constraints in judicial interpretation to the 
Act, the danger that Brunt had previously foreseen, that it would become subject to 
judicial marginalisation through the inheritance of the English common law tradition 
and practices, never eventuated.  It avoided the fate of the Australian Industries 
Preservation Act 1906 (Cth).  This also supports the separation of competition policy 
from public interest. 
 
Just as importantly, the administrative bodies have not worked in conceptual opposition 
to either economists or the Courts.  The dual system of adjudication and administrative 
discretion for exemption does allow for different ways of thinking to be adopted.  Yet 
for the most part, according to Brunt (admitting to somewhat benign view) the  
administrative bodies, both Commission and Tribunal, use the structure-conduct-
performance approach in their work and ‘there has been a kind of dialogue between the 
administrative bodies, the courts, lawyers, economists and the Parliament to achieve 
clarity and sense’.48  To put this another way, the conceptual framework of competition 
policy as established by Sir Garfield Barwick remained hegemonic. 
 
  
Prices Oversight of Government Business 
 
Governmental oversight, even prescription, of prices in an economy has a long history.  
Lex Julia de Annona of about 18BCE in the Roman Augustan period against merchants 
raising market prices is commonly cited in this respect but 2000 years earlier 
Hammurabi’s Code also provided numerous examples of set prices.  Since then there 
would be hardly a society which has not had at least some controls on some prices at 
some stage.   
 
Over those two, or perhaps four, millennia, Governments have intervened in prices by 
either direct control, whether by specifying a price or a formula from which a price may 
be derived, or by requiring information to be provided, from which various 
determinations of, say, acceptability, and decisions as to possible direct control can 
flow. The information can be requisitioned by demanding notification of price change to 
                                                 
48 Brunt, above n 41, 319. 
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an administrative agency, monitoring of prices by an agency or inquiry as to pricing in 
specific markets.   
 
In Australia all these techniques have been variously deployed (although only in 
Australia’s case for a couple of centuries).49  Prices have been fixed or set at minimum 
or maximum levels by numerous statutory authorities marketing particular products, 
industry-specific regulation has set prices,50 governments have directed the provision of 
services at set prices, and there have been various oversight mechanisms.51  Prior to 
Strickland v Rocla Pipes Limited52 the Commonwealth was considered not to have the 
power, other than in wartime, to directly control prices but subsequently the power to  
regulate corporations under the Constitution, s 51(xx) was considered sufficient.  Hence 
much early direct regulation was effected by the States.  Post Strickland, however, the 
Commonwealth moved to provide for general oversight in the form, first, of the Prices 
Justification Act 1973, which remained in force until 1981, and the Prices Surveillance 
Act 1983.  The latter remained in force until 2003, when it was replaced by similar 
provisions in Part VIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), now of the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).   
 
Prior to the Hilmer Report there was little distinction between prices of products and 
services provided for or by Government businesses and those of other businesses.53  
Certainly there was a change in focus, away from prices as something to be concerned 
about in themselves to prices as the product of market forces and hence possibly 
symptomatic of market ills – in other words, of the presence or absence of competition.  
                                                 
49 Productivity Commission, Review of the Prices Surveillance Act 1983, Report No 14, 2001, ch 2 
provides a most useful overview of prices control and oversight in Australia.  Ironically, this report is a 
Commonwealth legislation review under the Agreements. 
50 In particular the Petroleum Pricing Act 1981 (Cth).  See Table 2.1 in Productivity Commission, 
Review, above n 49, 13. 
51 Prices Justification Act 1973 (Cth), Prices Regulation Act 1949 (NT), NSW Prices Regulation Act 1948 
and Prices Act 1948 (SA). 
52 (1971) 124 CLR 468. 
53 One partial exception is New South Wales, where a Provisional Prices Tribunal and Government 
Pricing tribunal was established.  However, it was not about government pricing as such, rather it was 
directed at utility pricing, such as electricity, water and public transport. 
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This can be seen in the changing justification for intervention in prices:  in 1983 it was a 
matter of a prices and incomes policy in itself whereas by 1993 it was seen to be a 
matter of competition policy.54  Nevertheless, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission is still required in its decisions as to prices surveillance to have 
regard to: 
 
(a) the need to maintain investment and employment, including the 
influence of profitability on investment and employment; 
(b) the need to discourage a person who is in a position to substantially 
influence a market for goods or services from taking advantage of 
that power in setting prices; 
(c) the need to discourage cost increases arising from increases in wages 
and changes in conditions of employment inconsistent with 
principles established by relevant industrial tribunals.55 
 
Only the second of these has a connection with competition policy.  No matter, 
however, the rationale prior to the Hilmer Report, the subjects of control remained 
undifferentiated at that time; moreover the shift to competition as a rationale implied 
that whether that subject was a government business or otherwise was irrelevant to the 
basis of the need for control.  That is not to say that the Hilmer Committee moved away 
from the trend: their recommendations, as will be discussed below, were about the 
likelihood of a failure of competition in the markets in which government businesses 
operated and also about ensuring government businesses were subject to market 
disciplines.  
 
Competitive Neutrality 
 
Given there was thought to be a category of institutions, the ‘government business 
enterprise’, which ought to be subject to competition policy, the question arises as to 
how the normative latter proposition arose.  There is little trace of an explicit Australian 
‘competitive neutrality’ policy prior to the government instrumentality reform 
                                                 
54 Productivity Commission, Review, above n 49. 
55 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 95G. 
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movement in New Zealand.56  Most of the concerns with government trading 
organisations, instrumentalities, business enterprises and so forth were about 
accountability,57 responsibility58 and performance,59 although this is not to deny that 
concerns about a ‘level playing field’ with private enterprise may have been acted upon 
in individual cases, including corporatisations and privatisations.   
 
Oddly enough, the idea of subjecting government instrumentalities to the market arose 
from perceptions that government was crowding out the private sector through 
excessive taxation and deficit financing leading to high interest rates.60  The public 
sector was seen to be inefficient and unproductive, its functions should be performed by 
the private sector to the extent possible.  In other words, efficiency would be served if 
the private sector did much of what the public sector tried to do.  This ushered in the era 
of ‘microeconomic reform’: the reform of the internal (‘micro’) organisation of 
government.   
 
                                                 
56 See Michael Taggart, ‘Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public Law’, (1991) 2 Public Law Review 77, 
77 & 79.  Competitive neutrality under the New Zealand State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 appears to be 
a broader thing that in the Hilmer Report’s sense, and mainly to be solved by corporatisation and 
privatisation: the operation of the enterprise as a public company.  Much more emphasis is on allowing 
State enterprises to operate unfettered by requirements that place them at a disadvantage, although unfair 
commercial advantages were eschewed.  Roger Wettenhall provides an explanation of this: New Zealand 
did not have the transition period between departmental organisation of state intervention in the economy 
and the public enterprise reform movement of the late twentieth century; accordingly the concerns were 
more broad-brush and did not take for granted issues which the Australian reform movement did; see 
‘Corporations and Corporatisation: An Administrative History’ (1995) 6 Public Law Review, 7, 9. 
57 Stephen Bottomley, Government Business Enterprises and Public Accountability through Parliament, 
Research Paper No 18 of 1999-2000, Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000 
58 E.g., Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Commonwealth Parliament, Report 315. Social 
Responsibilities of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises, 1992. 
59 E.g., Task Force on Monitoring Performance of Government Trading Enterprises, A Framework for 
national Performance Monitoring of Government trading Enterprises, Report to Special Premiers’ 
Conference, 1991. 
60 Stephen Bell. Ungoverning the Economy (Oxford University Press, 1997) 131-2. 
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New Zealand was an early adopter of microeconomic reform.  Competitive neutrality 
was introduced as a matter of the assessment of managerial performance.61  New South 
Wales followed suit fairly rapidly, in 1989 nominating competitive neutrality as one of 
‘five principles of corporatisation’.62  While this was still a matter of internal disciplines 
on management, the entire conceptual framework was addressed by the Steering 
Committee on Government Trading Enterprises.63  This conceptual framework was 
couched in microeconomic terms, those of productive and allocative efficiency: 
 
The main way a GTE [Government Trading Enterprise] affects the 
community's overall welfare is through the efficiency of its commercial 
performance in undertaking those activities. The concept of economic 
efficiency refers to the extent to which society's scarce resources (of 
people, knowledge, physical capital and environmental resources) are 
able to satisfy competing wants.64 
 
While management performance was seen as a matter of productive efficiency, 
allocative efficiency ‘relates to whether the levels of goods and services produced by 
organisations are consistent with the mix of goods and services which will yield 
maximum consumption benefits to society over time’.65  This focussed consideration on 
whether the organisation received benefits or suffered detriments not available to 
private sector organisations, to the extent that they were not justified in the public 
interest.  It was this that came to be known as ‘competitive neutrality’. 
 
                                                 
61 Wettenhall, above n 56, 9-10, referring to a speech by the New Zealand Minister of Finance in 1985. 
62 Ibid 10. 62 In Queensland, the government adopted an approach to corporatising government owned 
enterprises which specifically mentioned ‘competition with alternative providers on equal terms’: 
Queensland Treasury, Commercialisation of Government Service Functions in Queensland.  Policy 
Framework, 1994, 3, although this was one of four ‘key principles in commercialisation reform, the 
others being, ‘clear specification of objectives; an appropriate level of management responsibility and 
autonomy; strict accountability for performance.’ 
63 Policy Framework, above n 18, 19. 
64 Ibid  11. 
65 Ibid 12. 
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Structural Reform of Government Monopolies 
 
While, again, there was no generally applicable State or Commonwealth policy about 
structural reform, in the decade prior to the 1990s there was considerable reform of 
individual utilities and other monopolies.  Indeed, the activity was sufficiently 
widespread that the Agreements referred to some of it as outside their purview and sub 
nom ‘other reforms’.   
 
Examples of pre 1993 structural reform of government monopolies included as to the 
gas industry in Victoria, ports and cargo handling in New South Wales, Western 
Australia, Victoria and Queensland, the electricity industry in New South Wales, 
Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia, water in Victoria and New 
South Wales, post and telecommunication services, marketing of various agricultural 
commodities in most States, the airline industry, rail in New South Wales and Victoria, 
aged care in Tasmania, educations and training in New South Wales and Victoria.66   
 
That there was a great deal of such activity is hardly surprising.  It was a trend predating 
conscious ‘microeconomic reform’ and adopted on a world scale, although not 
universally so.67  Australia’s closest models, the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, international institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operations and Development, and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, 
plus the public service68 and much of the economic profession69 (although there were 
                                                 
66 From its 1989-90 Annual Report onwards, the Productivity Commission and its predecessor, the 
Industry Commission, published a list of what it called ‘microeconomic reforms undertaken by 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments’.  While somewhat inflated, they do provide useful 
compendia and illustrate well the point being made here that much was happening in the years before the 
advent of the National Competition Policy.  See Industry Commission, Annual Report 1991-2, 1992, 
Appendix F; ... Annual Report 1992-3, 1993, Appendix L; Annual Report 1990-1, 1991, Appendices 1 & 
2; ... Annual Report 1989-90, 1990, Appendix 5. 
67 The chief exceptions in the list of developed nations are the ‘corporatist countries of Northern Europe’: 
Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy (Oxford University Press, 1997) 128.  
68 As exemplified by Pusey’s study: Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
69 Bell, above n. 67. 
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dissidents70) all promoted, even proselytised, commercialising, corporatizing and 
privatising much of the erstwhile activities of the public sector.    
 
Legislation Reviews 
 
A formal process of Legislation review to remove unnecessary impediments to 
competition was an invention by the Hilmer Committee.  This is not to say that in the 
years leading up to the advent National Competition Policy many pieces of legislation 
had not been reviewed in various jurisdictions and changed in favour of competitive 
models of organisation; after all, structural reform of various industries was well 
established.  However, the explicit focus on impediments to competition was new.   
 
Access 
 
Access to essential facilities is an old issue in competition law: in some situations there 
is a ‘natural monopoly’ which allows a single supplier or purchaser to dominate a 
market and hence charge or give non-competitive prices.  A ‘natural’ monopoly is 
generally thought of one where the entire market can be supplied by a single institution 
at a lower cost than having more than one supplier (or purchaser). Sometimes an 
additional criterion, that it is uneconomical to duplicate the facility, is added.  The 
access issue is how to ensure that prices do not reflect the monopoly power of the 
institution.     
 
There are at least three established ways of dealing with the problem of access.  They 
are (i) to provide for industry specific regimes for access to the facilities, (ii) to provide 
a general regime, and (iii) to consider access to be a matter of the general proscription 
against the abuse of market power.  The Hilmer Committee chose the second as most 
appropriate for the Australian economy, but there are still specific regimes in place for 
                                                 
70 For example, see Ben Fine and Dimitri Milonakis, From Economics Imperialism to Freakonomics 
(Routledge, 2009), or Lee Boldman, The Cult of the Market: Economic Fundamentalism and its 
Discontents (ANU ePress, 2007).  There are many others. 
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telecommunications71 and electricity72 and gas, 73 and a variety of State regimes.  The 
existence of general and specific regimes for access did not and does not preclude 
reliance on s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) or its predecessor74 in 
relation to the use of market power for a prescribed purpose, although the mere charging 
of monopoly prices is not one such purpose.   
 
Recognition of Need 
 
To summarise the position as the start of the 1990s, there was considerable 
governmental activity concerned with the reform of the public sector in some of the 
jurisdictions comprising the Australian polity.  Structural reform in a variety of 
industries was progressing apace; government organisations were being reformed to 
clarify objectives, enhance accountability, ensure managerial competence and authority, 
and where possible to compete without disadvantage or advantage with the private 
sector.  Problems of misuse of natural monopoly power were being addressed.  Price 
control was easing, being replaced with surveillance.  All this was part of a general 
movement within Australia’s political economy against ‘big government’ – ‘big’ in 
terms of its financial burden on the economy, its excessive regulation both in terms of 
freedom to act and costs of compliance, its constraints on financial system, and its 
protectionism. 
 
Economic Rationalism 
 
By 1990 speeches of Premiers and the Prime Minister paid considerable attention to 
microeconomic reform.  It is a clear element in Prime Minister Bob Hawke’s 1990 
speech to the National Press Club in which he complains of the ‘balkanised’ nature of 
                                                 
71 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Part XIC. 
72 National Electricity Law, implemented by the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA). 
73 National Gas Law, implemented by the National Gas (South Australia) Act 2008 (SA).  It was 
previously known as the Gas Code and was implemented by the Gas Pipelines Access (South Australia) 
Act 1997 (SA). 
74 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 46. 
101 
 
the Australian Economy,75 a claim echoing a notorious comment of his Treasurer Paul 
Keating in 1986, that Australia ran the risk of becoming a ‘banana republic’.  Bob 
Hawke was quite explicit as to the need for competition within the economy on 12 
March 1991 in his speech ‘Building a Competitive Australia’.76   
 
The need for reforms, variously called microeconomic reform, structural reform, 
economic and industry policy, or competition policy, figured large in the debates and 
machinations surrounding the Premiers’ Conferences of the early 1990s.  Even while 
the politics was thrashed out, steady progress was made on what should be done in these 
areas.  Morgan talks of ‘narrowly bounded debates within the microeconomic reform 
“policy community”’ at this time.77  It is a little difficult to work out exactly who did 
what in her explanation, the idea of ‘policy community’ being somewhat of a 
construct,78 but clearly the claim is that various bureaucrats from Treasury, Finance, the 
Structural Adjustment and Expenditure Review committees of federal cabinet, the 
Industries Assistance Commission and its successor the Productivity Commission, and 
the then Trade Practices Commission engaged in a one-way conversation with the more 
general policy community. Moreover, the extant government reports, particularly from 
the Industry Commission,79 reveal a strong polemic, much in the way of a mantra, 
repeated in almost every discussion. The mantra is about efficiency in achieving the 
social or economic objectives of government.  ‘Efficiency’ is divided into productive 
and allocative varieties, both of which require the disciplines of operation in a market, 
either literally or in terms of organisational design principles.  The only constraint on 
                                                 
75 Robert J. L. Hawke, Towards a Closer Partnership, Speech by the Prime Minister, Canberra, National 
Press Club, 19 July 1990 
76 National Press Club, 12 March 1991. 
77 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003), 66. 
78 The analytical structure of policy making adopted for her study is discussed by Morgan at ibid, 45-7, 
although without explicit mention of ‘policy community’.  As discussed in Chapter 9, Morgan’s analysis 
for present purposes (but not necessarily for hers) renders invisible many matters of significance to a 
thick descriptive account.  A relevant example here is the dynamics of federalism; another is the 
translation gap between the polemic of efficiency and the unified action list of the Hilmer Report. 
79 The ‘push for ‘microeconomic reform’ in the Industries Assistance Commission is discussed in 
Productivity Commission, From Industry Assistance to Productivity: 30 Years of ‘the Commission’ 2003, 
58-62.  
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the pursuit of ‘efficiency’ is ‘the public interest’, in accordance with the hegemonic 
thinking as to competition law discussed earlier.  The polemic is taken up in the Hilmer 
Report.  All of this fits in with Pusey’s account of economic rationalism in Canberra.80  
 
As observed in Chapter 1 in relation to government material assessing competition 
policy, the Public Service is required by s 10(1)(a) of the Public Service Act 1999 and 
its predecessors81 to be ‘apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial and 
professional manner’, and under s 10(1)(f) it is required to be ‘responsive to the 
Government in providing frank, honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice and 
in implementing the Government’s policies and program’.  Policy arises out of politics, 
the public service provides advice and implements it: this is the system of separation of 
powers so famously observed of England in the eighteenth century by Montesquieu82 
and which allegedly obtains in Australia and much of the Western World.   
 
Montesquieu’s picture has been seriously challenged.83  While this is hardly ground-
breaking commentary – the lack of reality of the image is even the subject of much 
popular comedy – it is of significance to competition policy.  The particular formations 
of thinking and discourse within the public service, or even elites within the public 
service, are a part of the context in which the National Competition Policy arose.  They 
are claimed to have had significant impact on it, even to have made it inevitable. 
 
                                                 
80 Pusey, above n 68.  See also Lindy Edwards, How to Argue with an Economist (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
81 In particular the Public Service Act 1922 (Cth) as amended from time to time; and the Administrative 
Arrangements Act 1987 (Cth).  There is a particularly useful timeline in Kathy MacDermott, Whatever 
Happened to Frank and Fearless? (ANU E Press, 2008) Appendix, 151-9. 
82 Charles du Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (first published 1748, tr Thomas 
Nugent,, rev ed, D Appleton, 1900). 
83 For Australia see especially S Encel, Equality and Authority (Cheshire, 1970) and more generally Joel 
D Aberbach, Robert D Putnam and Bert A Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western 
Democracies (Harvard University Press, 1981).  See Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991) 2. 
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In this vein, Michael Pusey provides a critical account of the advent of ‘economic 
rationalism’ into the Commonwealth public service in the 1980s.84  He concludes that 
there has been a ‘triumph’ of a particular perspective which has come to dominate (at 
least) Canberra with its particular ‘political-administrative discourse’.85  In contrast to 
Lindy Edward’s version of these events, which is considered below, Pusey’s ‘economic 
rationalism’ is a complex model of the relation between state, economy and society, 
with world ordering pressuring the national economy.  It is summarised in the following 
diagram:86 
 
 
 
 
He says of it: 
 
The presumption of economic rationalism is that the reproduction of 
society turns increasingly, or even exclusively, on a strengthened mode 
of system integration in which the burden of coordination is passed from 
the inferior medium of coordination of state bureaucracy to the 
supposedly better one of the economy.87 
 
                                                 
84 Pusey, above n 83, ch 5.  There are many corresponding but later accounts, including MacDermott, 
above n 81 and Lindy Edwards, How to Argue with an Economist (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
85 Ibid 10. 
86 Pusey, above n 83, 210. 
87 Ibid. 18. 
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The ‘rationalism’ lies in the replacement of (Habermasian) ‘deliberative capacity’ 
within the political administrative system with a  
 
scientism that seems to turn arbitrariness into givenness and imperiously 
asserts its own exclusive evaluative criteria for what will, in the wake of 
its ‘reforms’, count as intelligence, ability, and efficacy within and 
beyond Canberra.  What wins is a kind of ‘dephenomenonalising’ 
abstraction that tries to neutralise the social contexts of program goals in 
every area whether it be education, industry support, public health, or 
water resource management.  What counts, further, is the speed, 
elegance, and agility with which one can create a purely formal and 
transcontextual commensurability of reference across goals that are then 
treated as objects of decisions that will be made on extrinsic criteria ever 
further removed from real tasks and situations.88 
 
Within this 
 
The choices and decisions of individuals are coordinated through the 
market economy and its capacity for delivering ‘efficient and effective 
outcomes’ depends on a relationship with the state that already goes 
beyond the libertarian presumption that the ‘freedom to’ pursue one’s 
own individual purposes equates, on the other side of the same coin, with 
a ‘freedom from’ state interference.89 
 
Further: 
 
Culture and identity dissolve into arbitrary individual choices and, 
moreover, institutional arbitrariness is no longer a sign of failure but is 
instead put forward with deadly seriousness as a necessary condition, at 
                                                 
88 Ibid 10-11. 
89 Ibid 240-1. 
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the steering level, for the smooth and rational operation of a self-
referential system.90 
 
This has been challenged as a ‘statist explanatory approach’ focussing on state elites 
and assuming too great a role for state autonomy and discretion,91 not to mention 
assuming a large coincidence of transitions to economic rationalism throughout the 
various polities of Australia.  This critique is somewhat unfair as Pusey’s account is 
intended as a model within which Australian politics functions, providing ‘mid-level’ 
concepts to counteract the vacuity of post-modern discourse.  However it is all too 
easily taken to be a description of the actual modalities of thought of the actors in 
politics – even Pusey falls into that trap.  Be that as it may, even the staunchest of critics 
acknowledges the influence of dominant discourses.   
 
A somewhat simpler, even simplistic, account of a possible dominant discourse in 
Canberra is provided by Lindy Edwards.  She describes ‘economic rationalism as 
 
The label slapped on a set of ideas that gripped Australian public policy 
circles through the 1980s and 1990s.  Some people use the term to 
describe putting economic considerations above all other values.  Others 
use it to describe an ideological commitment to small government and 
free markets.  My use of the term incorporates both of the above. ... The 
ideas are a simplification of neo-classical economics that combine to 
yield a worldview.92 
 
After reviewing basic microeconomics, Edwards goes on to set out the ‘five rules of 
thumb that economic rationalists take’ from the microeconomics: 
 
 The problem they are trying to solve is the allocation of scarce 
resources. 
                                                 
90 Ibid 21. 
91 Stephen Bell, Ungoverning the Economy. The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 1997) 49. 
92 Edwards, above n 84, 4. 
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 The market targets our resources at making the goods and services 
we value most. 
 The price of a particular good determines how much of it is made. 
 In the end there will be similar profit levels across different sectors of 
the economy. 
 Government should not distort the market.  We should let the market 
operate freely to create maximum wealth, and then redistribute the 
wealth afterwards to achieve any social goals. 
 
Edwards proceeds to describe how ‘economic rationalists deploy these principles: 
 
... economic rationalists charge forth and apply these principles with 
impunity.  They use them as their rule of thumb for understanding the 
world.  Central agency bureaucrats apply them to every issue that comes 
across their desks.  They permeate the assumptions of almost all of the 
policy advice given to the Prime minister, the Treasurer and the Minister 
for Finance. 
 
While Edwards’ account is somewhat overwritten, in the instant study there does indeed 
appear to be a remarkable coincidence of explanation in policy documents. These views 
stress the importance of competition in achieving optimal outcomes in the economy and 
in disciplining and providing incentives for government business enterprises. 
 
At this point in this analysis, as before, care has to be taken to maintain the approach of 
reflexive thick description.93  The imminent danger lies in the extent to which the 
                                                 
93 Even Pusey, above n 83, 13, cites Clifford Geertz (for Pusey the meaningful insight is to be found in 
The Interpretation of Cultures (Hutchinson, 1975) 312-13) at this point in his analysis, although with 
rather different result: 
In a search for an appropriate way of analysing the ‘politics of meaning’, Clifford Geertz long ago 
declared that the scholar has no choice but ‘to build the theoretical scaffold at the same time that 
he constructs his [sic] analysis’.  In his judgment that was the only way of holding analysis 
between the two poles of ‘vacant generality’ and blank description’. ... Yet now, to survive, we 
must make sense of the old and the new meaning of politics.  That task still asks for an approach 
that is, in Geertz’s rather perfect formulation, ‘at once circumstantial enough to carry conviction 
and abstract enough to forward theory’. 
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substance of the dominant perspective, in Pusey’s view being ‘economic rationalism’, 
should be counted as structure in which the National Competition Policy was 
negotiated. In predictive accounts such as Pusey’s and descriptive accounts such as 
Morgan’s and Edwards’, economic rationalism is seen as causative of policies, such as 
the National Competition Policy, in which the policy can be seen to be implicated in or 
even derived from the dogma.  However, accepting wider contexts of, say, Simeon’s 
‘funnel of causality’94 where there may be multiple influences on the development of 
policy, from personal influence to hegemonic ideology, leaves economic rationalism as 
one influence amongst many.  Hence the discussion here is confined to an 
acknowledgment of the probability of policy-forming elites and the possibility of 
discursive hegemony in the public service, together with an indication of what the 
substance of that discourse might be.  The account is of the context of what happened, 
rather than of the possible causes or of the deductions from theoretical understanding of 
policy formation.  That is left to later. 
 
Federalism 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the development of the National Competition Policy was 
coincident with changes in Australia’s federal practices, in particular, the development 
of the Council of Australian Governments.  Indeed it is possibly misleading to say, as it 
is indeed said above, that the Agreements were made ‘coincident with’ or ‘in the context 
of’ the Council of Australian Governments; it could equally be said that the exigencies 
of the development of the National Competition Policy required the Council of 
Australian Governments to be established, as happened on 11 May 1992.95  Putting it 
most accurately, as is argued here, each formed the other. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
The argument in this thesis is that so far in relation to the National Competition Policy there has been too 
much approach and not enough circumstance.  Pusey proceeds to construct just such a ‘theoretical 
scaffold’.   
94 See Bell, above n 91, referring to R Simeon, ‘Studying Public Policy’, (1976) 9 Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 548. 
95 Heads of Government Meeting 11 May 1992, Communique.  This is rather difficult to track down and 
hence a copy is included as Appendix 3 to this thesis. 
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The main apparent mechanisms of intergovernmental relations at the turn of the 1990s 
had been Premiers’ conferences, ministerial councils and financial bodies such as the 
Loans Commission and the Grants Commission.  While Sharman maintains96 that the 
role of these fora was substantially political in that they allowed the executive officers 
in charge of either governments or particular policy areas to speak out representing their 
constituencies, commenting on national affairs and defending those interests, this is to 
downgrade the substantial collective appearance projected by the outcomes of such 
conferences.  That collective appearance was achieved by the development of 
substantial bureaucracies, variously located, supporting the achievement of the 
collective aims of the conferences and commissions.97   
 
Sharman’s account, written in the late 1980s, is of a complex range of activities and 
focuses on ‘executive federalism’, ‘characterised by the channelling of 
intergovernmental relations into transactions controlled by elected and appointed 
officials of the executive branch’.98  This is still as yet tied to a model of conflict: 
Hollander, citing Painter, calls it ‘“arm’s length” federalism’ and describes it as 
‘conflictual in style, parochial in motivation and divergent in outcome with the states 
jealously guarding their remaining powers in the fact of Commonwealth attempts at 
encroachment’.99   
 
Most later commentators describe a further change that took place in the years 
immediately prior to the establishment of the Council of Australian Governments.  This 
change at the very least maintained the role of the executive and probably enhanced it.  
Furthermore, most commentators on the Council of Australian Governments root the 
establishment of that institution in this change.  It was, in Painter’s term, a change to 
‘Collaborative Federalism’.100   
                                                 
96 Ibid, 27-8. 
97 Martin Painter, ‘The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of 
Cooperative Federalism’, (1996) 26 Publius 101, 103. 
98 Ibid, 25. 
99 Hollander, Hollander, Robyn, ‘National Competition Policy, Regulatory reform and Australian 
Federalism’, (2006) 65 Australian Journal of Public Administration 33, 33, citing Martin Painter, 
Collaborative Federalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
100 Ibid. 
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Painter, like many others, gives a particular date for the inception of the change: 19 July 
1990.101  On that day Bob Hawke, then Prime Minister, gave a speech at the National 
Press Club in which he excoriated lack of coordination between states, the entanglement 
of essential services in bureaucracy, and a lack of mobility, portability and uniformity, 
concluding with characteristic hyperbole that the Australian economy was 
‘balkanised’.102  This represented a commonplace point of view, especially in the 
business community (the latter, however, went further and allied it with the public 
choice theory of ‘government failure’ discussed later).   However, Bob Hawke 
proceeded to proselytise a ‘New Federalism’. It comprised two parts:  the first was 
program rationalisation focussing on microeconomic reform, financial relations, 
delivery of services, social justice, industrial relations and the environment.  The second 
part was constitutional reform – although this was to languish and die.  The centrepiece 
of the first was indeed microeconomic reform,103 the substantial part of which was to 
become the National Competition Policy.  This illustrates the extent to which 
competition policy came to be tied into federalism. 
 
A series of ‘Special Premiers Conferences’ were called to set about the tasks set by Bob 
Hawke’s ‘New Federalism’.  These were to take place in July and November 1991, and 
in May 1992, although the course of events was not a smooth as this suggests.  In any 
event, in the last of the meetings it was agreed that a Council of Australian 
Governments would be established ‘as a permanent body for on-going consultations 
between the Prime Minister, Premiers, Chief Ministers and the President of the 
Australian local Government Association’.104  It was to meet at least once a year and 
would be in addition to the financial Premiers’ Conference; in this way splitting off the 
contentious issue of financial relations from more constructive policy possibilities.  
 
                                                 
101 Ibid 3.  See also Kenneth Wiltshire, ‘Recipe for Marble Cakes’, (1992) Publius 165 
102 Robert J. L. Hawke, Towards a Closer Partnership, Speech by the Prime Minister, Canberra, National 
Press Club, 19 July 1990. 
103 Painter, above n 99, 4. 
104 Heads of Government Meeting 11 May 1992, Communique, 1-2 (a copy is appended to this thesis). 
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Much has been written about this transition in the nature of federalism, although there is 
little debate as to exactly what happened, nor even as to causes.  As to causes, the 
consensus seems to be that over the preceding decades the division of sovereignties 
created by the Constitution had been rendered increasingly complex by Australia’s 
increasingly national character, by the perceptions of the functions of government 
changing into conceptions at odds with the divisions written into the Constitution, and 
by the growth of new functions entirely unthought-of at the time of the Constitution’s 
development.  Moreover, what government was supposed to do changed.  The way 
these complexities were handled was changing too, as policy development came more 
out of bureaucratic processes and negotiation than hitherto, yet there was no procedure 
of intergovernmental discourse or pooled authority provided for in the Constitution, 
especially as interpreted by the High Court.  As later decisions in Wakim105 and 
Hughes106 were to demonstrate, constitutional limitations extended to attempts to pool 
courts’ jurisdictions and even the conferral of powers on officers of the executive.  
Hence intergovernmental consultation and committees at a variety of levels had 
proliferated in order that legislative, policy and executive coordination might 
nevertheless exist.  This is not to say that there were no contests of will over powers and 
competencies, as the existence of the latter two, very expensively litigated, cases 
illustrate. 
 
Politics too played a part;107 in late 1991 Hawke was replaced as Prime Minister by the 
less consensus-oriented Paul Keating108 and the party complexion of the various States 
varied.109  Indeed, Hawke’s 1990 speech was arguably simply an attempt to bolster his 
own standing in the face of Keating’s (ultimately successful) leadership challenge.110  In 
the early 1990s all State Premiers were Labor, apart from Nick Greiner of New South 
                                                 
105 Re Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 declaring the vesting of State Courts’ jurisdiction in 
federal Courts unconstitutional. 
106 R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, doubting the constitutionality of conferring States’ powers on 
Commonwealth officers. 
107 See, generally, the account offered by Painter, above n 99, chapter 3. 
108 In October 1991 he gave a speech to the National Press Club asserting a strongly centralist posture. 
109 See esp the table in Painter, above n 99, 46. 
110 Painter, above n 99, 37. 
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Wales, yet there was considerable acrimony over finances and a desire for reform of the 
vertical fiscal imbalance.  The States proposed a ‘Council of the Federation’ and at one 
stage even reached agreement on a shared national income tax system.  The planned 
Special Premiers’ Conference for November 1991 was in fact cancelled, although the 
State and Territory leaders held their own meeting and agreed on a set of federal 
principles: cooperation in making national principles in the national interest, 
subsidiarity, structural efficiency and accountability.111 In the face of the demands from 
the States and Territories for structured institutions of collaboration, Keating conceded 
the need for some form of arrangement and out of this the Council of Australian 
Governments was born.  It met for the first time on 7 December 1992. 
 
The Council of Australian Governments is described in its website as ‘the peak 
intergovernmental forum in Australia, comprising the Prime Minister, State Premiers, 
Territory Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government 
Association’.112   This reflects the Communique from the Heads of Government Meeting 
on 11 May 1992, which stated: 
 
Leaders agreed to establish a ‘Council of Australian Governments’ as a 
permanent body for on-going consultation between the Prime Minister, 
Premiers and Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local 
Government Association 
 
The Council was to meet at least once a year, which has been the approximate case, in 
addition to the financial Premiers’ Conference.   
 
The issues which became the National Competition Policy were stated to be a focus of 
the new Council: its role113 was to be: 
                                                 
111 Premiers and Chief Ministers Meeting 21-2 November 1991, Adelaide, Communique, 13 (available at 
< http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm> (last accessed 10 September 2011)) 
112 <http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag/index.cfm> (last accessed 31 August 2011) as updated 18 
February 2010.   
113At the time of writing, the role of the Council of Australian Governments is summarised as: 
The role of COAG is to initiate, develop and monitor the implementation of policy reforms that 
are of national significance and which require cooperative action by Australian governments (for 
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 Increasing co-operation among governments in the national interest; 
[The broad protocols for the operation of Ministerial Councils, of 
which as at May 1992 there were more than 40, were nominated as a 
matter for consideration in the first meeting.] 
 Co-operation among governments on reforms to achieve an 
integrated, efficient national economy and single national market 
[singular in the original]; 
 Continuing structural reform of governments and review of 
relationships among governments consistent with the national 
interest; and  
 Consultation on other major issues by agreement such as: 
– International treaties which affect the States and territories 
and which have not been resolved through the agreed 
processes; 
– Major initiatives of one government which impact on other 
governments; 
                                                                                                                                               
example, health, education and training, Indigenous reform, early childhood development, 
housing, microeconomic reform, climate change and energy, water reform and natural disaster 
arrangements). Issues may arise from, among other things: Ministerial Council deliberations; 
international treaties which affect the States and Territories; or major initiatives of one government 
(particularly the Australian Government) which impact on other governments or require the 
cooperation of other governments. (<http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag/index.cfm> (as at 1 
September 2011)). 
Competition policy is here relegated to one (‘microeconomic reform’) instance of ‘policy reforms that are 
of national significance’, although this appears lately to have been reversed with competition policy 
appearing more prominently.  
At the time of editing, with a new Government in power, the role of the Council of Australian 
Governments had simplified to, ‘The role of COAG is to promote policy reforms that are of national 
significance, or which need co-ordinated action by all Australian governments.’  However ‘[m]icro-
economic reform linked to national competition policy in the mid-1990s’ now takes pride of first place in 
the Council of Australian Governments’ ‘strong record of achievement’ and most of its record is 
comprised of ‘reforms to increase productivity, raise workforce participation and mobility and improve 
the delivery of government services’.  See <http://www.coag.gov.au/about_coag> (last accessed 1 June 
2014). 
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– Major whole-of-government issues arising from Ministerial 
council deliberations. 
 
The second and third of these are the substance of the National Competition Policy.   
 
The May 1992 Heads of Government meeting had business other than simply setting up 
the Council of Australian Governments; most of that business was the sort of thing 
envisaged for the new body114 but it is to be doubted that Commonwealth-State 
Financial Arrangements was so. This was kept separate from Council of Australian 
Governments business, although the necessity for objective calculation of the tranche 
payments under the Implementation Agreement led to a regularisation of the manner by 
which various grants to States were made.115 
 
What the Council of Australian Governments was and did in 1995, and the role it 
performed is more easily comprehended when seen in its own historical context.  That 
goes, as it obviously must if it is a matter of the relations between governments in a 
federation, right to the foundation of the Australian federation.  The Constitution itself 
in section 101 provided for an Inter-State Commission ‘with such powers of 
adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execution 
and maintenance, within the Commonwealth, of the provisions of this Constitution 
relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws made thereunder’.  Despite this express 
wording, the legislation constituting the Inter-State Commission, the Inter-State 
Commission Act 1912 (Cth.), was held by the High Court of Australia to be invalid as 
infringing the separation of powers implied into the Constitution.116  Yet there was too 
                                                 
114 This included an agreement to eliminate regulatory impediments to a national market in goods and 
services, which certainly is microeconomic reform as envisaged by the National Competition Policy and 
is a precursor to legislation reviews, and road, rail, electricity generation, transmission and distribution 
reform which is certainly the subject of later Council of Australian Governments meetings.  Vocational 
training, aboriginal affairs and environment matters are matters not obviously part of the role of the 
Council of Australian Governments as envisaged in May 1992, although if one looks at the Subject Index 
of Council of Australian Governments Meeting Outcomes (<http://www.coag.gov.au/ 
coag_meeting_outcomes/issues_by_subject.cfm>, (last accessed 31 August 2011)) they are frequently 
discussed thereafter, in amongst a plethora of other subjects. 
115 See the discussion in Chapter 2 above. 
116 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54. 
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much business to be done ex ante between the various governments for there to be no 
relations at all apart from the ex post judicial determination of disputes.  This was 
especially so with regard to finances: revenue raising and revenue distribution. 
 
Most commonly recognised117 due to its longevity and as an early example of the 
machinery of intergovernmental relations is the Loan Council, established in 1923 to 
deal with competitive borrowing by Australian governments. During 1927-8 a financial 
agreement between the States and the Commonwealth was ratified by all Parliaments 
and subsequently the Constitution was modified by referendum to render agreements 
with respect to the public debts of the States binding when ratified by the 
Commonwealth Parliament alone.118  The original agreement remained operational until 
December 1992 when it was replaced by a new Financial Agreement.119  Of interest in 
this are three matters: the first is that the agreement was made in a series of Premiers 
Conferences, implying that there was already an institutional structure, even if ad hoc, 
for dealings between the States and the Commonwealth; the second is that arrangements 
were made between the Commonwealth and the States by agreement and that the 
binding force of such agreements was already an issue – this is the subject of discussion 
in Chapter 2; and, third, is that the Loan Council, initially voluntary but subsequently 
established in the initial Financial Agreement and continued in existence by the 
Agreement appended to the Financial Agreement Act 1994 (Cth.), remains as an 
operating mechanism in the form of a Ministerial Council to co-ordinate borrowing 
within the federation and thus is an example of the complex mechanisms of federalism 
which have obtained in Australia throughout its history.   
 
                                                 
117 See esp. Cheryl Saunders, ‘Government Borrowing in Australia’, (1989) 17 MULR 187.  See also 
Brian Galligan, Owen Hughes and Cliff Walsh, ‘Perspectives and Issues’ in their Intergovernmental 
Relations and Public Policy, Allen and Unwin, 1991, 3 and Campbell Sharman, ‘Executive Federalism’, 
in the same, 23.  Sharman provides a bibliography of discussions of the Loans Council at 29. 
118 Constitution s 105A.   
119 This is appended to the Financial Agreement Act 1994 (Cth.).  See, generally, Richard Webb, The 
Australian Loan Council, Research Note No 43 2001-02, Parliamentary Research Service, Department of 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1992. 
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Nevertheless, Galligan, Hughes and Walsh wrote that there was, at least in 1991, 
‘relative neglect of [the study of] intergovernmental relations’.120  Later in the same 
publication, Sharman, substantially filling for the time being the gap thus identified at 
least in terms of the then recent past, states that ‘[t]he growth of intergovernmental 
relations – as the interaction between the component governments of a federation are 
now frequently called – is commonly observed to be one of the most significant changes 
to have affected federal government since the war [World War II]’.121  This is despite 
the evidence adverted to above of extensive consultation at earlier Premiers’ 
Conferences and the like. 
 
In the June 1993 Council of Australian Governments meeting, the bureaucratisation of 
intergovernmental relations reared its head in relation to ‘microeconomic reform’.  It 
was agreed the ‘momentum for [microeconomic] reform needs to be maintained in the 
interests of improving the competitiveness of Australia in the international economy’ 
and hence a ‘working group of Commonwealth, State and Territory senior officials 
(chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) should report to the next 
meeting of the Council of Australian Governments with an agenda for further micro-
economic reform to be undertaken at a national level’.122  It did not do so.  The Hilmer 
Committee reported and its much broader proposed micro-economic reform agenda was 
laid on the table.   
 
Prior to the February 1994 meeting, all premiers and Chief Ministers, except Richard 
Court, the Premier of Western Australia, expressed agreement with the Hilmer 
Committee proposals.  The Business Council of Australia, the peak industry lobby 
group, made strong representations to all governments to agree on competition 
                                                 
120Galligan, Hughes and Walsh, above n. 117, 4.  This is a little unfair, given that the whole of the Fall 
(sic) 1990 edition of Publius was dedicated to recent developments in Australian federalism. 
121 Sharman, above n. 117, 23.  More recently, there have been a series of characterisations of Australia’s 
version of federalism: see for an account of these, Robyn Hollander, ‘National Competition Policy, 
Regulatory Reform and Australian Federalism’, (2006) 65 Australian Journal of Public Administration 
33, 33-6. 
122 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 8-9 June 1993, Communique, 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm> (last accessed 12 June 2011). 
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policy.123  However, even after the Western Australian doubts had been assuaged, the 
issue of the fiscal imbalance intruded: if competition policy were implemented, there 
would be a substantial loss of revenue for the States, revenue which would be picked up 
by the Commonwealth by other means.  Hence the matter was referred to yet another 
committee of senior officials (although it might have been the previous one, constituted 
in the June 1993 meeting), but this was to be a standing committee ‘to manage this 
continuing agenda of micro-economic reform’.124  Specific mention was made of reform 
to the maritime sector and the legal profession. 
 
The February 1994 meeting agreed to implement the Hilmer Report. However, it saw 
that various matters needed to be worked through in more detail.  These were the 
arrangements for the new administrative bodies (especially appointments), the financial 
arrangements, the nitty-gritty of legislation, and the overall ‘practicalities of applying 
the Hilmer Report’.  Nevertheless, from this point on the external face and record of 
progress towards the National Competition Policy was the Council of Australian 
Governments; that is not to say that negotiation and formulation did not take place 
elsewhere – it did, through the reports of the Industry Commission and its successor the 
Productivity Commission, in a Leaders Form in February 1995,125 through the pressure 
from the Business Council of Australia and in the usual circus of policy development. 
All of this is detailed below; suffice it for now to assert that by February 1994 if it was 
going to happen, it was going to happen in the Council of Australian Governments. The 
Council of Australian Governments was the context of its existence. 
 
To summarize, the development of the Council of Australian Governments took place in 
a contested sphere of politics, both in terms of political parties and within the jigsaw of 
federalism.  It was a product of a sense that federalism itself as it had hitherto been 
                                                 
123 Painter, above n. 99, 49. 
124 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 25 February 1994, Communique, 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm> (last accessed 12 June 2011) 
125 The Leaders Forums of the 1990s are rather shadowy, having little by way of documentary evidence of 
their existence.  As far as can be ascertained they were meeting s of the State premiers and Territory 
Chief Ministers designed to formulate common positions in the absence of the Commonwealth. 
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effected was a drag on the efficiency of the economy 126 and also that in many respects 
the structure of the Australian economy needed reform but that the federal division of 
powers was rendering that difficult to remedy.  There was a national interest in reform 
but there was only loss to those who might undertake it.  Finally, the processes of 
federalism were carried out by a burgeoning bureaucracy at both State and 
Commonwealth levels; the ready availability of working groups and committees of 
officials lead to their dominance in much of the policy formation process.  It is not 
surprising then that the agreements which form the National Competition Policy spring 
suddenly out of the May 1995 meeting as fully fledged policy instruments; their 
formulation takes place in the corridors of power between the submission of the Hilmer 
Report in August 1993 and the May 1995 meeting. If one looks to the conception of 
what was needed in relation to reform as illustrated by the Communiqué of the June 
1993 meeting and the radically more comprehensive Agreements and bearing in mind 
the extraordinary complexity of financial relations involved between the governments, 
one can see that much had had to have been done.  Yet the evidence of when and where 
is scant.  This thesis turns to that development in the next section – the sequence of 
events leading to and contents of the Hilmer Report itself requires prior attention. 
 
What happened 
 
In the midst of the stand-off between the Commonwealth and the States over the nature 
of federalism in late 1991, the Prime Minister wrote to the Premiers and Chief Ministers 
proposing an independent review.  In the November 1991 meeting of State Premiers and 
Chief Ministers a process was agreed under which a ‘small steering committee of 
Commonwealth, State and Territory officers’ would be ‘set up to oversee the review to 
be undertaken by an agreed independent consultant’.  This independent review would be 
‘of the Trade Practices Act … to determine its capacity to secure a national competition 
policy and to identify alternative models for regulating market behaviour’.127   
 
                                                 
126 A sense still not satisfied: see Anne Twomey, ‘Reforming Australia’s Federal System’ (2008) 36 
Federal Law Review57. 
127 Premiers and Chief Ministers Meeting 21-22 November 1991, Communique. 
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It is worth noting here that the idea of a ‘national competition policy’ at this point in the 
development of the National Competition Policy is of a ‘policy to create and safeguard 
market structures and behaviour which prevent anti-competitive practice, ensure 
markets operate efficiently and to protect the interests of consumers’.128  This does not 
encapsulate the ideas of regulatory reform, competitive neutrality and structural reform 
which later loomed so large in the National Competition Policy.  Those ideas appear 
separately and in dilute form elsewhere in the 1991 meeting’s Communiqué:  in the 
nomination of some of its ‘major decisions’ as ‘regulatory reform’, although this was 
more to do with uniform standards than reviewing legislation against competition 
principles; in referring to the reform what were then called Government Trading 
Enterprises; and in support for the removal of ‘impediments to competition’, without 
defining exactly what this meant.  Oddly enough, the most cogent reference is in the 
Attachment to the Communiqué, in which the ‘Principles for Reconsidering the Agreed 
Allocation of Roles and Responsibilities among Levels of Government in Australia’ are 
elaborated. Principle 3, the ‘Structural Efficiency Principle’, ties economic efficiency to 
microeconomic reform of all governmental activities; the industry structure of health 
care and education were singled out as examples.  However, the discussion is muddled 
and segues into a call for more cooperative intergovernmental approach and reform of 
the vertical fiscal balance. 
 
In any case, the 1991 outcomes, limited as they apparently were, authorised the Prime 
Minister to commission an independent inquiry.  He did so in August 1992 and its 
report has become known as the Hilmer Report, after its Chairman, Fred Hilmer.  The 
Terms of Reference of the inquiry reflect the agreement, stating that the Committee was 
to inquire into and advise on the scope of the (then) Trade Practices Act 1974, market 
behaviour and structure then outside the scope of that Act, and other matters ‘directly 
related’ to the application of the competition principles as market conduct, the removal 
of barriers to trade and competition, and the reduction of complexity and administrative 
duplication arising from the increasingly national operation of markets.  As the account 
below will demonstrate, the report far exceeded those terms.  In any event, the reporting 
period for the committees was extended until August 1993 and it finally reported to the 
‘Heads of Australian Governments’ on 23 August of that year.  
 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
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The Hilmer Report  
 
Not only is the Hilmer Report129 an identified precursor of the National Competition 
Policy as set out in the Agreements, but it is also a representative example of the 
elaboration of the concept ‘competition policy’ as formulated in 1993 or thereabouts. 
By contrast, most alternative accounts of Australian competition policy go further and 
refer to it as a source for both the substance of the policy and for its rationale.  In the 
context of this thesis it is neither, rather it simply represents a step in the formulation of 
the Agreements as the National Competition Policy and hence as a text is merely 
excellent evidence of what was thought of as ‘competition policy’ at the time.  
 
The Terms of Reference 
 
The Terms of Reference for the Hilmer Committee are appended to this thesis and 
therefore do not need to be repeated.130  However, they do need to be analysed because 
to do so indicates the achievement, for better or worse, of the Committee.  While 
various theoretical emphases, many recommended processes and, indeed, to some 
extent, the formulations of the elements themselves change in the time between 
presentation of the Committee’s Report and signing of the Agreements, despite the 
contention here that the Report does not represent the policy itself, and for whatever it 
might have been worth, the Hilmer Report created out of the disparate and confused 
trends, theories, policies and actions articulated in its confused and repetitious terms of 
reference, a single, clear policy direction with recommended implementation processes 
laid out.   
 
The Terms of Reference commence with a statement of four agreed principles to be 
given effect by a ‘national competition policy and law’.  The first three are about 
competitive conduct rules, in other words are about the sort of proscriptions to be found 
in the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), although, at a stretch, they could be 
                                                 
129 National Competition Policy Review Independent Committee of Enquiry (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), 
National Competition Policy, AGPS, 1993. 
130 Appendix 4.  They can be found in Annex A of the Hilmer Report: National Competition Policy 
Review Independent Committee of Enquiry (Fred Hilmer, Chairman) National Competition Policy 1993, 
361-3. 
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interpreted to mean that the government as a market participant should conduct itself, 
including legislate, so as not to behave anti-competitively.  Indeed, the second principle 
indirectly refers to government businesses by asserting that universal and uniform 
market conduct rules should apply regardless of ownership.  Paragraph 4 expands on 
this by instructing the Committee to take into account ‘in exercising its function’ not 
only the principles stated earlier, but also legislation other than the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) affecting market behaviours and structure, the fact that government business 
and trading enterprises may operate in a context of natural monopoly and ‘current 
moves to reform government trading enterprises’.   
 
The last enumerated principle talks to developing an open, integrated domestic market 
for goods and services through the removal of unnecessary barriers to trade and 
competition and through the reduction of complexity and administrative duplication.   
The phrase ‘unnecessary barriers to trade and competition’ is key here, because it does 
not exclude barriers erected by government action.   In this way, it allows the 
application of the particular theories of microeconomic reform which conflate 
government with other private action without recourse to alternative discourses, except 
those implicated by the strong ‘unnecessary’.  Most of the Hilmer Report’s 
recommendations rely on that principle for legitimacy. 
 
But these are simply ‘principles’ which the Committee of Review was to ‘give effect to’ 
and ‘take account of’ in inquiring into and giving advice as to legislative changes and 
‘other measures’.  Specific targets were nominated: expanding the scope of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and determining other possible means for addressing market 
behaviour and structure.  The next paragraph, 3, further expanded and particularised this 
by indicating that authorisation and exemption procedures (the latter also in respect of 
current exemptions in substance) in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) should be 
reviewed, as should price regulation especially of government businesses.  Yet also 
nominated for particular attention was ‘the need for, and approaches to, the transition of 
government regulatory arrangements – including any associated revenue impact on 
States – to more competitive and nationally consistent structures’.  This, again, allowed 
for a broad-ranging look at ‘government regulatory arrangements’ in terms of particular 
ideas of government and market.  
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Presumably the reference in the second general target to ‘structure’ was to the intent of s 
50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), relating to the acquisition of market power by 
takeover or merger; interestingly, the obvious such alternative means is to provide a 
general disaggregation power such as exists in the United Kingdom under the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (UK)131 and there is no hint of discussion of such a power in the 
Report.  Alternatively, and again at a stretch, this reference to ‘structure’ could be taken 
to be about reform of vertically integrated government monopolies such as utilities. 
 
The nominated targets of the Committee’s inquiries and advice, however, also included 
a general target:  ‘other matters directly related to the application of the principles’. This 
once again allowed into the picture the implications of microeconomic reform theory.  
This aptly sums up the dual nature of the Terms of Reference: on the one hand they 
specified reasonably tightly the precursor trends of policy implementation as matters to 
be reviewed; on the other overarching licence was given to implement a general review 
of government from a specific theoretical framework.  The Hilmer Committee used 
their latter broad licence under the guise of targeted policy formulation. 
 
Submissions 
 
There were some 139 submissions to the Hilmer Committee.132 Many are not available.  
However, a perusal of the 39 available in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, 
                                                 
131 Chapter 1 of Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002 provides for ‘market investigations’.  The Fair Trading 
Commission can make a reference to the Competition Commission if it thinks there are monopoly 
problems in a market.  The Minister can intervene if he or she thinks there are public interest concerns.  If 
there are such problems or concerns, the Competition Commission can make a variety of remedial orders, 
including disaggregation of the business. Appeal is limited.  This echoes the powers available to the US 
Supreme Court under the Sherman Act – deployed notoriously to disaggregate AT&T (‘Ma Bell’) into the 
Regional Bell Operating Companies (the ‘Baby Bells’): United States v AT&T 552 F. Supp. 131 (DDC 
1982).. 
132 There is no central record of these submissions. However, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library 
holds a 4 volume set of 39 submissions.  Included in the index to the submissions in this set as a 
handwritten addition, is one from ‘AOTC’, probably Telstra, which is not on the list provided in the 
Report itself.   A more complete set of submissions may be held in the Commonwealth Archives, 
although there appears at the time of research (December 2012) to be no catalogue record.  In the 
following discussion, the submissions are referenced simply by author and number. 
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taken with a reading of the Report’s references to submissions, reveals the quite 
startling fact that there appears to be no substantial challenge to competition as a 
principle of government.  Even the submission from the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions states, ‘Whilst the ACTU does not demur from the view that there may be 
benefits from competition …’.133 (To be fair, it goes on to place limits on that 
proposition.)   
 
At least five government departments lodged submissions which unreservedly 
supported competition policy as a means of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the Australian economy.134  There were a number of other submissions to this 
effect.135  In all of these competition was seen as an unalloyed good.  Not one of the 
others said competition was bad in itself, although some, mainly State governments and 
sectoral organisations said competition was good but, as a policy competition, has 
limits. These limits included that markets might need development before the rigours of 
competition were applied,136 by co-operation as a general principle137 and by societal 
                                                 
133 Australian Council of Trade Unions, Submission no 113, Committee of Inquiry into National 
Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, National Competition Policy 1993, 2.  For 
convenience immediately hereafter, submissions to the Hilmer Committee are referred to simply by 
Author and number. 
134 They were the Department of Industry, Technology and Regional Development (Commonwealth) (no. 
101), the Department of Health, Housing, Local Government and Community Services (Commonwealth) 
(no 84), the Department of Finance (Commonwealth) (no 61), the Department of Arts and Administrative 
Services (Commonwealth) (no. 83), the Department of Primary Industries and Energy (Commonwealth) 
(no. 50).  
135 These included (unsurprisingly for at least the first), the Industry Commission (no. 6) , the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (no. 100), the National Farmers Federation (no. 90), the Australian 
Overseas Telecommunications Authority (no. 139), the Australian Mining Industry Council (no. 39), the 
Australian Capital Territory Government (no. 109), the South Australian Government (no. 98), and the 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria (no. 2). 
136 Australian Telecommunications Users Group (no. 111), the National Farmers’ Federation (no. 90), 
Department of Industry, Technology and Regional Development (Commonwealth) (no. 101), the 
Queensland Government (no. 104). 
137 The Australian Council of Trade Unions (no. 113), and the Australian Council of the Professions (no. 
12) 
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objectives, including equity.138  Sectoral organisations argued for ring-fencing justice,139 
statutory marketing authorities140 and unions.141 Naturally there were many submissions 
about the technicalities of trade practices law and the implementation process. 
 
The Australian Council of Trade Unions offered the only substantial critique of 
competition policy, although there were a number that set out visions of the theory 
behind it.142  It conceded that competition may bring benefits but asserted that 
competition was not the sole important variable in the determination of the most 
efficient and productive direction for an economy.  The degree and quality of 
cooperation were also important, especially in labour markets.  Thus it argued that 
competition policy might meet head-on freedom of association.  
 
The startling omission is an argument that competition is bad in itself. There was not 
even an argument that even if competition has good effects, it also has bad effects.  
Competition is seen by some as the most important principle of good government of the 
economy and all others as good, except where it doesn’t work in which case it should 
not be used – that it has a province of arguable boundaries.   
 
                                                 
138 The Australian Capital Territory Government (no. 109), the Communications Law Centre (no. 116) 
and the South Australian Government (no. 98).  The Industry Commission argues that competition policy 
was incapable of dealing with equity issues (no. 6) 
139 The Victorian Bar Council (no 33), The Law Council (no. 65), the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (no. 100). 
140 The Australian Dairy Farmers’ Federation (no. 10), the Bar Council (no 33), the Northern Territory 
Government (no. 91), the Australian Council of Professions (no. 12), the Queensland Sugar Corporation 
(no 51) the National Farmers’ Federation (no. 90). 
141 The Australian Council of Trade Unions (no. 113).  The Industry Commission argued the contrary: 
Industry Commission (no. 6). 
142 The Industry Commission (no. 6), the Australian Council of the Professions (no. 12), the Australian 
Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (no. 95), and the South Australian Government (no. 98). 
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The Report 
 
In Chapter 1, ‘Towards a National Competition Policy’, the Committee sets out its 
approach: 
 
Section A reviews the concept of competition and its relationship to 
community welfare and considers the bounds of competition policy. 
 
Section B provides an outline of the evolution of national competition 
policy in Australia, including the new pressures for developing a more 
comprehensive competition policy framework that is truly national in 
application. 
 
In other words, the concept of competition is first defined; second, why it is good is set 
out, and, third, how far it should be taken as a policy imperative explored.  This leads 
into a discussion of ‘competition policy’ and what it encompasses. What has been done 
in the past is the fifth step and why more should be done now is the last. 
 
Looking at each of these six steps in turn, the following definition, attributed to F G 
Dennis,143 commences the elaboration:144 
 
Competition may be defined as the ‘striving or potential striving of two 
or more persons or organisations against one another for the same or 
related objects’. 
 
Four aspects of this definition are explored (‘have been found to be particularly 
important by recent economic research’); (1) as to ‘striving or potential striving’ and (2) 
‘two or more persons or entities’, both of which are about how many competitors are 
necessary for competition to occur – whether it is necessary to have ‘two or more 
persons’145 and whether large numbers of competitors are necessary;146 (3) as to ‘against 
                                                 
143 This proves to be Kenneth Dennis, Competition in the History of Economic Thought (PhD Thesis, 
Oxford University, 1975). 
144 Hilmer Report, above n 129, 2. 
145 No – all that is necessary is that the market must be open to potential rivals; ibid. 
125 
 
one another’ and ‘related object’ both of which are about the implicit product or service 
in the definition – whether competition as a concept is limited to competitors providing 
identical products or services; 147 and (4) whether competition only takes place in 
respect of price.148  All of these have a negative answer, which somewhat undermines 
the cogency of the definition. 
 
The segue to the second step in the Committee’s approach to ‘competition policy’, why 
competition is good, is this: ‘The relationship between competition and community 
welfare can be considered in terms of the impact of competition on economic efficiency 
and on other social goals.’  ‘Good’ here is ‘community welfare’.  The second step taken 
by the Hilmer Committee is, thus, to discuss the idea of efficiency as an economic 
concept and its role in enhancing community welfare.  To this end, the report sets out 
three forms of efficiency and how each is enhanced by competition: 
 Technical or productive efficiency where improvements in managerial 
performance, work practices and the use of material inputs are enhanced by 
competition. 
 Allocative efficiency where competition results in resources being allocated to 
their highest valued use. 
 Dynamic efficiency where competition provides incentives to respond to 
changes in technology and consumer demand. 
The described enhancements in the various forms of efficiency are said to lead to 
community welfare improvement in the following ways: increase in the productive base 
of the economy leading to higher returns to producers and higher real wages; new and 
better products on offer to consumers; new jobs and new industries; better adjustment to 
change and the capacity to adjust to unforeseen change hence a more resilient and 
robust economy.  There is no discussion of whether competition is bad in itself.  Nor is 
there discussion of whether notions of competition might be socially contingent.   
                                                                                                                                               
146 Again, no – a small number of competitors may produce more economic benefits in a given situation: 
ibid 3. 
147 And again, no – competition is really about meeting consumer needs, hence competition is between 
products or services which can substitute for one another: ibid. 
148 Yet again, no – competition may be in respect of other elements of value, such as service, quality or 
timeliness of delivery: ibid. 
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That competition is a Good Thing is accordingly merely asserted through a sketch of the 
theory behind it.  Yet there is much to be said for the argument that competition in itself 
is much more problematic than allowed.  As is apparent in in the discussion of the 
submissions to the Hilmer Committee above and in Chapter 7, all arguments to that 
effect, to the extent there were any, were ignored in the formulation and implementation 
of the National Competition Policy.  Indeed, that the rules nominated as ‘competitive 
conduct rules’ are necessarily about competition is not universally accepted.  In the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives second reading debate on the Trade Practices 
Bill 1973 the parties took opposite sides on this, with the liberal opposition clearly  
considering the rules to be about promoting competition, but the government arguing 
for them on more complex grounds: 
 
The Government seeks to guarantee the rights of small business, to 
protect the consumer, to prevent exploitation and profiteering and to 
prevent the unregulated and improper growth of foreign owned 
industry.149   
 
Even the label ‘competition law’ is relatively recent, although in the 1973 debates there 
is reference to competition policy and competition law by the opposition. The European 
Union had ‘competition law’.  But the reference in Australia was to ‘trade practices’ and 
‘restrictive trade practices’ were what Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
regulated.  Nor did it ever have law under the label of ‘Antitrust Law’ as did the United 
States of America, although there is occasional reference to Australia’s ‘anti-trust law’.  
The Hilmer Committee avoided the term ‘trade practices’, referred to ‘competitive 
conduct rules’.150  Apart from textual references, perhaps the earliest recognition of 
‘competition law’ was in the titles of textbooks, which started about 1990.151  The 
                                                 
149 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 November 1973, 1 (Mr Riordan). 
150 Hilmer Committee, above n 130, Part I. 
151 Stephen Corones started the trend in 1990, with Competition Law and Policy (Law book Co, 1990), 
although he continued in his textbook, the major one in the area, with ‘restrictive trade practices’: 
Restrictive Trade Practices Law (Law Book, 1994) until 1999, when it became in its second edition, 
Competition Law in Australia (LBC Information Services, 1999).  Other textbooks began switching 
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Agreements referred to ‘competition laws’ but defined them by reference to Part IV of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).   Now ‘competition law’ is all but universally 
accepted.  Yet that to which ‘competition law’ refers was not always as fixed as it is 
now, nor did it have its import or functions defined as it is now.   
 
That the practices now proscribed are anti-competitive and therefore should be 
proscribed on the basis of quod est demonstratum, is again intensely theory contingent.  
As above, they can equally be regarded as bad in themselves, due to conceptualisations 
of abuse of power or reduction in the entrepreneurial function, or even as a matter of 
moral fibre.152  After all, in the sixteenth century the operation of markets were 
protected by statutory prohibitions on engrossing, forestalling and regrating153 – all now 
encompassed by perfectly acceptable practices of wholesaling and arbitrage.  Cartels 
themselves are problematic in common law understandings of laissez faire, as their 
acceptability under the Mogul Steamship Case154 demonstrates.  And there is 
incomplete consensus in economics about proscription of various conducts: rules 
against predatory pricing, resale price maintenance and even cartels themselves have all 
been subject to criticism from within economics.155 
 
The Report discusses, as the third step in its elaboration of a concept of competition 
policy, whether competition, being generally good, enhances community welfare in all 
circumstances.  It acknowledges two where it might not.  The first is where competition 
does not necessarily lead to efficiency enhancement: these are situations of ‘market 
failure’.  The situations of market failure listed are where market participants have 
imperfect information and natural monopolies.  The second is where there is some other 
social goal with which competition is inconsistent.  The report nominates as an example 
                                                                                                                                               
across at this time; see, for example, John Duns and Mark J Davison, Competition Law.  Cases and 
Materials (Butterworths, 2000). 
152 Hofstadter, above n 40. 
153 5 & 6 Edw VI c 14 (1552).  Forestalling is mentioned in the Domesday book: Sir Frederick Pollock 
and Frederick William Maitland, History of English Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1968) Vol. 
II, 453 
154 (1888) 21 QBD 544. 
155 Robert H Bork. The Antitrust Paradox. (Free Press, 1993); Herbert Hovenkamp. ‘Chicago and Its 
Alternatives’,[1986] Duke Law Journal, 1014. 
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where ‘the government may wish to confer special benefits on a particular group for 
equity or other reasons.’  It is a half-hearted example, as the report continues to provide 
three cases where the government does so but promptly avers, ‘[i]n each of these cases, 
however, it is possible for governments to achieve objectives of these kinds in ways that 
are less injurious to competition and the welfare of the community as a whole.’156 
 
The fourth step in the Hilmer Committee’s elaboration is to make the connection, which 
formulates ‘competition policy’, between the concept of competition and action by 
governments.  Thus:  
 
In its broadest sense, competition policy encompasses all policy dealing 
with the extent and nature of competition in the economy. It permeates a 
large body of legislation and government actions that influence 
permissible competitive behaviour by firms, the capacity of firms to 
contest particular economic activities and differences in the regulatory 
regimes faced by firms competing in the one market.157 
 
Competition law (as opposed to competition policy), being the rules of the kind set out 
in Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), is stated by the Report to be the 
traditional ‘cornerstone’ of competition policy.  Nevertheless, the Committee expands 
the province of competition policy to include unjustified regulatory restrictions on 
competition, inappropriate structures of public monopolies, denial of access to essential 
facilities, monopoly pricing, and competitive neutrality.  In these areas, it says,  
 
… [competition policy] seeks to facilitate effective competition in the 
interests of economic efficiency while accommodating situations where 
competition does not achieve economic efficiency or conflicts with other 
social objectives.  These accommodations are reflected in the content and 
                                                 
156 Ibid., 6. 
157 Ibid., 6; footnote removed.  The footnote excises from consideration competition from international 
sources and consumer protection policy.  Both are acknowledged to affect competition and efficiency, but 
are excluded because, in the first case, it is a matter of trade policy. No reason is given in the second case, 
other than that most submissions treated consumer protection as a different area of policy and to do so 
seemed consistent with the Committee’s terms of reference. 
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breadth of application of pro-competitive policies, as well as in the 
sanctioning of anti-competitive arrangements on public benefit 
grounds.158  
 
Having set out nature and the province of competition policy, the Report moves first, as 
its fifth step in its elaboration of the concept, to an examination of the legal history of 
competition law in Australia, albeit with due acknowledgment of US forbears.  It starts 
this by reciting the fate of the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth) – 
‘substantially limited by a restrictive interpretation of the Commonwealth’s 
constitutional powers’ – then refers to the various unsuccessful attempts to introduce 
Sherman Act159 style legislation.  The Report cites ‘growing disquiet with the 
cartelization and concentration of Australian industry’ – with ‘restrictive business 
practices’ – as the motivation for attempts in 1962,160 and 1965161 to legislate against 
them.  With a ‘new interpretation’ of the Constitution in 1971162 Commonwealth 
legislation was passed that year163 setting up an administrative investigation scheme.  A 
change in government in 1972, brought new legislation, based on a prohibition model, 
in the form of the Trade Practices Act 1974.  The Report proceeds to enumerate the 
various changes made to the Act in 1977,164 1986,165 and 1992,166 and the various then 
current reviews. 
 
Then comes a history of governmental policy and action under the rubric: 
‘Developments in Wider Competition Policy’.  In contrast to its history of competition 
                                                 
158 Ibid. 
159 1890 ch 647, 26 Stat 209, 15 USC ss 1-7. 
160 This is somewhat misleading: see the discussion of Sir Garfield Barwick’s statement in 
Commonwealth Parliament in Chapter 3 above. 
161 Trade Practices Act 1965 (Cth). 
162 The Concrete Pipes Case: Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468, allowing inter 
alia more extensive deployment of the corporations power in sec 51(xx) of The Constitution 
163 Restrictive Practices Act 1971 
164 Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977 (Cth). 
165 Trade Practices Revision Act 1986 (Cth). 
166 Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth). 
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law, the Report only considers the decade prior to its submission.  It starts with this 
polemic: 
 
Over the last decade, Australians have come to appreciate the necessity 
of building a flexible, dynamic and efficient economy, and of the 
important role competition can play in meeting these goals.167 
 
It proceeds to list as examples: 
 Trade policy, under which the average level of effective assistance to 
manufacturing was reduced between 1981-2 and 1991-2 from 25% to 15% of the 
value of manufacturing output. 
 Commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation of rail, electricity, gas and 
water utilities. 
 Reform of statutory marketing arrangements for agricultural products. 
 Removal of various restrictions on many professional services and occupations. 
These are, of course, the precursors discussed above.   
 
The Report exaggerates when it claims that these are examples of policy motivated by 
the need to be competitive.  After all, the development of competition policy as a thing 
in itself to be pursued separately from other policies a recommendation arising from the 
considerations of the Committee. By definition, then, the need to be competitive was 
not as yet fully articulated nor was it seen as separate from other elements of economic 
rationalism.168 To be sure, they were activities conducted in a context of a prevailing 
orthodoxy and competition had a place in that orthodoxy, but there were other 
motivations and reasons.  Hence commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation 
were more about management structures than about exposing entities to competition.169  
Similarly, reform of statutory marketing arrangements and the removal of restrictions 
on professional services and occupations were just as much about power elites as about 
                                                 
167 Hilmer Report, above n 129, 11. 
168 See above 10-12, 99-106. 
169 See above 79-99 under ‘Government Business Enterprise’, 
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efficiency.170  The Hilmer Committee in its Report thus promulgates a particularly 
narrow version of the concept of competition as much as it overstates the influence of 
competition even in the then prevailing orthodoxy. 
 
The sixth and final step taken by the Hilmer Committee in elaborating its concept of 
competition policy is to set out why more should now be done and what that should be.  
First in this is its ‘case for developing a national competition policy’.  It claimed reform 
should be: 
 Broader rather than case by case, leading to a consistent approach which would 
be cheaper and quicker to implement. 
 National because Australia is a national market and hence duplication and 
complexity can be reduced. 
 Applied to matters within state powers to prevent anomalous exemption and 
extra-jurisdictional affects. 
This, then, is the crucial step which runs counter to much of the academic discourse 
about policy development.  It is a case for a grand vision, an attempt to achieve change 
across a broad class of situations using a single framework.  It is not ‘muddling 
through’,171 or a case of a ‘funnel of causality’.172  Nor is it, as Sparrow puts it, ‘picking 
an important problem and fixing it’.173  It is more like a Puseyesque discursive 
hegemony174 implemented without concern for alternative ways of thinking or even for 
political resistance.  As it turned out, the confidence was warranted, apart from the issue 
of State sovereignty and even that turned to the policy’s advantage.  Ultimately, 
however, resistance to hegemony175 developed in the form of One Nation.   
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 Charles E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”, (1959) 19 Public Administration Review 
79. 
172 R Simeon, ‘Studying Public Policy’, (1976) 9 Canadian Journal of Political Science 548. 
173 Malcom K Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems and Managing 
Compliance (Brookings Institute, 2000) 
174 Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 2.  See the 
discussion above. 
175 See Pat O’ Malley, ‘Genealogy, Systemisation and Resistance in “Advanced Liberalism”’ in Gary 
Wickham and George Pavlich, Rethinking Law, Society and Governance (Hart, 2001) 13. 
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The Committee then proceeded to outline what competition policy implied.  Taking the 
‘Agreed Principles for a National Competition Policy’ as set out in its Terms of 
Reference176 and decided on by the Premiers and Chief Ministers at their Adelaide 1991 
meeting,177 despite their competitive conduct emphasis, it settled on the six principles 
adverted to above in Chapter 1: 
7. To slightly modify and broaden the application of the generally applicable 
conduct rules, found in Australia in Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
8. To reform regulatory restrictions on competition; the report outlined the 
applicable principles and processes. 
9. To reform the industrial structure of existing public monopolies. 
10. To impose conditions of competitive neutrality between governments and 
private businesses. 
11. To provide a general access regime. 
12. To more narrowly focus the existing prices oversight mechanism. 
 
As discussed above, it is hard to see how the Terms of Reference give rise to these six 
principles.  In any case, it saw three main ‘challenges’ in implementing them.178  First, 
was balancing the benefits of competition against other factors.  In one of its most 
stunning and radical strictures, the Committee stated that it was ‘satisfied that the 
general desirability of permitting competition was so well established that those who 
wish to restrict or inhibit competition should bear the burden of demonstrating why that 
is justified in the public interest.’  As discussed below, no justification was given for 
this, other than that it was already reflected in the agreed principles dealing with anti-
competitive market conduct.  It was the product of the Committee’s failure to consider 
competition as a phenomenon with diverse ethical and social consequences, of its 
assumption that the only sense of the concept is that in economic theory. 
 
                                                 
176 Hilmer Report, above n 129, 361-3 (Annex A). 
177 Premiers and Chief Ministers Meeting 21-22 November 1991, Communique 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-outcomes/archive.cfm> 
178 Hilmer Report, above n 129, 18. 
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Second, was implementing competition policy with its substantial but sometimes 
dispersed benefits in the face of smaller and focussed interest groups.  Independent 
executive bodies, transparency and advertising of national benefits are the response.  
Oddly enough, this is a more justifiable conclusion from one of the more controversial 
schools of economic thought.  Public choice economics analyses the political process as 
market functions: the ‘challenge’ faced in the recommendation in the Report is 
expressed in public choice terms.  As such, the comment simply posits political 
difficulties and what could be done about them, were they to exist.  Moreover, 
competition policy itself should be subject to the same reading: the question that results 
is, ‘Who benefits from competition policy?’  Nevertheless the public choice approach is 
evident throughout the Report and its impact is further considered below. 
 
The final challenge the Committee saw in implementing its six principles lay in 
accommodating the interests of all nine governments in the Commonwealth of 
Australia:  Apart from where co-operation is possible or only a single government is 
involved, the committee proposed participation by all governments in the ‘key policy-
making institutional arrangements’.  One of the major conclusions of this thesis is that 
the National Competition Policy was driven as much by federalism as by anything else, 
hence this ‘challenge’ is the inverse of what could well be said: that competition policy 
was the means by which co-operation could be achieved. 
 
The second and third of these ‘challenges’ involve a particular understanding of the 
nature of regulation.  The Committee did not propose a full-blown ‘Public Choice’ 
approach179 in its understanding of the nature of regulation, although what they say 
bears its imprint:  
                                                 
179 The Public Choice approach is based of the theories developed in James M. Buchanan, and Gordon 
Tullock. (1962), The Calculus of Consent, (University of Michigan Press,  1962);  and Kenneth J Arrow, 
Social Choice and Individual Values, (Yale University Press,  2nd ed., 1963).  More particularly, the idea 
of ‘rent seeking’ implies governments are the source of special privileges which market participants seek 
to garner for themselves, so reducing the efficiency overall of the economy. The privileges are provided 
in legislation and regulations: Gordon Tullock, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’, 
(1967) 5 Western Economic Journal 224; Anne Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society’. (1974) 64 American Economic Review 291.  For a strident defence of competition policy based 
in public choice theory, see John O McGinnis and Mark L Movsesian, ‘The World Trade Consititution’ 
(2000-1) 114 Harvard Law Review 511. 
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… where anti-competitive consequences flow from government 
regulation, the public interest justification generally rests on policy 
judgements of elected governments and parliaments. These decision-
makers are entrusted with defining and implementing the public interest, 
and must evaluate a range of competing considerations. While 
perceptions of public interest requirements evolve over time, regulations 
remain in place unless reviewed. Regulation that confers benefits on 
particular groups soon builds a constituency with an interest in resisting 
change and avoiding rigorous and independent re-evaluation of whether 
the restriction remains justified in the public interest. 
 
Governments intervene in markets for many reasons and in many ways. 
At one level, all such interventions affect competition. Taxation policy, 
for instance, often deliberately discriminates between various classes of 
businesses or business activities, potentially affecting their relative 
competitive positions. Similarly, regulation impacting on business costs 
affects the relative competitive position of Australia and its firms. In this 
sense, almost no regulatory activity is neutral in its implications for 
competition.180 
 
The Committee went on to identify the forms of regulations impacting most directly on 
competition.  They were: 
 
1) Regulatory Barriers to Entry 
a) Barriers creating a monopoly 
i) Public Utilities 
ii) Monopolies over Budget funded services (including welfare services) 
iii) Rural marketing 
iv) Other Government-sanctioned monopolies, such as intellectual property 
rights, and reservations of transport of some commodities to rail 
                                                 
180 Hilmer Report, above n 129, 191,  references removed: they were to submissions. 
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b) Restrictions that Operate by Reference to the Number of Producers or Product, 
usually by licensing. 
c) Restrictions that Operate by Reference to Standards or Qualifications 
d) Barriers Operating against Interstate Goods or Service providers, despite section 
92 of the Constitution.  These extend from differential regulatory requirements 
between States to State infrastructure decisions and national policies which 
inhibit interstate trade. 
e) Barriers Operating against Foreign Goods or Service providers 
2) Restrictions on Competitive Conduct; such as price controls on sectors of the 
economy or ethical standards on professions.181 
 
It recommended in relation to these: 
 
I There should be no regulatory restrictions on competition unless 
clearly demonstrated to be in the public interest. Governments which 
choose to restrict consumers' ability to choose among rival suppliers and 
alternative terms and conditions should demonstrate why this is 
necessary in the public interest; 
II  Proposals for new regulation that have the potential to restrict 
competition should include evidence that the competitive effects of the 
regulation have been considered; that the benefits of the proposed 
restriction outweigh the likely costs; and that the restriction is no more 
restrictive than necessary in the public interest. Where a significant 
restriction on competition is identified, the relevant regulation should be 
subject to a sunset period deeming it to lapse within a period of no more 
than five years unless re-enacted after further scrutiny in accordance with 
Principle III. 
III  All existing regulation that imposes a significant restriction on 
competition should be subject to regular review to determine conformity 
with Principle I. The review should be performed by an independent 
body, involve a public inquiry process and include a public assessment 
of the costs and benefits of the restriction. If retained after initial review 
                                                 
181 Ibid 191-200. 
136 
 
the regulation should be subject to the same requirements imposed on 
new regulation under Principle II. 
IV  To the extent practicable and relevant, reviews of regulation 
undertaken pursuant to Principles II and III should take an economy-
wide perspective of the impact of restrictions on competition. 
 
It is extraordinary that the underlying principle, that competition is always to be 
preferred in regulating, is not explicitly justified in the Report.  To be sure, that 
competition is a Good Thing is amply considered in Chapter 1 on the usual grounds, but 
the step to Principle I above is merely asserted at p 190, albeit as a matter of simple 
belief: 
 
The Committee believes that the time has come to progress regulatory 
reform more broadly, and to do so by reversing the onus of proof in 
considering the desirability of reforming particular regulation. Consistent 
with the principles already agreed between governments in relation to 
market conduct, the Committee considers that there should be no 
regulatory restriction on competition unless clearly demonstrated to be in 
the public interest. 
 
And later at p 206, in relation to Principle I above: 
 
This principle is unexceptional but gives formal recognition to the new 
consensus over the proper role of competition in building an efficient and 
dynamic economy capable of delivering improved living standards. The 
principle recognises that while it may be appropriate to restrict 
competition in some circumstances, this should not be done lightly. 
 
Just about the only justification that can be found is provided at page 205, where it is 
mentioned as an antidote to rent-seeking:  
 
Where such regulation is in place, the challenge is to overcome the 
resistance of protected groups. This might be facilitated by governments 
accepting the principle that there is a presumption that competition is 
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desirable, placing the onus on those proposing continuation of a 
restriction to demonstrate why it is justified in the public interest. 
Experience shows that improving the transparency of the costs and 
benefits of particular restrictions is usually a vital part of reform 
processes, and a common commitment to such processes could expedite 
reform across the economy.  
 
However this seems hardly sufficient for the introduction of a complete new criterion 
for acceptable regulating.182 
 
Summary 
 
The Report of the Hilmer Committee sets out a set of consistent and coherent policy 
recommendations despite confused, contradictory and vague Terms of Reference.  The 
recommendations are founded in an economic understanding of ‘competition’ and its 
societal benefits, and a theoretically contingent and unreflective approach to 
government.  Only the slightest nod to social history is afforded, with an only 
marginally more comprehensive legislative background to relevant (in a narrow sense of 
the word) statutes.  All of its core propositions about what is good (or bad) in and for 
society are assumed: there is no discussion of social theory, other than a statement of 
public choice economics.  It is couched in simple persuasive language.  
 
It appears from what came later that the Hilmer Report was just what most of the then 
Governments in Australia wanted.  It also served business well. 
  
Post Hilmer Negotiations 
 
The Hilmer Report was released on 25 August 1993 and the Agreements were signed on 
11 April 1995.  What happened between those two dates?  Were the recommendations 
of the former fully accepted into the latter?  Was there any debate? What about?  Did 
                                                 
182 This is taken up by Morgan in above n 77, Chapter 1,.  Morgan argues that competition is thereby 
raised to a footing equal to the rule of law. This is considered in Chapter 8. 
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any Governments demur and, if so, how were they brought into line?  These are the 
questions this section tackles.183   
 
A comparison between the Report and the Agreements reveals major areas of difference 
within the overall thrust: 
 The inclusion of a definition of the ‘public interest’; 
 The institutional structure of implementation;  
 The detail and means of expansion of application of the competitive conduct 
rules; and 
 The articulation of the principles upon which federalism would be 
accommodated with competition policy. 
Yet other than these matters there is a startling correspondence.  The ‘elements’ of 
competition policy in the Agreements are those set out in the Report, the rationale never 
deviates and issues for debate are predicted to be so in the Report.   
 
The first step towards the Agreements was taken in February 1994 when the Council of 
Australian Governments agreed ‘to the principles of competition policy articulated in 
the Hilmer Report’.  Agreement was only to the ‘principles’, not being expressed to be 
an acceptance of the recommendations.  In the intervening period Richard Court, the 
Premier of Western Australia, had attacked the Commonwealth for usurping and 
abusing States’ rights, a position with which Premiers Kennett (Victoria) and Brown 
(South Australia) agreed.184  Financial distributions under the vertical fiscal imbalance 
were also contentious, with Prime Minister Keating resisting any challenge to the 
Commonwealth’s supremacy.  Looming large in this debate was the prospective loss to 
State and Territory finances as a result of lessened revenues from erstwhile state 
monopolies.  However, only Premier Court actually expressed disagreement with the 
principles.  The Business Council of Australia was particularly vocal in support and 
may have exerted considerable pressure on Premiers and Chief Ministers to overcome 
their reluctance to accede to any threat to their revenues.   
                                                 
183 For a detailed analysis of the process of negotiation of the National Competition Policy in terms of 
network analysis, see Elizabeth Harman, ‘The National Competition Policy: A Study of the Policy 
Process and Network’ (1996) 31 Australian Journal of Political Science 205. 
184  Martin Painter, Collaborative Federalism, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 49. 
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The Communique of the February 1994 meeting set out what was agreed and what was 
yet to be decided.  In the former category was that recommendations or legislation 
arising from the Hilmer Report would apply to ‘all bodies, including Commonwealth 
and State government agencies and authorities.  This has two limbs: the old 
constitutional restraints on the application of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to 
bodies other than corporations were to be demolished, and it was to be extended to State 
government instrumentalities.  A transitional period was allowed for in the latter 
expansion.  Also agreed was a rejigging of administrative bodies so that competitive 
conduct and price surveillance would be the province of a single instrumentality – the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.  All this was to be encompassed in 
new legislation on which ‘State Territory and Commonwealth Governments will 
commence work’ with a view to its consideration at the August meeting of the Council 
of Australian Governments. 
 
Two matters were expressed to be matters for further work:  ‘the practicalities of 
applying the Hilmer Report’ and ‘assistance to the States and territories for loss of 
monopoly rents and the process for managing adjustment’.   The former was to be a 
matter of ‘report to the next council meeting’ and the latter for consideration by the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The precise process set out in the meeting Communique in order to formulate the 
required legislation, decide on the practicalities of implementation and deal with 
financial implications is somewhat opaque. The Council agreed to establish ‘a standing 
committee of senior officials’ to ‘manage [a] continuing agenda of micro-economic 
reform’.  Whether this was the one set up in the June 1993 meeting is not clear.  Either 
the new working group or its predecessor was specifically tasked with reporting on 
detailed proposals for further reform of the maritime sector and the legal profession.  
Whether the working group was to deal with the matters for further ‘work’ or even to 
manage the intricacies of drafting the envisaged legislation was not specified.   
 
Despite the ambiguity of the Communique, it appears that the Heads of Government 
knew what they wanted in terms of process.  Two working groups were subsequently 
set up: a legislative drafting group to deal with the proposed legislation and the micro-
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economic reform group referred to in the Communique as to be established.  Both were 
coordinated and supported from within the Commonwealth Public Service, albeit the 
one from within Treasury and the other the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.  The former was supervised by the latter.185  In the meantime, the 
Parliamentary Library paper by John Kain, discussed in Chapter 1, was made available 
to the officials and the Council of Australian Governments.  No doubt it contributed to 
discussions, although there is no trace of it.  Certainly such doubt as it cast on the 
foundations of the Hilmer Committee’s recommendations was ignored. 
 
The Commonwealth dominated the process of formulating the policy.  Churchman 
vividly describes the subordinated position of State and Territory representatives on 
meetings:  in a context requiring an uncommon combination of skills and knowledge,186 
State officials, often with multiple other responsibilities, were often not either 
lawyers187 nor familiar with competition policy or law and sometimes both, faced a 
‘phalanx of Commonwealth officials of varying degrees of seniority, some of whom 
were working full time on this project’: 
 
                                                 
185 The account that follows draws substantially on the account provided by Susan Churchman, apparently 
a member of the microeconomic reform group: see Susan Churchman, ‘National Competition Policy – its 
Evolution and Implementation: A Study in Intergovernmental Relations’ (1996) 55(2) Australian Journal 
of Public Administration 97.  Morgan adds somewhat to the account, having interviewed a number of 
participants: Morgan, above n 77, 67-73.  A contrasting description is provided by Painter, above n 184, 
50, where he maintains that ‘[c]loser attention to the communique’ reveals ‘the issues were referred to 
functional ministerial councils, out of the grasp of central agency reform enthusiasts’.  He suggests that 
the 1993 working group ‘would have a “monitoring” role’.  Closer attention does not bear out Painter’s 
view, although Churchman’s description seems somewhat focussed on her apparent role in the Legislative 
Drafting Group rather than its supervising Micro-economic Reform Group.  See also P G H Carroll, 
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations: COAG, the NCP, and RIS, Proceedings of the Public Policy 
Network Summer Conference 2007, 1-2 February 2007, Oaks Plaza Pier Hotel, Glenelg, Adelaide, SA EJ 
(2007). 
186 Churchman lists familiarity with the particular policy issues and how to translate them into law, legal 
issues such as the division of powers under the Constitution, and knowledge of various complex legal 
concepts: ibid., 97-8. 
187 Churchman’s own examples (ibid 98) of the powerlessness of the States and Territories in view of 
‘constitutional realities’ underlines the point: neither is in fact substantially correct.  Clearly the resources 
of the South Australian government did not extend to checking all claims by Commonwealth officials. 
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Great wads of newly drafted or redrafted material would hit the fax 
machines a couple of days before the meeting, and we would have to 
analyse it for possible issues and get any necessary legal and policy 
advice before flying out for the next meeting. Usually, this would have to 
be done in conjunction with meeting a number of unrelated 
responsibilities, all with their own deadlines and political imperatives. 
This could lead to a certain imbalance in the degree of preparedness at 
the meetings.  
 
Nevertheless, as Churchman dryly remarks, ‘The ease with which the Commonwealth 
view prevailed among officials did not necessarily translate into political support.’188  A 
package of legislation and draft intergovernmental agreements were ready for the 
August 1994 Council of Australian Governments meeting but was not adopted.  Painter 
nominates the outcome a ‘face saving formula’ in view of substantial discord over fiscal 
relations.  In March 1994 the Premiers had ventured a scheme for maintaining their 
revenues under the guise of competitive neutrality by taxing government-owned state 
enterprises as if they were privately owned.  At a ‘Leaders Forum’, of which there is 
little record,189 the State and Territory leaders, while acceding to the principles of 
competition policy as set out in the Hilmer Report, asserted a claim to revenue losses 
resulting from their implementation.  The discord spread to the institutional structure of 
implementation and the ability of the States and Territories to exempt from conduct 
regulation.   
 
The upshot of the disputes in mid-1994 was a Communique which blandly stated: 
 
The Council agreed that higher productivity levels were essential to 
Australia’s growth and competitiveness. Competition is a key stimulus to 
productivity improvement. The Council agreed that an effective national 
competition and legal framework were crucial to underpin enhanced 
economic performance. 
 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
189 Painter’s unreferenced account is about the only one extant: Painter, above n 184, 51. 
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The Communique  specified that agreement to be as to extension of the conduct 
regulation, structural reform, legislation reviews, limited price surveillance, access 
regulation for essential facilities only and with ‘participating State/Territory regimes to 
be taken as being effective if they meet agreed principles’, and a limited province for 
the ‘Australian Competition Council’ (nominated to have previously been the National 
Competition Council, but which indeed did remain the National Competition Council).  
There were a number of transitional arrangements.  Necessary draft legislation 
(amended from the proposals) and draft agreements in relation to the Conduct Code and 
Competition Principles were agreed to be released.   
 
Despite commentators’ assertions, much of what became the National Competition 
Policy had in fact been agreed by August 1994.  Painter is, therefore, somewhat 
overstating it when he refers to the Communique as representing a ‘face saving 
formula’.  While the sticking issue of fiscal relations still overshadowed competition 
policy, the Commonwealth conceded that a share of increased revenue resulting from 
competition policy reforms should accrue to the States, Territories and Local 
Government.  (The last of these makes its first appearance at this point.190)  The matter 
was, in true bureaucratic style, referred away: an assessment of the benefits of the 
reforms was to be made ‘by the Industry Commission on a brief provided by Heads of 
Treasury’.  In this way the path to a resolution was cleared. 
 
Yet once Council of Australian Governments made public the intentions of the various 
Governments with regard to microeconomic reform, resistance made itself known.  
Morgan provides an account, deriving from a 1997 interview with the then Director of 
the New South Wales Council, of the formation of a ‘dissenting coalition’ of key 
unions, and consumer, environmental and social welfare groups. This coalition, 
according to Morgan, ‘sensing that the political momentum of the reforms was too great 
to succeed in blocking them’, focussed on moderating the impact of the default position 
of preferred competition in legislative reviews by proposing that the ‘public interest’ be 
                                                 
190 As the Communique puts it: ‘The Council agreed that the Australian Local Government Association 
would participate in the further consultations on competition policy that are now to occur and in the 
preparation of the advice to the Council flowing from these consultations’: Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) Meeting 19 August 1994, Communique, <http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting-
outcomes/archive.cfm>  (last accessed 20 July 2014).. 
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defined.191 It would operate as a regulatory device, or process, under which 
‘[b]roadening the range of concerns that had to be explicitly addressed would therefore 
make proportionately more difficult any final political decision to ignore ‘social’ 
concerns in favour of ‘economic’ ones’.  Unfortunately the terms of the clause do not 
bear out this interpretation.  They are permissive rather than regulatory and incorporate 
too much (the ‘competitiveness of Australian businesses’ and the efficient allocation of 
resources) to the contrary.   
 
To be sure, the ‘dissenting coalition’ may have sought articulation of exactly what was 
that which argued against competition, but it is to impose a theoretical structure to say 
that it was a regulatory device calculated to influence the process of regulatory 
formation in favour of social concerns.  Indeed, in the end it performed quite the 
opposite function.  At the same time as the development of the clause, the institutional 
structure of inter-governmental transfer or to redress the fiscal balance was determined 
as was the relative provinces of the various levels of government.  Together these 
stances enabled the sort of defences to claims of alleged harm as discussed in Chapter 7 
under which no level of government bore responsibility for the process.   
 
Nevertheless, Morgan’s observation that the clause resulted in a degree of ‘political 
malleability’ at the same time as there was a fixing of the institutional structure of 
                                                 
191 Morgan, above n 77, 68-9.  Morgan is not clear in her description of the impact of the public interest 
clause: ‘This clause mitigated, at least in theory, the strength of the rebuttable presumption in favour of 
‘marketisation’ and maximum competition in regulatory policy choice.’  It does, however, refer to 
legislation reviews. The Hilmer Committee, according to a 2001 interview with Professor Hilmer, did not 
believe such a clause was appropriate, both because it would strengthen the (rent-seeking) hand of those 
arguing against competition in legislation reviews and, conversely, because politicians would in any case 
be involved in decision-making.  Oddly enough, by 1998 in the implementation phase, having the public 
interest defined appealed as much to those in favour of micro-economic reform as those against it.  At that 
time the National Competition Council asked the Centre for International Economics, a private economic 
research agency, ‘to set out as clearly as possible a framework covering the National Competition Policy 
legislation review and reform process, including implementation of recommendations’: Graeme Samuel, 
‘Foreword’ in Centre for International Economics, Guidelines for National Competition Policy 
Legislation Reviews, Centre for International Economics, Canberra, 1999, v,.  The resulting document set 
out the procedures Governments might undertake in undertaking reviews.  Indeed, there are a number of 
other, mainly government publications dealing with the processes of legislative review: E.g., Office of 
Regulation Review 1998, A Guide to Regulation (second edition). 
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competition policy is astute.  The clause could be and was drawn upon in the political 
debates to represent that the imposition of micro-economic reform was not to be 
absolute.  Yet the institutional structure which provided the impetus to reform was 
powerful and fiscal difficulties were solved through the terms of the Implementation 
Agreement and the process of rendering calculable the amounts at stake.  Moreover, the 
establishment of the National Competition Council provided an independent arbiter.   
 
The States were bound to the Agreements by the promise of money, but compliance had 
to be measured in an unbiased way where justice was seen to be done.  While the 
National Competition Council’s original role as formulated by the Hilmer Committee192 
was much broader, it did not include assessment.  The Hilmer Committee assumed a 
referral of power by the States would overcome constitutional issues, but was clearly 
mistaken with regard to at least legislative reviews.   As the National Competition 
Council was formulated to deal with the issues of Commonwealth-State rivalries and 
institutional capture, it was the ideal body to assess compliance with the Agreements.   
 
1995 Industry Commission Report 
 
The referral of assessment of the benefits of the reforms to ‘the Industry Commission on 
a brief provided by Heads of Treasury’ is mentioned above.193  To do so was an 
essential step in solving the problem over fiscal arrangements which had almost 
threatened the development of the National Competition Policy: the States and 
Territories foresaw that some of the actions taken in compliance with competition 
policy would lead to diminished revenue to them and increased revenue to the 
Commonwealth.  For example, if a utility which remits funds to a State is sold, the State 
                                                 
192 Hilmer Report, above n 129, pp 318-340. It recommended (at p 338) that: 
A National Competition Council be established to advise Australian Governments on: 
(a) regulatory restrictions on competition; 
(b) the restructuring of public monopolies; 
(c) the declaration of access rights to essential facilities; 
(d) pricing matters; 
(e) competitive neutrality matters; 
(f) issues associated with the transition to competitive markets; and 
(g) other matters as directed. 
193 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 19 August 1994, Communique. 
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loses that revenue but the Commonwealth receives additional revenue from tax on the 
profits of the utility (this is to ignore the reduced interest payments on the debt which 
the sale enabled the State to repay – the matter is complex).  Moreover, what the 
Commonwealth wanted would cause the States and Territories pain, both in terms of 
political popularity and to the residents of those States and territories by way of the 
personal, social and financial costs of structural adjustment.   Precisely how much 
should be paid to salve the pain was the nub of the matter, once the Commonwealth had 
conceded the point.  But assessment of personal and social costs is difficult, hence the 
decision was taken in the August 1994 Council of Australian Governments meeting to 
distribute the benefits and allow the implementing governments determine how much 
would be paid to those of its residents who bore the costs.  This was an unremarked 
reinforcement of the federal arrangements represented by the National Competition 
Policy – one of the most important concessions of the Commonwealth. 
 
The full terms of reference for the Industry Commission were provided, as agreed, by 
heads of Treasury of the various Governments on 23 September 1994, with the first 
draft to be ready by 30 November and Final report by 20 January 1995.  The terms of 
reference were confined to providing estimates of revenue growth, although this was of 
course net.  Even were the Industry Commission to have been inclined to do so, a 
doubtful proposition in the first place, no scope was provided for questioning that 
competition policy reform would lead to benefits through ‘sustainable increases in 
living standards and greater national output and income’ leading to greater government 
revenue.  Competition policy and ‘related reforms’ were to ‘contribute to a domestic 
market environment that facilitates improvements in the productivity of capital and 
labour and leads to lower prices and/or better quality goods and services’.  The ‘related 
reforms’ were specific reforms to the electricity, gas and water industries, road 
transport, ports, providing mutual recognition for goods and occupations, and providing 
for a national approach to partially registered occupations.194 
 
The task set the Industry Commission was onerous and time lines were extremely tight.  
The Industry Commission repeatedly states this: for example, ‘[t]he Commission has 
                                                 
194 Industry Commission, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms. A 
Report by the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments (Industry Commission 
Research Report), 1995, Appendix D1. 
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sought to provide the highest quality information possible in the time available’,195 
‘[o]ver the very tight frame available, the Commission could not investigate every 
possible reform and every possible implication’.196  Moreover, the Commission strongly 
qualified its advice: ‘The point to be made is that, if the implications of this package of 
reforms are difficult to tie down in principle, a modelling exercise cannot manufacture 
certainty out of the unknown’.197  There were simply too many ‘unknowns and 
intangibles in implementation’ because the reforms were ‘more about concerted 
strategies to foster a climate for improved economic prosperity than they are about 
implementing specific, known and tangible changes’.198 
 
Despite its persuasive arguments about the implausibility of definitive results, the 
Commission managed to come up with the following: 
 Australia’s GDP would grow by 5.5 per cent or $23 billion a year.  This is 
about an additional $1500 spending per year per household. 
 The benefits of reform would be widely distributed.  The majority of 
industries would gain and, since so much was to be reformed, the loss from 
one reform would be offset by gains from another. 
 There would be large revenue gains for both levels of government, although 
exactly how much was too problematic even for the Industry Commission to 
state with certitude.  It did make a heavily qualified approximation (it looks 
more like a guess) of $5.9 billion for the Commonwealth and $3.0 billion to 
the States, Territories and local government. 
It produced these results by modelling the impact of the reforms.  The Council of 
Australian Governments had specifically asked the Industry Commission to explain 
how its methodology and assumption used to derive its estimates199 and this it does, 
although there is no explanation of the epistemology of modelling as such.  An 
economic model called HILORANI was deployed, chosen because it was good enough 
                                                 
195 Ibid 2 
196 Ibid 4. 
197 Ibid 3 
198 Ibid 3-4 
199 Ibid Appendix D1 
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and other better ones were still not fully tested out.  There was no time to do so.  As the 
Industry Commission puts it: 
 
ORANI is a large-scale multisectoral model of the Australian economy. 
It is large in scale because it embodies considerable microeconomic 
detail on the nature of production and demand in the economy.  It is 
called a multisectoral model because it treats the economy as a system of 
inter-related industry sectors.  The model captures the interdependencies 
between industries that arise from the purchase of each other’s output of 
goods and services. It also captures the industry linkages that arise from 
competition for available resources, such as labour and capital. Finally, it 
captures the dependence of Australian demands for industry outputs on 
prices and domestic incomes, and the dependence of foreign demands on 
Australian prices relative to those overseas.   
 
Some amendments have been made to the standard version of ORANI to 
produce a special purpose version, HILORANI, that has been used for 
this exercise. Amendments have been made to the model’s industry 
breakdown, its database and its theoretical structure.200 
 
Effectively a ‘model’ is a set of formulae which indicate the responses to changes in 
various industries within a particular economy.  The formulae are developed from 
observation and theory.  Hence acceptance of a model’s results is predicated on belief 
in: 
 the epistemology of economics,  
 the theory accepted into the particular model,  
 the data used to produce the constants in the model,  
 the plausibility of the tests deployed to determine if the model functions well,  
 the data inputted to establish the base point from which change is to be 
measured, and  
 the data derived as that resulting from the changes. 
                                                 
200 Ibid 389.  Reference deleted.   
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The Industry Commission’s qualifications on its estimates arises from uncertainty as to 
some of these, but not all.  However, it was not asked to do more that of which it was 
capable and it never moves outside the area of estimating probable consequences. 
 
The Council of Australian Governments had also asked the Industry Commission to 
review the estimates of productivity gains in the Australian economy from micro-
economic reform made by other studies.  This it did in Part C 3.  Its conclusion was 
that: 
 
The main message to come out of the studies are that there is a lot of 
uncertainty about the likely direct impacts of microeconomic reforms, 
but the eventual benefits to consumers in all cases are significant.  Also 
the broader the range of reforms, the greater the likelihood that that all 
sectors of the economy will benefit.  In a number of studies it can be 
inferred that governments gain considerable economic benefits from the 
reforms, which can be taken in various combinations of greater revenues, 
expenditures or savings (lower PSBR).201 
 
In a substantial coda, the Commission stated: 
 
The studies mostly abstract from the difficult timing issues, such as the 
phasing in of the reforms, the rate at which economic agents react to 
those reforms, the duration and magnitude of adjustment costs, and the 
length of time before the full gains from the reforms are achieved on an 
ongoing basis.  These timing issues are important in determining whether 
the discounted long-term benefits exceed the short-term costs of reform.  
Again, the broader the package of reforms, the more likely this will be, 
because the losers from one set of reforms will be the gainers from many 
other reforms.202 
 
                                                 
201 Ibid 495.  ‘PSBR’ is ‘public sector borrowing requirements’. 
202 Ibid 495-6 
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This coda repeats more explicitly the qualification on the Commission’s own results 
mentioned above.  It has two aspects which resonate down the history of the National 
Competition Policy: who wins and who loses, and can they be aggregated – the Kaldor 
Hicks efficiency problematic;203 and assessment of the costs of its implementation.  
Neither of these is directly dealt with by the Industry Commission in this report, nor 
perhaps should they have been, given they were not within its terms of reference, but 
how the Industry Commission’s opinions were read later is quite a different matter.  
Equally, its methodology of assessing benefit is not later questioned. 
 
Most importantly, the Report did what was required: it placed an independently 
generated monetary figure on the proposed reforms. Later, the figure was shown to be 
substantially inflated yet that was not taken to destroy the credibility of the Industry 
Commission, subsequently called the Productivity Commission.   The figure provided, 
$23 billion a year, was that which informed the amounts distributed under the 
Implementation Agreement.  That someone could provide a figure calculated to the 
satisfaction of the Treasuries of all Governments was what mattered.  To have done so 
solved the problem of the fiscal imbalance and allowed the National Competition Policy 
to proceed. 
 
Conclusion: Origins 
 
Resistance to proposals, the fiscal imbalance, jealousies over jurisdiction, and the 
possibilities of bureaucratic independence together made an acceptable solution 
possible.  Of course, it is quite possible that what that was a solution to had been 
forgotten by then.  Yet these were the immediate ingredients of the formation of the 
National Competition Policy as set out in the Agreements signed in April 1995. Prior to 
then there had been a mixture of particular policies and driving ambition to reform 
Australia’s federal polity, governmental structure and performance, and private sector 
conduct.  ‘Competition’ was only one concept in a prevailing discourse, albeit one 
pregnant with theory and implication.  Yet it came to dominate.  Through it the other 
reform ambitions were rendered possible of realisation.   
 
                                                 
203 Tibor Scitovsky, ‘A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics’ (1941) 9 The Review of Economic 
Studies 77.  
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In all of this, there was no concerted attack on competition as a good thing in itself.  The 
only attacks were on its use as a regulatory device in certain circumstances, and on the 
impact of proposals on federalism and finances. The latter two were satisfactorily 
worked out in the Agreements, although that settlement had to be reasserted from time 
to time.  The narrowness of remaining resistance played out through the whole of the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy.  When it boiled over in the 
Australian Commonwealth Senate in the latter half of the 1990s, the focus on effect 
becomes particularly visible in the terms of reference of the consequent inquiry: they 
were simply into the ‘Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition 
Policy’.204 
 
  
                                                 
204 The report of which was Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select 
Committee, Commonwealth Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000. 
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Chapter 4 
Implementation: The Institutions of the National 
Competition Policy 
 
 
Chapter 2 sets out that to which the Agreements1 comprising the National Competition 
Policy committed their parties and what evidence there is of implementation; the 
context and history of the development of the Agreements occupies Chapter 3. The next 
three chapters, including this one, investigate what was done in pursuance of those 
obligations in terms of context, time and the elements of the National Competition 
Policy.  This Chapter is concerned with the establishment of the institutional structure in 
which implementation took place.  Chapter 7 describes responses, resistance to and the 
defence of the policy.  Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, summarizing the many 
observations made as the thick description is worked through.   
 
Mainly for reasons of discursive completeness and convenience, rather than some 
conclusion from theory, Chapter 2 argues that Australia’s National Competition Policy 
should be taken to be comprised of a particular suite of intergovernmental agreements.  
Yet they were far more than simply a set of abstract obligations to do certain things.  
Surprisingly, this obvious fact has been mostly overlooked in the literature.2  After all, 
the Agreements were between governments somewhat sovereign3 in nature, were 
probably unenforceable in law but secured by large sums of money, and relied for 
efficacy on the possibility of unbiased bureaucratic assessments of performance.  In 
                                                 
1 See above Chapter 1 n 14. 
2 The literature which acknowledges that there was more than mere obligations tends nevertheless to 
ignore much of what Chapter 3 explores: the dilemmas of sovereignty in Australia’s form of federalism, 
the ambitions which drove the development of the policy, the conception of the possibility of objective 
assessment and so forth.  On the other hand, there is some recognition of the interplays of bureaucratic 
agency and federalism’s fiscal structures. 
3 ‘Somewhat sovereign’ is here offered as a suitably oxymoronic descriptor of the status of Australia’s 
component entities, Diceyan sovereignty confined by a common Constitution yet independently 
autochthonous in the K. C. Wheare sense.  See the discussion in Chapter 2. 
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other words, in understanding them and their implementation, their form, institutional 
framework and internal dynamics are as important as the substance of the obligations.  
This is critical to an understanding of implementation. 4 
 
Overall Institutional Framework 
 
As was observed of the Agreements in Chapter 2, the institutional framework for the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy comprised five levels: the Council 
of Australian Governments as representing (but not in toto) what might be called meta-
governmental arrangements, governments negotiating between themselves and 
determining the meaning or content of the policy, legislatures to change the law, 
administrations to implement those actions which were not changes in legislation or 
regulation, and bodies (including the public service) to assess, recommend and advise.  
Much of this pre-existed the Agreements and therefore has already been discussed in 
Chapter 3 as precursor to or product of the development of the National Competition 
Policy, or has been assumed to be knowledge common (in both senses) to readers of this 
thesis.  For present purposes, little changed in this context over the period of the 
National Competition Policy, apart from that considered below. 
 
One of the major bodies of the third level, the Productivity Commission, did not exist 
on signature of the Agreements. It was formally established in 1998.  On the other hand, 
its form was a simple adaptation of that of its predecessor, the Industry Commission.  
Yet the changes that were made were the result of debate and controversy 
cotemporaneous with, and perhaps arising from, the early implementation of the 
National Competition Policy.  For that reason its form and structure are worthy of 
investigation as an aspect of implementation.   
 
Second, the only body established in accordance with express terms in the Agreements 
was the National Competition Council.  This body, as is obvious from much in previous 
                                                 
4 A number of terms are available to describe the bodies set up to (broadly) administer the National 
Competition Policy.  ‘Organisations’, ‘bodies’. ‘state structures’ and so forth are candidates.  At the risk 
of confusion with other disciplinary understandings of the terms, ‘institution’ is here used as it implies a 
established form, an external creation and a relationship with the state with its policy formation, 
implementation and law enforcement functions.  
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chapters and as mentioned above, performed crucial functions in the federal aspects of 
implementation and also in reporting and advising.  Hence it will be dealt with 
following consideration of the Productivity Commission.  Finally, various bodies and 
processes were established by the Commonwealth State and Territory governments 
within the various public services to implement particular elements of the National 
Competition Policy and they will be dealt with as they become relevant. 
 
The Productivity Commission and Predecessors 
 
The Productivity Commission was formed from a merger between the Industry 
Commission, the Economic Planning Advisory Commission (earlier it was a ‘Council’) 
and the Bureau of Industry Economics.  It was established in accordance with a promise 
by the then putative Prime Minister, John Howard, in 1995: as a matter of 
administrative arrangements in June 1996 with legislative legitimacy following in 1998 
through the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth).5  
 
The Productivity Commission and its predecessors were heavily involved in the 
development and implementation of competition policy.  Indeed, the Productivity 
Commission’s immediate predecessor, the Industry Commission, provided secretariat 
services to the Special Premiers Conferences and to the Council of Australian 
Governments.6  The Industry Commission also provided the 1995 assessment of the 
benefits to be gained from the implementation of competition policy which enabled the 
                                                 
5 The Industry Commission was informally (‘administratively’) operating as the Productivity Commission 
in the two years prior to the latter’s establishment: Productivity Commission, From Industry Assistance to 
Productivity: 30 Years of ‘The Commission’ 2003, 87.  Indeed, reports were issued in the name of the 
Productivity Commission before it came into existence. This was challenged (with some glee) by Mr 
Latham: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 November 1996, 7035 and 
defended on budgetary, convenience (it was going to happen anyway), and election commitment grounds. 
See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 February 1997, 630 (an 
equally gleeful Mr Gareth Evans).  
6 Productivity Commission, From Industry Assistance to Productivity: 30 Years of ‘The Commission’ 
2003, 76. 
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Implementation Agreement to be formulated.7  Many of the reports of the Productivity 
Commission were directed at dealing with issues arising from the implementation of the 
National Competition Policy.  And the Productivity Commission provided the final 
review at the end of the term of the National Competition Policy.8  
 
The Industry Commission was established under its own Act in 1989.9  The picture 
prior to that is a little less clear.  While the Productivity Commission’s 2003 
autobiography10 concedes that on its establishment, the Industry Commission took on 
the functions of both the Industry Assistance Commission and the Inter-State 
Commission, and later the Business Regulation Review Unit, it tends to downplay the 
latter two.  Partly this appears to be because their staff represented less than ten per cent 
of the amalgamated staff and 20 percent of the total budget.  The Business Regulation 
Review Unit was tiny, consisting of just four staff, compared to the Inter-State 
Commission with sixteen, and was effectively merely an administrative unit within the 
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce. 
 
The Industries Assistance Commission was a creature of the 1970s, inquiring into the 
assistance that should be given to industries, but ensuring that the economy-wide 
                                                 
7 Industry Commission, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms. A Report 
by the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments (Industry Commission Research 
Report), 1995 
8 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report no. 33, 2005. 
9 Industry Commission Act 1989 (Cth). 
10 Productivity Commission, From Industry Assistance to Productivity: 30 Years of ‘The Commission’ 
2003 is a history of the Productivity Commission published on the thirtieth anniversary of the formation 
of the Industries Assistance Commission.  The history sought, in the words of the Foreword written by 
the then Chairman of the Productivity Commission, Gary Banks, ‘to be a brief “document of record”, 
eschewing historical interpretation (enticing though it may be). Disentangling the two is not always easy, 
of course, and we may not always have succeeded.’  With the caveat in mind, bolstered somewhat by the 
considerations in Chapter 1 hereof that it is impossible to separate the two, the history is an excellent 
resource.  The existence of the caveat is, however, the main point of much of what this thesis says about 
the Productivity Commission.  This is that the Productivity Commission was captured by a school of 
thought to the exclusion of alternative thinking.  This is, of course, Pusey’s point about the public service 
in Canberra as a whole (Pusey, Michael, Economic Rationalism in Canberra (Cambridge University 
Press, 1991) but is more defensible here due to the structure of the Commission.   
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implications of its recommendations were considered.  This is what distinguished from 
its predecessor, the Tariff Board.11  Later, the work of the Industries Assistance 
Commission inverted, so to speak, to concentrate on the general structure of protecting 
industry rather than the best way of protecting particular industries.12 
 
Soon after the establishment of the Industries Assistance Commission, ‘the need for a 
tool that quantified the effects of change in a range of factors (e.g., the level of trade and 
government policies) on other industries and on the economy as a whole’ was 
‘perceived’ and with other agencies and academic institutions sponsored the 
development of large scale multisectoral models of the economy – the ORANI model 
discussed in Chapter 3 as that deployed to quantify the effect of National Competition 
Policy reforms.13   It was later extended for multi-period analysis into the MONASH 
model and further to distinguish State and Territory regional economies14 and used in 
the Productivity Commission’s 2005 Assessment of the National Competition Policy.  It 
also developed and deployed other models, such as the Salter model of the world 
economy.  
 
In contrast to the relatively uncontroversial transition from Industries Assistance 
Commission to Industry Commission, the assimilation of the Inter-State Commission 
provoked questions in Parliament and media comment.15 This was partly about the 
perceived disregard for the constitutional position of the Inter-State Commission as 
mandated by s 101 of the Australian Constitution, although enabling legislation, the 
Inter-State Commission Act 1912 (Cth) had already once, after 1920, fallen into 
                                                 
11 Ibid, 22. 
12 See, for example, Industries Assistance Commission, Approaches to general Reductions in Protection, 
Report no. 301, 1982. 
13 Industry Commission, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms. A Report 
by the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments (Industry Commission Research 
Report), 1995. 
14 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reform, Report No 33, 2005. 
15 Michael Coper, The Second Coming of the Fourth Arm,  The Present Role and Future Potential of the 
Inter-State Commission, Discussion Paper No 2, 1989-90, Legislative Research Service, Department of 
the Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth, Canberra, 1989; Productivity Commissions, 
above n 6, 67.  
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desuetude only to be revived in the Inter-State Commission Act 1975 (Cth); even this 
was not proclaimed until 1983 and the Commission established in 1984. The 
controversy was also about the intergovernmental functions of the Inter-State 
Commission, both as envisaged in the Constitution, subject to the Wheat Case,16 and 
purportedly in practice, as a guardian of s 92 of the Constitution, freedom of inter-state 
trade.17  Much of its work was about the transport industry, which was of the ilk of the 
work of the Industries Assistance Commission, although its remit was taken by the 
Inter-State Commission to be as much about social issues: safety, town and regional 
planning, the economic and social life of cities and local communities and 
environmental matters.  After reporting the controversy, the Productivity Commission’s 
autobiography moves on with the innocuous segue ‘[i]n any event ...’, thus ignoring the 
substantive issue of purpose and function.  Again, the description of the Inter-State 
Commission in a text box is similarly dismissive: 
 
For most of the years since federation there has been no Inter-State 
Commission. An ISC was first established in 1913 by the Labor 
Government to deal with intense lobbying between free traders and 
protectionists. Its last report was forwarded to the Government in 1917. 
In 1984, an ISC once again commenced operation. With its 
independence guaranteed by the Constitution, its role was to advise the 
Commonwealth Government on matters relating to interstate transport 
and wider trade-related matters. The ISC’s central theme was: 
 
… the improvement of the efficiency and equity of 
interstate transport arrangements and the development of 
a balanced national transport strategy and the 
infrastructure for implementing that strategy. (ISC 1989, 
p. 2) 
                                                 
16 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54 
17 Inter-State Commission, Annual Report 1988-9, 1989, 6; Inter-State Commission, The Inter-State 
Commission A Guide to Its Powers, Functions and Procedures, 1986, 7-14; Michael Coper, The Second 
Coming of the Fourth Arm,  The Present Role and Future Potential of the Inter-State Commission, 
Discussion Paper No 2, 1989-90, Legislative Research Service, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 
Parliament of the Commonwealth, Canberra, 1989, 5. 
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The ISC investigated a variety of transport-related issues, including road 
user charges, waterfront reform and the efficiency of interstate transport 
arrangements.  
 
The Industry Commission itself was similar to many such bodies, being a committee 
with a chairperson with the powers to employ staff.  Its function was to hold inquiries 
and make reports to the Minister on matters referred to it by the Minister.18  It was given 
a variety of powers to do so, including to compel attendance at hearings (ss 18-9), 
compel answers to questions (subject to self-incrimination) (s 20), to take possession of 
documents (s 20, 23), as to false and misleading evidence (s 21) and so forth.  In its 
reports, the Commission was required by s 8 to have regard to ‘the desire of the 
Commonwealth Government: 
 
(a)  to encourage the development and growth of Australian industries 
that are efficient in their use of resources, self-reliant, enterprising, 
innovative and internationally competitive; and 
(b)  to facilitate adjustment to structural changes in the economy and to 
ease social and economic hardships arising from those changes; and 
(c)  to reduce regulation of industry (including regulation by the States 
and Territories) where this is consistent with the social and economic 
goals of the Commonwealth Government; and 
(d)  to recognise the interests of industries, consumers, and the 
community, likely to be affected by measures proposed by the 
Commission. 
 
Under s 8(2) the Commission was also required to have regard to matters notified to it 
in writing by the Minister.  Under s 8(3) it was required, when inquiring and reporting, 
also to inquire into and report in the same report on ‘the social and environmental 
consequences of any recommendations it makes’.  All of this was and is 
unexceptionable in the context of the sort of inquiries envisaged: it was the normal sort 
of Commission set up to make the normal sort of enquiries as to the economy.  The 
matters about which it was to be concerned and have regard to were broad ranging and 
                                                 
18 Industry Commission Act 1989 (Cth), s 6. 
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representative of  the sorts of things that were thought to of concern to governments: 
efficiency, progress, innovation, overregulation, and the social and environmental 
consequences of change.  The last was emphasised by the requirement in s 28 that at 
least one of the Commissioners ‘be a person who has knowledge of, and at least 3 years’ 
experience, in an employed or voluntary capacity, in, environmental matters’.  Despite 
these emphases, from 1987 the relevant Minister was the Treasurer,19 and connections 
between the Department and Commission staff were close; for example, A S Cole, the 
chair of the Commission from 1990 to 1991 was appointed as Secretary of the 
Department of Treasury on his resignation, similarly, S T Sedgwick was appointed on 
resignation as Secretary of the Department of Finance. 
 
The Bureau of Industry Economics had similar purposes and functions to those of the 
Industry Commission: investigation and reporting on economic policy issues.  It was 
‘established administratively’ – it did not have an enabling Act of Parliament, and was 
specifically tasked with conducting research of an economic nature.   
 
The Economic Planning Advisory Commission was a very different beast.  It was 
created as a community forum established to be a representative body, a ‘channel of 
information’, to investigate and provide the Minister with advice as to economic and 
social issues, and to promote public debate on those issues.  By 1994 the Council had 
been replaced by a more conventional ‘Commission’; indeed, the Commission was 
constituted by a single Commissioner.20   Its functions appear to have been retained by 
the 1994 changes, although close examination reveals substantial limitations were been 
placed on them: 
 
                                                 
19 The Industry Assistance Commission on establishment was the responsibility of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, unlike its predecessor, the Tariff Board which was under the Department of 
Trade.  By the end of 1974 responsibility had passed to the Special minister of State and then successively 
the Departments of Business and Consumer Affairs, Administrative Services and Industry and 
Commerce.  The degree to which industry lobby groups could influence policy and impact of 
protectionist sentiments in the various departments is controversial.  It is reasonably clear that the shift to 
the Industry Assistance Commission being the responsibility of the Treasurer was as a result of the desire 
to separate it from sectoral interests located in or having connections with departments and also a desire 
to relate it more to national economic policy: Productivity Commission, above n 6, 26-7. 
20 Prime Minister and Cabinet (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (Cth) s 5. 
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(a) to investigate, or assist in the investigation of, matters relating to 
medium and long-term economic and social issues and provide, or assist 
in the provision of, information and advice to the Minister in respect of 
those matters; and 
(b) to promote public debate on, and public understanding of, economic 
and social issues; and 
(c) at the request of the Minister, to undertake special projects in respect 
of matters relating to economic and social issues; and 
(d) to seek, and report to the Minister on, the views of persons, and 
groups of persons, in industry, the trade union movement, and the 
community generally, in connection with the preparation of the annual 
Commonwealth budget. 
 
The consultative function was thus limited to the preparation of the ‘annual 
Commonwealth budget’, and ‘medium and long-term economic and social issues’ were 
to be simply investigated without regard to consultation.  More general consultation was 
limited to ‘promoting debate, and public understanding of,’ those issues – spreading 
information about and testing ideas and proposals, rather than discovering them in the 
public consciousness.  It is this limited idea of consultation which is subsumed into the 
powers and functions of the Productivity Commission, rather than the previous wider 
democratic or consultative, even Habermasian, ideal.  
 
The Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth) provided the Productivity Commission 
with a statutory structure, establishment, purposes and functions.  Much of this was 
similar to that of the Industry Commission and everything substantive has remained the 
same since 1998.  In full, the functions of the Commission are stated in s 6 to be: 
 
(a) to hold inquiries and report to the Minister about matters relating 
to industry, industry development and productivity that are 
referred to it by the Minister; and 
(b) to provide secretariat services and research services to 
government bodies as directed by the Minister; and 
(c) on and after 1 July 1997, to receive and investigate complaints 
about the implementation of competitive neutrality arrangements 
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in relation to Commonwealth government businesses and 
business activities and to report to the Minister on its 
investigations; and 
(d) to provide advice to the Minister about matters relating to 
industry, industry development and productivity, as requested by 
the Minister; and 
(e) to undertake, on its own initiative, research about matters relating 
to industry, industry development and productivity; and  
(f) to promote public understanding of matters relating to industry, 
industry development and productivity; and 
(g) to perform any other function conferred on it by this Act; and 
(h) to do anything incidental to any of the preceding functions. 
 
This elaborates somewhat on the stated functions of the Industry Commission, which 
was simply required to ‘hold inquiries and make reports to the Minister in respect of 
such matters relating to industry as are referred to it by the Minister’.21  There is a much 
greater emphasis on productivity.  In contrast to that narrowing to the economic, the 
‘general policy guidelines’ in s 8 are somewhat broader, although only to the extent that 
they reflect some of the political controversies to do with the National Competition 
Policy that then raged, as will be discussed later in this Chapter.  The ‘guidelines’ for 
the Productivity Commission are: 
 
(a) to improve the overall economic performance of the economy 
through higher productivity in the public and private sectors in 
order to achieve higher living standards for all members of the 
Australian community; and 
(b) to reduce regulation of industry (including regulation by the 
States, Territories and local government) where this is consistent 
                                                 
21 Industry Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 6.  The Productivity Commission itself in its autobiography 
considered that its functions were considerably broader than those of the Industry Commission, as did the 
Government in Parliament. However, the Productivity Commission conceded that its functions were 
‘focused more on productivity performance of industry and industry development’: Productivity 
Commission, From Industry Assistance to Productivity: 30 Years of ‘The Commission’ 2003, 94. It 
viewed the trajectory of change was best described in terms of a change from protectionism to efficiency 
and community welfare: ibid, 45. 
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with the social and economic goals of the Commonwealth 
Government; and 
(c) to encourage the development and growth of Australian industries 
that are efficient in their use of resources, enterprising, innovative 
and internationally competitive; and 
(d) to facilitate adjustment to structural changes in the economy and 
the avoidance of social and economic hardships arising from 
those changes; and 
(e) to recognise the interests of industries, employees, consumers and 
the community, likely to be affected by measures proposed by the 
Commission; and 
(f) to increase employment, including in regional areas; and 
(g) to promote regional development; and 
(h) to recognise the progress made by Australia’s trading partners in 
reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers; and 
(i) to ensure that industry develops in a way that is ecologically 
sustainable; and 
(j) for Australia to meet its international obligations and 
commitments. 
 
The first of these ‘guidelines’ was not in the equivalent section of the Industry 
Commission Act (1989) (Cth.) reflecting the new emphasis on productivity; the last five, 
(f) to (j) were also new, reflecting concerns expressed in Parliament22 about regional 
                                                 
22 As expressed in debate in the Senate (Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 1 September 
1997, 6087 (Senator Sherry, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate): 
(1)   [The Senate] expresses its concern at the monopolisation of economic advice under 
the Treasury portfolio, with the abolition of Economic Planning and Advisory Council 
and the Bureau of Industry Economics meaning the disappearance of independent 
sources of economic and industry policy advice to the Prime Minister and to the 
Minister for Industry, Science and Tourism; 
(2)   expresses its concern that the centralising of economic and industry policy advice 
under one Minister increases the risk of the Government adopting inappropriate policies 
in these areas; 
(3)   expresses its concern on the basis of the interim Productivity Commission's now 
completed reports on Micro-Economic Reform and the Motor Vehicle Industry, that the 
new Productivity Commission will be far more preoccupied with advancing the 
162 
 
communities, environmental concerns and the perceived tendency of Australian 
governments to sacrifice Australia’s international trading position on the altar of 
theoretical purity (although the last is tempered by the reference in (j) to ‘international 
obligations and commitments’ – relevantly largely about free trade rather than a more 
mercantilist position).     
 
Earlier concerns about the environment had led to one commissioner of the Industry 
Commission being required to have knowledge of and experience in environmental 
matters.  This was continued for the Productivity Commission by s 24(3), although the 
criterion was changed, again to a more productivity focused terminology: ‘at least one 
Commissioner must have extensive skills and experience in applying the principles of 
ecologically sustainable development and environmental conservation’.   
 
Concerns raised in Parliament and elsewhere about the epistemology of the Industry 
Commission’s work23 were also reflected in the Productivity Commission Act 1998 
(Cth).  Section 8(3) requires the Productivity Commission to reflect on what it is doing 
when it relies on economic models: 
 
The Commission, in all reports on matters referred to it, must provide a 
variety of viewpoints and options representing alternative means of 
                                                                                                                                               
Government's political and ideological agenda than with balanced, sensible and 
technically sound advice assisting industry development; and 
(4)   expresses its strong preference for an alternative structure for industry and 
productivity related advice to Ministers, one that: 
   (a)   is provided by a diverse range of fully qualified and experienced individuals and 
organisations, not operating solely under a Treasury umbrella; 
   (b)   fully involves industry, trade union and relevant community groups in the 
development of advice; and 
   (c)   has full regard to the larger economic, social and especially regional 
consequences of the advice given. 
23 Largely these were that the Productivity Commission would be simply advise what Treasury wanted it 
to advise.  This was variously described as a ‘dry economic agenda’ (Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 February 1997, 630 (Mr Gareth Evans), and variously as neo-classical 
economics.  Mr Latham distinguished that from ‘institutional economics’ Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly 11 February 1997, 641-3 (Mr Latham) and there was critique of the 
models used. 
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addressing the issues in the report. If the report relies on formal 
mathematical economic modelling, the Commission must either: 
(a) if practicable—utilise at least 2 different economic models, with 
the assumptions and results of those models made explicit in the 
report; or  
(b) if it is not practicable to utilise at least 2 different economic 
models, appoint, and report on the views of, an independent 
reference panel on the modelling. 
 
These concerns also informed the composition of the Commission; in addition to the 
environmental Commissioner, another was required to ‘have extensive skills and 
experience in dealing with the social effects of economic adjustment and social welfare 
service delivery’.24  This is somewhat offset by the further requirement for one 
Commissioner to ‘have extensive skills and experience acquired in working in 
Australian industry’.25 
 
Consultative processes were advertised in the second reading speech to the Productivity 
Commission Bill 1996, when the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary noted that 
 
The Productivity Commission will be the government's principal 
advisory body on all aspects of micro-economic reform. It will continue 
to pursue the current functions of the IC, EPAC and BIE, but it will also 
have a broader charter. It will continue to have open and transparent 
consultative processes which engage industry and community groups in 
informed debate on important public policy making.26 
 
Yet there was no mandated consultative process. Nor was the body seen as a 
development of the Economic Planning Advisory Council; quite the opposite,27 as it 
                                                 
24 Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth) ss 24(4), 26(4). 
25 Ss 24(5), 26(5). 
26 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 December 1996, 7720 (Mr Miles) 
27 This point was repeatedly made in Parliamentary debate, both Gareth Evans and Mark Latham noting 
not only was there refusal of advice originating from the consultation process, but also that the 
establishment of the Productivity Commission was reducing all advice to the Government to one stream: 
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was left to develop its own processes in formulating its advice.  There was no 
requirement to hold public hearings, but it was empowered to do so as well as hold 
public seminars, conduct workshops, form working groups and so forth if to do so was 
thought necessary.  A draft report for public consultation was indicated to be a good 
idea but not a necessary process.28  Overall, then, there was very little guidance as to 
how the Productivity Commission was to go about its business.29 
Whether the putative Productivity Commission would be biased in its work was 
repeatedly raised in Parliament during the extensive debates over the Productivity 
Commission Act 1996 (Cth.).30 If the Public Service generally could be said to have a 
prevailing discourse as mooted in Chapter 3, the same might be able to be said more 
specifically of the Productivity Commission; if so, the Commission’s research services 
and advice to the government would be biased in accordance with the perspective 
permitted by that discourse.  In Parliament this bias was referred to as ‘dry economics’ 
or ‘neo-classical economics’.31  It is the epistemological argument earlier referred to:  
that the focus in the Productivity Commission’s defined functions and powers as 
summarised in the second reading speech32 and as universally acknowledged in all its 
Annual Reports (including when it was in the guise of the Industry Commission), is on 
‘productivity’33 and ‘effectiveness’ or ‘efficiency’.  The task of the Commission is and 
                                                                                                                                               
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 February 1997, 630 (Mr Gareth 
Evans) and 641-3  (Mr Latham). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Section 6 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth), as quoted in the text above, provided that its 
business would be to hold inquiries as referred to it, the result of which would be a public report, provide 
advice on Ministerial request, which would not result in a public report, and to provide secretariat and 
research services to government bodies.  
30 See above n 22. 
31  Ibid. 
32 ‘[T]he Productivity Commission's economy-wide perspective, its broad charter, public inquiry process 
and research functions will play a key role in promoting policies at both the government and business 
levels to improve the competitiveness and dynamism of Australian industry. The bill provides for an 
effective and broad-ranging institution to serve the needs of parliament, the people and government’: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 December 1996, 7723 (Mr Miles) 
33 The Productivity Commission’s very name refers to productivity.  As to the debates over the name, see 
Productivity Commission, above n 6, 22. 
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was to ‘research’ these matters.  Essentially the argument is that a focus on those 
matters predetermines the epistemology of research (usually economic) and renders 
invisible or unimportant equally important ways of looking at understanding society for 
the purposes of government.   To put this another way, the idea of ‘research’ presumes a 
science and a set of data on which to practice it.  The Productivity Commission’s 
mission is, according to its Act, to formulate advice from research. Yet ‘advice’ is not 
defined or elaborated.  Science has thought long, hard and inconclusively about what it 
produces, as has economics in relation to the significance of the difference between 
positive and welfare economics, yet this is ignored in the elision of ‘results of research’ 
with ‘advice’.34  In the elision lie many assumptions about society, particularly those 
brought about by the implications of ‘productivity’ and ‘effectiveness’ or ‘efficiency’ as 
teleology.  This would be a matter of the nature of the Productivity Commission, to 
which of course there might be resistance, but if established as a matter of its 
institutional being would be structural within the implementation of the National 
Competition Policy. 
 
The Productivity Commission was, of course, sensitive to the accusation of bias and 
spends a deal of space in its 2003 autobiography, let alone every Annual Report, 
defending itself.35  Its first defence is that it is simply presenting conclusions from its 
rigorous, yet independent and transparent, research processes.  It is helping the 
community decide between competing goals through informed debate.36  ‘Productivity’ 
within this is a concept within its science rather than an assumed analytical structure.   
 
Second, it maintains that its very nature is such that bias is not present, although it does 
not put the argument that way; rather, it claims that critical attention paid to it is 
unwarranted.37  It says of its structure: 
 
                                                 
34 This point was made, albeit in a different way, by Mark Latham: Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 February 1997, 641-3. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Industry Commission, Annual Report 1995-96, 1996, xix, 1-2. 
37 Productivity Commission, above n 6, 1. 
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What makes the Commission unusual, if not unique, among public sector 
institutions around the world, is the combination of three core principles 
which it embodies: 
 Independence. The Commission operates under the protection and 
guidelines of its own legislation. It has an arm’s length relationship 
with the Government, which can tell it what to do but not what to 
say. 
 Transparency. The Commission’s advice and the information that it 
generates are open to public scrutiny. 
 A community-wide focus. In providing advice, the Commission seeks 
to advance the interests of the community at large.38 
 
Third, it claims that it frequently and with community acceptance39 deals with matters 
of ‘social, environmental and economic interaction’, although it concedes that it is 
required to ‘focus on ways of achieving a more efficient and productive economy’.40  It 
says all that is required by this is that the issue have ‘microeconomic dimensions’.  Of 
course, the object of research is not the means by which research is carried out, and 
Productivity Commission commentary frequently segues straight to its ‘strong 
analytical tradition’.   
 
Finally, as indeed required by its Act,41 it reflects on the nature and use of modelling 
techniques.42  It concedes that models ‘are necessarily constrained in how well they 
capture the complexities of a modern economy’,43 but refuses the notion that how they 
work at the level of detail is informative at the level of policy debate: 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 See especially ibid, ch 7. 
40 Ibid, 3 
41 Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth), s 8(3). 
42 Ibid, 103.  It has held various workshops to discuss aspects of quantitative analysis: Productivity 
Commission, Quantitative Tools for Microeconomic Policy Analysis, Conference Proceedings, 17–18 
November 2004, 2005;  Productivity Commission, Strengthening Evidence-based policy in the Australian 
Federation, 2010. 
43 Productivity Commission, above n 6, 103. 
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‘[B]attles’ over the technical intricacies of competing models tended to 
confuse rather than inform debate over policy choices. Some agreement 
on the policy scenarios to be modelled and on the use of workshops to 
expose to expert assessment the modelling used by the Commission (and 
any other models used by participants) has helped to focus attention on 
commonalities and differences in projected outcomes.44 
 
This does not respond to the incommensurable argument: that the discourses differ and 
hence that the techniques of modelling cannot measure within some social perspectives. 
 
While structural bias is a possibility, whether it is there or not and for how long can 
only be determined by an all-encompassing empirical study, beyond the scope of this 
thesis. In any event, given that personnel and practices change, and what they do varies 
what may be true in one instance may not be true in another. However, the possibility of 
epistemological bias means that the texts issued by the Productivity Commission should 
be viewed sceptically, bearing in mind the possibilities that research and conclusion are 
linked in many more ways than simple deduction.   
 
When the 2005 Assessment of the National Competition Policy45 is viewed through the 
lens of scepticism, a disjunct appears between the data and the conclusion.  This is 
demonstrated in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  Further, a reference to the Productivity 
Commission was made46 just as the Senate Select Committee on the Socio-Economic 
Consequences of National Competition Policy was inquiring into the National 
Competition Policy and that reference was clearly designed to produce data to test the 
recommendations of the Inquiry.   That and numerous other observations lead to the 
conclusion that the Productivity Commission was indeed captured by a particular point 
of view in respect of the National Competition Policy, and that Governments deployed 
it strategically to argue for certain changes knowing that the opinions were represented 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005. 
46 On 31 August 1998 by the then Treasurer, Peter Costello: Productivity Commission, Impact of 
Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Report No 8, 1999. 
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as unbiased, even objective.  This was particularly true of the defence here called ‘the 
falling man’ under which it was argued that because it takes time for effects to make 
their way through the economy the best assessment of probable effects should be that of 
the Productivity Commission. 
 
In conclusion, the trajectory of development of the Productivity Commission can be 
seen to one where the sources of its intellectual foundations, it powers and its purposes 
are pared back versions of those of its constituent institutions.  It lost the idea of 
consultation as the source of it worldview and replaced it with research on command. It 
lost diversity of form and function.  Its purpose narrowed as it focussed on productivity 
as a measure of societal well-being.  As is recounted in subsequent Chapters, this 
became obvious in the course of the National Competition Policy, as it was deployed by 
governments to counter community action, and as it refused to qualify its conclusions 
and justified previous positions in its final assessment of the National Competition 
Policy.   
 
The National Competition Council  
 
The National Competition Council was established47 by Part IIA of the then Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), (now Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) in 
accordance with the Agreements.  Initially, it had the sole purpose of arbitrating 
between the Commonwealth as payer and the States and Territories (and local 
government through them) as payees of competition policy payments under the 
Implementation Agreement.  Hence, although it was a creature of Commonwealth 
legislation, the Agreements substantially controlled appointments to the National 
Competition Council, and its work and workflow.  Latterly, as the National Competition 
Policy fades from view (apart from in this thesis), the main function of the National 
Competition Council has devolved into making recommendations to the responsible 
Minsters of the Commonwealth, States and Territories as to the declaration of certain 
infrastructure services as essential and the certification of access to monopoly 
infrastructure regimes.  The Competition Policy Review set up in December 2013 
makes no mention of the National Competition Council or even of the manner in which 
                                                 
47 Technically it is now established in s 29A of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth.). 
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federalism is to be accommodated. While matters are still under discussion, at the time 
of writing it appears that the National Competition Council has been sidelined.  The 
story of the National Competition Policy thus includes a subplot of the rise and fall of a 
significant federal institution.  
 
The provisions in the Agreements relating to the National Competition Council have 
already been discussed.  In its establishing Act, these provisions can be seen to have 
been translated into a surprisingly direct form, given the difficulties in accessing dated 
and original versions of the Agreements.48 In s 29B(2A) conferrals of functions on the 
National Competition Council by State or Territory laws must be ‘in accordance with 
the Competition Principles Agreement’ and by virtue of s 29C appointments must not 
be made by the Governor-General unless ‘a majority of the States and Territories that 
are parties to the Competition Principles Agreement49 support the appointment’. 
 
In a series of amendments to the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in 200650 and 
2007, 51 provision was made for the conferral of functions, powers and duties on the 
National Competition Council by States or Territories, those provisions ensuring 
Commonwealth consent, that there was an agreement between the Commonwealth and 
the State or Territory, and, in further amendments made in 2007, that such conferral was 
constitutional.52  But prior to those amendments, and indeed before amendments made 
in 1997,53 the National Competition Council’s functions and powers were simply put: 
 
29B. (1) The Council's functions include: 
                                                 
48 Mind you, s 4 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth.)  defines each of the Agreements as 
being ‘that agreement as in force from time to time’. 
49 Italics in original.  Oddly enough, the previous mention of the Agreement was not in italics. 
50 Energy Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth.) 
51 Australian Energy Market Amendment (Gas Legislation) Act 2007 (Cth.) 
52 There are a series of rather tortuous provisions (ss 29B(2), and 29BB(2) - (5) which accommodate 
certain High Court decisions about the conferral of jurisdiction and powers between the Commonwealth 
and States.  These decisions  include re Wakim; ex parte McNally, (1999) 198 CLR 511; [1999] HCA 27; 
R v Hughes 2000 (202) CLR 535; [2000] HCA 22 
53 These amendments were effected by the Gas Pipelines Access (Commonwealth) Act 1998  (Cth.) s3, 
referring to item 12 in Schedule 1.   
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(a) carrying out research into matters referred to the 
Council by the Minister; and 
(b) providing advice on matters referred to the Council by 
the Minister. 
(2) The Council may carry out a function conferred on it by a law 
of a State or Territory. 
(3) In carrying out its functions, the Council may co-operate with 
a department, body or authority of the Commonwealth, of a State 
or of a Territory. 
 
The 1997 amendments reflected the conferral of extra functions to do with developing a 
national market in gas and in particular, third party access to gas pipelines.  As such it 
represents a precursor to the extended functions in relation to access to infrastructure 
(mostly gas pipelines) that were given to it and which received legislative amplification 
in 2006 and 2007.   
 
The important point to take from these detailed events is that the conferral of functions, 
powers and duties on the National Competition Council by the States and Territories are 
severely controlled and subject to agreement and consent; the Commonwealth is not so 
constrained.  However, the Commonwealth is the payer under the National Competition 
Policy and the States and Territories are recipients.  Just as important as ensuring the 
National Competition Council’s assessments of progress in implementing the National 
Competition Policy were reasonable in terms of payer/payee relations was the 
recognition that the States were and are jealous of each other: fairness between them is 
always of paramount concern.  Hence, while the payer/payee relation is a matter of the 
Agreement and principles on which appointments are made, fairness between the 
governments is a matter of scrupulous lack of apparent bias and the dedication of 
sufficient resources to the task.  For that reason the workload and workflow was subject 
to stringent regulation in the Agreements and was not to be disturbed unless by 
substantial agreement. 
 
The independence of the National Competition Council was secured by the 
appointments and dismissal procedures.  The Conduct Code Agreement sets out quite a 
detailed procedure in clause 4 providing for notifications of vacancies, invitations for 
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suggestions, notifications of suggested appointees, notification of support, and 
appointment by the Governor General only if there is majority support from those 
Governments participating in the National Competition Policy.  The time period of 
thirty-five days was allowed between notification and suggestion, and suggestion and 
support.  The then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was somewhat briefer: 
 
29C  Membership of Council 
(1)  The Council consists of the Council President and up to 4 other 
Councillors. 
(2)  Each Councillor is to be appointed by the Governor‑General, for a 
term of up to 5 years. 
(3)  The Governor‑General must not appoint a person as a Councillor or 
Council President unless the Governor‑General is satisfied that: 
(a)  the person qualifies for the appointment because of the 
person’s knowledge of, or experience in, industry, commerce, 
economics, law, consumer protection or public administration; 
and 
(b)  a majority of the States and Territories that are parties to the 
Competition Principles Agreement support the appointment.54 
 
Dismissal was even more critical for independence, although it is not mentioned in the 
Agreements.  Section 29H provided for termination for misbehaviour, incapacity, 
bankruptcy, absence, and failure to disclose conflicts of interest (which re further 
defined in s 29K). 
 
Such was the structure of the National Competition Council.  What sort of institutional 
practices and procedures, and, in the terminology used above in relation to the 
Productivity Commission, epistemological biases developed during the currency of the 
National Competition Policy is a matter of review of what it actually did and said.  This 
is a matter of the next two chapters.  Certainly the National Competition Council, as is 
later described, was sensitive to the need to rigorously define its procedures for making 
                                                 
54 This remains unchanged in s 29C of the present incarnation of Australia’s competition law as the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth.). 
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assessments.  It should be noted, however, that, in contrast to the Productivity 
Commission, decisions of the National Competition Council were matters of the 
implementation of agreed criteria.  Its role was to be fair between States and Territories 
as much as it was to determine progress.  There was no complaint about bias.  However, 
complaint did arise in respect of the enthusiasm with which it pursued its tasks.  It took 
upon itself measurement of the public interest and whether that which the States and 
Territories protected was sufficiently in the public interest to be protected.  This 
undermined the careful balance of sovereignty in the Agreements in favour of a view of 
competition not necessarily represented by the Agreements.  The National Competition 
Council thus overreached itself and this led to constraints being placed on it and its 
eventual marginalisation as described above.  To this extent the federal impulse trumped 
competition policy. 
 
Conclusion: Implementation in terms of Institutions 
 
The stories related in the Chapters which follow reveal differing trajectories for the two 
major institutions involved in the National Competition Policy.  The Productivity 
Commission strengthened and prospered throughout, the National Competition 
Council’s trajectory reached its apogee at about 2000 only for it to be restrained and 
ultimately to fail to have much further influence of competition policy.  The 
Productivity Commission transcended its origins to become a research institution of 
significance within Australian policy-making circles but only at the expense of diversity 
of view.   
 
Each had had specific functions within the National Competition Policy.  The 
Productivity Commission was not formally involved, yet its advice provided the 
foundations for the claimed legitimacy of what had been done and what was to be done.  
The advice was partial and self-justificatory: it failed to effect its purpose to conduct 
social research from a multiplicity of points of view.  It viewed the world through the 
lens of economic theory and modelling.  It could not recant its predecessor’s 1994 
advice that the National Competition Policy could bring a substantial increase in 
economic welfare and thus it was not able to deny its capacity in the 2005 Assessment to 
draw evidence-based cause-effect relations between economic progress and the National 
Competition Policy. 
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On the other hand the National Competition Council was obligated by its function 
within the National Competition Policy to produce data which could withstand dispute.  
It was careful to measure against transparent and agreed standards.  However, it 
overreached itself by taking on roles other than as provided by the Agreements.  It took 
on the role of defining and proselytising competition policy and of judging 
Governments against a theoretical construct. 
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Chapter 5 
Implementation: Sliced by Time 
 
 
This Chapter and the next provide an additional two accounts of what was done and 
attributed to the National Competition Policy within the contexts previously described.  
Chapter 5 dealt with the institutional framework.  This Chapter slices by time: it 
provides a historical account. The next chapter sets out what was done in terms of the 
elements of competition policy as identified by the Hilmer Committee and embedded in 
the Agreements.1  The first tends to generality, the second to specificity.  There is a little 
unavoidable repetition, mainly for completeness of each but also to cross-check for 
discursive incompatibility. 
 
A description of the responses to the implementation of the National Competition 
Policy follows in Chapter 7.  That Chapter completes the data provision aspects of this 
thesis.  Conclusions are eschewed until after Chapter 8.  The reason for this is to keep 
within a thick description modality, as described in Chapter 1, subject to the evidentiary 
limitations adverted to in Chapter 2.    
 
1995-6 
 
A year or so after the signing of the Agreements, the National Competition Council had 
been established, commenced operations and evinced a world view, the Productivity 
Commission was operational if not yet in existence, the access regime had been put in 
place Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the Competition Code applied in 
all States except Western Australia and even it was merely being dilatory, all States had 
provided statements of their intentions as to legislation reviews, competitive neutrality 
and local government involvement, and infrastructure reform had continued.  In terms 
of its principal function2 under the Agreements, to assess governments’ progress in 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1, n 12. 
2 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996, 28. 
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competition policy reforms, the National Competition Council had defined what it 
meant by ‘satisfactory progress’.3  
 
The National Competition Council took upon itself the role of promoting competition 
policy.  Indeed, in some senses it saw itself as having the carriage of the policy rather 
than simply assessing activities against criteria, which is the most obvious reading of its 
role.4  Its Annual Reports, at least until towards the end of the ten years of the National 
Competition Policy, were focussed almost entirely on the implementation of the 
Agreements and associated reforms.  It set out a ‘mission statement’: 
 
The [National Competition] Council’s supporting mission statement — 
to help raise the living standards of the Australian community by 
ensuring that conditions for competition prevail throughout the economy, 
which promote growth, innovation and productivity — emphasises our 
role as part of the COAG team charged with delivering the benefits.5 
  
This, in its Annual Report for 1995-6, is followed by a strong defence of competition 
policy and an attack on arguments to the contrary.  Its self-proclaimed mission is 
reiterated, although this time with an emphasis on the National Competition Council as 
a part of a ‘team’ with governments: ‘... we see our mission as being part of the team 
charged with establishing the conditions for effective competition focused on improving 
the living standards of the Australian community.’  The idea of ‘team’, although 
rephrased into a more subservient conceptualisation, leads to a characterisation of its 
role as support and assistance in the common objective, including arguing the case for 
change: 
 
Australian governments — Commonwealth, State and Territory — are 
joint stakeholders in the Council. In recognition of this, our first year has 
seen the establishment of contacts and work groups involving all nine 
                                                 
3 Appendix C, amplifying the Attachment to the Competition Principles Agreement. 
4 And as admitted as the principal role apart from advice as to exceptions from the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), and other work as agreed by a majority of stakeholder governments: Ibid, 28. 
5 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996, 2 
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governments. A principal objective has been to assist governments to 
develop policies and methodologies to increase the prospect that reforms 
occur in full and on time, through strategies such as communicating 
innovations in particular jurisdictions more widely, and promoting 
community awareness of the benefits of change.6 
 
In accordance with this mission, the National Competition Council felt it necessary to 
deal, albeit at this stage obliquely, with criticism of competition policy. Attacks on the 
National Competition Policy had already started and were growing. They manifested 
themselves in fiery debates in Parliament, especially that of Western Australia over 
producer boards and of the Commonwealth in respect of the establishment of the 
Productivity Commission.  The National Competition Council’s response was to 
identify in the implementation of each element of the National Competition Policy 
failures to either communicate the reasons for reform7 or to put in place systems which 
would lead to greater confidence in the reform process.8  It saw that it had a ‘key 
implicit responsibility’ to ‘promote and explain the issues’.  Moreover, in this it did not 
take an impartial stance:  
 
Unless the National Competition Policy reforms and their benefits are 
understood widely in the community, there is a high risk that people will 
equate competition reform with job loss in particular sectors, rather than 
see key benefits such as increased employment opportunities overall 
arising from a growing economy. Accordingly, we see explaining and 
promoting competition reform as one of our most important tasks.9 
 
That being said, it set for itself the ‘Key Performance Indicator’ that all State and 
Territory governments receive their full competition transfers, although in later years 
this received much less emphasis.  By 2005, the National Competition Council had 
retreated to the position that, although it would do all it could to encourage and help 
                                                 
6 Ibid 9 
7 Particularly for legislation reviews: Ibid 14 
8 Procedures for competitive neutrality complaints: Ibid 15 
9 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996, 1 
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Governments to achieve the measures which would enable the Council to recommend 
full transfers, its main function was to assess whether they had done so.  As it happened, 
some deductions were made in the final tranche – it failed to reach its self-set Key 
Performance Indicators. 
 
The statements of intent referred to above were to become an important mechanism for 
the National Competition Policy.  They were required by the Attachment to the 
Implementation Agreement and set out the commitments of each Government to 
competitive neutrality, legislation reviews (with a timetable) and the application of the 
Competition Principles Agreement to local government.  They were used as that against 
which the National Competition Council was to measure progress and decide whether to 
recommend payment of the tranches of competition payments.  Despite their stated 
intentions to the contrary, the National Competition Council expressed concern that 
some State and Territory Governments were backsliding even in their statements from 
what it considered had been agreed.10 There were some exclusions, and States and 
Territories did not appear to be placing priority on that legislation which gave the 
greatest gain.  Both New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory had even 
enacted restrictive legislation since the Agreements.  In this expression of concern can 
be seen the difference between a National Competition Council merely assessing the 
performance of obligations assumed by the Governments and one which had assumed 
the carriage of competition reform.  
 
Concerns were also expressed by the National Competition Council in relation to the 
statements in respect of competitive neutrality and prices oversight. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Competition Principles Agreement provided only a messy definition of 
the government businesses to which the principles would apply: they were to be those 
listed on the Australian Bureau of Statistics register of public trading enterprises and 
public financial enterprises. That they were to be ‘significant’ was an added criterion. 
But no description was provided indicating how a government business could be 
distinguished from simple government.   In their statements States and Territories 
tended to identify businesses subject to competitive neutrality strictures by size alone.  
The expressed concern of the National Competition Council was that this excluded 
many business activities subsumed within general government; it identified fleet vehicle 
                                                 
10 Ibid 13. 
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management, cleaning, refuse collection, construction, maintenance and printing.  These 
were businesses which the National Competition Council considered could have 
substantial influence on the market in which they operated and for that reason should 
not be excluded.11  
 
1995-6, then, represented a both a year of beginnings and of completions; the former of 
the structures of competition policy, and the latter of the direct legislative work 
expressly required by the Agreements.  For those elements of the National Competition 
Policy needing more than simple legislation, policies and operational systems had 
begun to be to put in place.  The National Competition Council assumed a position of 
centrality in the implementation of competition policy, perhaps going beyond the role 
envisaged in the Agreements.  1995-6 also represented the year in which the strength 
and form of opposition to competition policy became apparent and in which the 
institutions of the National Competition Policy began to develop their strategies of 
defence to this critique.  
 
1996-7 
 
Two years after the Agreements were signed, work on getting the policy settings right 
for legislation reviews, competitive neutrality and local government involvement was 
continuing. Some 100 reviews from the review schedules developed by the various 
Governments had been completed, although few reforms had actually been made.  
Policies and mechanisms, varying amongst the jurisdictions, had been developed for 
applying competitive neutrality principles to stated activities of governments.  Various 
government businesses had been broken up and also had their business roles separated 
from regulatory functions. Some had been corporatised, and many of these sold.  The 
national access regime in Part IIIA of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 and some 
access regimes for specific infrastructure in several States had been approved within the 
system.  The National Competition Council finalised its processes for making the 
assessments required under the Implementation Agreement.   
 
                                                 
11 Ibid 14-15. 
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The assessment of progress of Governments in meeting commitments in respect of the 
National Competition Policy was the core task of the National Competition Council, 
even though, as discussed above, it had broadened this almost immediately after 
establishment.  This resulted in a somewhat precarious position constitutionally, as the 
National Competition Council took the position that the National Competition Policy 
bound Parliaments rather than particular Governments:   
 
[F]or the purposes of assessing jurisdictions’ progress in implementing 
the National Competition Policy [National Competition Policy], the 
Council views the NCP as a national commitment by all parties, binding 
not only government but also the parliament.12 
 
The shakiness of the democratic ideal in this context is exemplified by the slightly 
earlier statement that, ‘In saying that [that reviews should be implemented] the Council 
recognises that some governments may need the co-operation of opposition parties to 
implement reforms.’13  Of course, this is tempered by the simple fact that the National 
Competition Council could but recommend as to competition payments.  Thus, when it 
came to compliance the worst offender turned out to be the Commonwealth.14  The 
Commonwealth was not paid competition payments under the Implementation 
Agreement: it was presumed to receive the benefits of compliance through additional 
taxation receipts due to increased economic activity.  That it, either as Government or 
Parliament, was bound to the Agreements did not seem to motivate it to comply.  Hence, 
despite the posturing of the National Competition Council and consistent with the 
discussion in Chapter 3 as to  intergovernmental agreements, jurisdictions were not in 
fact bound to the Agreements in any formal way; they merely risked adverse 
assessments and non-payment of the competition payments. 
 
Competition Payments were the consideration for compliance with the Agreements.  
They were provided for in the Implementation Agreement thus: 
 
                                                 
12 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1996-7, 1997, 11 
13 Ibid 10. 
14 Ibid 29. 
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There will also be three tranches of general purpose payments in the 
form of a series of Competition Payments. 
 The first tranche of Competition Payments will commence in July 
1997 and will be made quarterly thereafter. 
 The annual payments from 1997-98 under the first tranche will be 
$200 million in 1994-95 prices. 
 It will be indexed annually to maintain its real value over time. 
 Commencement of the first tranche of the Competition Payments and 
the per capita guarantee is subject to the States meeting the 
conditions below. 
 The second and third tranches of Competition Payments will 
commence in 1999-2000 and 2001-02.  The annual Competition 
Payments will be $400 million, in 1994-95 prices from 1999-2000 
and $600 million, in 1994-95 prices, from 2001-2002.  These 
payments will be indexed in real terms. 
The Competition Payments to be made to the States in relation to the 
implementation of National Competition Policy (NCP) and related 
reforms will form a pool separate from the FAGs pool and be distributed 
to the States on a per capita basis.  Those Competition Payments will be 
quarantined from assessments by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission. 
 If a State has not undertaken the required action within the specified 
time its share of the per capita components of the FAGs pool and of 
the Competition Payments pool will be retained by the 
Commonwealth. 
Prior to 1 July 1997, 1 July 1999 and 1 July 2001 the National 
Competition Council will assess whether the conditions for payments to 
the States to commence on those dates have been met. 
 
The Implementation Agreement thus sets out the conditions for payments in both its text 
and in an Attachment.  Further, during the latter half of 1996 and early 1997, various 
amendments were made to the timetable for implementation of commitments made 
outside the Agreements but within the National Competition Policy by virtue of their 
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inclusion as ‘Related Reforms’ in Council of Australian Governments deliberations 
were made.  These were as to electricity reform, gas and road transport.15 
 
By July 1997 the National Competition Council had finalised the process by which it 
was going to make assessments of progress and had made its first assessment.  There 
were a number of steps in this: 
1. Define and promulgate what it meant by ‘satisfactory’.  This was a set of 
detailed criteria in respect of each of the elements of the National Competition 
Policy formulated through consultation and agreement and set out in its Annual 
Report for 1995-6.  It set this out in two steps; first, how it interpreted each 
requirement as set out in the Implementation Agreement and, second, what 
‘satisfactory progress’ meant in that context.16   
2. Receive the statements published by all jurisdictions in July 1996 which out 
their commitments as to legislation reviews, competitive neutrality reform and 
the application of reforms to local government.  These formed the touchstone 
of for the assessment of ‘satisfactory’, although they themselves had been the 
subject of negotiation and agreement.   
3. Once ‘satisfactory progress’ was defined, the National Competition Council 
would set about ‘gauging jurisdictions’ overall progress against their 
commitments’.17 This, according to the National Competition Council was a 
process of investigation, drawing on information from ‘other parties’, its own 
knowledge and investigations of specific reforms, and information from the 
jurisdictions themselves.   It raised ‘particular slippages or shortcomings’ with 
the relevant jurisdiction. 
4. Circulate a preliminary assessment to each government.  This would set out 
where the National Competition Council thought that the government had not 
met its reform commitments.  The governments could respond by providing 
                                                 
15 Relevant Agreements made within the Council of Australian Governments are reproduced as 
Attachment B and C to the First Assessment: National Competition Council, Assessment of State and 
Territory Progress with Implementing National Competition Policy and Related Reforms,  1997.  
16 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996.  It is set out in more detail in the First 
Tranche assessment, National Competition Council, Assessment of State and Territory Progress with 
Implementing National Competition Policy and Related Reforms,  1997, 1-18. 
17 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1996-7, 1997, 28 
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further evidence of progress, explain what they had done and why, or modify 
their approach. 
5. The States and Territories (the Commonwealth is not mentioned here) would 
provide a progress report on the implementation of the National Competition 
Policy reforms. 
6. The National Competition Council then would assess these reports against 
commitments in the original statements.  Further clarification might be sought 
and meetings of senior officials and Ministers held to discuss unresolved issues 
and any subsequent matters. 
7. The National Competition Council would circulate a draft final assessment, 
providing an opportunity for last minute clarifications and revisions. 
8. The National Competition Council finalises its recommendations and 
dispatches them to the Commonwealth Treasurer. 
 
This process was adopted throughout the currency of the National Competition Policy.  
It is clearly highly bureaucratic, involving intense negotiation amongst public servants 
and politicians around the meaning of the terms of the various Agreements and 
commitments.  In this, the National Competition Council averred that it saw ‘its job as 
one of encouraging reform rather than penalising non-performance’.  It did not seek to 
trade off one area of good performance against shortcomings in others but said that it 
‘had not legalistically demanded perfect compliance.  It also deployed a graduated set of 
responses to avoid being seen to ‘punish’ and working towards compliance: it could 
simply defer recommendation pending further performance or it could recommend 
payment be deferred as well as recommend less than full payment.  These were 
deployed extensively, especially in the last year or two of the National Competition 
Policy.18   
 
                                                 
18 In this can be seen, although it is not explicit, the influence if not enactment of responsive regulation: 
see Ian Ayres, and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation. Transcending the Deregulation Debate. 
(Oxford University Press, 1992); John Braithwaite, (2011) 44 ‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’ 
University of British Columbia law Review 475.  In particular the graduated responses of discussion, 
notified preliminary determination and final sanction fir squarely into the schema.  
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The National Competition Council recommended that the first year of tranche payments 
under the Implementation Agreement be made in full, hence indicating general 
satisfaction with implementation of the National Competition Policy.   As it said: 
 
All governments have taken significant steps to meet their NCP 
commitments. As it is still early days, most activity to date has focused 
on getting the policy processes right. However, there have also been 
several ‘on the ground’ reforms, with some promising early results. The 
Council identified some matters which require greater attention by 
jurisdictions but, overall, it was able to recommend that all States and 
Territories receive the complete first instalment of their first tranche 
NCP payments.19 
 
Despite its recommendation, it was not entirely happy with what it called ‘progress’.  It 
isolated some ‘shortcomings’ or ‘deficiencies’ as to: 
 Legislation reviews, where 
 Some legislation was omitted from the schedules in the statements. 
 Some scheduled reviews were not carried out. 
 Some reviews led to unconvincing recommendations or for other reason 
were simply insufficient 
 Some recommendations were not carried out for unclear reasons 
 Some jurisdictions passed legislation which restricted competition 
without providing reasons. 
 Infrastructure reform was proceeding too slowly and without sufficient review. 
 
Accordingly, the second part of the first tranche payments, due in 1998-9, were made 
conditional on various jurisdiction-specific20 compliance issues: 
 New South Wales: Requirements as to legislation reviews in respect of rice 
marketing, casino control and TAB privatisation, and applying competition 
principles to local government. 
                                                 
19 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1996-7, 1997, 3 
20 The Implementation Agreement is couched in terms of the States, but was signed by the Territories (and 
the Commonwealth) as well.  The National Competition Council assessed on the basis that the Agreement 
referred to the Territories. 
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 Victoria: Application of the national gas code and applying competition 
principles to local government. 
 Queensland: Application of the national gas code, applying competition 
principles to local government and requirements as to legislation reviews in 
respect of casino control. 
 Western Australia: Commitment to implementation of the National Gas Access 
Code, national gas reform commitments in respect of removing regulatory 
barriers to free and fair trade in gas, legislation reviews generally and applying 
of the competition principles to local government. 
 South Australia: Requirements as to legislation reviews in respect of casino 
control, application of the national gas code and applying competition principles 
to local government. 
 Tasmania: Application of competition principles to local government. 
 Australian Capital Territory: Application of the national gas code. 
 Northern Territory: Application of competition principles to local government. 
Ultimately, all jurisdictions complied. 
 
Meanwhile, criticism was strengthening.  There was debate in the Commonwealth 
Parliament over the establishment of the Productivity Commission and furious 
opposition to elements of competition policy in Queensland and Western Australia.  On 
11 April 1997 Pauline Hanson launched the One Nation political party in Ipswich, 
Queensland.21  This party, although also concerned to combat policies as to Australia’s 
indigenous people, immigration and multiculturalism, was concerned to oppose key 
elements of competition policy, including ‘economic rationalism’ (a phrase which the 
National Competition Council expressly disavowed on many occasions), especially 
those aspects impacting in rural areas.  It advocated protectionism, and support for small 
businesses and the rural sector.22  In both Western Australia and Queensland the focus 
of resistance was Statutory Marketing Boards and utility reform.   
 
Oddly, but in line with submissions to the Hilmer Committee as previously discussed, 
submissions to inquiries in the first couple of years of the National Competition Policy 
                                                 
21 As stated on the One Nation website: <www.onenation.com.au> (accessed 13 February 2013). 
22 There is a discussion of the appearance of One Nation in the media in Chapter 8. 
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mostly supported competition reform in principal, but were concerned about the impact 
on specific industries and regions.23 This response was to continue throughout the 
currency of the National Competition Policy, although the argument about impact 
became quite shrill between 1997 and 2001.   
 
Whether or not it was a reaction to the mounting criticism, The National Competition 
Council contextualised the National Competition Policy as simply a plank in a broader 
policy platform.  Otherwise, it asserted, in an accurate summary of the criticism that had 
been directed at the National Competition Policy, ‘[t]here is a chance that people will 
simply equate competition policy and micro-economic reform with job losses, 
breakdown in communities, reduced government accountability and impaired 
environmental quality.’24 
 
It conceded that competition reforms did impact on individuals, particular businesses 
and even regions as a whole.  However, it said that living standards for Australians as a 
whole would increase.  Later on in the implementation period it attempted to 
demonstrate this with a considerable amount of statistical data and anecdotal evidence.  
In 1997, it simply advocated that yet to come benefits should be fully realised, shared 
equitably and put to best use; the ‘falling man’ defence was as yet in development.   
 
The broader policy platform directed at improving productivity of Australians involved, 
according to the National Competition Council, four separate issues beyond simply 
implementation of the National Competition Policy: 
1. Specific, ongoing action to address issues such as social justice, the 
environment, tax reform, education and labour market reform; 
2. Adjustment assistance for both individuals and communities; 
3. Confining competition policy processes to its aims and, in particular, to keep 
them in the public interest and to include all public interests in the public interest 
test; and 
                                                 
23 For example, to the Standing Committee on Uniform Legislation and Intergovernmental Agreements, 
Western Australia Parliament, Competition Policy: Consideration of the Implementation of a National 
Competition Policy (1996). 
24 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1996-7, 1997, 14. 
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4. Clear and accurate explanations by Governments to the community of ‘the 
interface between the competition reforms, other aspects of government policy 
and overall community objectives’.25 
These issues and their further articulation remained constant themes in National 
Competition Council reports from this time on.   
 
Overall, 1996-7 represented a year in which the institutions of the National Competition 
Policy settled into place, defined their functions and set about their business.  The 
processes to be followed were developed and promulgated, and initial instances of 
reform took place.  Opposition to reform arose and the defences to that opposition were 
formulated, although at this stage they were not very sophisticated.  There seems to an 
element of surprise that the opposition was vehement and patient appeals to rationality 
seems to be the favoured reply option. 
 
1997-8 
 
Opposition to the implementation of the National Competition Policy grew strongly in 
this period.  One Nation became a strong force arguing against many elements of 
competition policy in various arenas.  Similar political debates raged around the 
country, but again especially in Queensland and Western Australia. The review of the 
Victorian Audit Act 1994 caused enormous controversy in that State.26  Debates in 
Commonwealth Parliament over the establishment of the Productivity Commission had 
thrown doubt on the processes of economic analysis and the narrowness of its subject 
matter.27    A number of Parliamentary Committees were set up to investigate elements 
of competition policy, most importantly the Senate Select Committee on the Socio-
Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy.  A number of matters 
were referred to the Productivity Commission.   
 
                                                 
25 Ibid 14. 
26 See below 264-6. 
27 See above, Chapter 3.  
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During the year the defences against opposition to the National Competition Policy 
were bedded down, which, when they are examined in the next chapter of this thesis,28 
will be called the ‘duck’, the ‘weave’ and the ‘falling man’. These were supported by an 
articulation of the rationality adopted by the National Competition Council in its Annual 
Reports of this year and the following years.  This process was consciously adopted in 
order to combat what the National Competition Council saw was a ‘[f]ailure of 
governments to adequately address related issues such as equity and adjustment 
assistance, and limited community understanding and acceptance of the nature, need for 
and place of competition policy itself.’29  Indeed, the National Competition Council 
claimed that groups were misrepresenting National Competition Policy processes: 
 
However, the level and nature of public debate about NCP [the National 
Competition Policy] has changed significantly in recent months. 
Awareness of the existence of competition policy has increased, although 
understanding of what it entails appears to have become more confused. 
This stems partly from the complex nature of the NCP package, and 
partly from the misrepresentation of NCP processes and outcomes by 
certain groups. Further, in the current political climate, there are limited 
incentives for community leaders to publicly support specific 
competition reforms, even if they believe that the reforms offer a 
substantial community benefit. 
 
In order to combat these tendencies, the National Competition Council developed a 
‘communications strategy’:30   
1. Correcting misunderstandings and highlighting public interest safeguards built 
into the National Competition Policy; 
2. Relying less on the media to convey its message, rather communicating directly 
with affected communities; 
3. Getting more money from the Government for an expanded information 
campaign 
                                                 
28 See below 352-3. 
29 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1997-8, 1998, 1. 
30 Ibid 61-2 
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4. Building a ‘greater constituency of groups that support particular reforms and 
encouraging those groups to make their views public’. 
 
Nevertheless, it spent a deal of space setting out its rationale in detail.  While each 
subsequent year had its focus, for 1997-8, it was on explaining ‘equity’ as well as the 
usual distinction between competition policy and privatisation, deregulation and 
economic rationalism, and the ‘one plank in a platform’ rhetoric, including some 
consideration of how environmental concerns fitted in.  The essence of the argument 
was that first, competition policy should result in improved sharing across society as it 
takes away entrenched advantages and substitutes competition for it, and utility price 
reduction should reduce the gap between rich and poor.  Second, deploying the ‘one 
plank in a platform’ argument, equity was a matter for other planks if it was a concern.  
Third, to the extent that equity was reduced by competition policy, adjustment 
assistance should compensate (although great care is taken to limit it: it had to be 
rigorously justified, transitional and targeted at equipping people to adjust).31 Finally, as 
a last resort, Community Service Obligations could be required of firms, although the 
National Competition Council preferred direct subsidy. 
 
Despite the concern with political pressures to resist competition policy and some 
indications that governments felt reluctant to press on with certain reforms, the National 
Competition Council felt able to assert that progress was still generally on track. It 
trumpeted in particular reductions in energy prices to consumers and resistance to the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  Nevertheless there was concern with legislation reviews, 
perhaps as they were the most visible changes and thus the most susceptible to pressure.  
Governments appeared to be willing to review restrictive legislation but did not seem to 
be implementing recommendations.  The Commonwealth in particular seemed 
recalcitrant, although it had undertaken to ‘address the matter’.32 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid 35-45. 
32 Ibid 23. 
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1998-9 
 
The Senate Select Committee on the Socio-Economic Consequences of the National 
Competition Policy released an interim report in 1999.33  While the report was generally 
favourable, as were, as one would expect, various other Reports from the Productivity 
Commission, submissions to the Senate Committee had crystallised many concerns with 
the National Competition Policy.  One Nation was still hugely influential and concerns 
continued to be raised in many Parliaments.   
 
Despite the prevalence of critical commentary, the Annual Report of the National 
Competition Council for the year resonates with renewed confidence.  It quotes strong 
economic results in a number of sectors to support its contention that the National 
Competition Policy was serving Australia well.  Thus the opening paragraph of its 
1998-9 Annual Report stated: 
 
The recent economic crises in East Asia revealed how global economic 
forces can affect the well-being of individual nations. But while 
globalisation brings risks, it is also a major source of wealth generation 
for nations with the appropriate blend of policies to minimise the risks 
and harness the benefits of change. National Competition Policy (NCP) 
is part of a suite of policies – both macroeconomic and microeconomic – 
that is placing Australia in a better position to benefit from global forces 
for change. 
 
While it had started in 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis had gripped the region to 
Australia’s north during much of 1998. However, Australia escaped the worst effects.  
Citing Reserve Bank, Commonwealth Treasury, Productivity Commission, OECD and 
IMF reports, the National Competition Council claimed that Australia’s strong 
economic performance, if not a direct result of the National Competition Policy in 
particular, was the result of sound macroeconomic underpinnings coupled with 
structural reforms.34   
                                                 
33 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Competition Policy: Friend or Foe.  Economic Surplus, Social Deficit?, Interim Report, 1999. 
34 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1998-9, 1999, 13. 
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Persuasive language in general is much more apparent throughout the Report; for 
example, 
 
Since the early 1980s, Australian governments have deliberately chosen 
to develop Australia as a dynamic, outward-looking economy. The 
benefits are significant … 
Although NCP is a relatively new policy area, many of the reforms are 
already yielding benefits to Australian consumers through lower prices 
and/or improved service provision. … 
NCP is also lowering a range of input costs for producers. Some 
examples are provided … 
On a broader plane, NCP and related reforms have been helping to forge 
a stronger, more resilient economy. 
 
Thus also in the Second Tranche Assessment where it said in a surprisingly strong 
denunciation of opposition to the National Competition Policy: 
 
NCP implementation has often been contentious. By subjecting all 
restrictions on competition to public interest tests, NCP has generated 
opposition from small, vocal (and often well resourced) groups who 
currently benefit from those protections. This narrow opposition has 
sometimes combined with a general lack of understanding of the scope 
and objectives of NCP, and widespread concerns about the pace of 
economic and social change generally in Australia, to help create a 
political environment not always conducive to any economic reform. The 
role of political leadership on economic reform and NCP has been a 
critical component of this environment. 
But attitudes to economic and social change in Australia are gradually 
becoming more sophisticated and this has helped NCP implementation to 
progress. There have been four factors in this development. 
First, the recent economic upheavals in the region have underlined the 
fact that Australia has little control of its economic environment: we 
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cannot stop change; we can only ensure that we are as well placed as 
possible to adapt to it. ·  
Second, economic reforms to date have helped Australia to adapt to the 
changing international environment. Recent international developments 
have made the importance of these reforms more evident.   
Third, there have been increasing efforts to explain the need for further 
economic reform to the community; from the political leadership in some 
jurisdictions down to the National Competition Council’s (the Council) 
expanding communications program. 
Fourth, there is greater recognition of the need to help people adjust to a 
changing world. This is important not just in terms of the direct 
economic consequences of NCP, but more broadly, in terms of the social 
and economic changes associated with technological developments and 
globalisation.35 
 
It is clear that this stronger rhetoric was the result of a decision, foreshadowed in 
previous years, to take persuasion of the populace of Australia as its primary role, apart 
from simple assessment of progress.  This also is apparent in the quotation immediately 
above.  In the Guidelines for National Competition Policy Legislation Reviews,36 a 
report commissioned, adopted and disseminated by the National Competition Council, 
there is a blatant call for propaganda:  
 
Where the political sensitivities to implementation are strong, a 
comprehensive process of public debate may be crucial to educate the 
electorate of the need for change and to counter the resistance from 
vested interests. 
To fuel the debate it may be necessary to: 
 ensure the release of either or both the draft or final report receive 
adequate publicity; 
                                                 
35 National Competition Council, Second Tranche Assessment of Governments’ Progress with 
Implementing National Competition Policy and Related Reforms, 1999, 7-8. 
36 Centre for International Economics, Guidelines for National Competition Policy Legislation Reviews, 
Centre for International Economics, Canberra, 1999, 56. 
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 produce a pithy, well edited summary concentrating on the key 
findings and pieces of evidence; 
 invite independent agencies such as the Productivity Commission, 
academics, other state NCP units or overseas agencies to comment on 
the report; 
 encourage independent editorials; 
 encourage groups, with an interest in the outcome of the review, to 
engage in the debate; and 
 stage an open public forum to allow both sides of the debate to be 
presented. 
Where warranted a publicity campaign (like that prepared for the GST) 
may be advantageous to educate the electorate. This may be especially 
important where the practicalities of a new system are highly 
complicated. 
 
Despite this attention to persuasion, legislation reviews remained problematic.  The 
review of the Victorian Audit Act 199437 had brought the processes into sharp focus in a 
State inured to structural reform.  Reform of the professions had proved to be sensitive 
and the Council of Australian Governments prevaricated on the subject.  Nevertheless, 
reviews were being followed by reforms and the National Competition Council 
approved most of them. 
 
Structural reform and competitive neutrality were facing difficulties in relation to 
minimum service levels.  Community Service Obligations were not favoured by the 
National Competition Council38 yet seemed to be favoured by all Governments.39  The 
National Competition Council conceded that well designed Community Service 
obligations might assure the provision of certain minimum levels of service to 
disadvantaged people provided and also enable government enterprises to operate on a 
competitively neutral basis.  Moreover, there seemed to be some hesitancy among the 
                                                 
37 Audit Act Review Committee, Audit Act 1994: Review, The Committee, Melbourne, 1997.  This is 
reviewed in depth below 264-6. 
38 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1997-8, 1998. 
39 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1998-9, 1999, 27 
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States and Territories to distribute competition payments to local governments even 
though they had borne the brunt of opprobrium resulting from many reforms.40  
 
Much of this is summarised in the Second Tranche Assessment. The National 
Competition Council is forthright in its claims of failure to perform, although it allows 
for redress in accordance with the graduated approach outline the year before.   With 
one exception, it recommended full payment of the first part of the second tranche of 
Competition Payments. The exception was Queensland, which, understandably given 
the strong showing (22.7% of the vote for 11 seats in the Legislative Assembly) for One 
Nation in the Queensland state election in June 1998, was somewhat dilatory in a 
number of areas.41  The recommendation was for a suspension of 25% of the first part 
due to be paid in 1999-2000, subject to a supplementary assessment in December.  The 
reason was a perceived failure to implement competitive neutrality principles in relation 
to public transport between Brisbane and the Gold Coast.  As it happened, the 
supplementary assessment was deferred pending the resolution of an application for 
judicial review relating to those principles.42  Nevertheless it raised the issue of who 
                                                 
40 Ibid 27. 
41 National Competition Policy was a matter of considerable controversy in Queensland; it was debated 
on motion frequently, for example Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Assembly, 11 November 1998, 
3025-3034.  The motion debated was, ‘That, given the fact that the National Competition Policy is the 
domestic extension of the economic rationalism, and the international history of the economic chaos 
produced by the adoption of the so-called level playing field which I will outline whilst so moving, this 
House determines to severely dilute the NCP before it costs Queensland more economic growth, more 
jobs, more welfare recipients, the total collapse of our rural communities, the loss of more industries, an 
ever-widening gap between the privileged and the rest, the loss of the Australian way of life and, 
eventually, depression. The indicators of economic malaise are already evident to all Queenslanders.’ 
(moved by Dr Kingston, 3025). Despite the ferocity of the motion, nothing in particular resulted. 
42 The case is unnamed in the Supplementary Assessment.  The only 1999 Queensland Supreme Court 
case to mention competitive neutrality principles is Hume Doors and Timber (Qld) Pty Ltd v Logan City 
Council [1999] QSC 350, although that case was decided in November and not September as stated by 
the National Competition Council.  It went on appeal ([2000] QCA 389) on different grounds. A more 
apposite case, Sita Qld Pty Ltd v Queenland [1999] FCA 793, was about public transport between 
Brisbane and the Gold Coast, was heard in the Federal Court and decided on 15 June 1999 by Dowsett J.  
It decided the case on many issues, including those summarized by the National Competition Council.  A 
further action for damages for breach of contract in the same matter was decided on 13 November 2000 
again by Dowsett J: Sita Qld Pty Ltd v Queenland [2000] FCA 1616.  Presumably the case to which the 
National Competition Council refers is the second of these: Sita Qld Pty Ltd v Queenland [1999] FCA 
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decides whether a Community Service Obligation is justified under the Competition 
Principles Agreement.  The Queensland Government gave way, but only reluctantly, it 
appears.  The National Competition Council conceded some of the deduction, 
nevertheless suspended 10% of competition payments for 2000-1 until an approvable 
framework for public transport in South East Queensland was finalised.  If it was not 
finalised by 31 December 2000, the National Competition Council proposed to 
recommend that the suspension become a permanent reduction.   
 
Payment of the second part of the Second Tranche was subject to supplementary 
assessments for every subject State and Territory.  These covered a range of items, 
including re-reviewing certain legislation because earlier reviews were not up to 
standard, incomplete reforms especially as to road transport, produce marketing 
arrangements, third party motor vehicle and professional indemnity insurance, gas 
access and retail shop trading hours, and water trading legislation not being enacted.  At 
least 13 Supplementary Assessments were issued before the end of the financial year.  
Ultimately, however, all payments were recommended. 
 
For the first time Second Tranche Assessments dealt with the Commonwealth 
Government’s progress in implementing the Agreements.  The First Tranche 
Assessment had considered progress in relation to telecommunications and a few other 
industries but only in those terms and not in terms of the Commonwealth as a separate 
jurisdiction.  There is little comment in relation to the progress of the Commonwealth.  
Clearly there were no consequences in terms of competition payment from adverse 
assessments of Commonwealth progress, except as a matter of hypocrisy.  No charge of 
that ilk is on the record. 
 
Matters of focus by the National Competition Council for this year were the distribution 
of wealth43 and the nature of community service obligations.44  Both had proved 
                                                                                                                                               
793.  The mistaken date reference may be accounted for by the Austlii report having been ‘Last Updated’ 
on 10 September 1999 but little can account for the mistaken court. 
43 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1998-9, 1999, 14-6. 
44 Ibid 27. 
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controversial during the year but the former receives more sophisticated articulation in 
later years, and is dealt with in Chapter 7 under the appropriate heading. 
 
Another matter that started to receive some attention was the future of the National 
Competition Policy.  The Agreements, the National Competition Council and third party 
access under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.) had been scheduled for 
review in 2000.  While much had been done, much remained to be done, according to 
the National Competition Council.  Notable in areas identified as needing further reform 
effort were government business enterprises, competitive neutrality, structural reform, 
legislation reviews and the associated reforms. 
 
The National Competition Council set out a program for the future: 
1. The National Competition Council and Governments were to reach agreement 
on reform priorities, including those which would raise compliance issues; 
2. The National Competition Council and Governments would work cooperatively 
to develop practical approaches to implement reform in those priority areas; 
3. A nation-wide coordinated program to consult, inform and assist key reform 
stakeholders; and 
4. The National Competition Council would conduct community information 
programs.   
In all of this the National Competition Council identified a key role for itself.   
 
1999-2001 
 
Much happened in the two-year period 1999-2001.  Implementation continued apace, 
although it, subject to what follows in respect of the public interest test, was carried out 
in much the same way as it had previously.  The real changes came as a result of 
growing discontent manifested politically.  What happened as a result over the two 
years is best taken together, rather than in annual blocks as previously. 
 
The Senate Select Committee inquiry into the Socio-Economic Consequences of the 
National Competition Policy published its report, Riding the Waves of Change, in 
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February 2000.45 It found that the community on the whole accepted the theory that the 
National Competition Policy was beneficial to society, but that when individual costs 
were severe people rejected particular changes.46  It set out what it saw as the major 
concerns of the community: 
 
 the inconsistent application and interpretation of the public interest 
test with its domination by economic assessment ahead of the harder-
to-measure intangible attributes in the social and environmental 
areas;  
 the lack of understanding of the policy overall, which indicates the 
need for a strong education program, particularly at local government 
and community levels;  
 the way legislation reviews are being undertaken within individual 
jurisdictions and the lack of a national approach;  
 the lack of oversight by CoAG [Council of Australian Governments] 
of the NCC [National Competition Council] and the NCP [National 
Competition Policy] agenda;  
 the impact on employment and the lack of structural adjustment and 
transitional arrangements; and  
 the interface of short term economic development policies and 
proposals with longer term ecologically sustainable development and 
environmental issues. The evidence presented to the Committee on 
water resource policies clearly marks this issue as an emerging one to 
which Governments will have to give due attention to resolve 
potential conflict within the community.47 
 
Responding in his own way to the same political pressures as instigated the Senate to 
refer the socio-economic impacts of competition policy to a select committee, the then 
Treasurer, Mr Peter Costello, referred ‘the impact of competition policy reforms on 
                                                 
45 Commonwealth, 2000. 
46 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000, xiii. 
47 Ibid xiii-xiv. 
198 
 
rural and regional Australia for inquiry and report’ by the Productivity Commission.  
This reference was very similar to that of the Senate albeit in language deriving much 
more from prevailing governmental discourse.48  ‘Socio-economic’ was to be 
determined by reference to ‘established economic, social, environmental, and regional 
development objectives of Australian governments.’  Moreover, in every respect 
analysis was to take into account the operation, structure and competitiveness of 
markets.   
 
The Productivity Commission released The Impact of Competition Policy on Rural and 
Regional Australia49 in September 1999.  This concentrated on disentangling the effects 
of the National Competition Policy from other influences on communities in rural and 
regional Australia, and on the diversity of impacts.  It concluded that most changes were 
due to other factors, mostly long-term and beyond government control.  It cited 
                                                 
48 Productivity Commission, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, 
Report No 8, 1999, iv:  
In undertaking the inquiry the Commission should have regard to the established economic, 
social, environmental, and regional development objectives of Australian governments. 
Consideration should be given to other influences on the evolution of markets in regional and 
rural Australia, including the role of international trade, foreign investment and globalisation 
generally. 
The Commission should specifically report on: 
(a) the impact of competition policy reforms on the structure, competitiveness and regulation of 
major industries and markets supplying to and supplied by regional and rural Australia; 
(b) the economic and social impacts on regional and rural Australia (including on small 
businesses and local governments) of the changes to market structure, competitiveness and 
regulation flowing from the reforms and the effect of these impacts and changes on the wider 
Australian economy; 
(c) possible differences between regional and metropolitan Australia in the nature and operation 
of major markets and in the economic and social impacts of the reforms promoted by national 
competition policy; and 
(d) any measures which should be taken to facilitate the flow of benefits (or to mitigate any 
transitional costs or negative impacts) arising from competition policy reforms to residents 
and businesses in regional and rural Australia. 
49 Productivity Commission, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, 
Report No 8, 1999. 
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declining terms of trade for agriculture, changes in technology and in consumer tastes as 
examples.  It claimed the National Competition Policy had become a scapegoat for such 
effects, although it acknowledged that metropolitan areas were receiving more of the 
early benefits and there was more variation in the incidence of benefits and costs in 
rural and regional areas.  Its recommendations were directed at ‘improving community 
understanding of NCP [the National Competition Policy] including clarification of how 
matters of wider public interest, and social considerations in particular, are to be taken 
into account in its implementation, and to consider ‘specific forms of adjustment 
assistance … for some people in adversely affected regions’. 
 
For now, the task is to talk about the effect of these reports on the implementation of the 
National Competition Policy. Given that it had the carriage of the National Competition 
Policy, albeit without sufficient multi-government supervision according to the Senate 
Select Committee,50 the reading of the reports provided by the National Competition 
Council is seminal. 
 
The National Competition Council read down the Terms of Reference of the Senate 
Select Committee to be an investigation of ‘community attitudes to National 
Competition Policy [National Competition Policy], general micro-economic reform and 
globalisation’.  They were in fact, 
 
To inquire into and report on the National Competition Policy, including: 
(a)  its socio-economic consequences, including benefits and costs, 
on: 
(i) unemployment, 
(ii) changed working conditions, 
(iii) social welfare, 
(iv) equity, 
(v) social dislocation, and 
(vi) environmental impacts; 
(b)  the impact on urban and rural and regional communities; 
(c) its relationship with other micro-economic reform policies; and 
                                                 
50 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000, xvii. 
200 
 
(d)  clarification of the definition of public interest and its role in the 
National Competition process.51  
 
In other words, the National Competition Council read the Terms of Reference of the 
Senate Select Committee to be asking it to find out what the community thought, rather 
than what was happening.  It left the latter to the Productivity Commission.  Thus by 
definition dealing with the Senate Select Committee’s findings became a matter of 
dealing with the community’s perceptions rather than ascertainable effects on the 
community.   
 
The National Competition Council went on to read the reports as together making three 
main points.52  First, it asserted that both reports concluded that the National 
Competition Policy led to net community benefits.  The Senate Select Committee did 
not in fact come to that conclusion.  All it concluded was that ‘the policy has not been in 
operation long enough for the full effect and impact to become apparent’.  On the other 
hand, the Productivity Commission concluded that  
 
The selected NCP reforms modelled are cumulatively estimated to 
provide a sustained increase in output from the economy, as measured by 
real gross domestic product (GDP), of 2.5 per cent above what would 
otherwise occur in the absence of the reforms 
 
Second, the National Competition Council read the Senate Select Committee as 
supporting the proposition that ‘many people, although not all, accept that NCP 
[National Competition Policy] provides a net benefit.’  This is not what the Senate 
Select Committee said.  It was talking about people’s perceptions of the disjunction 
between theory and practice:   
 
The community is clearly expressing concern at the social consequences 
of the changes that are resulting from NCP [National Competition 
Policy], general micro-economic reform and globalisation. There is a 
                                                 
51 Ibid vii. 
52 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1999-2000, 2000, 23-5 
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concern that policies labelled as ‘economic rationalisation policies’ are 
eroding the social cohesion of some communities and devaluing social 
objectives at the expense of economic objectives such as productivity 
and efficiency. The nexus extolled by economists between the 
achievement of economic objectives and the flow-on to the achievement 
of social benefits is not always evident to the community at large. This 
scepticism of the nexus arises particularly in the many small 
communities being disproportionately affected by the impact of 
economic reform policies, social changes, globalisation and 
technology.53 
 
This is saying that experience makes people doubt the theory – a very different point 
from that the National Competition Council attributed to the Committee.  In the 
National Competition Council version ‘people also reject individual changes where 
direct costs (such as increased unemployment or reduced social infrastructure) are 
severe.’  Later it casts this point as a veritable tautology: ‘The Council well recognises 
that National Competition Policy [National Competition Policy], while benefiting 
Australia overall, can have significant impacts on those directly affected by change.’ In 
any case it is axiomatic to the Productivity Commission report that the question is 
simply whether real benefits to all outweigh detriments to individuals and particular 
communities. It does not pursue the extensive economic theory on this point.  
 
Third, the National Competition Council stated, correctly this time, that both inquiries 
found ‘continuing misunderstandings about the scope and requirements of the NCP 
[National Competition Policy]’.54   
 
These points appear to have little substantial influence of the course of the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy by Governments.  This is not 
surprising as the inquiries were a reaction to pre-existing political pressures.  However, 
there were influences on the manner in which the National Competition Policy was 
                                                 
53 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000, xiii. 
54 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1999-2000, 2000, 24. 
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implemented; in particular, on the way the National Competition Council carried on its 
business. 
 
First, the National Competition Council changed the manner in which it represented the 
achievements of the National Competition Policy.  While every Annual Report paints a 
rosy picture of progress, as would be expected given that the National Competition 
Council had taken on the function of ensuring all commitments were met as a ‘key 
performance indicator’, from 1999-2000 there is renewed emphasis on external 
evidence of the benefits to be accrued from competition policy.  Thus the 1999-2000 
Annual Report quotes the Productivity Commission Report that the National 
Competition Policy ‘can potentially add 2.5 per cent to Australia’s economic growth’.55  
It also quotes reports by the OECD and academic authors.  It provides more facts and 
figures, although continued resort is still made to anecdote and simple assertion.   
 
Second, the Council of Australian Governments insisted on the clarification of the 
public interest test in legislation reviews and also on procedures for transparency of 
review procedures. This was implemented through amendments to the Implementation 
Agreement in the form of a letter from the Prime Minister to all Premiers and Chief 
Ministers on 27 October 2000.56  Meanwhile, the National Competition Council had 
commissioned an external consultant to prepare a document as to how reviews should 
be carried out.57  The upshot of these was that the review procedure was regulated more 
heavily and the criteria for the public interest test spelled out in more detail.  There had 
been a call by the Productivity Commission in its Report to quantify any public interest 
issues so that a balancing exercise could be carried out, although changes did not go that 
far. 
                                                 
55 Ibid 3.  No mention is made of the Industry Assistance Commission’s 1995 prediction of 5.9% growth: 
Industry Commission, The Growth and Revenue Implications of Hilmer and Related Reforms. A Report 
by the Industry Commission to the Council of Australian Governments (Industry Commission Research 
Report), 199. 
56 Council of Australian Governments Communique, 3 November 2000.  The letter itself is only available 
in the Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council 11 September 2003, 2105, as a 
tabled copy in response to a question by Hon Dee Margetts.  
57 Centre for International Economics, Guidelines for National Competition Policy Legislation Reviews, 
(Centre for International Economics, 1999). 
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Third, considerable disquiet had been expressed about the interface between 
competition-based water reform and the associated environmental and social issues.  
Moreover, the then current drought brought tensions of a different order into the 
processes of reform.  Water reform received more attention.  That there was a conflict 
was not conceded by either the National Competition Council or the Productivity 
Commission, both asserting that the reform procedures took the latter into account.  
However, from 2000 on, there was a marked change in the representation of change.  
Thereafter the environmental and social concerns were far more to the fore and that 
reform was not entirely efficiency based reiterated on many occasions.   
 
Fourth, the principles on which adjustment assistance should be provided were spelled 
out.  These were that assistance should be focussed on helping people adjust to change, 
should be of limited duration and tailored to the particular dislocation.   These principles 
were based on the idea that change was a fact of life and that there was a generally 
available social welfare net.  People hurt by the National Competition Policy were not 
to be privileged over those affected by other changes going on in society.58  
Interestingly, as discussed in Chapter 9, the theoretical foundations of this approach in 
the Kaldor-Hicks measure of efficient public policy is not set out, although they are 
clearly at its core.  The most important aspect of the approach to adjustment assistance 
was to be that the public interest test be transparent, rigorous and independent in order 
that there be community confidence in its application. That compensation was 
problematic had been foreshadowed from the first evaluations of what the Hilmer 
Report might imply.59  That the theoretical foundations for efficiency-enhancing 
policies were not spelled out at any time is a notable absence, especially as they do not 
preclude compensation.  It is surprising that little commentary was inspired by the 
polemic of the National Competition Council. 
 
                                                 
58 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1999-2000, 2000, 25.  On 13 September 2001 it held a 
workshop to consider processes that could be used to help those directly affected by implementation of 
the National Competition Policy adapt to change; see National Competition Council, Annual Report 
2001-2, 2002, Box A12 
59 See Chapter 1.  
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Fifth, framework of the National Competition Policy was clarified by making it very 
clear that the obligations of Governments arose from the Agreements and Governments 
were simply implementing what was agreed.  From this arose the defences to criticism, 
here nominated the ‘duck’ and the ‘weave’, repeatedly deployed from this point on by 
all Governments.   This was that if the policy was criticised, implementation by the 
States or Territories was blamed (the ‘duck’); and if the implementation was criticised, 
it was claimed that what was being done was as required by the National Competition 
Policy and that if it was not done competition payments would not be paid (the 
‘weave’).  
 
Finally, the National Competition Council was subjected to greater accountability 
requirements, most notably to the Council of Australian Governments through its 
‘senior officials’.  These were the product of a secretive review by those same ‘senior 
officials’.60  The measures included61: 
 the National Competition Council was to formulate its work program not on its 
own initiative, rather in consultation with senior Council of Australian 
Governments officials; 
 the commitments to reform and the assessment of progress in meeting them 
were to be subjected to control by Council of Australian Governments Senior 
Officials and the Agreements were amended to ‘further guide’ the National 
Competition Council in it assessments;  and 
 the deadline for completion of the legislation review program was to be 
extended to 30 June 2002 (it was later further extended).  
 
Although this is to comment outside the strict limits of descriptive purity adopted in this 
Chapter, in its Annual Report for 2001-2, the National Competition Council is 
remarkably impatient and defensive, no doubt as a result of the implicit criticism of its 
role in the preceding 5 years,  Even the business community appears to have seized the 
opportunity to criticise.  In a passage remarkable for its anti-libertarian flavour the 
National Competition Council sets out what it perceives the role of business is and is 
                                                 
60 It is mentioned in the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 3 November 2000 
Communique and in the Prime Minister’s letter of 11 September 2000. 
61 Ibid. 
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not.  It says the role of business does not extend to advocating government policies, 
being hypocritical, avoiding the question and avoiding accountability.  It says that the 
role of business is in fact ‘acceptance of, and practical support for, the social and 
economic objectives behind the rules’.  Business, it said, should implement sensible 
socially responsible change management accounting for socioeconomic impacts. 
 
Meanwhile Governments fell further behind the timetable for legislation reviews and 
competitive neutrality structures still, according to the National Competition Council, 
needed to be extended into a greater range of government businesses through 
clarification of what ‘significant’ meant.  Energy reform also was behind schedule, 
especially the establishment of the retail electricity market with choice of supplier and 
sufficient geographical coverage, and because of game playing by participants.62  Water 
reform had a long way to go. 
 
In summary, 1999-2001 marked a turning point in the implementation of the National 
Competition Policy.  Controversy had focussed on its remaining elements of legislative 
reviews and certain structural reform.  The public interest test was the storm centre.  
Further, some areas of structural reform lagged.  However, little changed in the nuts and 
bolts of implementation.  Attention began to be paid to what was to happen once the 
Agreements expired: whether the ambit of the National Competition Policy should be 
broadened and what the role of the National Competition Council was to be.  Rail and 
upstream gas were of particular concern to the National Competition Council.  It also 
thought there should be a process to ensure continued implementation of the emphasis 
on competition in legislation.   
 
                                                 
62 See Ann Wardrop, ‘Competition, Regulation and the California Electricity Market’, in Christopher 
Arup and David Wishart (eds), Competition Policy with Legal Form (Federation, 2002), 141.  The 
National Competition Council (National Competition Council, Annual Report 1999-2000, 2000, 30) puts 
it this way: 
 the ongoing use of vesting contracts to manage financial risk; 
 the lack of a consistent response to supply imbalances, in some cases resulting in electricity 
prices being inflated; and 
 concerns among some parties that government owned businesses in the electricity sector may 
enjoy competitive advantages by virtue of their public ownership. 
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2002-5 
 
This period marked the end of the National Competition Policy.   One Nation faded 
away and critique ran out of steam, although, as we shall see in Chapter 8, the ‘Civil 
Society’ movement gained intellectual rigour in the form of the ‘Third Way’ and had a 
brief period of political acceptance.  National Competition Policy processes were 
refined and strengthened, particularly those related to competitive neutrality and 
legislation reviews, and the final assessments for the purposes of Competition Payments 
were made.   
 
Over the final three years, the National Competition Council emphasised the National 
Competition Policy as a social enterprise aimed at improving Australian society in 
many differing respects. Water reform was highlighted as a matter where the economic 
viability and ecological sustainability of Australia’s water resources had both been 
improved despite the commonly held idea that these were incommensurable goals.  It 
stated that water rights trading was crucial to these successes.63  Evidence of the 
benefits conferred by the National Competition Policy was also touted, especially in the 
2001-2 and 2003-4 Annual Reports; again the evidence was as to falls in utility prices, 
especially electricity, modelling by the Productivity Commission, for what that was 
worth, and anecdote.  That evidence was not conclusive is acknowledged,64 in particular 
the comment by the Productivity Commission in its 2002 Report that Australia’s 
economic performance over the period of the National Competition Policy could have 
been due to education and skills development, take-up of information and 
communication technologies as much as of competition reform initiatives. 
 
Areas of rhetorical focus were, again consistently with the approach adopted after the 
1999-2001 Reports and Reviews, adjustment assistance, the application of the public 
interest test and competition policy as not just about economics and the economy, but 
also about it as a social matter.  Little changed in the substance of what the National 
Competition Council said, what is worth noting is the concentration on these matters.   
 
                                                 
63 National Competition Council, Annual Report 200102, 2002, 1. 
64 National Competition Council, Annual Report 20002-3, 2003, 3. 
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Adjustment assistance was comprehensively discussed in the 2002-3 Annual Report, 
under the heading ‘Managing the Change Process’.65   The National Competition 
Council first places the National Competition Policy in the context of a history of 
continual structural change arising from a number of causes.  This is followed by a 
discussion of what costs are caused by change and the determinants of the ability to 
adjust to change.  It says, citing a paper on water reform prepared for it,66  
 
The ability of businesses and individuals to adjust to change depends on 
the availability of alternative employment and business opportunities. It 
also depends on whether businesses and individuals have the skills, 
financial resources and flexibility to take advantage of alternative 
opportunities. 
 
It then describes what it thought the most effective packages of adjustment assistance: 
 
The most effective packages balance the competing objectives of 
maximising the ability of people and communities to cope with change, 
and maximising the speed of achieving the benefits of reform, while 
minimising the cost to taxpayers. Adjustment assistance does not 
necessarily involve direct financial assistance to those affected by 
reform. 
 
Elsewhere it insists that direct financial assistance is a last resort to be used sparingly.  It 
mounts an argument based on fairness: that most structural changes in the economy do 
not attract direct compensation therefore National Competition Policy induced changes 
should not do so either.  It also asserts that general social support mechanisms should 
deal with adverse impacts where people have not been able to adapt.   
 
Finally it points out that the National Competition Policy Agreements place no 
obligations on Governments in respect of the change process.  While change 
management might be a matter of implementation strategy, who bears the cost is a 
                                                 
65 Ibid 18-20. 
66 Deborah Cope, Water Reform: Who pays for the environment (Pirac Economics, 2002) 
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matter for the particular implementing government.  This rather begs the question of 
why the National Competition Council deals with it at all.  After all, the function of the 
National Competition Council was to assess compliance with the Agreements for the 
purposes of determining whether the tranche payments should be made.  Whether unrest 
within any jurisdiction occurred as a result of implementation was not its concern. 
 
The National Competition Council also focussed on what was to happen when the 
National Competition Policy wound down.  Given its functions, this was somewhat 
beyond its jurisdiction; nevertheless it appears to consider that as the expert in the area 
its thoughts were cogent.  It was in fact generally ignored.  As one would expect, the 
National Competition Council took the attitude that to continue pro-competition reform 
after the conclusion of the National Competition Policy, an independent supra-
governmental body just like the National Competition Council was essential.  This is 
most evident in its 2004-5 Annual Report, tabled after the formal end of the National 
Competition Policy.  Most interesting here is an acknowledgement that the federal state 
fiscal imbalance was the driver of policy.  Earlier it had nominated labour market 
reform as an important target of competition policy for the future.  In its 2005-6 Annual 
Report,67 the National Competition Council reviewed the future of competition reform, 
noting that on 10 February 2006 the Council of Australian Governments had agreed to a 
‘National Reform Agenda’ and supporting institutional arrangements.  There was no 
place in that for the National Competition Council.  Its role as assessor was supplanted 
by case-by-case consideration by the federal Government of implementation plans. 
 
In 2000 the Council of Australian Governments68 had required annual assessments of 
progress for the remainder of the National Competition Policy and also better reporting 
of the basis for deductions from competition payments.  Before 2002, the National 
Competition Council took a soft line, suspending payments pending further discussions.  
From 2002 on, a more stringent process appears.  The language of ‘penalties’ appears.    
Penalties are categorised into, permanent deductions, specific suspensions and pool 
suspensions.  Permanent deductions were to be irrevocable for specific failures, 
although their application might be suspended pending the introduction of complying 
                                                 
67 National Competition Council, Annual Report 2005-6, 2006, 68-74 
68 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 3 November 2000 Communique. 
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reform.  Suspensions were where payment was to be made, but only when certain 
conditions were met.  If the conditions were not met, the suspensions would be 
converted into a permanent deduction.  Specific suspensions were for particular matters 
and pool suspensions were for a category of reforms, mostly legislation reviews. 
 
Naturally, the Assessments include a huge amount of detail as to what was done and 
what was not.  For present purposes, the following table appears best to summarize the 
National Competition Council’s assessments:   
 
 
Source:  
National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing 
the National Competition Policy and related reform’, 2000, xviii 
 
 
The final result was that the Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, and Tasmania all 
received payment in full; permanent deductions were made for New South Wales 
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory.  The 
following table sets it out: 
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Source:  
 National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing 
the National Competition Policy and related reform’, 2000, xxxviii 
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It is notable that the Commonwealth Government was the worst performer, yet was 
excluded from any penalties.   
 
Final Assessments of the National Competition Policy 
 
The Council of Australian Governments, the Productivity Commission and the National 
Competition Council all provided assessments of the National Competition Policy at the 
conclusion of its period of formal operation.  However, as one would suspect from 
reading this thesis thus far, each took a particular approach to the task. The dimensions 
of difference between them are the concept of what the National Competition Policy 
was thought to be, the idea of its purposes, what was measured, and the interests of the 
institution concerned. 
 
The National Competition Council  
 
The National Competition Council might have provided an assessment of the National 
Competition Policy as a whole in its Final Tranche assessment submitted in October 
2005. However, it did not do so, limiting itself to assessments of progress in each of the 
elements of the National Competition Policy. It was more forthcoming in its Annual 
Report for 2005-6, although again resiled from extensively assessing the National 
Competition Policy as such.  Of course, it should be remembered that, given that the 
National Competition Council set for itself the task of ensuring the success of the 
National Competition Policy as measured by completion of the again self-set tasks of 
the governments concerned, any assessment of it as a whole by the National 
Competition Council would have been an assessment of its own success and hence not 
to be trusted, except where it detailed its failures.   It did state, as illustrated in the Table 
provided above, the areas where the ‘objectives of the National Competition Policy’ had 
not in its opinion been met.  Overall its assessment was ‘[m]any reform objectives under 
the NCP and program of related reforms have substantially been met’but that there was 
still much more to do. 69   It cited the Council of Australian Governments Communique 
of 10 February 2006 and the Productivity Commission Report of 2005 in support.  That 
                                                 
69 National Competition Council, Annual Report 2005-6, 2006, 66. 
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there was still much to do is clearly self-serving, even were it to be true: it saw itself as 
having a role in that task.  Nevertheless, no such role was given to it. 
 
The Council of Australian Governments  
 
The Council of Australian Governments also provided a very brief formal assessment of 
the National Competition Policy in June, 2005.  It simply said: that the National 
Competition Policy ‘measures were pivotal in boosting the competitiveness and growth 
of the Australian economy and the living standards of all Australians and drew together 
the reform priorities of the Commonwealth, States and Territories, to improve 
Australia's overall competitiveness and raise living standards – with Australian income 
per head rising from 16th in the OECD in 1990 to 8th in 2004.’ The Council of 
Australian Governments moved on in February 2006 to set out ‘A New National 
Reform Agenda’.70  This was somewhat broader than the National Competition Policy, 
covering in addition ‘Human Capital’ in addition to continuing competition and 
regulation reforms:  
 
A healthy, skilled and motivated population is critical to workforce 
participation and productivity, and hence Australia’s future living 
standards. By focusing on the outcomes needed to enhance participation 
and productivity, the human capital stream of reform aims to provide 
Australians with the opportunities and choices they need to lead active 
and productive lives.   
 
The Council of Australian Governments saw ‘this new wave of collaborative reforms’ 
as building ‘on the success of a quarter of a century of national economic and social 
policy reform, which has fundamentally reshaped the Australian economy and increased 
living standards’.  It went on to say that its  
 
[The] National Reform Agenda aims to deliver significant economic and 
social rewards. Heads of Treasuries have advised that it has the potential 
to deliver over the next decade benefits of the same size, if not even 
                                                 
70 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 10 February 2006 Communique 1 
213 
 
larger, than those achieved in the last decade from the implementation of 
national competition policy and associated reforms. The Productivity 
Commission has estimated that national competition reforms have 
permanently increased the level of Australia’s GDP by 2.5 per cent, or 
$20 billion. 
 
The competition and regulation reforms to be undertaken under the National Reform 
Agenda were stated to be ‘a substantial addition to, and continuation of, the highly 
successful National Competition Policy reforms’ focusing further reform in the areas of 
transport, energy, infrastructure regulation and planning, and climate change 
technological innovation and adaptation.  The reforms are set out in greater detail than 
was provided in the Principles Agreement from 1995, but little else changed beyond 
bringing areas which were once in the ‘additional reforms’ category into the general 
family of competition reforms and adding climate change into the mix. 
 
By way of contrast, implementation was to be very different from previously.  The 
National Competition Council was stripped of responsibility for implementation and 
was replaced by a body called the ‘COAG Reform Council’.  This body was to have the 
role of ‘report[ing] to COAG annually on progress towards the achievement of agreed 
reform milestones and progress measures across the broad National Reform Agenda’.71 
It was also to take over the National Competition Council’s role in relation to third-
party access to infrastructure although the Council of Australian Governments decided 
otherwise in April of 2007.  The COAG Reform Council, like the National Competition 
Council before it, was to make recommendations as to funding of reform. But it was to 
be on a case-by-case basis, not generic, additional to Commonwealth funding and was 
to be decided upon by the Commonwealth.72 
 
The implications of the Council of Australian Governments’ 2006 Communique is that 
the reforms associated with the National Competition Policy were accepted to have been 
of substantial benefit, but that the institutional arrangements were no longer needed, if 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 13 April 2007 Communique. 
214 
 
they had ever been necessary.  The Productivity Commission’s 2005 assessment was 
apparently taken to be accurate. 
 
The Productivity Commission 
 
Assessment of the National Competition Policy was referred to the Productivity 
Commission by the then Treasurer, Peter Costello, by letter dated 24 April 2004.  In that 
letter it was stated that the referral was pursuant to Council of Australian Governments 
agreement in November 2000, although it was in fact pursuant to an attachment to a 
letter from the then Prime Minister, John Howard to Premiers and Chief Ministers dated 
27 October 2000.73 It is notable that the Treasurer’s letter informed the Productivity 
Commission that ‘[The National Competition Policy] has delivered significant benefits 
to Australia’ and ‘[I]t is therefore timely to undertake an independent review of these 
arrangements to consider the extent of the benefits the reform program has delivered to 
date’.  The commissioned scope of the enquiry was less didactic, including as its first 
item:  
 
the impact of NCP and related reforms undertaken to date by Australian, 
State and Territory Governments on the Australian economy and the 
Australian community more broadly. To the extent possible, such 
assessment is to include: 
i. impacts on significant economic indicators such as growth and 
productivity, and to include significant distributional impacts, 
including on rural and regional Australia; and  
ii. its contribution to achieving other policy goals. 
 
The second reporting item returned to a discourse of assumed benefit: 
 
[A]t the Australian, State and Territory level, areas offering opportunities 
for significant gains to the Australian economy from removing 
impediments to efficiency and enhancing competition, including through 
                                                 
73 As discussed in Chapter 2. 
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a possible further legislation review and reform programme, together 
with the scope and expected impact of these competition related reforms. 
 
One can only assumed that the question was begged.  Even if that assumption is not 
made, a critical eye is warranted when looking at the Productivity Commission’s 
findings. 
 
The conclusions of the Productivity Commission and their tenor are best presented by 
simply quoting the boxed set of ‘Key points’ at the outset of the Report:74 
 
Key points 
 National Competition Policy (NCP) has delivered substantial benefits to the 
Australian community which, overall, have greatly outweighed the costs. It 
has: 
– contributed to the productivity surge that has underpinned 13 years of 
continuous economic growth, and associated strong growth in 
household incomes; 
– directly reduced the prices of goods and services such as electricity 
and milk; 
– stimulated business innovation, customer responsiveness and choice; 
and 
– helped meet some environmental goals, including the more efficient 
use of water. 
 Benefits from NCP have flowed to both low and high income earners, and 
to country as well as city Australia — though some households have been 
adversely affected by higher prices for particular services and some 
smaller regional communities have experienced employment reductions. 
 Though Australia’s economic performance has improved, there is both the 
scope and the need to do better. Population ageing and other challenges 
will constrain our capacity to improve living standards in the future. Further 
reform on a broad front is needed to secure a more productive and 
sustainable Australia. 
 In a number of key reform areas, national coordination will be critical to 
good outcomes. These areas — many of which have been encompassed 
by NCP — should be brought together in a new reform program with 
common governance and monitoring arrangements. Priorities for the 
program include: 
                                                 
74 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, xv 
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– strengthening the operation of the national electricity market; 
– building on the National Water Initiative to enhance water allocation 
and trading regimes and to better address negative environmental 
impacts; 
– developing coordinated strategies to deliver an efficient and integrated 
freight transport system; 
– addressing uncertainty and policy fragmentation in relation to 
greenhouse gas abatement policies; 
– improving the effectiveness and efficiency of consumer protection 
policies; and 
– introducing a more targeted legislation review mechanism, while 
strengthening arrangements to screen any new legislative restrictions 
on competition. 
 An ‘overarching’ policy review of the entire health system should be the 
first step in developing a nationally coordinated reform program to address 
problems that are inflating costs, reducing service quality and limiting 
access to services. 
 National action is also needed to re-energise reform in the vocational 
education and training area. 
 Reform is important in other key policy areas, including industrial relations 
and taxation, but there would be little pay-off from new nationally 
coordinated initiatives. 
 The Australian Government should seek agreement with the States and 
Territories on the role and design of financial incentives under new national 
reform programs. 
 
 
The Productivity Commission famously quantified the growth in the economy 
attributable to the National Competition Policy as 2.5% with few differential regional 
impacts.  However, closer examination of the Report reveals a great deal of uncertainty, 
many qualifications and shifting conceptual frameworks.  There is little challenge to the 
discourse of competition, despite challenges provided by submissions to the 
Productivity Commission in relation to the Report.   
 
The uncertainty in the Report stems from the evidentiary problem of separating effects 
of the National Competition Policy from the results of other policies, trends and events.  
For example, to what extent were falling prices in a number of areas due to 
technological change (this was the era of extraordinary progress in computing and the 
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invention and expansion of the Internet) rather than market restructuring? 75  Indeed, the 
difficulty of disentangling National Competition Policy reform from other things is a 
theme running through the whole report.76  Some of those things are obvious, like 
technological change, but others such as microeconomic reforms not part of the 
National Competition Policy are quite subtle and difficult to disentangle;77 as discussed 
later, the Productivity Commission tends to merge the two.   
 
The Report discusses alternative explanations of ‘Australia’s productivity revival’ at 
quite some length.78 Productivity is claimed to have increased at the second highest rate 
of the nineteen OECD countries and at a historically high rate for Australia.  The upshot 
was that Australia’s productivity per worker grew from 16th to 8th in the OECD.79  This, 
claimed the Productivity Commission, was despite major domestic and international 
constraints, such as declines in terms of trade, economic stagnation in Japan, the impact 
of the SARS epidemic, drought and global economic weakness in 2001-2 after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks.  The alternative (to competition reforms) causes of the 
productivity revival considered by the Productivity Commission were a cyclical 
recovery from recession, an unsustainable increase in work intensity and more rapid 
accumulation of workplace skills.  The Productivity Commission argues against those 
explanations by citing OECD analyses and International Monetary Fund reports, both of 
which in this respect should not be considered to be independent,80 and an article by 
Salgado which, like the others, did not single out competition reforms as the sole 
determinant; rather trade liberalisation, and labour market reforms were considered as 
also important.  Looking at selected sectoral productivity, the Productivity Commission 
again argues by assertion and selective citation.  Its evidence in each case is simply a 
statement of reforms and a statement of productivity improvement.  This does not 
establish causality.  It simply establishes contemporaneity.   
 
                                                 
75 Discussed in particular at ibid 62. 
76 See ibid 3, 52, 85, 87. 
77 Ibid 89 
78 Ibid 42-47 
79 Ibid 40-42 
80 See above Ch 1, n 4. 
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In general, the Productivity Commission dealt, in its 2005 Report, with uncertainty by 
acknowledging it, then simply asserting a positive result for National Competition 
Policy reforms. A similar approach was adopted in relation to the use of economic 
modelling.    
 
Distrust of economic modelling had been at the heart of criticism of the then 
Government’s plans when setting up the Productivity Commission in 1996-8 (although 
the erstwhile Industry Commission had been acting as the Productivity Commission 
between 1994 and 1998).  As Mark Latham put it in the House of Representatives: 
 
I am also concerned by the limits of their [the Productivity 
Commission’s] economic modelling. Anyone who has been through the 
study of the dismal science of economics knows that outputs from a 
model are directly related to the assumptions and inputs that fashion the 
model—that is that anything, virtually, can be proved in economic 
modelling according to the types of inputs and assumptions that are 
applied from first principles.81 
 
The upshot of the debates was s 8(3) of the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth.) 
which requires that the Productivity Commission  
 
… in all reports on matters referred to it, must provide a variety of 
viewpoints and options representing alternative means of addressing the 
issues in the report. If the report relies on formal mathematical economic 
modelling, the Commission must either: 
(a) if practicable—utilise at least 2 different economic models, with 
the assumptions and results of those models made explicit in the 
report; or  
(b) if it is not practicable to utilise at least 2 different economic 
models, appoint, and report on the views of, an independent 
reference panel on the modelling. 
 
                                                 
81 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 February 1996, 641.  See, 
generally, the discussion in Chapter 4 pp 161-7 under the Heading ‘The Productivity Commission’. 
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The response of the Productivity Commission was to hold conferences on the economic 
models it used as well as to comply with the requirements of the Act.  Thus 
 
A workshop was held in Canberra in July 2004 to make the 
Commission’s preliminary modelling results available for scrutiny and 
comment. This was attended by academics, consultants and 
representatives of the Australian, State and Territory governments. A 
second modelling workshop was held in Canberra in February 2005 to 
further discuss the distributional component of the modelling. It was 
attended by academics, consultants and the ABS.82 
 
Little is said in the Report about the proceedings of those workshops, although it says 
that ‘[f]eedback from those workshops has been taken into account in the version of the 
modelling results presented in this report’.  However, the Productivity Commission’s 
modelling, plus that of the Victorian Government, and a summary of the workshop 
proceedings were published in a supplement to the report.83  The following is the 
Productivity Commission’s summary of the referees’ comments: 
 
The referees supported the modelling approach adopted to quantify 
national and regional impacts of infrastructure industry change over the 
1990s, and recognised the ambitious nature of the undertaking. The 
referees and workshop participants noted that the changes observed were 
influenced by both NCP and other factors and that the results would need 
to be interpreted with care in that light. 
 
As to the second workshop: 
 
The workshop was supportive of the work. In particular, the workshop 
noted the absence of information on the distributional implications of 
infrastructure industry reform and the importance of this study in filling 
                                                 
82 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, 391 
83 Productivity Commission ‘Modelling Impacts of Infrastructure Industry Change over the 1990s’, 
Supplement to Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report 
No. 33, 2005. 
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this gap. It also confirmed the appropriateness of the key measure of 
household purchasing power adopted in the study. Nevertheless, some 
concerns were expressed about the rudimentary treatment of investment 
income in current MMRF-style models. The reconciliation of benchmark 
MMRF-CR and HES data and the possible implications this may have 
for the distributional analysis was also discussed. In response, a range of 
alternative modelling and data assumptions were examined. The results 
were not found to be sensitive to the alternatives considered. 
 
While economic modelling is a specialist skill it is clear from the Productivity 
Commission’s own admission that the following factors were important in the process 
adopted by the Productivity Commission. 
 
1. It was aimed at finding what happened, not, as had been the case for the 
previous two studies,84 at an assessment of prospective effects of the National 
Competition Policy reform program.85   
2. It looked only at ‘the impact of labour productivity and service-price changes’.  
The Productivity Commission argued that falls in prices were greater than as 
shown by falls labour costs, possibly due to other National Competition Policy 
elements.  However, causation was not identifiable and could have been due to 
other non-National Competition Policy factors. 
3. It looked only at ‘six key infrastructure activities encompassed by NCP — 
electricity, gas, urban water and sewerage, urban transport, ports and rail 
freight and telecommunications’, although changes had already commenced in 
many of these prior to the Agreements.   
4. It only took in the first 5 years of the National Competition Policy – that is, 
until 1999-2000.   
5. It was based on the assumption of ‘full adjustment to the effects of labour 
productivity and service-price changes in infrastructure industries.’  Of course, 
                                                 
84 In 1995 and 1999.  These were, as the Productivity Commission belatedly stated ‘outer envelope’ 
studies: the best possible outcome based on ‘the full implementation of reforms, prospective productivity 
and price changes and complete adjustment to their effects.’ Ibid  2. 
85 Ibid.   
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experience in the second half of the 2000s somewhat puts the lie to electricity 
price falls, about which see below. 
6. It did not model what would have happened in the absence of the National 
Competition Policy: ‘To create a counterfactual, judgments would be needed 
about the effect of NCP compared to other influences. Such judgements 
themselves would determine the outcome of the analysis and would be 
contentious.’  This meant that the model did not distinguish between changed 
not due to the National Competition Policy.  Thus the model assumed the 
cause/effect relation.   
 
The modelling thus ignored most legislation reviews and competitive neutrality 
procedures, although they had been the chief raison d’ etre for criticism of the 
National Competition Policy, and did not isolate the National Competition Policy from 
other influences on the economy.   
 
The following diagram86 encapsulates the findings of the modelling.  It shows the GDP 
growth attributed to each of the infrastructure industries examined. 
 
 
Perhaps that should be compared to a later diagram:87 
                                                 
86 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No. 33, 2005, 52 
87 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Enhancing Australia’s Economic Prosperity Fact 
Sheet Electricity Prices, 2012, 2. 
222 
 
 
 
This diagram shows household gas and household electricity prices experiencing 
remarkable increases since 2000.  Price falls persisted for business electricity and 
business gas until about 2007, whereupon they resumed the real prices as at 1991.  The 
main factor for price rises is attributed to network costs: remedying the rundown of the 
previous twenty years.  Yet those years are the years of price reductions the 
Productivity Commission claims are due to simple competition reform.  This renders 
the Productivity Commission’s claim  
 
‘[m]oreover, the full gains from reform are yet to be realised. In 
particular, the more responsive and innovative business culture 
engendered by NCP and other reforms should be a source of dynamic 
efficiency gains for the community over time’88  
 
somewhat specious.  
 
Regional and distributional impacts were also modelled.  Again, detailed critique is a 
specialist matter, but it should be noted that the long run was assumed to be discernible 
even within just a few years of changes having been made, and that labour is mobile.  
Of course, this is at the core of critique: that disruption is in itself a cost and it is a 
human cost not apparent in employment or income data.  In a particularly insensitive 
couple of paragraphs the Productivity Commission puts it this way: 
 
The model’s estimates are also made on the presumption that workers in 
eight occupational groups are mobile between regions in the longer run.  
                                                 
88 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No. 33, 2005, 52, 
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In reality, while job mobility may pose few problems for some, it could 
pose significant adjustment problems for others.  For example, in regions 
with declining employment, mobility may be inhibited by depressed 
regional real estate markets relative to those in expanding areas. 
 
Estimated employment changes made in this framework provide one 
indication of adjustment problems.  In particular, instances are identified 
where employment is projected to be lower than otherwise as a result of 
infrastructure industry change in regions that have experienced actual 
employment declines over the 1990s.  The estimated changes may be 
contributing to or aggravating those observed changes in regional 
employment.  However, it needs to be stressed that adjustment problems 
are transitory while income gains are permanent.89 
 
Dislocation is accordingly assumed to be a ‘transitory’ ‘adjustment problem’.  More 
generally, human or psychological cost is simply not measured.  And given that the 
effects of legislation reviews were not a part of the assessment, there is no indication of 
how costs are incorporated.  There is no sense of ‘public benefit’ as a matter not 
commensurable against economic welfare.   
 
The assessment of regional and distributional impact by the Productivity Commission 
was relatively crude.  There was no attempt to provide detailed micro-level assessment 
by industry and region while the critique was of the impact on small communities and 
individual persons.  Aggregation can smooth away much.   
 
Most of the evidentiary and incommensurability problems with modelling were 
acknowledged by the Productivity Commission.90  Indeed it quotes from various 
submissions talking of the increase of inequality that might have flowed from the 
                                                 
89 Productivity Commission ‘Modelling Impacts of Infrastructure Industry Change over the 1990s’, 
Supplement to Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report 
No. 33, Canberra February 2005, 9. 
90 Productivity Commission, above n 88, 47-52. 
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National Competition Policy.91  At this point, however, the burden of proof seems to 
switch:   
 
However, the more pertinent question is whether the contribution of NCP 
has been significant, relative to the many other factors that would have 
influenced income distribution over the 1990s. … 
 
As outlined in earlier chapters, the Commission’s modelling does not 
differentiate between changes induced by NCP and other factors. 
Nonetheless, it suggests that the impacts on income distribution of 
productivity improvements and price rebalancing in the infrastructure 
sectors — and by implication the effects of National Competition Policy 
and related reforms — have been small. 
 
The Productivity Commission concluded that many regional areas benefitted from the 
reforms but that some mainly smaller communities were adversely affected.92  It is 
somewhat difficult to reconcile with the figures one page later that  
 
[T]he Commission’s modelling projects that the productivity and price 
changes in the infrastructure sectors will have led to higher employment 
than would otherwise have prevailed in 16 of the 57 regions, and lower 
employment levels than otherwise in the remaining 41 regions. 
 
Overall, then, the Productivity Commission’s 2005 assessment was a highly qualified 
statement based on flimsy evidence.  It did not test propositions, rather it set out to 
support them.  It made theory contingent assumptions as to what counts as ‘cost’ and 
the nature of ‘public benefit’.  Where it conceded evidentiary or methodological 
problems, it proceeded to ignore their impact: its conclusions frankly ignored the 
concessions it had made.  Costs were narrowly defined, if at all (including the very costs 
of implementation as such).  Causation was not established and it conflated non-
National Competition Policy measures with microeconomic reform while at the same 
                                                 
91 Ibid 88-9.   
92 Ibid 104. 
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time concluding that it was measuring the effect of the National Competition Policy.  
Claims to increased economic resilience were not borne out nor were those as to 
continued cost benefits.  Finally, the Report did not convincingly settle on what it was 
measuring: was it productivity, increases in gross domestic product or infrastructure 
price reduction?  The conclusion must be that there was no real assessment of the 
National Competition Policy; certainly that provided was not convincing. It can be said, 
then, to have satisfied the requirements of the terms of reference: to provide a panegyric 
for the National Competition Policy. 
 
Conclusion: the story over time 
 
When the course of implementation of the National Competition Policy is viewed as a 
series of events, it is revealed as somewhat different from the normal picture of smooth 
government-directed change.  It translates into a picture of initial progress but growing 
resistance, followed by turmoil provoking the Senate Select Committee’s inquiry as the 
impact of reform on certain industries, regions and government activities became 
apparent. (That turmoil will be further explored in Chapter 8.)  Resistance was 
overcome, with very little alteration to the National Competition Policy, by a 
combination of clever political defence, careful misrepresentation of findings, reference 
of matters to friendly inquiries (especially the Productivity Commission) and superficial 
change in the Agreements and processes.  While the place of the National Competition 
Policy in the platform of Government policy initiatives shifted from being a major 
support to be being a single plank amongst many, efforts were made to broaden its 
reach. These included muted references to industrial relations reform coming under its 
aegis (a subplot of a fascinating story, but not one within the purview of this thesis) and 
a more concrete assumption of responsibility for water reform (which was equally 
futile).  The latter was in part to address concerns that competition policy was regardless 
of environmental concerns. 
 
The events chronicled here add to the story sketched in Chapter 5 about the National 
Competition Council’s overreach.  The National Competition Council took on the task 
of proselytizing the National Competition Policy within a year of its establishment and 
moved to what can only be called propaganda after 2000. It failed to concede the 
legitimacy of the political processes of implementing governments although its early 
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claim that the Agreements bound Parliaments was not repeated.  It mounted a series of 
arguments about equity, compensation, and community service obligations, none of 
which were taken up by critical commentators but all of which are theoretically 
problematic. 
 
Ultimately very little was deducted from competition payments, which the National 
Competition Council took as a marker of success.  Assessments, particularly that by the 
Productivity Commission, tended to hagiography.  While the possibility of 5.9% growth 
was repeatedly deployed as justification of the National Competition Policy, the 
estimate of 2.5% growth was greeted with equal joy, with little mention of the failure to 
meet expectations.  No assessment was made of the overall costs of the program.   
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Chapter 6 
Implementation Diced: The Elements 
 
 
The elements of the National Competition Policy as set out in the Agreements1 were 
reform of competition law, prices oversight of government businesses, access, 
competitive neutrality, legislation reviews and structural reform.  While previous 
chapters set out the implementation of these elements in terms of an institutional and a 
historical account respectively, what follows here is how each one of the elements were 
implemented in terms of government action. This chapter drills into specifics, although 
only where necessary for descriptive completeness. More might been provided were it 
not for space limitations; moreover, a large proportion of the extant literature dealing 
with competition policy measures or elements describes the impact of implementation 
on certain industries, businesses and geographical areas. There is no need to repeat it, 
even were it epistemologically appropriate to do so.  
 
Competition Law 
 
Extending the reach of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.) to non-corporate 
businesses throughout Australia was the subject of the Conduct Code Agreement.  
Given that the Heads of the State and Territory Governments had signed the Agreement, 
it was relatively unproblematic for the legal processes of legislative reform to take 
place.  This involved the insertion of a new Part XIA into the Act by virtue of the 
Competition Policy Reform Act 1996 (Cth.). That part provided for a version of Part IV 
known as the ‘Schedule Version of Part IV’ the ‘Conduct Code’ or the ‘Competition 
Code’ (the last was nominated in sections 10-12 of the application legislation as the 
correct citation), and various legislative accommodations to the scheme.  That version is 
altered every time the Commonwealth Parliament varied the main text (which it does 
quite frequently, with consultation with the States and Territories2).  By September 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1, n 12. 
2 For example, changes made in response to the difficulties with cross vesting legislation resulting from re 
Wakim; ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
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1996 every State and Territory had enacted its own application act sub nom Competition 
Policy Reform (Name of State) Act.  Those Acts applied the ‘Competition Code’ within 
the States or Territories, and provided for future alterations of that Code.   
 
Section 51 of the Competition Code provided for legislative exception to the operation 
of the Code.  The operation of this was constrained by the Conduct Code Agreement, 
which set up a system to ensure that such exceptions did not undermine the project of 
coverage of businesses throughout Australia.  It applied only to the application of the 
Commonwealth legislation, although in its Annual Reports the National Competition 
Council seemed to be of the opinion that the system applied to non-corporate businesses 
covered only by the State Competition Codes.3  A Government enacting such legislation 
was required to notify the National Competition Council within 30 days of the 
legislation.  That would normally trigger the Treasurer to apply the exemption to all 
business covered by the Commonwealth Act by regulation under sec 51(1C)(f).4  
However, the Treasurer was required to also table a notice that the benefit to the 
community outweighed the costs and that those benefits could only be achieved by 
restricting competition.  These are the familiar legislation review criteria.  The 
requirements triggered no deductions from competition payments. 
 
Prices Oversight of Government Businesses 
 
Clause 2 of the Competition Principles Agreement set out detailed provisions as to 
prices oversight of Government Businesses.  Yet the requirement was limited: subclause 
(1) made it clear that prices oversight was the responsibility of the State or Territory that 
owned the business and the commitment in subclause (2) was to ‘work cooperatively to 
examine issues associated with prices oversight’ and in subclause (3) to ‘consider 
establishing independent sources of prices oversight advice’.  The rest of clause 2 stated 
what characteristics an independent source of prices oversight advice should have and 
provided for jurisdictions to subject its businesses to prices oversight advice by the 
National Competition Council or another jurisdiction.  While, as discussed earlier, 
                                                 
3 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996, 96-7.  The Commonwealth Parliament 
would not have had the power to override the State Parliaments in this respect, although it could override 
State Parliaments.   
4 In the Competition Principles Agreement it is nominated as s 51(1B) 
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‘government business enterprise’ was not defined, the commitment was in respect only 
of ‘all significant Government business enterprises that are monopoly, or near 
monopoly, suppliers of goods or services (or both)’.5  Moreover, all that was suggested 
should be the function of the ‘independent source of prices oversight advice’ was that it 
should take submissions from interested persons and that its pricing recommendations, 
with reasons, should be published.  Recommendations suggested to be made on the 
basis of the ‘efficient allocation of resources’ while having regard to any community 
service obligations that may be imposed on the enterprise.6 
 
By the second assessment of implementation of the National Competition Policy by the 
National Competition Council all States and Territories, apart from Western Australia 
and the Northern Territory, had prices oversight arrangements in place.  Generally the 
function is given to a statutory body.7  In New South Wales and Victoria, the particular 
monopolies were specified (for the former, electricity, gas, water, waste and urban 
passenger transport, and, for the latter, electricity, gas, water, ports and grain handling).  
In the other jurisdictions the body was tasked with prices oversight of enterprises 
declared to be subject to it, usually by a nominated Minister.  Quite frequently other 
functions, such as access determinations, are also exercised by the same body.  Western 
Australia established its body in 2004,8 although gas pipelines and rail transport had 
been subject to specific oversight earlier.  The Northern Territory established its body in 
2000.9 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid cl 2(4)(c). 
6 Ibid cl 2(5) 
7 The bodies are: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Australian Government), the 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (New South Wales), the Essential Services Commission 
(Victoria), the Queensland Competition Authority, the Essential Services Commission of South Australia, 
the Government Prices Oversight Commission (Tasmania), and the Independent Competition and 
Regulatory Commission (Australian Capital Territory). 
8 Economic Regulation Authority Act 2003 (WA) establishing the Economic Regulation Authority of 
Western Australia, 
9 Utilities Commission Act 2000 (NT) establishing the Utilities Commission of the Northern Territory. 
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Access 
 
The National Competition Policy required only that the Commonwealth ‘put forward’ 
legislation providing for access to significant infrastructure facilities.  Accordingly, the 
National Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth.) inserted Part IIIA into the then 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.).  This satisfied the terms of the Competition Principles 
Agreement.  Part IIIA was amended in 2006 and 2010.10 
 
The Hilmer Committee had recommended11 against reliance on s 46 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth.)12 to deal with the problem of natural monopoly and access to 
essential services.  The reason was that the High Court of Australia had ‘not embraced’ 
such a doctrine and the Federal Court had ‘specifically rejected it’.13  Section 46 would 
have had to have been amended.  Moreover, Courts do not like setting prices or 
determining the terms of a bargain that should exist between parties, which is what it 
                                                 
10 Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act 2006 (Cth.).  This was pursuant to a 
Productivity Commission report: Productivity Commission, Review of the National Access Regime,, 
Report no. 17, 2001.  The amendments: 
 Inserted a new objects clause (s 44AA) 
 Modified the criteria in s 44G(2) for declaration from ‘promote competition’ to ‘material 
increase in competition’. 
 Provided pricing principles for access disputes, undertakings or codes in s 44ZZCA. 
 Altered some process matters, including as to arbitration, lodgement of undertakings and codes, 
appeal rights, time limits and publication of decisions and reasons. 
 Provided for pro-competitive supervision of tender processes for Government infrastructure 
facilities in Division 2B. 
2010 amendments were by virtue of the Trade Practices Amendment (Infrastructure Access) Act 2010 
(Cth.).  They were designed to simplify and speed up the processes of Part IIIA.   
11 Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, 
National Competition Policy 1993, 239-268 
12 This section proscribes the abuse of market power by a corporation possessing a substantial degree of 
market power.  An owner of a facility that is necessary for the operation of an upstream or downstream 
market possesses market power. 
13 Ibid 243. 
231 
 
must do if granting access to an essential facility.14  Nevertheless, s 46 remains operable 
in cases of essential facilities: it has not been excluded from operation.15 
 
The regime recommended by the Hilmer Committee was a matter of the creation of a 
right of access through declaration by a designated Commonwealth Minister.16  The 
debates in the Council of Australian Governments, the bureaucrats involved and the 
drafters of Part IIIA of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) teased apart the 
elements of the Hilmer Committee’s recommendations into two processes while 
keeping its national and general facets:17 first, a declaration that a facility was subject to 
the regime and, second the development through negotiation or arbitration, adoption or 
recognition of a regime for access.  This was implemented by the National Competition 
Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth.). 
 
The declaration process is unnecessary under Part IIIA in two circumstances.  The first 
is where there is already an ‘effective access regime’; indeed, in these circumstances the 
                                                 
14 Ibid 243-4. 
15 NT Power generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 210 ALR 312; [2004] HCA 48. 
16 The declaration was to set out the applicable access regime, including: 
 The facility or facilities subject to the regime. 
 Those who were to benefit from the right. 
 The pricing principles governing access to the facility. 
 Other terms and condition to protect the legitimate interests of the owner of the facility. 
 Any safeguards necessary to protect the competitive process. 
 Who was to arbitrate disputes. 
 The penalties for non-compliance with an access right.  
The right would be created if the owner agreed or by fiat on the advice of the National Competition 
Council, subject to recommended or agreed terms and conditions.  There were recommendations as to 
publicity and review.  The system, therefore, was an amalgam of consent, arbitration and National 
Competition Council recommendation.  The bureaucratic processes involved were not particularly well 
articulated.  Importantly, however, it was to be national and general (rather than industry specific). 
17 In re Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2010) 271 ALR 256; [2010] ACompT 2 at [1348], the majority 
(Finkelstein J, Mr Grant Latta and Professor David Round), in observing the complexity of the process, 
stated that there were 9 steps in the process: (1) NCC recommendation; (2) Ministerial declaration; (3) 
Tribunal review; (4) Appeals to the court; (5) Possible remitter; (6) Negotiations for access; (7) 
Arbitration; (8) Further Tribunal review; (9) Possibly more appeals to court. 
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service cannot be declared.18  An ‘effective access regime’ is one which complies with 
clause 6 of the Competition Principles Agreement.19 Clause 6 sets out the characteristics 
of an access regime put in place by a State or Territory government. In other words, it is 
a regime under the jurisdiction of the State or Territory and the National Competition 
Council considers that it complies with competition policy as set out in the Agreements.  
This is the accommodation of the national character of the access regime to State and 
Territory sovereignty made by the Council of Australian Governments.  During the 
currency of the National Competition Policy it was deployed for gas pipelines, 
electricity, and ports.20   
 
A service subject to an ‘access undertaking’ also cannot be declared.  An access 
undertaking is a regime set out in the form of an undertaking to the National 
Competition Council setting out the details ‘under which the provider undertakes to 
provide access to the service.’21  Thus it is for those who own or are prospective owners 
of facilities which might be subject to declaration and who seek to pre-empt the 
declaration process.  The criteria are not those for a declaration because it is a voluntary 
subjection of a proposed regime which may or may not be approved. A number of 
sections then followed setting out the procedures for the acceptance of access 
undertakings.22   
 
Under Part IIIA as implemented, and as in almost all respects still obtaining, 
applications for declarations could be made by any person, including the designated 
Minister.23  They were to be made to the National Competition Council, which would 
recommend to the Minister whether a declaration should be made. The Minister would 
then decide whether or not to declare it.  The criteria for the advice and the decision 
were and mostly are: 
                                                 
18 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)  s 44G(4). 
19 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)  s44N. 
20 Ray Steinwall, Annotated Competition and Consumer Act 2010, Butterworths, 2012 ed, 2012.  
21 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s44ZZA. 
22 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44ZZA-44ZZC.  These were amended in 2006: Trade Practices 
Amendment (National Access Regime) Act 2006 (Cth). 
23 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 44F. 
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(a) that access (or increased access) to the service would promote competition in 
at least one market (whether or not in Australia), other than the market for the 
service; 
(b) that it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to 
provide the service; 
(c) that the facility is of national significance, having regard to: 
(i) the size of the facility; or 
(ii) the importance of the facility to constitutional trade or commerce; or 
(iii) the importance of the facility to the national economy; 
(d) that access to the service can be provided without undue risk to human health 
or safety;24 
(e) that access to the service is not already the subject of an effective access 
regime; 
(f) that access (or increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the 
public interest.25 
 
There has been a deal of litigation defining the precise ambit of these criteria:26 clearly 
much hangs on the decision of the Minister. (Such judicial casuisms as resulted do not 
concern the argument of this thesis.)  Appeal lies to the Australian Competition 
Tribunal and thence to the Federal Court.27   
 
The second part of the process is as to the access regime. Declaration is simply that the 
facility is an essential facility.  If those seeking access are happy with access as 
provided at the given price, no more procedures apply other than registration of 
agreements with the National Competition Council and enforcement procedures: there 
                                                 
24 This was removed in 2010: Trade Practices Amendment (Infrastructure Access) Act 2010. 
25 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44G and 44H. 
26 As might be expected, most of these were over transport facilities.  The major cases were BHP Billiton 
Iron ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (2008) 236 CLR 145; [2008] HCA 45; re Review of 
Freight Handling Services at Sydney International Airport (2000) ATPR 41-754; [2000] ACompT 1. 
27 Trade Practices Act 1974  (Cth) s 44K. 
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is no need. 28  This is considered to be access by agreement. Usually, of course, there 
will be substantial negotiation and sophisticated contracting.   
 
The balance of the legislation operates only where there is a dispute.   It sets out a 
procedure29 for notification of disputes and, failing agreement, for arbitration of the 
dispute by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission with appeal to the 
Australian Competition Tribunal for review30 and further appeal to the Federal Court.31 
 
Approval of contracts by the National Competition Council and arbitration decisions are 
made using criteria that are required to be taken into account.  For registration of 
agreement, these are that that the public interest, including the public interest in having 
competition in markets (whether or not in Australia) and the interests of all persons who 
have rights to use the service.32  For arbitrations the list is somewhat more expansive, 
reflecting the imposed nature of the result of arbitration, although it is much the same 
sort of thing:   
 
(a) the legitimate business interests of the provider, and the provider's 
investment in the facility; 
(b) the public interest, including the public interest in having competition in 
markets (whether or not in Australia); 
(c) the interests of all persons who have rights to use the service; 
(d) the direct costs of providing access to the service; 
(e) the value to the provider of extensions whose cost is borne by someone else; 
(f) the operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and reliable 
operation of the facility; 
(g) the economically efficient operation of the facility.33 
                                                 
28 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44ZU-ZW. 
29 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44R-ZO. 
30 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44ZP-ZQ. 
31 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 44ZQ-ZT. 
32 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 44ZW.  From 2006 the objects of Part IIIA also had to be taken into 
account: Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act 2006 (Cth). 
33 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 44X; again, the objects of Part IIIA  were added in 2006 as para (aa). 
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Overall, then, by the end of 1996 the requirements of the Agreements in respect of an 
access regime had been put in place.  It did not perceptibly change during the currency 
of the National Competition Policy.  During that time the access regime was well used 
and a number of declarations were made.34  Agreements were registered and arbitrations 
held.35 
 
Competitive Neutrality 
 
Clause 3 of the Competition Principles Agreement dealt with ‘competitive neutrality’ – 
a policy, maybe not named as such, which had been implemented by Australian 
governments for some years prior to the National Competition Policy.  The Hilmer 
Committee had argued that ‘by far the most systematic distortions [to competition] 
appear to arise when government businesses participate in competitive markets.’36  
These were, in particular, competitive advantages by virtue of ownership by the 
government, including exemptions from taxation.  The Hilmer Committee proposed that 
a systematic, nationally consistent mechanism be established as part of national 
competition policy to address these distortions.  There would be a set of principles, 
supported by appropriate institutional arrangements and agreed upon by Australian 
Governments.  The Hilmer Committee’s recommendations based on these arguments 
were the foundation of the competitive neutrality provisions in the Competition 
Principles Agreement, although there were substantial departures.37  
 
Clause 3 (1) of the Competition Principles Agreement sets out the objective of 
competition policy thus: 
                                                 
34 These are recorded on the National Competition Council website: <www.ncc.gov.au> (last accessed 20 
June 2013). 
35 There are public registers in respect of ss 44Q, 44ZW, 44ZZC and 44ZZL on the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission website: <www.accc.gov.au> (at last access the website was in 
transition but as these are public registers, it is highly unlikely they will disappear). 
36 Hilmer Report above n 11, 293. 
37 These were in that complaints mechanisms were not national, reflecting the Hilmer Committee’s 
naïveté in relation to federalism, in the suggested presumption in favour of corporatisation and in its 
simplistic notion of government business; see Hilmer Report, above n 11, 308-309.  
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… the elimination of resource allocation distortions arising out of the 
public ownership of entities engaged in significant business activities: 
Government businesses should not enjoy any net competitive advantage 
simply as a result of their public sector ownership. These principles only 
apply to the business activities of publicly owned entities, not to the non-
business, non-profit activities of these entities. 
 
‘These principles’ referred, albeit apparently ungrammatically, to the propositions set 
out paragraphs (4) and (5) and the qualifications in paragraphs (6) and (7).   
 
The principles applied to enterprises classified as ‘Public Trading enterprises’ or ‘Public 
Financial Enterprises’ in the Government Financial Statistics Classification (clause 4).  
They also applied in situations where an agency of a government which did other things 
as well also undertook ‘significant business activities’ (clause 4(5)).  Finally, the 
principles applied, as did legislation reviews and structural reform, to local government, 
even though they were not parties to the Agreements.  This was particularly cogent for 
competitive neutrality as local government carried out many activities directly.  While 
not parties, local government is a creature of State and Territory Parliaments and hence 
State and Territory governments were made responsible for applying the principles to it.  
Consultation with local government was required by clause 7 (2)(a).  These provisions 
reflect the trend in the Council of Australian Governments for greater recognition of 
local government as constitutional partners, although it is far from equality of status 
with Territories, let alone States.   
 
The competitive neutrality propositions38 were: 
1. Somewhat less forcefully than the presumptive approach recommended by the 
Hilmer Committee, the Governments would ‘where appropriate’ corporatise 
                                                 
38 In its 2005 assessment (Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, 
Report No 33, 2005) the Productivity Commission was somewhat more robust in its articulation of the 
requirements: ‘competitive neutrality requirements involving the adoption of corporatized governance 
structures for significant government enterprises; the imposition of similar commercial and regulatory 
obligations to those faced by competing private businesses; and the establishment of independent 
mechanisms for handling complaints that these requirements have been breached’:  xv. 
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Government business enterprises.  A particular approach developed for the 
November Special Premiers’ Conference was recommended. 39  
2. Government business enterprises should pay Commonwealth State and Territory 
taxes or their equivalents, and fees for any debt guarantees resulting from their 
status as government business enterprises.  Where the business was not fully 
severed from other activities, sums equivalent to those taxes and fees should be 
reflected in prices for their goods and services. 
3. Government business enterprises should be subject to the same regulations as 
private sector competitors.   If a government business enterprise was subject to 
regulation but the private sector competitor was not, the relevant government 
was free to retain the regulation if it thought to do so was appropriate. 
Clause 4(6) watered down these propositions by only requiring Governments to 
implement them ‘to the extent the benefits to be realised outweighed the costs’.  A 
requirement for a complaints mechanism under which competitors could seek to have 
government businesses be placed under the same costs and constraints as they were was 
not included in the principles of competitive neutrality.  Complaints mechanisms are, 
however, mentioned in clause 4 (8) as something to be included in Governments’ policy 
statements.  That is their only mention; nevertheless complaints mechanisms became 
one of the major issues in the implementation of competitive neutrality principles. 
 
The Competition Principles Agreement set out the procedures for implementation.  
These were similar for the other elements of competition policy.  By June 1996 the 
Governments were to publish a ‘policy statement on competitive neutrality’.40  This was 
to include an implementation timetable and a complaints mechanism.  It was also to 
publish an annual report on implementation of the principles, including allegations of 
non-compliance.41  The National Competition Council was specifically enjoined by the 
                                                 
39 Special Premier’s [sic] Conference Coordinating Task Force on GTE Reform, Characteristics of a 
Fully Corporatised Government Trading Enterprise and Checklist for National Stocktake of GTE 
Reforms, NSW Treasury, 1991. 
40 Competition Principles Agreement cl 3 (8).  While the National Competition Policy website maintained 
by the National Competition Council claims these statements are available 
(<http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/pages/competitive_neutrality> (accessed 26 June 2013)), a publication search 
does not reveal them. 
41 Competition Principles Agreement cl 3 (10). 
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Implementation Agreement not to recommend payment of tranches of the Competition 
Payments unless Governments had complied with competitive neutrality principles and 
publication timetables for statements. 
 
These principles and processes proved problematic.  In its assessment of the National 
Competition Policy,42 the Productivity Commission, while acknowledging competitive 
neutrality as a key element,43 virtually ignored it as such.  Most of the mentions are in 
respect of road and rail transport. It is only in Chapter 10, where it discusses its ideas for 
the future competition framework that there is discussion of any depth of competitive 
neutrality.  There it says: 
 
For the most part, the CN [competitive neutrality] elements of NCP [the 
National Competition Policy] have been implemented and appear to be 
working relatively smoothly. There is general agreement that the broad 
principles underlying the CN regime remain appropriate and that the 
regime – including complaints’ handling mechanisms – should continue 
into the future.44 
 
In this context it thought suggested changes for the future could be characterised as 
‘fine-tuning’ and not of high priority.45   
 
The main evidence for the Productivity Commission’s satisfaction with the competitive 
neutrality regime is its assessment of Government Business Enterprise financial 
performance.  Indeed, the National Competition Council also cites the Productivity 
Commission’s assessment of this as an indicator of the competitive neutrality regime 
doing well.46  This is illogical.  The aim of competitive neutrality is not performance of 
the government business enterprise, it is resource allocation in the economy.  It is not 
                                                 
42 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005. 
43 Ibid XLIX. 
44 Ibid 293. 
45 Ibid 294. 
46 National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National 
Competition Policy and related reform’, 2005, 2.1. 
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even performance in the industry, although the state of competition in an industry is, 
according to economic theory, a predictor of performance.  The equivocal assessment 
by the Productivity Commission, apart from in summaries, of overall and industry 
specific economic performance has been discussed above.  The performance of 
government business enterprises would be expected to reduce once advantages are 
removed.  It is management change that might improve performance and competition is 
alleged to help in that respect, given that enterprise structure permits it.  In its 
assessment of the performance the Productivity Commission said this: 
 
There has been a pronounced improvement in the financial performance 
of GBEs since the early 1980s, attributable to NCP and related 
governance reforms.  Nevertheless, around half of Australia’s GBEs 
continue to record rates of return below the risk-free government bond 
rate.47 
 
This statement, used as evidence of the effectiveness of competitive neutrality reforms, 
is not only contradictory but also irrelevant to assessment of the National Competition 
Policy.  If the policy is good, why is financial performance bad?  How can improved 
performance ‘since the early 1980s’ be attributable to a policy that commenced 
implementation sometime after 1995?   
 
The National Competition Council was a little more equivocal in 2005.  It again referred 
to the financial performance of government business enterprises as the touchstone of 
assessment,48 noting that ‘most are not achieving fully commercial levels of financial 
performance’.  Mind you, it also said, ‘The performance of government businesses has 
improved as CN [competitive neutrality] has promoted a more dynamic culture through 
greater transparency and accountability.’  Its summary assessment was that 
‘Governments generally met the explicitly stated obligations of CN several years ago, 
but realising the objective of CN still appears some way off, bringing into focus the CN 
obligations that are only implied.’49  For the National Competition Council, then, 
                                                 
47 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, 53. 
48 National Competition Council, above n 46, 2.7-2.10. 
49 Ibid 2.12. 
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competitive neutrality appears then to be one of the less successful aspects of 
competition policy, even if, in terms of the interpretation in this thesis of the National 
Competition Policy as the Agreements, the obligations of governments were 
acknowledged to have been met.  
 
But what was actually done?  Disentangling the strands of competitive neutrality policy 
from other aspects of competition policy generally is somewhat problematic.  In the 
various reports they are confused with structural reform and legislation reviews, 
especially in relation to corporatisation.  However, the strands most commonly 
distinguished are: 
 Coverage, 
 Requirements, 
 Community Service obligations, 
 Complaints mechanisms, 
 Corporatisation, 
 Application to local government. 
 
Coverage 
 
The Competition Principles Agreement had defined the enterprises covered as 
significant business activities of entities under public ownership and classified as 
‘Public Trading Enterprises’ or ‘Public Financial Enterprises’ in the Government 
Financial Statistics Classification (clause 4).  Yet even with such external reference 
there was early debate.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the idea of ‘government business 
enterprise’ has not been articulated with certitude.   The Competition Principles 
Agreement seemed to be precise by reference to classification, yet this was illusory.  
The classification begged its own question: What is the difference between ‘business’ 
and ‘government’?  An example of the doubt that could creep in is in the potential 
application of the principles to Universities.  In 2005, the National Competition Council 
noted the reluctance of governments to apply competitive neutrality principles to even 
the commercial activities of universities, although Western Australia did so in 2003 and 
also implemented a complaints process.  The issue was that Universities were not 
thought of as businesses, at least at that time, and even the severance of ‘commercial 
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activities’ was problematic. 50  Moreover, as noted above, as early as 1996 the National 
Competition Council lamented the coverage of the competitive neutrality principles and 
the tendency of States and Territories to identify ‘significant’ businesses subject to 
competitive neutrality strictures by size alone, rather than influence of in the relevant 
market.51  It conceded only that size alone might be a useful determinant as to priorities. 
 
The lamentations of the National Competition Council were to some extent addressed 
by its assessment powers. Nevertheless, clause 3 of the Competition Principles 
Agreement is strong in preserving for governments discretion in relation to the 
application of competitive neutrality principles.  Only ‘significant’ business activities 
were covered, business activities of agencies which undertook a broader range functions 
need only apply the principles ‘where appropriate’ (clause 3 (5)), corporatisation was 
subject to the same qualification (clause 3 (4)(a)) and all applications of the principles 
and corporatisations need only be undertakes ‘to the extent that the benefits to be 
realised from implementation outweigh the costs’ (clause 3 (6)).  All jurisdictions 
reserved to themselves the right of determination of what was ‘significant’ although the 
National Competition Council assessed only Western Australia as not having met its 
clause 3 obligations.  Western Australia had subjected only significant business 
activities that it, after review, considered should be covered in the public interest, to 
competitive neutrality principles.52 However, this is as permitted in the Competition 
Principles Agreement, thus the main reason is somewhat unclear; it appears to be more 
a matter of the timeliness of review rather than the fact of review. 
                                                 
50 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996, 14-15.  In  its November 2000 meeting, 
the Council of Australian Governments softened the requirements of clause 3 by only requiring 
governments to use their ‘best endeavours’ where a ‘government business is not subject to executive 
control of a party’.  (This is not in the Council of Australian Governments Communique, rather it is as 
stated in an attachment to a letter from the Prime Minister to Governments dated 27 October 2000, which 
the Council of Australian Governments adopted in November 2000: Communique, 2000. 4-5.)  Of course, 
legislation could have been passed requiring compliance.  In this can be seen the equivocal nature of 
Universities and other such institutions and the inability of the competition discourse to capture any 
institution other than government or business.  It is an issue deserving of further articulation beyond the 
space available here. 
51 Ibid 14-15. 
52 National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National 
Competition Policy and related reform’, 2005, 2.2 
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Ultimately governments adopted similar agency self-assessment processes which 
followed the following steps:53  
1. Is the activity a ‘significant’ activity in a market in terms of both size and 
significance? 
2. Do the expected benefits of application of competitive neutrality policy 
outweigh the costs of so doing? 
3. Is it in the public interest to apply the competitive neutrality polices, using the 
criteria expressed in clause 1(3) of the Competition Principles Agreement?54 
4. If all answers are ‘yes’, then competitive neutrality measures should be 
undertaken. 
The decisions about applicability of the principles were then subject to review under the 
complaints mechanism. 
 
Requirements 
 
The requirements as to competitive neutrality (other than as to corporatisation) as set 
out in the Competition Principles Agreement appear relatively simple: to impose taxes 
or equivalent, to charge fees for debt guarantees and to apply all regulations.  Mandating 
that government businesses comply was relatively easily accomplished for most 
jurisdictions.   It was simply a matter of requiring it within the terms of public service 
arrangements.   
 
The legal structure of government activity is not always of departmental activity under 
enabling legislation.  There are a number of statutory forms of organisation some of 
which are susceptible to Ministerial or other order and others that are more autonomous. 
It depends whether they have separate enabling legislation and the terms of ministerial 
or other direction in it. It is for this reason that ordering Universities to apply 
competitive neutrality principles was problematic, as noted above.  It also meant that the 
processes of corporatisation were not separable notionally from application of pricing 
                                                 
53 This is taken from Victoria, Department of Treasury and Finance, Competitive Neutrality Policy ,2012. 
54 It is notable here that the preference for competition evinced in legislation reviews under clause 5 is not 
required. 
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and subjection to regulation.  Public critique of competition policy tended to confuse 
and conflate these processes, throwing contracting out and competitive tendering into 
the mix as well.  The National Competition Council and governments generally 
valiantly tried to disentangle these aspects, with only limited success.55  These 
complexities are dealt with below.  For now the focus is on what such orders, if 
empowered, might contain. 
 
Very early in the National Competition Policy the National Competition Council had 
broadened the matters it considered necessary to take into account in determining what 
was a competitively neutral position for a government business enterprise.  In its 1997 
Assessment it took the brief and probably careless reference in clause 3(5)(b) to ‘full 
cost attribution’ of the matters to be included (taxes, debt guarantee fees and regulation) 
to apply generally as a competitive neutrality principle.56 There appeared to be no 
objection on the basis of what the Agreement said, hence the Prime Minister’s letter of 
27 October 2000, adopted at the November 2000 Council of Australian Governments 
meeting stated that ‘the term “full cost attribution” accommodating a range of costing 
methodologies, including fully distributed cost, marginal cost, avoidable cost etc., as 
appropriate in each case’.  While there expressed to be a mere redefinition of the term, 
by 2002 the National Competition Council had broadened the principles themselves to 
include targeted rates of return, costs of noncurrent assets, depreciation, and other costs 
such as local government charges and rates.57  
 
The types of advantages that government business enterprises might have include 
exemptions from payroll tax, land tax, stamp duty, insurance premiums, local rates and 
charges, cost of capital, corporate overhead costs, and government guarantee charges.  
On the other hand, employment remuneration and awards, accountability measures, 
structural rigidity and compliance costs might all be greater.  Competitive neutrality 
principles required that these all be quantified and appropriate adjustments to agency 
goods and services charges be made. 
                                                 
55 National Competition Council, Second Tranche Assessment of Governments’ Progress in Implementing 
the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms, 1999, 7 
56 Ibid 57; see also National Competition Council, Annual Report 1997-8, 1998, 150-151 
57 National Competition Council, 2002 Assessment of Governments’ Progress in Implementing the 
National Competition Policy and Related Reforms, Volume 1: Assessment 2002, 2.17-8. 
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Community Service Obligation. 
 
Competitive neutrality implies a distinction between ‘business’ and other governmental 
activity.   ‘Business activities’, the policy asserts, should be priced according to the full 
cost attribution so that both private and public suppliers compete.  However, in some 
situations governments do not want to charge the full price.  This is allowed for under 
the rubric of ‘community service obligation’.  The National Competition Council put it 
this way: 
 
Ensuring that prices reflect a full cost attribution does not preclude 
government businesses from charging prices below cost, that is, 
subsidising the good or service, where there is a strong public interest 
justification. This can be done through what is known as a CSO.58 
 
Examples include the obligation on Australia Post to deliver letters to every address in 
Australia59 or, as became contentious in Queensland, obligations to run bus services 
even when uneconomical.60 
 
As early as 1994 the Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of 
Government Trading Enterprises had proposed a definition of community service 
obligations as: 
 
A Community Service Obligation arises when a government specifically 
requires a public enterprise to carry out activities relating to outputs or 
inputs which it would not elect to do on a commercial basis, and which 
the government does not require other businesses in the public or private 
                                                 
58 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1997-8, 1998, 152.  See also Industry Commission, 
Community Service Obligations: Policies and Practices of Australian Governments, 1997. 
59Australian Postal Act 1989, s 27. 
60 See Chapter 6, n 37. 
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sectors to generally undertake, or which it would only do commercially 
at higher prices.61 
 
Within a couple of years this definition was accepted by most Australian Governments, 
with a few minor alterations.62  
 
There was a strong impetus to confine the ambit of community service obligations.  
According to the National Competition Council, they should only: 
 ‘be used to achieve a specific community outcome for a well-defined target 
group’; and 
 be funded directly from general revenue or, at least, costed as if it were so 
funded and the business’s rate of return transparently adjusted accordingly.63 
Moreover, if they could be clearly defined and separately funded, competition could be 
introduced into their provision, asserted the National Competition Council, by making 
them contestable.  This suggestion was slapped down by the Council of Australian 
Governments, which adopted the principles of: 
 there being no requirement for parties to undertake a competitive process for the 
delivery of Community Service Obligations (CSO); and 
 parties being free to determine who should receive a CSO payment or subsidy, 
which should be transparent, appropriately costed and directly funded by 
government.64 
Perhaps the National Competition Council saw that it had overreached itself as early as 
1999, when in its Annual Report it moderated its language to say: 
 
                                                 
61 Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, 
Community Service Obligations: Some Definitional, Costing and Funding Issues, Industry Commission, 
1994, xi. 
62 Industry Commission, Community Service Obligations: Policies and Practices of Australian 
Governments, Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, 7-8. 
63 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1997-8, 1998, 152. 
64 The letter from the Prime Minister to Governments dated 27 October 2000, which the Council of 
Australian Governments adopted in November 2000: Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
Meeting 3 November 2000 Communique 4-5. 
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Emerging issues are the relationship between, and reconciliation of, 
competitive neutrality reforms (including actions by governments to 
address competitive neutrality complaints) with the treatment of 
community service obligations (CSOs). Properly designed CSOs allow: 
 governments to assure the provision of certain minimum levels of 
service to disadvantaged people; and 
 government businesses to operate efficiently and on a 
competitively neutral basis. 
The Council has an ongoing interest in these issues, and looks to 
governments to develop CSO frameworks which meet the social needs of 
the community as well as the community interest in competition policy 
reform.65 
 
Community service obligations thus was one of the early sites of resistance to 
competition policy.  This resistance led to a rewriting of the relation between 
competition policy and other policies.  By the end of the National Competition Policy, 
competition policy was conceived of as a social policy on a par with other social 
policies, not as metaregulatory of all social policies.66  A claim that the spirit of 
competition policy reform should imbue all aspects of government was defeated and 
retreat was made to the terms of the Competition Principles Agreement.  The situation 
was different, however, for legislation reviews, where the Agreement provided for the 
supremacy of competition over other policies. 
 
Were making community service obligations contestable to have been accepted, it 
would have been an example of contracting out.  This is the process of taking a 
particular activity away from a government agency and contracting for its delivery by a 
body distinct from that responsible for its delivery.  It is frequently known as an 
implementation of the provider/supplier split.  The National Competition Council from 
its first Annual Report claimed that contracting out was not required under the National 
Competition Policy.67  This was true of competitive neutrality.  However, contracting 
                                                 
65 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1998-9, 1999, 27. 
66 Comp.  Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003), ch 1. 
67 National Competition Council, Annual Report 1995-6, 1996, 15. 
247 
 
for the supply of services was taken into account in assessing legislation reviews for 
compliance with competition principles. 
 
Complaints Mechanism 
 
By 2005, the Competition Principles Agreement was assumed to require a mechanism to 
investigate complaints that a government business has breached competitive neutrality 
policies.  It is not explicitly mentioned, but appears to be implied.  The National 
Competition Council signalled a complaints mechanism as a requirement in its First 
Tranche Assessment, stating that Governments were to have set out what they intended 
to do in their Statements due by June 1996.  All Governments did in fact set one (or 
more: New South Wales had two) in place. 
 
The mechanisms varied.  A unit within the Productivity Commission (the Australian 
Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office) investigates complaints by any 
individual or organisation in relation to Commonwealth Government business activities, 
making recommendations to the Treasurer.  In New South Wales the Premier refers 
matters to the State Contracts Control Board in relation to tenders, bids and all other 
complaints to the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, although the usual 
process is to refer it the relevant authority first.  Complaints in Victoria are made to the 
Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission.  South Australia appoints 
competition commissioners to deal with assigned complaints. The other States and 
Territories have variants.68   
 
Each Government reported to the National Competition Council on complaints every 
year.  The only real issue arose over bus lines on the Gold Coast in 1997, which cost 
Queensland some part of its second tranche payment.69 
 
                                                 
68 See National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National 
Competition Policy and related reform’, 2005, 2.4-2.7 
69 See Chapter 6, n  37. 
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Corporatisation 
 
Corporatisation is a technique deployed extensively in competition policy.  It is also 
repeatedly criticised and even railed against.  However, except in so far as it is 
mentioned in Clause 3, it was not a separate element of the National Competition 
Policy.  It was considered merely as a tool to be deployed in competitive neutrality, 
structural reform and legislation reviews.  As such, corporatisation rests on some 
misconceptions as to the nature of companies, let alone corporations, and that the 
process demands that the concept of the company be reconstructed to fit competition 
policy especially in terms of shareholder primacy and the nature of the corporate 
constitution.70 This suggest that corporatisation represents a gross simplification of the 
idea of governance; it harks back to the argument made in Chapter 2 that the critical 
assumption is the idea of ‘business’ and illustrates that this idea has been imposed 
without rational consideration. 
 
Parties agreed under clause 3 of the Competition Principles Agreement that they would 
‘where appropriate adopt a corporatisation model for these [the defined] Government 
business enterprises’.  Competitive neutrality is thus explicitly constructed as the 
principal mechanism for governing the difference between government functions and 
business functions.  Matters in the public interest are government-controlled but those 
deemed ‘businesses’ are to be competition controlled, either by launching them into the 
private sphere as corporations or by mimicking corporations.  To the extent that a 
company incorporated under a companies statute (for Australia, the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth.)) is separate, decisions must be made in that corporation’s best interest, 
rather than that of the Government, consumers, the public or anyone else.71  To the 
                                                 
70 David Wishart, ‘A Reconfiguration of Company and/or Corporate Law Theory’, (2010) 10 The Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 151. 
71 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.) ss 181.  The seminal case is Re Smith & Fawcett [1942] Ch 402 In that 
case the duty was expressed to be merely to act in what the directors consider are the best interests of the 
company, but the subjective element is almost universally disregarded.  There is a huge jurisprudence on 
exactly what ‘the company’ means in this context.  A sampling of the issues includes: is ‘the company’ 
synonymous with ‘the members’(Darvall v North Sydney Brick and Tile Co Ltd (1987) 16 NSWLR 212, 
Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425) and always so (as to creditors, Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty 
Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 722; Spies v R (2000) 201 CLR 603; as to other members of a group of companies, 
Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62; Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1); what 
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extent that the corporation is incorporated under its own enabling statute, decisions are 
to be made in accordance with that statute and also under the regulations applicable to 
appointees to the positions provided for in that legislation – both of these normally 
provide for duties.72   
 
The process of corporatisation is essentially twofold.  The first part is legal.  A legal 
entity is formed either by registration under a general registration act, such as the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or by individual act of Parliament. Second, the 
government business is transferred to it by the relevant government.  A half-way 
measure is to set up the governance structure for the business as if it were an 
independent entity.  Within this there are many variations. If a company is formed, it 
need not be for profit; it can be a charitable company or even a company limited by 
guarantee – a point which seems to have escaped much of the corporatisation literature.  
Statutory corporations are similarly variable, although more visibly in that instance. 
 
Both the Hilmer Report73 and the Competition Principles Agreement make it clear that 
National Competition Policy was not to be a matter of who owns the corporation or 
government business enterprise.  The Agreement puts it this way: 
 
This Agreement is neutral with respect to the nature and form of 
ownership of business enterprises.  It is not intended to promote public or 
private ownership.74 
 
All National Competition Council Reports and Assessments rigorously exclude any 
favouring of privatisation of government ownership, although the Hilmer Report’s 
                                                                                                                                               
happens when the interests of members conflict (Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 15); to what degree does 
the company constitution determine the interests of the company Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v 
Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457; Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285). 
72 See, for example, Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) ss 21-23; State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1992(Vic), ss 31-6; State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) Schedule 10; Public 
Corporations Act 1993 (SA) ss 14-19. 
73 Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, 
National Competition Policy 1993, 226. 
74 Competition Principles Agreement, cl 1(4). 
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mention that sometimes government ownership provides a temptation for governments 
to favour the businesses they own is repeated.  Less frequently mentioned is the Hilmer 
Report’s assertion that private ownership of monopoly elements in disaggregated 
industries can lead to a loss of control in situations where incentive structures are 
inadequate.  Overall, one gets the feeling, and it is just that, that the assessments smiled 
on privatisations. 
 
As important as the legal structure of the corporatised government business is the 
subsequent process of fitting the decision-making structure into the legal form.  The 
Competition Principles Agreement specifically mentioned ‘the model developed by the 
intergovernmental committee responsible for GTE National Performance Monitoring’ 
as a ‘possible approach to corporatisation’.  That particular model is somewhat elusive, 
although the summary provided by the National Competition Council in its First 
Tranche Assessment75 seems to be abstracted from a set of background papers 
developed for the 1991 Special Premiers Conference.76  In any event, there was no 
objection to the summary, although the Communiqué of the Special Premiers’ 
Conference does not specifically adopt any model.  There appears to have been a 
Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading 
Enterprises, possibly organised through the Council of Australian Governments, but it 
was abolished in 1997.77   
 
The summary of the model referred to in the Competition Principles Agreement as set 
out by the National Competition Council in its first tranche assessment is as follows: 
 a clear statement of objectives, with a clear commercial focus aimed 
at maximising the value of the owner government’s investment in the 
enterprise; 
                                                 
75 National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments’ Progress in Implementing the National 
Competition Policy and Related Reforms, 1997, 22 
76 New South Wales, Characteristics of a Fully Corporatised Government Trading Enterprise and 
Checklist for National Stocktake of GTE Reforms, (NSW Treasury, 1991) 
77 Productivity Commission, Performance of Government Trading Enterprises, 1991-92 to 1996-7 (1998) 
27. 
251 
 
 full responsibility and accountability for decisions affecting 
enterprise performance vested in a management board at arms’ length 
from the owner government; 
 independent and objective performance monitoring focussing 
primarily on commercial performance against clearly specified 
performance targets; 
 effective rewards and sanctions pre-defined against agreed 
performance targets; 
 competitive neutrality in input markets such that government 
enterprises do not face advantages or disadvantages in the cost of 
inputs relative to the private sector because of their public ownership; 
 competitive neutrality in output markets, including the removal of 
any protective barriers which reduce the degree of competition faced 
by government enterprises and the application of the same legislative 
regulations facing equivalent private sector enterprises; and 
 effective regulation of government enterprises such that natural 
monopoly powers cannot be abused. 
This is clearly a set of characteristics or outcomes rather than a process.  The actual 
processes were thus a matter of internal bureaucratic actions.  Each government had 
procedures as to how each step was to be carried out.  However, all jurisdictions were 
well experienced in these mechanics even before the Hilmer Committee’s inquiries.  
The National Competition Policy hardly changed the process; it merely provided a 
mechanism for ensuring the processes adopted were good enough to meet the standards 
set by the National Competition Council.  Thus, in its 1997 Report, Performance of 
Government Trading Enterprises, the Productivity Commission stated that the process 
of corporatising had been bedded down and that was the reason why the 
Intergovernmental Steering Committee had itself decided that it should be disbanded.78 
 
On the disbanding of the Steering Committee, the Productivity Commission was given 
the task of assessing the performance of Government Trading Enterprises.  The National 
Competition Council extensively used these reports in its own assessments.  The 
Productivity Commission assessments were issued on a rolling four year basis almost 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
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every year, starting with 1991-2 to 1996-7 and ending at the end of the currency of the 
National Competition Policy with a Report considering performance in the two years of 
2004-5 to 2005-6.  In this last report the stern message, taken up by the National 
Competition Council was issued: 
 
Although the return on assets improved on average, about half of the 
monitored GTEs earned less than the long-term bond rate in 2005-06. 
This implies that an even greater proportion did not earn a commercial 
rate of return (which would include a margin for risk). 
The poor financial performance of many GTEs underscores a longer-
term failure to operate these businesses on a fully commercial basis in 
accordance with competition policy agreement undertakings.79 
 
In summary then, the exhortation to corporatise in the Competition Principles 
Agreement cannot be said to have done very much at all.  The work on process had 
already been done, the National Competition Policy did not alter the procedures, and the 
corporatisations that took place cannot be said to have performed well.    
 
Application of Competitive Neutrality Principles to Local Government 
 
Local government was in somewhat of an equivocal position in relation to the National 
Competition Policy.  Local government provides many services such as garbage, roads, 
parks and reserves, cleaning, childcare, recreation, sport and leisure, libraries, heritage 
protection, arts promotion and promotion of the locality generally.  Accordingly 
competitive neutrality impacted heavily on the way in which local governments were to 
provide the services.  On the other hand, local governments are creatures of State and 
Territory governments, existing only as a result of State and Territory legislation and 
subject to State and Territory directives to the extent that legislation allows. Moreover, 
local government has few resources for and little expertise in engaging in the 
development of policy implementation processes.  Finally, the services provided by 
local government impact directly on people with immediacy and universality; hence 
reforms are at their most sensitive at this level.  This equivocal position played out 
                                                 
79 Productivity Commission, Financial Performance of Government Trading Enterprises 2004-05 to 
2005-06, 2006, 2  
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through the whole currency of the National Competition Policy: in its formulation, in 
the Agreements, in the events and controversies, and in the assessments, even in the 
funding arrangements and the membership of the Council of Australian Governments 
itself. 
 
The trace of the equivocal position of local government in the National Competition 
Policy starts early.  The President of the Local Government Association had attended 
meetings of the Council of Australian Governments since its inception in 1992.  The 
Communiqué setting out the outcomes from the very first Council of Australian 
Governments meeting in which a National Competition Policy (1994) was discussed 
states: 
 
The Council agreed that the Australian Local Government Association 
would participate in the further consultations on competition policy that 
are now to occur and in the preparation of the advice to the Council 
flowing from these consultations.80 
 
However, by the time of the signing of the Agreements this had been moderated to: 
 
… under the Competition Principles Agreement, Governments agreed to 
publish policy statements on competitive neutrality and the application of 
the Competition Principles Agreement to local government (in 
consultation with local government) by June 1996.81 
 
By the time of the signing of the Agreements themselves, matters had settled down.  
Local government did not become a Party to the Agreements.  Clause 7 (1) the 
Competition Principles Agreement articulated the equivocal position of local 
government well: 
 
7(1) The principles set out in this Agreement will apply to local 
government, even though local governments are not Parties to 
                                                 
80 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 19 August 1994, Communique. 
81 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 11 April 1995, Communique. 
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this Agreement.  Each State and Territory Party is responsible for 
applying those principles to local government. 
 
Subclause (2) extended the applicability of the competition principles to include 
legislation reviews and structural reform in relation to local government, although it was 
a little far-fetched and somewhat illusory given the lack of legislative power and utility 
ownership.  It also confirmed the consultation requirement while preserving the 
sovereignty of the States and Territories by placing responsibility squarely with the 
States and Territories.  Nevertheless, any accountability was diminished by adoption of 
the technique of States and Territories setting their own agendas by statement to which 
they would be held:  
 
(2) Subject to subclause (3) [as to later accession by States or 
Territories], where clause 3, 4 and 5 permit each Party to 
determine its own agenda for the implementation of the principles 
set out in those clauses, each State and Territory will publics a 
statement by June 1996: 
(a)  which is prepared in consultation with local government; 
and 
(b) which specifies the application of the principles to 
particular local government activities and functions. 
 
Governments satisfied the requirement to lodge statements with the National 
Competition Council and by the time of the first tranche assessment the National 
Competition Council was satisfied ‘that all governments have made some progress 
towards implementing reform proposals in cooperation with local government, 
particularly in informing local government about processes for the application of NCP 
[National Competition Policy] reforms’.82 However having set the standard for the first 
tranche to be: 
 
Governments should have published a policy statement outlining their 
proposals for applying the competition principles to local government. 
                                                 
82 National Competition Council, Assessment of Governments’ Progress in Implementing the National 
Competition Policy and Related Reforms, 1997, 24. 
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The competition principles with most relevance for local government are 
the application of competitive neutrality principles and the review of 
restrictive local government legislation. In assessing first tranche reform 
performance, the Council has focused on the adequacy of the local 
government reform agendas proposed by State and Territory 
governments in these two areas, and evidence of progress against these 
agendas.83 
 
The National Competition Council felt it did not have enough evidence to be satisfied 
that it had been met.  It issued an implicit threat that it needed more evidence of 
substantive progress.  Clearly the question was of progress.  All governments were 
subjected to supplementary assessment.  However, the National Competition Council 
expressed much greater satisfaction in its Second Tranche Asssessment, saying: 
 
From that difficult start, local government reform has gathered 
acceptance and support, helped by positive measures to assist local 
government reform by State governments. Increasingly, local 
governments are adopting NCP and complementary reform measures to 
provide better value services to ratepayers and the community. The shift 
in the attitudes to, and performance of, local government competitive 
neutrality reform is exemplified by the fact that no jurisdiction is the 
subject of a qualified second tranche assessment in this area.84 
 
The sort of thing the National Competition Council identified was an initial survey by 
State and Territory governments of what business activities were being carried out, and 
to categorise them according to size, and to apply taxation equivalents and debt 
guarantee fees, and charge commercial rates of return, including full cost attribution.  At 
about this time, the National Competition Council started noting the extent to which 
governments were passing competition payments through to local governments.85  As 
                                                 
83 Ibid 6. 
84 National Competition Council, Second Tranche Assessment of Governments’ Progress in Implementing 
the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms.  Vol 1: Assessment, 1999, 8. 
85 For example, in relation to Queensland, ibid 61. 
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the National Competition Policy wore on, the National Competition Council was 
generally satisfied with the application of competitive neutrality principles (and 
structural reform) to local government businesses although the relatively minor benefits 
relative to implementation costs was noted (and hence the importance of the 
categorisation by size).86 
 
Debate over the pass-through of competition payments is not apparent in the National 
Competition Council Assessments.  It is apparent, however, in the Productivity 
Commission Final Assessment, especially in the submissions to the Productivity 
Commission from local governments.87  The problem was that it cost money to 
implement the changes (although this was never factored into an assessment of the 
overall worth of the National Competition Policy) yet local government was not 
provided with the benefits.  This was the reason for competition payment in the first 
place: that the States and Territories were not receiving the benefits while wearing the 
costs.  On the other hand, as the States and Territories put it: 
 
… competition payments under NCP [National Competition Policy] 
were not intended to compensate jurisdictions for the costs of 
implementing reform. Rather, their role was to provide State and 
Territory governments with a share of the higher tax revenues generated 
by the NCP reforms that would not otherwise have accrued to them 
because of vertical fiscal imbalance.88  
 
The difference is not obvious.  In any event, Queensland, Victoria and Western 
Australia shared some of their competition payments with local government.  The 
Productivity Commission refused to draw any general conclusions, except to suggest 
sharing where ‘local governments [to] incur disproportionate costs relative to the 
benefits of reform.89 
 
                                                 
86 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, xxiii. 
87 Ibid 153-4. 
88 Ibid 154. 
89 Ibid. 
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Competitive Neutrality in Summary 
 
Despite the rhetoric of the National Competition Council and the Productivity 
Commission, competitive neutrality was one of the less successful elements of the 
National Competition Policy in the form of the Agreements.  The Productivity 
Commission had to resort to fudging the figures to maintain the appearance of success.  
That this was so should not be surprising as many of the key strands in competitive 
neutrality do not withstand rigorous scrutiny.  They prove theoretically suspect.   
 
The distinction between government business and simple government was not 
articulated with clarity. This issue plagues many of the elements of competition policy.  
More practically, working out when an activity was important enough to be a candidate 
for application of the principles was unclear, particularly as States and Territories were 
reluctant to put themselves to the bother and political opprobrium of doing so.   
 
Community service obligations as the interpretation of the ‘public interest’ – other of 
competition requirements – inevitably produced difficulties.  To assert that they should 
be contracted out was a clear case of the National Competition Council overreach.  
Indeed the reaction of governments to the subjection of public interest to competition 
policy was sufficient to relegate competition policy from its putative position as a 
metaregulatory ideal.   
 
On the other hand, despite the gross simplification of the idea of institutional 
governance represented by the preference for the corporate form, corporatisation was 
relatively uncritically adopted.  The Hilmer Report and the Agreements both carefully 
distinguish between the corporate form and ownership. This could well be because 
corporatisation was already a well-accepted and established process and hence the 
process of competitive neutrality could concentrate on the problematics of technical 
calculation of the pricing principles reflecting full cost of production, taxation or 
taxation equivalent, fees for government guarantees, and equal subjections to regulation 
such as that as to the environment, and planning and approval processes.   
 
The final strand of competitive neutrality which produced less than satisfactory results 
was its impact on local government.  The problem here was its subordinate position and 
the tendency of State and Territory governments to take the competition payments for 
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themselves while expecting local government to wear the burden of implementation.  
There was not much the National Competition Council could do about it – it was a 
matter of federalism that was untouched by the Agreements.  The National Competition 
Policy can be considered to have failed to reform federalism to that extent.   
 
Legislation Reviews 
 
Under the National Competition Policy, the States, Territories and the Commonwealth 
implemented a process of review of the larger portion of their current statutes.  This 
process checked legislation for compliance with competition principles.  All legislative 
restrictions on competition were to be removed unless justified – meaning that the 
benefits of a restriction outweigh the costs to the community.  Of 1,800 pieces of 
legislation identified by the Governments in 1996 as containing restrictions on 
competition and which they committed to review, by the end of 2005 around 85% had 
been reviewed and, where appropriate, reformed.90 
 
Legislative reviews are supposed to continue to this day.  At the meeting of the Council 
of Australian Governments on 10 February 2006 and as a result of the assessment of the 
National Competition Policy, all governments recommitted themselves to legislation 
review principles, to completing their outstanding priority legislation reviews under the 
National Competition Policy and to prevent the introduction of unwarranted 
competition restrictions in new and amended legislation and regulations.91 
 
The legislation review process was an invention of the Hilmer Committee, as described 
in Chapter 3. While many instances of legislation review proved to be enormously 
controversial92 and even if, as recounted in Chapter 1, the process, with the rest of the 
National Competition Policy, has been little examined other than from within the 
National Competition Policy process itself, personalities in Australian competition 
                                                 
90 National Competition Council, Annual Report 2006-2007, 2007, 22.  Interestingly, in 1996 around 800 
pieces of legislation were slated for priority review; of these only 78% have been reviewed and, if 
appropriate, reformed. 
91 COAG Meeting 10 February 2006, Communique. 
92 See for example, the reform of the Office of the Victorian Auditor-General, which occasioned protests 
in the streets of Melbourne.  This is considered below. 
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circles – particularly ex-heads (chairmen) of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission – are particularly proud of legislative reviews.93  Legislation reviews, 
regardless of the extensive critical scholarship on legal transplantation,94 are held up as 
a model to the world of good economic management.95 
 
The ‘guiding principle’ of legislation reviews was that  
 
legislation (including Acts, enactments, Ordinances or regulations) 
should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that: 
(a)  the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh 
the costs; and 
(b)  the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting 
competition.96 
                                                 
93 I have not been able to dig up references for this, but I have personally heard Alan Fels and Graeme 
Samuels, both ex-chairmen of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, eulogise the 
legislative review process as a model for the world.  See also the interview evidence in Bronwen Morgan, 
Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003), 11. 
94 For example, Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of 
Georgia Press, 2nd ed, 1993) 95, Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”’ (1997) 4 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 111; Otto Kahn-Freund, “On Use and Misuse of 
Comparative Law” (1974) 37 Modern Law Review, 1, Gordon Walker and Alma Pekmezovic, ‘Legal 
Transplanting: International Financial Institutions and Secured Transactions Law Reform in South Pacific 
Island Nations’, (2013) 25 New Zealand Universities Law Review 560. 
95 See for example OECD, Competition Assessment Toolkit (English Veresion) (OECD, 2010) (available 
at http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3699,en_2649_40381664_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html) 3-4; World Trade 
Organization Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Synthesis Paper 
on the Relationship of Trade and Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth, WTO Doc 
WT/WGTC/W/80, 18 September 1998 and World Trade Organization Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy, The Fundamental Principles of Competition Policy, WTO Doc 
WY/WGTCP/W/127, 7 June 1999, both of the latter, according to Morgan, being drafted by a group of 
six advocates of competition policy, two of which were Australians: Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship 
in the Shadow of Competition, (Ashgate, 2003), 11. 
95 National Competition Council, Annual Report 2006-2007, 2007, 22.  Interestingly, in 1996 around 800 
pieces of legislation were slated for priority review; of these only 78% have been reviewed and, if 
appropriate, reformed. 
96 Competition Principles Agreement, cl 5(1).   
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In other words, competition was always to be preferred: if a market can do it, then the 
state should not. This represents a boundary for state action, one at the functional level 
rather than at the structural level as in competitive neutrality.   It was new, adopted from 
the recommendations of the Hilmer Committee, and, as stated in Chapter 4, founded in 
an economic understanding of ‘competition’ and its societal benefits, and a theoretically 
contingent and unreflective approach to government. 
 
The process required under the National Competition Policy, specifically clause 5 of the 
Competition Principles Agreement, was similar to the one adopted for competitive 
neutrality: the Governments were required to provide, by June 1996, a timetable for 
reviews, and reform (if appropriate) of all the legislation within their jurisdiction 
restricting competition.  They had freedom to determine their own agenda within that 
list.  Any proposal for legislation to be made after the commencement of the 
Agreements was to be accompanied with evidence that the legislation would be 
consistent with competition principles as set out in the ‘guiding principles’. 
 
The process of a review was set out in clause 5(9) of the Competition Principles 
Agreement: 
 
Without limiting the terms of reference of a review, a review should: 
(a) clarify the objectives of the legislation; 
(b) identify the nature of the restriction on competition; 
(c) analyse the likely effect of the restriction on competition and on the 
economy generally; 
(d) assess and balance the costs and benefits of the restriction; and 
(e) consider alternative means for achieving the same result including 
non-legislative approaches. 
 
The factors to be taken into account in assessing the public interest were stated to be:  
 
(d) government legislation and policies relating to ecologically 
sustainable development; 
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(e) social welfare and equity considerations, including community 
service obligations; 
(f) government legislation and policies relating to matters such as 
occupational health and safety, industrial relations and access and 
equity; 
(g) economic and regional development, including employment and 
investment growth; 
(h) the interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers; 
(i) the competitiveness of Australian businesses; and 
(j) the efficient allocation of resources.97 
 
In 1998, about half way through the program and probably as a result of political 
pressure,98 the National Competition Council asked the Centre for International 
Economics, a private economic research agency, ‘to set out as clearly as possible a 
framework covering the National Competition Policy legislation review and reform 
process, including implementation of recommendations’.99  This resulting framework 
sets out the procedures Governments might undertake in undertaking reviews; 
procedures recommended by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and the World Trade Organisation are extraordinarily similar to it.100  
Moreover, there are a number of other, mainly government publications dealing with the 
processes of legislative review.101  
 
While the Hilmer Committee had emphasised that the issue in reviews was what a 
reviewing body did, rather than the legal or institutional form, it did seem to envisage 
                                                 
97 Ibid cl 1(3) 
98 Morgan, above n 93, chs 3 and 4 provide detailed description.  See also Robyn Hollander, ‘National 
Competition Policy, Regulatory reform and Australian Federalism’, (2006) 65 Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 33, 33-6.  Western Australia was particularly restive.  The politics of Pauline 
Hanson were also whipping up a degree of resistance in relation to the social impact of the National 
Competition Policy in rural areas: see Chapter 8. 
99 Graeme Samuel, ‘Foreword’ in Centre for International Economics, Guidelines for National 
Competition Policy Legislation Reviews, (Centre for International Economics, 1999), v. 
100 See n 95 above. 
101 E.g., Office of Regulation Review 1998, A Guide to Regulation (2nd ed, 1998). 
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that the reviews would be more national in character co-ordinated strongly through the 
National Competition Council.  This fell before State chauvinism,102 and given the 
assessment process it was probably unnecessary.  Each state set up a variety of 
processes and bodies, although essential to most was the independence of the reviewing 
body.103  Space does not permit a thorough analysis, but they varied104 from ad hoc 
committees to specialist bodies to undertake such reviews as have to be made.105  
Morgan provides detailed analyses of the impact of the legislative review process in 
four sectors: the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, utility reform, a statutory 
marketing board and the Victorian Auditor General.106 
 
Remembering that somewhat more than 1,500 pieces of legislation have been reviewed, 
a comprehensive review of every legislative review is somewhat far-fetched.  
Nevertheless, a study of the practicalities is instructive.  The following example is 
chosen precisely because it is the ‘edge experience’, as de Certeau would put it: that by 
reason of its outrageousness it reveals the nature of the normal. 107 
 
The example is the review of the Audit Act 1994 (Vic.).  Conveniently, but not 
altogether by chance, most of the relevant material is gathered together in a book, In the 
Public Interest.108  The book was prompted by the review and the extraordinary public 
                                                 
102 Clause 5(8) of the Competition Principles Agreement preserved the right of a government to request 
the National Competition Council to undertake a review of legislation if the government thought it should 
be a national review.  As to the politics in which State chauvinism was embedded, see also Martin 
Painter, Collaborative Federalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
103 Centre for International Economics, Guidelines for National Competition Policy Legislation Reviews, 
(Centre for International Economics, 1999), 21. 
104 The best way to survey the variety of processes is to peruse the National Competition Commission’s 
Competition Policy website: <ncp.ncc.gov.au> . 
105 See, for example, the Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, set up by order in Council 
under the State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 (Vic.); see < http://www.vcec.vic.gov.au> or the Queensland 
Competition Authority, set up by the Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 (Qld.) 
106 Morgan, above n.94, ch 5. 
107 Critiquing Foucault: Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (tr. Steven F. Randall) 
(University of California Press, 1984), 61. 
108 Peter Yule, In the Public Interest, (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, 2002). See also Morgan, above 
n 94,190-200; Victorian Auditor-General’s Office Response to the Review Team Report by the Auditor-
263 
 
outcry that followed.  It was written at the behest of the members of the Auditor-
General’s Office and in many ways is a defence against the review, even though the 
review had proved abortive. The story is linked into the political history of Victoria – 
which raises, of course, a major critical in itself: can it be stripped out of its context?   
 
The Auditor-General of Victoria is an office which since 1857 had carried out the task 
of public sector auditing, like many such offices in governments around the world.  
Since 1981 it been carried out as ‘risk-based auditing’ and included analysis of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of government services.  The Auditor-
General was an appointment for seven years by the Governor in Council, without clear 
responsibility but reporting to the Department commissioning an audit, the Department 
of Premier and Cabinet and for special audits to both Houses of Parliament.  It was 
funded by the Department of Premier and Cabinet.   
 
A new Liberal/National party coalition came to power in 1992, although for present 
purposes whether it or its predecessors or successors were left, right or brindled does 
not matter in the slightest.  That Government had been helped in its accession to power 
by some devastating reports on the previous Labor party government by the then 
Auditor-General.  Initially relations were good, but after a series of critical audit reports 
relations deteriorated.  Although the Audit Act (Vic) had been slated as low priority by 
Victoria in its 1996 National Competition Policy Statement and its equivalent had not 
been even contemplated for review by other Governments, in November 1996 the 
Victorian Premier, as responsible Minister for the Audit Act 1994 (Vic), issued the terms 
of reference for a review of the Audit Act under the National Competition Policy.  An 
independent Committee was appointed in December 1997 and it reported on 18 April 
1997.  It recommended that the Auditor-General or their office no longer carry out 
audits, that all be contracted out by the Auditor-general who would organise the tenders.  
A separate government business enterprise to actually do the audits was recommended, 
but they would have to compete with the private sector.109 
 
                                                                                                                                               
General of Victoria (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, 1997); Rodney Maddock The Victorian Audit 
Act Review (Institute of Public Affairs Economic Policy Unit, 1997). 
109 Audit Act Review Committee, Audit Act 1994: Review, (The Committee, Melbourne) 1997.  
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The essential change recommended was to move to contracting out rather than in-house 
audits.  The idea was that competition for audit work would improve the quality of audit 
work, and that the purchaser/provider split would sharpen the definition of what was 
required for audits.  These are relatively conventional economic recommendations.  The 
Committee admitted that the cost of audit services would probably rise, although it said 
that it was its judgment that ‘benefits to Victoria will exceed any rise in costs and that 
the reforms proposed are in the public interest’.110  Although the Committee had made 
strenuous efforts to enhance responsibility and accountability and independence, the 
main critique was that independence had not been preserved and that competition would 
not work.   
 
Public outcry followed the Review. There were demonstrations and public meetings.  
Public debate was vigorous. Both the Chairman of the Review Committee and the then 
Auditor General issued pamphlets attacking each other.  Nevertheless the Audit 
(Amendment) Act passed through Parliament and became effective on 1 July 1998.  
However, the Labor party had seen that political capital was to be made.  In the 1999 
elections it campaigned heavily on the issue and won.  Most of the changes were 
reversed in December 2000. 
 
As the case of the Victorian Auditor-general exemplifies, over the period of the 
National Competition Policy legislation reviews were the most controversial element.  
Throughout the National Competition Council tranche payment assessments there is a 
continuing complaint about the standard of reviews undertaken by the States, Territories 
and Commonwealth and the lack of implementation of those that were carried out.  As 
recounted in the previous chapter in relation to the National Competition Policy in 
2000, the Governments agreed in Council of Australian Governments to a series of 
measures formulated by ‘senor officers’ to try and address some of these issues.  This 
was cotemporaneous with high levels of somewhat unfocussed agitation in the 
community about the effects of the National Competition Policy and the suspected 
politicisation of reviews revealed by the case study above.  In any event, the upshot of 
the new measures was taken by the National Competition Council to imply: 
 
                                                 
110 Ibid 53. 
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… the need for a rigorous analytical approach whereby reviews consider 
all relevant evidence and logically draw conclusions and 
recommendations from that evidence. Policy actions in line with review 
findings and recommendations based on flawed analysis or incomplete 
evidence may not satisfy the CPA guiding principle.111 
 
The deadline for completion of the reviews had been set at year 2000 in the original 
Competition Principles Agreement, although this was extended in the Council of 
Australian Governments meeting that year to 30 June 2002.  The National Competition 
Council itself gave one year extensions in 2002.  Its 2003 Assessment recommended 
payment reductions and suspensions for failure to complete reviews and reforms.  
However, Governments did carry out many reforms to the National Competition 
Council’s satisfaction.  It issued the following table:112 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 National Competition Council, Assessment of governments’ progress in implementing the National 
Competition Policy and related reform’, 2005, 9.2. 
112 Ibid xviii. 
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 The clear recalcitrant was Western Australia with South Australia and the 
Commonwealth not far ahead.  Accordingly, deductions were made for the former two.  
The Commonwealth Government, not being a recipient of competition payments and 
thus under no real compulsion, was merely told that it was ‘still to appropriately address 
some significant legislative restrictions’.113  New South Wales was given a chance to 
redeem itself from a deduction with regard to rice marketing.  The Northern Territory 
and Queensland were non-compliant with respect to liquor sales. 
 
Structural Reform 
 
The concept of structural reform overlaps competitive neutrality and legislation reviews.  
In the National Competition Policy, competitive neutrality was aimed at ensuring that 
government businesses were not in a favourable position relative to private sector 
counterparts; legislation reviews were aimed at ensuring that competition was deployed 
as much as possible as a tool for getting things done as cheaply and efficiently as 
possible, and structural reform was about changing the structure of markets114 where 
goods or services were supplied by a public115 monopoly. Putting it another way, under 
structural reform as much competition as possible was to be introduced – a legislation 
                                                 
113 Ibid xxxvii 
114 The Hilmer Committee analysed the introduction of competition into two parts: the separation of 
natural monopoly and potentially competitive activities (vertical separation), and the horizontal separation 
of potentially competitive activities: Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred 
Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, National Competition Policy 1993, 217-220. 
115 As noted earlier, the National Competition Policy was directed at public monopolies.  The Hilmer 
Committee explicitly rejected a general divestiture power for public monopolies (Ibid 233-4) let alone a 
power to disaggregate private monopolies such as under called the Enterprise Act 2002. In Chapter 1 of 
Part 4 it provides for ‘market investigations’.  The Fair Trading Commission can make a reference to the 
Competition Commission if it thinks there are monopoly problems in a market.  The Minister can 
intervene if he or she thinks there are public interest concerns.  If there are such problems or concerns, the 
Competition Commission can make a variety of remedial orders, including disaggregation of the business. 
Appeal is limited.  This echoes the powers available to the US Supreme Court under the Sherman Act – 
deployed notoriously to disaggregate AT&T (‘Ma Bell’) into the Regional Bell Operating Companies (the 
‘Baby Bells’), although the break-up was infact a consent decree resulting from the antitrust case United 
States v AT&T 552 F.Supp. 131 (DDC 1982). 
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review – and industry regulation was to be isolated from the exercise of the monopoly 
power, which was explicitly conceived of as a matter of competitive neutrality. 116   
 
While structural reform was a separate and explicit part of the National Competition 
Policy by virtue of being required by clause 4 of the Competition Principle Agreement, 
the Implementation Agreement made Competition Payments conditional not only on the 
States and Territories giving effect to the ‘Competition Policy Intergovernmental 
Agreements’ but also effective implementation of intergovernmental agreements as to 
electricity, gas, water and road transport.117  This is the fuzzy edge of the definition of 
National Competition Policy as adopted in this thesis: electricity, gas, water and road 
transport are notionally only half in the National Competition Policy.  However, the 
assessments at the end of the National Competition Policy tell a different story.   
 
The Productivity Commission’s 2005 Assessment distinguishes between general and 
sector-specific reforms, both being aspects of the National Competition Policy.  Yet the 
chief illustrations of benefit are electricity charges, rail freight rates, port charges, 
telecommunications charges and milk prices.  Its quantitative modelling, from which the 
much-vaunted figure of a 2.5% increase in Australia’s Gross Domestic Product due to 
the National Competition Policy was derived, was based on just six industries: 
electricity, gas, urban water, urban transport, ports and rail freight and 
telecommunications.118  All but urban transport and ports were the subject of the 
additional intergovernmental agreements.  It could thus be argued that the ancillary 
matters came to dominate perceptions of what the National Competition Policy was 
                                                 
116 Competition Principles Agreement, clause 4 (2):  ‘Before a Party introduces competition to a sector 
traditionally supplied by a public monopoly, it will remove from the public monopoly any responsibilities 
for industry regulation.  The Party will re-locate industry regulation functions so as to prevent the former 
monopolist enjoying a regulatory advantage over its (existing and potential) rivals.’ 
117 Road transport:  the 1992 between Australian Transport Ministers to improve efficiency and safety, 
and reduce the costs of regulation; Electricity: the 1993 agreement between the Australian, New South 
Wales, Victorian, Queensland, South Australian and ACT Governments to form a competitive interstate 
electricity market; Gas: the 1994 Council of Australian Governments agreement to provide for free and 
fair trade in gas between and within the States and Territories; and water: the 1994 Council of Australian 
Governments agreement to implement a framework for the efficient and sustainable reform of the 
Australian water industry. 
118 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, 47-52 
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about.  Ironically, as described earlier, it was these very sectors where reform 
methodologies and proposals were already most developed in 1995.  The National 
Competition Policy thus in this respect merely facilitated the reform and mitigated the 
impediments arising from of Australia’s federal structure, both in terms of jurisdictional 
sovereignty and the federal-state vertical fiscal imbalance.   
 
To the extent that structural reform pre-existed the National Competition Policy, it of 
constitutional necessity respected the jurisdiction of the States and, to a lesser extent, 
the Territories.  In the Competition Principles Agreement the sovereignty of the Parties 
is strongly reasserted in the opening subclause, 4(1): ‘Each party is free to determine its 
own agenda for the reform of public monopolies’, although this was subject to the 
Implementation Agreement which set out a timetable as to electricity and gas industry 
reform, and in the Attachment to the Agreement referred to progress in water and road 
transport. Despite this, progress in structural reform was closely monitored by the 
National Competition Council and this was factored into Competition Payments.  It is 
difficult to assess the extent to which States and Territories objected to this, although it 
is noticeable how structural reform in assessments is conflated with competitive 
neutrality, especially in respect of corporatisation, and with legislation reviews.  Both of 
these had, as has been described, the requirement of a statement and this was something 
to which the Parties would be held.  Parties were not required to lodge a statement with 
respect to structural reform.   
 
The process of structural reform as set out in the Competition Principles Agreement was 
simply that Parties were to conduct a review when it proposed to introduce competition 
into a market traditionally supplied by a public monopoly or privatise a public 
monopoly.  That review was to inquire into: 
 its appropriate commercial objectives, 
 the merits of separating any natural monopoly elements from potentially 
competitive elements, 
 the merits of separating potentially competitive elements from each other, 
 the most effective means of separating regulatory functions from its commercial 
functions, 
 the most effective means of implementing competitive neutrality principles, 
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 the merits of any community service obligations and the best means of 
delivering any mandated ones, 
 the price and service regulations to be applied to the industry, and 
 the appropriate financial relationships between the owners of the public 
monopoly and the public monopoly itself, including the rate of return targets, 
dividends to be paid, and capital structure. 
As mentioned above, no more than a review was required by the Competition Principles 
Agreement.  However, there were other intergovernmental agreements in respect of each 
of the electricity, gas, water and road transport industries.  The extent to which these 
were carried out was measured by the National Competition Council in assessing 
progress of Governments for the purpose of Competition Payments.   
 
Thus structural reform was seen to be about corporatisation as a matter of coherent 
objectives and financial structure, competitive neutrality while maintaining community 
service, introducing or maintaining competition where structural reform made it 
feasible, and maintaining price and service regulation while separating them from 
commerce interests.  It was a complex task to change from the state of the industry 
before structural reform to one which reflected these ideas and thus resulted in huge 
amounts of activity.  It also has taken a great deal of regulation, in both legislation and 
regulations to maintain these goals.119  The electricity industry provides a useful 
example.  It is a story that has often been told,120 although seldom from the point of 
view of governmental actions.   
 
The structure of the electricity industry is usually taken to have always already been, 
before structural reform, one of a monopoly, state-owned utility providing electricity to 
all customers in each State or Territory.  This is far from the case, as there were a 
number of private generators selling electricity into the grid and municipal authorities 
                                                 
119 This is a point made repeatedly in Christopher Arup and David Wishart (eds) Competition Policy with 
Legal Form: Reviewing Australian and Overseas Experience (Federation, 2002).  Indeed, it is the pun in 
the title. 
120 A particularly useful, if early, analysis is the Australian Parliamentary Library Research paper: Mike 
Roarty, Electricity Industry Restructuring: The State of Play, Research Paper No 14, Parliamentary 
Research Service, Department of Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 1998. 
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buying or generating electricity to sell into a municipality.121  However, as a 
generalisation by the 1980s the vast proportion of electricity was generated and supplied 
in Australia by monopoly state-owned utilities structured under specific legislation as 
government instrumentalities.  The structure of these instrumentalities was simple: 
enabling legislation and regulation.   
 
After reports and the usual paraphernalia of policy development, structural reform of the 
electricity industry took the form of 
 the formation of a number of companies;  
 the sale of generation, transmission, wholesaling and retailing businesses to the 
companies;  
 the onsale of those companies into the capital markets; 
 the removal of anticompetitive regulation so as to permit choice of supplier; 
 the review of regulation and legislation to remove discriminatory barriers to 
trade and to allow for new entrants into the generation industry; 
 the establishment of or conferral of power on regulators of  
o supply,  
o safety,  
o emergency management,  
o fair trading, 
o pro-competitive regulation,   
o sustainability and energy efficiency, and  
o essential service maintenance; 
                                                 
121 For example, there were a multitude of separate companies selling electricity with varying voltage, 
phase or current, and tariffs in Melbourne until after the advent of the State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria in 1921.  There were eleven municipal authorities reselling electricity until as late as the 1990s.  
See Cecil Edwards, Brown Power: A Jubilee History of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria 
(State Electricity Commission, 1969). The advent of public ownership of a variety of common services  in 
Victoria was controversial, being seen as a form of socialism; see F. W. Eggleston, State Socialism in 
Victoria (King, 1932) . 
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 the establishment122 of a national electricity wholesale market for Queensland, 
New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia, which involved 
setting up 
o the operator, together with all the necessary assets and personnel, 
o a transition institution, 
o a regulator, and 
o a rule-maker. 
 
The result is an industry comprising many privately owned competing generators, 
although in Western Australia and the Northern Territory there are corporatised entities 
owned by the Government and many remote locations have separate vertically 
integrated systems.  The regime of generation in most places is open access, on 
condition of meeting technical supply conditions.  There is a national wholesale 
electricity market, operated by a company (National Electricity Market Management 
Company Limited) and an administrating company (National Electricity Code 
Administrator Limited).  On this market the generators sell electricity into a pool.  
Wholesalers purchase electricity from the pool or on an associated ‘spot market’.  
Wholesalers may then onsell electricity to retailers or retail it themselves.   All 
electricity is transmitted over networks owned by monopolies which are themselves 
regulated as to the prices they charge.   
 
Whether this vast amount of activity resulted in decreased prices, better services or both 
is moot.  It is this that the Productivity Commission measured and claimed did represent 
a change for the better, although most of the benefit was garnered by business. (It is 
worth noting parenthetically that economic efficiency pays no regard as to whether 
consumers or producers receive the benefits, all that matters is that the surplus is 
maximised in sum.)  Certainly governments received large sums of money from the sale 
of generators, transmitters and retailers.  This was at the expense of future payments 
from those businesses and, while accordingly cannot be claimed to be a benefit, did 
substantially reduce government debt.  On the other hand, in 2005 the Productivity 
Commission itself noted multiple regulators, a lack of investment in transmission 
between established grids, insufficient competition between generators, and inflexible 
                                                 
122 This was through cooperative legislation adopted in the various States and Territories: National 
Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA). 
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retail contracts.  Moreover assessments tend to ignore the role of transmission.  This 
remained in the form of a monopoly.  Transmission represents more than 50% of the 
cost to customers of electricity and thus reform under the National Competition Policy 
seems to have been less than comprehensive of the industry.   
 
In contrast to the relatively smooth transition of the electricity industry to contestability, 
the path to competition in the telecommunications industry has been rocky, contested 
and inconclusive.  This is, no doubt largely due to the rapid technological change that 
occurred during the currency of the National Competition Policy.  After all, mobile 
phones were in their infancy in 1995 yet by 2005 were ubiquitous.  Another eight years 
on, at the time of writing, they are connected as a matter of course to the Internet.  Yet 
much of the problematic nature of the discussion of competition policy’s effectiveness 
can be seen through the lens of Telstra’s trajectory during this time.  In particular, 
telecommunications (strictly, ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services’) 
under the s 51 (v) of the Australian Constitution is the province of the Commonwealth 
and hence the National Competition Council had no power to influence implementation 
through the competition payments system.  
 
Prior to 1991, Telstra had been a fully vertically integrated monopoly provider of 
telephone services, introducing mobile services in 1981.123 Between 1989 and 1993, the 
structure of Telecom changed from a statutory authority to a public limited company, 
although then owned by the Commonwealth Government.  It changed its business name 
to Telstra in 1997.  Notwithstanding the determinedly non-committal approach of the 
National Competition Policy to ownership of businesses, the Government sold tranches 
of ownership of Telstra in 1997 (33%), 1999 (16.6%) and 2006 (31%), with the 
remaining 17% transferred to the Future Fund in 2007.   
 
Industry restructuring occurred in 1997 with the passing of the Telecommunications Act 
1997 (Cth.).  No formal review pursuant to clause 4 of the Implementation Agreement 
                                                 
123 Indeed prior to 1975 and since 1901, both postal and telecommunications services were provided by 
the Postmaster-General’s Department.  In 1946 telecommunications with the rest of the world was hived 
off to the Overseas Telecommunications Commission, to be reunited with Telecom in 1991.  In 1975 two 
statutory authorities were set up, the Australian Postal Commission for postal services and the Australian 
Communications Commission for telephone services, the latter trading as Telecom Australia.   
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was undertaken, although the Commonwealth maintained that a series of reviews 
sufficiently answered the requirement.  The Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth.) 
provided for competition between providers, regulation of that competition under Part 
XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), and access to the local fixed network by 
providers under Part XIC of the same Act.  Both of these were (and are) administered 
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Technical regulation was 
placed in the hands of the Australian Communications Authority. The fixed network 
remained in Telstra’s hands.   
 
Some of the National Competition Council’s strongest criticism was reserved for the 
Commonwealth’s approach to the structural separation of Telstra.  In 1999 it reported 
that the partial privatisation of Telstra should not have taken place before at least 
examination of whether the monopoly should be structurally separated into network and 
retail arms.124  The Government’s response was that regulation through the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 served the competition just as well.   After privatisation structural 
separation would have been difficult due to shares having been sold in the unified 
business.  However, even to simply allow access was difficult as the question of price 
dogged regulation.  In 1999 the National Competition Council commissioned an 
independent report from Tasman Asia Pacific to consider just the record-keeping 
necessary for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to do its job as 
regulator. 
 
That the Government was sensitive on the issue of structural separation is demonstrated 
by the fact that it withheld consideration of structural separation from its terms of 
reference for the Productivity Commission review into telecommunications regulation 
in 2000.  Under sustained pressure from the National Competition Council the 
Government conceded an operational separation in 2005 yet even this was insufficient 
for the National Competition Council.  In its 2005 Assessment the National Competition 
Council concluded that the Australian Government was in breach of its Implementation 
Agreement obligations.  However, this was no more than embarrassing because for the 
Commonwealth Government there was no penalty. 
 
                                                 
124 National Competition Commission, Second Tranche Assessment of Governments’ Progress with 
Implementing National Competition Policy and Related Reforms. Vol 1: Assessment 1999, 338 
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The irony in this concern as to structural separation is that technological development 
left the matter for reconsideration de novo.  Both mobile telephony and broadband has 
left the copper network owned by Telstra redundant.  Satellite communications further 
erodes the monopoly.   
 
Reform of the water industry also commenced well before the advent of the National 
Competition Policy.125  Indeed it was a matter of sufficient importance to be the subject 
of provision in the Australian Constitution, reflecting the shortage of water in the 
continent and the problems of allocation and governance in a federation.  In the 1980s a 
variety of matters made reform a pressing issue. These included excessive and 
inappropriate use in both urban and rural situations, difficulties in constructing new 
dams, aging and degrading infrastructure, and salinity and other environmental damage.  
In the same meeting as its adoption of the Hilmer Committee Report, the Council of 
Australian Governments also and separately agreed to a ‘strategic framework’ for the 
reform of the industry.126 
 
The strategic framework was described in these terms: 
 
The framework embraces pricing reform based on the principles of 
consumption-based pricing and full-cost recovery, the reduction or 
elimination of cross-subsidies and making subsidies transparent. The 
framework also involves the clarification of property rights, the 
allocation of water to the environment, the adoption of trading 
arrangements in water, institutional reform and public consultation and 
participation.127 
 
It was envisaged to be completed within 5 to 7 years with a Working Group on Water 
Resource Policy reporting annually. 
                                                 
125 See generally, National Water Commission, Water markets in Australia: a short history 
 (NWC, 2011) available at <http://www.nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/18958/Water-markets-
in-Australia-a-short-history.pdf> (last accessed 27 August 2013). 
126 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 25 February 1994, Communique. 
127 Ibid. 
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By 2005, some eleven years after the decision by the Council of Australian 
Governments, the National Competition Council praised governments for ‘making 
progress’ on their water reform obligations.128  It had proved much more difficult than 
envisaged.  These difficulties were due to the complexity of what was required, the 
diversity of administrative and legislative environments across jurisdictions, differences 
in the actual river systems, particularly in their health, and the different interests of 
stakeholder interests.129 
 
The particular activities included, in respect of urban areas,  
 consumption based usage charges, and 
 corporatisation, and sometimes privatisation or contracting-out of urban water 
authorities. 
For rural areas the changes included: 
 the separation of water entitlements from land title, and movement towards 
water rights trading, 
 institutional reforms to regulatory bodies, 
 new economic and environmental appraisal arrangements, and 
 administrative reforms in relation to irrigation water delivery.130 
 
Resistance grew to the implementation of many of these changes from about 1998.131  
The National Competition Council responded by emphasising the importance of 
ecological and social concerns in the reform process, asserting that the framework of 
change for the water industry did not arise out of legislation reviews, where competition 
had primacy.  Rather it arose out of a mix of social policies in which efficiency and 
hence competition had but a part.132  This rendered water’s place in the National 
                                                 
128 National Competition Commission, Second Tranche Assessment of Governments’ Progress with 
Implementing National Competition Policy and Related Reforms 2005, xvi. 
129 Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, 27. 
130 See generally Kate Stoeckel, Romany Webb, Luke Woodward, Amy Hankinson, Australian Water 
Law, (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) Chapters 5,6 & 7. 
131 This is discussed in Chapter 8. 
132 National Competition Council Annual Report 2001-2, 2001, 1 
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Competition Policy somewhat equivocal as it was treated under a differing conceptual 
framework.  
 
At the end of the National Competition Policy, water reform was the subject of further 
activity in order to achieve more.  In 2004 a new National Water Initiative was initiated 
in the Council of Australian Governments.133  This was maintained through the change 
in Government: in 2009 the Council of Australian Governments agreed to ‘redouble its 
efforts to accelerate the pace of reform under the National Water Initiative.134  Slightly 
earlier, the effects of the then drought impelled serious attention to the Murray-Darling 
basin and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. 
 
The gas and road industries were also the subject of reform attention with more and less 
efficacy respectively.  Reform in many other industries could also be brought under the 
heading of structural reform, including rail, ports, airports, various produce marketing 
arrangements, and so forth.  In all the same principles applied: separation of the 
monopoly into the necessarily monopolistic elements (such as transmission wires) and 
introducing competition into the other areas. 
 
Overall, there is no evidence that the National Competition Policy changed any 
government’s approach to structural reform.  What was done may have been changed as 
a result of pressure by the National Competition Council, particularly in relation to 
Western Australia’s marketing boards.  The National Competition Council did not have 
a great degree of influence of the Commonwealth Government in relation to Telstra, 
which emphasises the degree to which the competition payments did provide an 
incentive to do as the National Competition Council interpreted government’s 
obligations.   On the other hand, the National Competition Policy removed impediments 
to structural reform resulting from Australia’s federal structure, allowing for 
recompense for loss of revenue streams and the negotiation under a mutually acceptable 
discursive framework of difficult issues over interstate trade, especially in electricity, 
gas and water. 
 
                                                 
133 See <http://nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/24749/Intergovernmental-Agreement-on-a-
national-water-initiative.pdf> (last accessed 27 August 2013). 
134 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Meeting 7 December 2009, Communique. 
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Conclusion: Adding complexity to the story 
 
When the details of what was done to actually implement the elements of the National 
Competition Policy, the story does not markedly change, although emphases within it 
alter.  The story becomes more focussed on what the States and Territories (and the 
Commonwealth as an implementing government) did.  The Productivity Commission 
2005 Assessment becomes even more unrealistic than is revealed in its own terms. The 
national agenda is subordinated to State and Territory interests. The only evidence of 
achievement that can be provided in the end is in respect of structural reforms which 
were not envisaged as part of the process in the first place. Whether or not competition 
was enhanced any more than would have otherwise happened is to be doubted.   
 
These conclusions, considered element by element, are perhaps overstated with respect 
to competition law, prices oversight and access.  However, these were the immediate 
matters for implementation once the Agreements had been signed and overall did not 
require much more than the States would have done anyway.  The coverage of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was an obvious issue and the solution carefully 
preserved State sovereignty.  Prices oversight was in some ways simply a retreat from 
price control and moreover the design of the relevant provisions in the Competition 
Principles Agreement ensured that restraint on what States and Territories might 
otherwise do was minimal.  The access regime preserved State and Territory regimes 
and only applied to facilities of national significance. 
 
The provisions in the Competition Principles Agreement as to competitive neutrality, 
legislation and structural reform demanded more, yet careful examination reveals that 
the judgement of implementing governments’ actions was measured only by what they 
agreed to do in the first place.  Thus the National Competition Policy’s characteristic as 
a solution to some federal finance issues in permitting States to do what they wanted to 
do constrained competition policy, no matter the railing of the National Competition 
Council.  Even if the Agreements are seen (cynically) as a solution to the thorny 
problem of voter backlash against the imposition of economic rationalism, the National 
Competition Council failed to persuade and, as will be seen in the next Chapter, 
disturbing problems within the Australian polity arose as a result. 
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Most of the problems that arose in implementation were predictable (and predicted – see 
Chapters 1 and 3) and arose from a necessary lack of full articulation of what was 
required by the Agreements. Were they to have been fully articulated, there would not 
have been agreement; the rhetorical appeal of the Hilmer Report would have been lost.  
These issues included the lack of distinction between business and government, a failure 
to agree on the form of community service obligations (which is much the same thing), 
overreach by institutions set up in accordance with the Agreements to do certain 
particular things, a failure to apply the same mentality of institutional self-interest as 
underlay the federal arrangements set up in the Agreements to the place of local 
government, and the impossibility of measuring public interest against net benefits of 
competition.  Given these conceptual and practical problems, competition did not take 
the metaregulatory place envisaged for it (at least by the Productivity Commission and 
the National Competition Council): it was relegated to merely another policy amongst 
many.  Even so, when it came up against a more complex issue in the form of water 
reform, it can only be said to have failed. 
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Chapter 7 
Responses and Defences 
 
 
This Chapter deals with reactions to the National Competition Policy and the responses 
those reactions elicited.  Much of this has been referred to already, sometimes 
inferentially and at other times substantially, especially in the stories already set out in 
Chapters 3-6.  There, however, the responses are part of the context for a description of 
the implementation of the National Competition Policy.  Here they are the focus, 
broadening out the thick description to a more complete and, as it turns out, even more 
complex picture.   
 
In an open society, there are many traces of discussion and critique. In the absence of 
the resources of a National Security Agency or the algorithms of Google, proxies have 
been chosen.  These are the reports of and submissions to a selection of inquiries into 
the National Competition Policy,1 the Hansards of the select Parliaments between 1 
July 1993 and 31 December 2006,2 and articles in major Australian newspapers between 
the same dates and accessed through Factiva.3  
                                                 
1 Most particularly: Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration, 
Commonwealth House of Representatives, Cultivating Competition  Report of the Inquiry into Aspects of 
the National Competition Policy Reform Package, 1997; Socio-Economic Consequences of the National 
Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000. 
2 Commonwealth Parliamentary debates were searched between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2005 
using the terms ‘competition policy’ although the search was somewhat broadened by serendipity and 
next-to observation (i.e., accident). The numbers of hits was not able to be recorded due to the nature of 
the databases and the informal textual approach, although impressionistically there seemed to be the same 
sort of distribution as revealed by the Factiva search (see below n. 3) apart from in relation to the 1995 
debate over the Competition Policy Reform Bill.  State and Territory Parliamentary debates were not 
rigorously searched, mainly because little there added to the Commonwealth debates. However, recourse 
was frequently made to confirm the representation in Commonwealth Parliament (particularly the Senate) 
of debates occurring within the States and Territories. 
3Factiva, owned by Dow Jones & Company, provides a free text search service of various information 
sources (‘free’ here refers to the text, not cost).  In the instant research the text ‘competition policy’ was 
searched for in major Australian newspapers with a total of 7453 hits in December 2013.  The figures for 
each year are as follows: 1993 (six months only), 109; 1994, 304; 1995, 319; 1996, 501; 1997, 529; 1998, 
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Parliamentary and other government inquiries are obvious possible sites of critical 
examination, because they are normally set up as a result of aired concerns.  Those who 
made submissions to them had a clear purpose to intervene in the conversation about the 
competition policy. Most of this material has, as stated above, already been considered 
in previous Chapters and is merely summarised here.  The second resource, Hansard, is 
useful and representative because not only do politicians represent the people and have 
an incentive to state what concerns them but also because it is the official channel for 
institutional reply to critique.  This is, of course, subject to politics: the need for party 
discipline and sometime bi-partisanship, both of which obtain in this context.  Finally, 
articles in newspapers record societal concerns because it is their expressed duty and in 
their financial interest to do so. To the extent that it has not already been discussed, each 
of these sources will now be considered, followed by an attempt at a chronological 
account of the winds of critique and their effect on the trajectory of the National 
Competition Policy.   
 
Two theoretical concerns arise at this point.  First, to say there is a response to 
something clearly involves a cause/effect relation.   That A causes B is possible, but that 
it does so should not be assumed. Simple coincidence is always possible.  Without 
descending to scientism, the discussion here is sensitive to this possibility.  
 
Second, the speeches, articles, essays and so forth commonly have surprisingly obvious 
themes.  Individual matters and issues receive concentrated treatment. It may well be 
that the distinguishability of these themes in, say, newspapers is simply due to the 
nature of journalism in that just one point is made per article, although that would not 
apply to submissions and speeches.  Moreover, the distinguishable issues are not 
unrelated.  As is evident in preceding chapters, actions undertaken under competition 
policy can be talked of under more than one label.  However, the articles found in the 
print media are usually explicit in terms of which of the categories they each fall and 
politicians tended to run from a party-based agreed script.  Given the consequent 
thematic structuration observable in the data, the following sections consider themes 
                                                                                                                                               
793; 1999, 769; 2000, 526; 2001, 1071; 2002, 491; 2003, 480; 2004, 607; 2005, 515; 2006, 439.   Thus 
there is a rise to a peak in 2001 (with a break in 2000) and then a plateau at about half the 2001 figure.   
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separately (with some elision when appropriate), first explaining them, then detailing 
where and when their expression can be found.4   
 
Reports from Inquiries and Government responses 
 
Elements of the National Competition Policy were the subject of numerous inquiries, 
both Parliamentary and otherwise, by reference and as an aspect of an inquiry otherwise 
directed.  They and their consequences are considered where appropriate in the Chapter 
6.   
 
Three inquiries deserve detailed consideration here because they responded to the 
National Competition Policy itself.  For each, the important issues for this chapter’s 
story are what it said about the National Competition Policy, and what the response 
was. 
 
Senate Economics Committee, 1995 
 
The first report dealing with the National Competition Policy as a package was that of 
the Senate Economics Legislation Committee.  Technically, the matter referred to the 
Economics Legislation Committee was the Competition Policy Reform Bill 1995, it 
being referred on 11 May 1995,5 rather than either the Agreements or competition policy 
generally.  Nevertheless, many of the issues raised before the Committee were about 
competition policy generally and were taken to be relevant to the Bill.  The Government 
response, included in the Report,6 pointed this out, even deployed it as a defence, 
although it did not confine itself to commenting only in relation to the Bill.   
 
                                                 
4 To the student of Karl Popper or even of Hume, this smacks of theory contingency.  Yet the apple falls 
where it may or, to change the metaphor to a more direct anti-post-modernistic stance, how else would we 
stumble across lost cities?  See Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (tr. Steven F. Randall) 
,University of California Press, 1984, 61. 
5 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 May 1995, 346 (Senator Foreman). 
6 Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Report on the Consideration of the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill 1995, 1995, 19. 
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Just twenty-eight submissions were received, although the Committee referred to 130 
submissions to the Hilmer inquiry and 60 substantive submissions received in respect of 
the draft exposure Bill, and two days of public consultation.  This constituted ‘extensive 
public consultation’. The majority Report noted that the 60 ‘substantive’ submissions in 
respect of the draft exposure Bill ‘for the most part expressed broad community 
agreement’.7   
 
The form of the (mercifully short) Report is to summarise the Bill’s history and 
proposed effect.  It then summarises the issues raised in relation to it and provides a 
‘government response to the issues raised at the hearing’.  The majority of the 
Committee concluded that the Bill be supported but that ‘the respective governments 
involved take note of the specific issues raised in evidence to the Committee’.8  It 
highlighted in particular concerns as to the impact on small business of the competition 
code (implicitly referring mostly to s 46 of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), now 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth.)).9 There were two minority reports, from 
Senators Dee Margetts and Sid Spindler from the Green and Democrats respectively.  
The Report, then, provides a useful snapshot of debate at the inception of the National 
Competition Policy.   
 
Tolstoy starts Anna Karenina with, ‘All happy families are alike; each unhappy family 
is unhappy in its own way.’  Thus, in describing this inquiry, support for the Bill (and 
that of the others to follow) – or for the National Competition Policy or competition 
policy generally – is a given: it is simply a restatement of its rationale which varies little 
and is dealt with elsewhere in this thesis; rather, the point here is what the ‘issues’, or 
critiques or disagreements were and what the response of the government was.  
 
There were three general issues noted by the Committee. The first was about what was 
to be subject to competition policy: that it was, in the quoted words of Dr Richard Copp 
of the Queensland University of Technology, ‘being extended to a whole range of 
bodies and organisations which have never in the past been thought of as being subject 
                                                 
7 Ibid 1. 
8 Ibid 6. 
9 Ibid 6. 
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to competitive legislation’.10 This was a matter of the definition of ‘business’ in the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.) as it was to be after amendment. The concern was that 
the Act would be too vague in its distinction between what the proper role of 
government was and what not.  This in turn would leave the matter to courts and, when 
the Act was found to cover bodies and organisations dealing with vulnerable sectors of 
the community excessive and burdensome regulation would result.  This was put in 
concrete terms by Senator Sid Spindler in his dissent: 
 
This section [Clause 75 of the Bill inserting the proposed section 2C of 
the Act] may need to be amended to further clarify what is and what is 
not ‘business’ to ensure that core services such as health, education, 
welfare, employment and environmental protection programs are clearly 
excluded. 
 
The same issue was raised before the Committee by the Australian Conservation 
Foundation.  It considered that private companies should not make management and 
policy decisions, such as those made by utilities, that impact on the natural 
environment. 
 
The Government replied11 in the first place by saying that to define what is the 
government’s role and what is that of business was simply too difficult. Instead it had 
decided to exclude certain defined activities but not education or health because there 
were circumstances where they should be covered.  Authorisation or legislative 
exemption procedures were available.  Besides, said the Government, it is not as if it is 
difficult to comply.  This expression of the issue conflates competition law and 
competition policy.  The concern was about there being a core of something which 
governments did and which should be outside the purview of competition.  The 
government reply addressed only the Bill and hence only the operation of competition 
law.   
 
                                                 
10 Quoted, Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Report on the Consideration of the Competition 
Policy Reform Bill 1995, 1995, 3.   
11 Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Report on the Consideration of the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill 1995, 1995, 19-20. 
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The second issue raised before the Committee was about competition policy.  It was 
about ‘the impact of competition policy, and associated moves towards corporatisation, 
privatisation, outsourcing, and breakup of government business enterprises, on the 
overall process of technological development in Australia and the education of future 
generations of professional people.’12  It was raised by the Institute of Engineers.  It was 
also raised by the concern of the Australian Conservation Foundation, as set out above.  
The Government reply did not directly address it in either form.  It responded as if the 
issue were a critique of privatisation.  In that response it averred that the Agreements 
established processes of change and provision had been made for all relevant public 
interest matters to be taken into account.13  This is the ‘weave’ defence, under which 
responsibility for what happens is evaded by reference to process.  Indeed, the reply 
suggests that the process imposes on governments a requirement to consider all relevant 
public interest criteria when before they had no such discipline.14  In other words 
Parliamentary democracy represented by responsibility for protection of particular 
interests of the public was to be subordinate to the procedure as set out in the 
Agreements.  Accordingly the Government, according to itself, could not be criticised 
for failure to protect any nominated public interest. 
 
The last general issue noted by the Committee was put by the Communications Law 
Centre.  This was, as the Committee summarised it,  ‘that current discussion on 
competition policy reform concentrated too much on the supply side of the economic 
equation (that is, that efficiency and economic gains are the primary goals) and that 
insufficient attention was being paid to the demand side of the equation (issues such as 
access, equity, pricing, quality, standards and privacy).’15  The government responded 
by referring to the insertion of ‘enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading and provisions for consumer protection’ as an 
object of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.) as acknowledging that competition ‘is not 
                                                 
12 Ibid 3. 
13 Ibid 19. 
14 Ibid 19. 
15 Ibid 4. 
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an end in itself, but rather a means of delivering benefits to society’.16  This is 
somewhat specious as the critique was clearly directed at more than the competitive 
conduct rules.   
 
Other issues noted were deemed ‘specific’ and most were: as to access to a rail system 
for coal haulage and to the gas industry facilities, the application of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth.) to employer associations compared to an exemption for professional 
associations, the application of competitive neutrality rules as compared to the 
applications of competitive conduct rules to not for profit businesses, and the drafting of 
s 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.).  Deemed ‘specific’ but which later became 
controversial and which indeed were responded to by the government were 
representation on the National Competition Council and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission of certain groups, and also the inclusion of local government in 
the processes of the National Competition Policy. The latter was also a concern of 
Senators Dee Margetts and Sid Spindler.  Senator Spindler was also concerned about 
the representative nature of the National Competition Council and the operation of the 
access regime.  The Government did not alter its stance or the Bill in relation to any of 
these. The Government did accept some suggestions made during consultation, 
including the abolition of s 49 as to price discrimination.  Further, it responded to 
discussion of the applicability of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to statutory 
marketing authorities by stating that where there is legislative backing for their 
activities, the competitive conduct rules will not apply but that legislation reviews may 
curtail them. 
 
Overall, the there was little impact of critique on the proposals of the government.  
Some matters which were to become controversial became apparent, but equally the 
government began to establish its defences to critique especially in the form of the 
‘weave’.  Most cogently, critique based on social theory of the rationale for the Bill and 
for competition policy generally was blocked, in this case by narrowing the frame of the 
discussion to the Bill.   
 
                                                 
16 Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Report on the Consideration of the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill 1995, 1995, 21. 
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House of Representatives Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and 
Public Administration 1997 
 
The second report responding to the National Competition Policy itself is the report of 
an inquiry by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Banking, Finance 
and Public Administration.17  The tenor of the Report can be taken from the following 
three quotes from the Chairman’s (David Hawker) Foreword:18 
 
The significant potential benefits arising from competition reform have 
been recognised by all levels of government and all major political 
parties. Implementing competition policy will impact across the whole 
economy and right across the community. 
… 
Lack of competition in the delivery of services in the public sector has 
been shown to add a significant cost for those services. National 
competition policy seeks to improve this by opening appropriate areas of 
the public sector to a competitive environment. 
… 
… the Committee was able to reach unanimous conclusions and 
recommendations in this report. These reflect the view of all major 
parties on the need to emphasise and promote competition as a strategy 
for making our public sector more efficient and effective. 
 
                                                 
17 The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Banking, Finance and Administration into 
National Competition Policy was provided with a reference to inquire into National Competition Policy in 
June 1995. The report of the inquiry was issued by its successor, the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration in Cultivating 
Competition 1997.  The election in 1996 and the consequent change in Government resulted in a change 
in the committee structure of the House and also meant that the terms of reference had to be reissued.  
They remained the same to all intents and purposes, which is strong evidence of the bipartisanship of the 
National Competition Policy. 
18 Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration, Commonwealth House of 
Representatives, Cultivating Competition. Report of the Inquiry into Aspects of the National Competition 
Policy Reform Package, 1997, vii. 
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Clearly this was not a critical inquiry; that can also be taken from both sets of Terms of 
Reference which enjoined the investigation of the means of application of the public 
interest test as provided in the Competition Principles Agreement, ‘the impact of 
competition policy on the efficient delivery of services, including an assessment of (a) 
existing government policies relating to community service obligations; and (b) options 
for the delivery and funding of these services; and, finally, ‘the implications of 
competition policy for the efficient delivery of services by local government’.19  Thus 
the question that the inquiry faced was not whether the National Competition Policy 
was Good or Bad, or even that any element, including structural change or legislation 
review was so, rather it was how to effect these changes.   
 
Nevertheless, the matters examined were the keys to the distribution of power between 
the implementing governments and the National Competition Council as assessor of 
compliance with the Agreements.  The public interest test, the nature of community 
service obligations and the degree to which State and Territory governments imposed 
competition policy on local government defined the latitude of freedom from 
competition principles whilst still having a claim on competition payments.  The 
question that the inquiry provokes, then, is whether there was an examination of the 
ambit of these matters or whether it was simply about making them work within their 
existing terms – a further articulation of the requirements of the Agreements.   
 
Cultivating Competition commences with a conventional recital of the rationale for the 
National Competition Policy, that ‘communities expect their governments to continually 
become more efficient and effective and enhanced competition is one way in which this 
can be achieved’20 and that ‘expected benefits from competition reform for ordinary 
Australians are price reductions, lower inflation, more growth and more jobs.’21 
However, it conceded that ‘[t]here has been no major analysis of the broader socio-
economic costs of the reforms particularly the impact on unemployment, changed 
working conditions, social welfare, equity, social dislocation, environmental impacts as 
                                                 
19 Ibid xiv. 
20 Ibid 1. 
21 Ibid. 
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well as the spatial variations in these.’22  No more is said about this.  It also set out the 
National Competition Policy in terms of ‘a cooperative approach’ in which ‘individual 
governments are responsible for setting their own agendas and timetables for 
implementing the reforms in line with the inter-governmental agreements’.23  Put 
together, these two factors are seen to imply that there might be substantial variation in 
the impact of competition policy across various jurisdictions and locations.  From that 
point the report moves to the position that  
 
Given the scope of the reforms, their potential to substantially impact on 
the lives of all Australians and the relative newness of the policy, it is 
critically important that there is adequate public education and 
consultation about the reforms and their progress. Without this there is 
little guarantee that the reforms are not misrepresented nor 
misunderstood. The reforms will stimulate discussion about the proper 
role of government.24 
 
The rationale for the inquiry was that although ‘there generally has been widespread 
support for the policy … there is dissension’ and some States or Territories were 
experiencing ‘more difficulties than others in implementing some of the reforms 
particularly because of the political downside especially regarding employment 
issues’.25  Dissension leading to political difficulty is seen as needing redress through 
public education.   
 
The Committee thus took upon itself the role of determining what was causing this 
dissension and how it could be reduced in the fields nominated in its terms of reference.  
It also assessed the performance of the National Competition Council and the 
arrangements for National Competition Policy payments, and the National Competition 
                                                 
22 Ibid 2. 
23 Ibid 5. 
24 Ibid 6. 
25 Ibid. 
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Policy as a whole.  It considered the impact of the policy in regional areas to be of 
critical concern.26 
 
In each of the three areas of concern, the Committee did little more than articulate 
procedures and processes.  It sets out the position as at 1997 clearly and in detail.  It 
notes differences between the jurisdictions and advocates uniform approaches in the 
definition of terms, such as ‘community service obligation’.  However, it represents 
another good example of the ‘weave’ defence deployed subsequently by governments.  
The ‘weave’ defence allows for all such matters to be political decisions of 
implementing jurisdictions at the same time as asserting the legitimacy and utility of 
competition policy itself.  Thus, for example, after considerable discussion of the 
various methodologies for funding community service obligations and the issues with 
the various methodologies deployed within the different jurisdiction, it simply 
recommends ‘that the funding arrangements for both existing and new community 
service obligations be transparent and assessed on a case-by-case basis.’27  Or, in 
relation to the definition of ‘significant business activity’ for competitive neutrality 
purposes, it says:  
 
‘Given the diversity of local government in terms of size, location, 
budget, regional employment, etc in different states, variation in the 
definition of significant business activities between jurisdictions is 
inevitable. The Committee supports the inclusion of a broad range of 
matters to define significant business activity rather than relying just on 
monetary thresholds.28 
 
On the critical issue of the impact of the National Competition Policy in rural and 
regional areas, the Committee is similarly anodyne:  
 
Rural communities need to build on some innovative thinking already 
appearing on how to approach opening their businesses to competitive 
                                                 
26 Ibid 8. 
27 Ibid 37. 
28 Ibid 50-1. 
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neutrality while still allowing the council to retain skills and expertise, 
ownership of infrastructure equipment, etc. For example options for 
doing this include phasing in of tendering over time; councils in a region 
specialising and sharing services; etc. This would apply in some 
metropolitan areas as well.29 
 
Given that the Committee stated that it considered the impact of competition policy in 
regional areas to be ‘of critical concern’,30 surprisingly little about it appears later in the 
report.   
 
Bronwen Morgan conducted an intensive study of submissions to the Inquiry into 
Aspect of the National Competition Policy Reform Package.31  Unfortunately for a thick 
study of the social field represented by the National Competition Policy (but, of course, 
not unfortunately for her purposes), Morgan approaches the matter structurally, by 
setting up an analytical model to categorise the submissions in order that her question, 
about the discursive survival of notions of social citizenship in a time of enhanced 
competition policy, might be answered. Her question determines how the submissions 
are observed.  As is later demonstrated, this question is an aspect of the instant study, 
but is just a part of it.  For that part it is immensely useful, but awareness of the 
possibility of other questions should nevertheless subsist.   
 
Morgan’s analysis consists of formulations of the legitimate role of the state and the 
appearance and categorisation of submissions accordingly.  Between market 
infrastructural regulation (represented by public choice economics and a reliance on 
                                                 
29 Ibid 55. 
30 Ibid 5. 
31 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003), 92-111.  There is 
some degree of difficulty in replicating this study as the 8 volume set of 103 submissions referred to by 
Morgan is not available at any public library.  A 5 volume set of 58 submissions is available and was 
obtained for the instant study.  The Report of the Committee, (Standing Committee on Financial 
Institutions and Public Administration, Commonwealth House of Representatives, Cultivating 
Competition. Report of the Inquiry into Aspects of the National Competition Policy Reform Package, 
1997) itself refers to 107 submissions. The 5 volume set contains submissions up to no. 58 as numbered 
by the Committee (at p 73).   
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market theory for rationality in regulation) and social citizenship as the determinant of 
the form of regulation (represented by the rule of law as a constitutional principle), 
Morgan finds ‘variations on tempered forms of market liberalism’.32    These allow for 
non-economic forms of social welfare. The two positions Morgan finds are a 
‘community morality perspective’ and a ‘differentiated consumer sovereignty 
perspective’.33   
 
The community morality perspective is one where ‘key functions such as the promotion 
of community and cohesiveness’ are to be maintained at the same time as ‘forcing and 
supporting market-mimicking strategies’.34  The second, or ‘differentiated consumer 
sovereignty perspective’, ‘reframed the goals of social justice, access and equity typical 
of the welfare state discourses in terms of the new language of competition and 
economic analysis’.35  This reflects strongly a distinction which was taken to be the 
theme of a special edition of Law in Context: Contractualism and Citizenship:36  neo-
liberalism may provide opportunities to self-actualise or it may have an insufficient 
concept of the individual to achieve the ends of government.  In the latter lies critique of 
competition policy, but as a critique of the National Competition Policy the deferral of 
implementation to other parties renders the critique into mere description.  Morgan’s 
categories thus are useful to indicate the proportion of submissions which find that the 
goals of the welfare state may be met within the state as framed by competition policy – 
those with a ‘differentiated consumer sovereignty perspective’, and those where there is 
a least incipient critique.   
 
                                                 
32 Ibid 92. 
33 Ibid 93. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Terry Carney, Gaby Ramia and Anna Yeatman, Contractualism and Citizenship. (Federation 2001).  
See also See Anna Yeatman, ‘Contract, Status and Personhood’  and Judy Cashmore, ‘Children: 
Contractual Non-persons?’ in Glyn Davis, Barbara Sullivan and Anna Yeatman (eds), The New 
Contractualism (1997) 39 and  57 respectively. Yeatman and Cashmore accept that the contract state 
assumes the capacity to choose, but argue that the state, in so doing, empowers persons to act within the 
state, and that a task of the state is to enhance this.   
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Morgan’s analysis leaves untouched the question of whether there was amongst the 
submissions a challenge to or critique of the National Competition Policy and what the 
impact of such a challenge or critique was.  There was at least one such critique 
amongst the published submissions and possibly more amongst those presently 
unavailable. This was a submission by the National Anglican Caring Organisation37 – 
no doubt counted by Morgan as amongst the seven ‘[s]ocial policy lobby groups (aged 
care, aboriginal, education, environmental, consumer, education)’.38  Mostly these, 
according to Morgan, ‘called for the maintenance of key functions such as the 
promotion of community and social cohesion in tandem with supporting and facilitating 
competitiveness’.39 This is to depreciate the claim that was made in the submission.  
This was that ‘unfettered competition is shifting the way in which we relate to each 
other within our community’ and that ‘this shift is a matter for examination – perhaps 
even for our concern, unless community values are reassessed and guidelines put in 
place to express these’. 40  Religion-based values were set out, including dignity and 
equality and that exploitation is wrong, responsibility and caring, and special concern 
for those in need.  The submission stated ‘[t]hese values do not portray a society which 
is “survival of the fittest”’ based on competition.  Then followed a rarely made 
connection between this critique and the National Competition Policy itself: 
 
Our concern with the National Competition Policy rests around this 
point.  It has changed the language of evaluating our national goals.  
Economic achievement alone is measured, and the means of achieving 
that – even though these means may exploit, ignore members of our 
society who are not the achievers, remove the most basic resources if a 
human being cannot pay for them – these means are tacitly approved, 
even seen as necessary.41 
                                                 
37 National Anglican Caring Organisation, Submission No 17 to the Standing Committee on Financial 
Institutions and Public Administration, Commonwealth House of Representatives, Inquiry into Aspects of 
the National Competition Policy Reform Package, 1 September 1995. 
38 Morgan, above n 31, 94 
39 Ibid, 99. 
40 National Anglican Caring Organisation, above n 37, 1. 
41 Ibid, 2 
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It is only after this general opposition that the submission moves to addressing the terms 
of reference of the inquiry by accommodating those principles as best they might within 
the structures of the public interest and community service obligations, with a special 
emphasis on social welfare provision. That structure illustrates two matters:  first, that 
there was a strong critique of competition as such and that it was expressed to the 
various bodies; and, second, that the processes and structure of the National 
Competition Policy, and the terms of inquiries into it channelled such critique into a 
discourse of accommodation within competition policy.  The promotion of community 
and social cohesion was not necessarily, or even in a majority of cases ‘in tandem with’ 
supporting and facilitating competitiveness.  Rather, if anything was to be saved in the 
inevitability of the reforms, this tactic was necessarily expressed. 
 
Hence the perspectives distilled by Morgan accommodate the structure of the National 
Competition Policy as setting out a process for the implementation of competition 
policy. The community morality perspective in its narrow formulation recognised the 
public interest as a matter to be considered as offsetting the advantages of competition.  
But if the goals of justice, access and equity were accommodated within competition, as 
accepted by the ‘differentiated consumer sovereignty perspective’ then the public 
interest had no offsetting advantage and would be ineffective as an inhibiting effect. In 
either case, the matter was for the implementing government and therefore was outside 
the National Competition Policy.   
 
The submissions in general did recommend in relation to the details of how particular 
visions of public benefit, whether within the competitive ideal or not, impacted on the 
agreed procedures for implementation. Thus the more community morality was thought 
to be encompassed within competition, the less the need to consider separately the 
public interest and the greater the need to restrict, confine and tame community service 
obligations.  Morgan found that the adoption of such opinions was not a function of 
whether the contributor came from state, market or civil society actors.  There was a 
surprisingly fragmented picture, according to Morgan.42  Such fragmentation is, 
however, predictable if the contributors are taken to have understood that the National 
Competition Policy was a means to the implementation of certain principles of 
                                                 
42 Morgan, above n. 31, 97 and 108-9.   
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competition policy, thus any resistance or incentive effects demanded a strategy in 
relation to the complexities of procedure.  Such strategies will vary considerably as the 
precise formulations of ‘public interest’ and ‘community service obligation’ satisfy or 
fail to satisfy the object of the contributor. The main areas where they did not vary was 
in relation to the trade-off between competition and the public interest: was the 
competition to be preferred unless the alternative public interest grounds outweighed its 
benefits, as the Hilmer Committee had recommended, or was the weighting to be 
different?  Given that the matter had been agreed by all governments, there seemed little 
doubt. Nevertheless, the Australian Council of Trade Unions argued otherwise,43 just as 
it had its submission to the Hilmer Committee and no doubt elsewhere too.  Church and 
producer groups (mainly rural industries) also argued in favour of a community 
morality perspective. Church groups in particular were able to articulate a rationale for 
community morality and thus to challenge the economic analysis.  However, as Morgan 
points out, they could provide few ‘institutional avenues for implementing [their] 
vision’.44  The point here is that this was the consequence of the submissions being 
about the National Competition Policy, which set out procedures which had already 
formulated the manner in which and degree to which those moralities could be heard.   
 
Morgan’s analysis provides a masterful dissection of the particular forms in which goals 
such as justice, access and equity could be thought of as operating within neo-
liberalism, and this is her aim, but it is of marginal help here. This is because neither of 
the possibilities framed a challenge to the National Competition Policy and neither 
produced a response.  By framing the ‘weave’ defence, Cultivating Competition, the 
report of the inquiry, simply absorbed such critique as existed. As the Committee 
concluded, such dissent as existed could only be irrational and was therefore to be dealt 
with by an injunction, in its final recommendation, ‘that all agencies involved in the 
implementation of national competition policy devote resources to ensure community 
understanding and debate about the contents of the policy and its outcomes.’45 
 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid 110. 
45 The Report of the Committee, (Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public 
Administration, Commonwealth House of Representatives, Cultivating Competition. Report of the 
Inquiry into Aspects of the National Competition Policy Reform Package, 1997), xix. 
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What Price Competition?  
 
Contracting out of government services had been a practice for some time prior to the 
Hilmer Committee’s adumbrations; indeed, it has always been a part of the way the 
state conducts itself.  The earliest forms of corporation were those set up by private 
individuals to gather taxes on behalf of the state46  clearly evidence of contracting out 
as the norm.  Or, as quoted in the Report47 from evidence given on behalf of the 
Department of Finance and Administration, the existence of mercenary armies is proof 
of the extreme of contracting out armed force.   
 
There were, even during the currency of the National Competition Policy, a number of 
reports into aspects of contracting out.48  Mostly these were about managerial 
accountability and Parliamentary scrutiny, quality assurance, performance monitoring, 
risk allocation and management.  While relevant to competition policy, they did not 
specifically address it, except in passing. 
 
However, by the early 1990s, as the National Competition Policy was being developed, 
contracting out was seen to be being ‘extended’ into ‘core’ government services 
(although there could hardly be anything more ‘core’ than tax collection or the 
                                                 
46 Two of the forms of commercial association recognised in the Corpus Juris Civilis, or Institutiones 
Justinian, were formed for the purpose of public activities: the universitas and the publicani.  In the 
middle ages manoe were organisations set up for the gathering of taxes. 
47 Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Commonwealth House of Representatives, 
What Price Competition?, 1998, 66. 
48 Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Commonwealth Parliament, Report 379.  Contract 
management in the Australian Public Service, 2000; Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 
Commonwealth Parliament, Report 369.  Australian Government Procurement, 1999; Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Commonwealth House of Representatives, Australian 
Government Purchasing Policies: Buying Our Future, 1994; Administrative Review Council, The 
Contracting Out of Government Services, Report No 42, 1998; Standing Committee on Finance and 
Public Administration, Commonwealth Senate, Contracting Out of Government Services Second Report, 
1998; Industry Commission, Competitive Tendering and Contracting by Public Sector Agencies, Report 
No 48, 1996; Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Commercial in 
Confidence Material and the Public Interest, 2000; to name but a few.  Naturally, each jurisdiction in 
Australia has equivalent reports; for example, Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Parliament of 
Victoria, Outsourcing of Government Services in the Victorian Public Sector, 2000. 
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provision of armed force) and was being subject to review as to whether social 
responsibilities,49 later to be known as ‘community service obligations’,50 were being 
neglected, and accountability was being preserved, objectives defined and business 
conducted efficiently and effectively.51  After the National Competition Policy was 
established, contracting out was expanded even further into the delivery of welfare 
services, although it would be a mistake to attribute this simply to the Hilmer Report: it 
was a national and international trend.  In any event, while the reports considered above 
illustrate that, by 1997, internal government questioning of National Competition Policy 
as such was abating, the application of competition policy to welfare services had 
become controversial.  Hence the Commonwealth Health Minister referred competitive 
tendering of welfare service delivery to the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Family and Community Affairs in April 1997.  This led to one of the 
most critical assessments of competition policy, although it was, in tune with other 
assessments, expressed as a study in implementation rather than a critique of the policy 
as such.  The report is What Price Competition? A Report on the Competitive 
Tendering of Welfare Service Delivery.52  This report was briefly considered in Chapter 
1 as an assessment of the National Competition Policy; here it is considered as a 
response. 
 
The material presented by this Report provides a devastating critique of competition 
policy.  The anger is at times palpable.  Yet the Committee appears resigned to the 
inevitability of the National Competition Policy: without contradicting the thrust of 
competition policy, it develops a series of recommendations calculated to restrain 
implementation. 
 
The anger can be seen in these paragraphs from the Executive Summary: 
 
                                                 
49 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Commonwealth Parliament, Report  315. Social Responsibilities 
of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises, 1992. 
50 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Commonwealth Parliament, Report 336.  Public Business in the 
Public Interest: An Inquiry into Commercialisation in the Commonwealth Pubic Sector, 1995, 72-4. 
51 Ibid generally. 
52 Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Commonwealth House of Representatives, 
What Price Competition? 1998. 
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The expansion of contracting into ‘core’ government services has led to a 
redefining of responsibilities and relationships between key stakeholders 
and raised important questions of accountability and quality, equity and 
distributional impacts of contracting, and the suitability of pro-
competitive models for particular services. While some of these 
questions have been raised in the context of government welfare 
services, there has been no detailed examination of the desirability and 
feasibility of increased contracting out and competitive tendering of 
welfare service delivery. The present inquiry is the first to specifically 
examine this question and the core issues surrounding it, including the 
current levels of service provision by the non-government welfare sector; 
the adequacy of current monitoring of performance standards for the 
sector; the role of government in standards setting and monitoring of 
accountability standards; and the role of government in measuring the 
efficiency and effectiveness of new service delivery arrangements. 
 
At the outset, the Committee wishes to emphasise that the overwhelming 
weight of evidence suggests that no further contracting out of welfare 
services should take place until a continuum of contestability framework 
is developed for determining the suitability of these services for 
contracting out. This framework should include service related and non-
service related factors and be reviewed on a regular basis to take account 
of changes in organisational objectives and practices, technology and 
service markets, and that the contestability status of all welfare services 
be re-assessed at regular intervals.53 
 
The Report itself, as distinguished from the Executive Summary, does not conclude in 
such trenchant terms, although the recommendations are strong.  The first was as to 
accountability. 54  Competition policy introduces a split between a service’s purchaser 
and its provider.  The government purchases a service from a provider.  The service 
may be to provide welfare to the client/recipient.  The Report comments on just the 
                                                 
53 Ibid xi.. 
54 Ibid, para 4.12. 
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relationship between the purchaser and the provider, not between the provider and the 
client – a relationship equally the subject of competition policy but in more subtle ways 
which are considered later.  For now, the Report identified as the first issue relating to 
the split as ‘who is accountable, to whom and for what’.55  Enhanced accountability 
could arise from the exigency of contracting: the necessity of specifying with exactitude 
the various responsibilities involved in the service, leading to easier identification of 
service failure; easier monitoring of service delivery, enhanced capacity for clients (in 
the Report – ‘consumers’) to choose between providers, hence achieving redress for 
failure or even simple inadequacy; and separating and clarifying roles allows the public 
service to concentrate on policy development and accountability monitoring.  On the 
other hand, contracting out enables risk to be shifted from the purchaser to the provider 
enabling government officials to evade their responsibilities; and extended lines of 
responsibility means that those responsible for service standards may become 
indeterminate.  Accountability should be always with the purchaser/Government 
agency, according to the Committee, regardless of who the provider, who actually 
delivers the service, is.56 
 
A second set of recommendations supports one of the main arguments of this thesis: 
simply that not enough was known about contracting out.  The Committee 
recommended that research be conducted into the impact of contracting out on the 
quality of welfare services,57 on service quality,58 cost,59 volunteerism60 and social and 
economic impact in small rural and remote communities.61 While it did not result in a 
recommendation, the Committee also noted the possibility of impacts on the structure of 
the welfare services industry.  Possible impacts included on the size of providers, the 
nature of relationships within the sector – a move to competition from co-operation, and 
on job security, wages and conditions of employees.  Competition policy begs this 
                                                 
55 Ibid xii. 
56 Ibid xii-xiii; 23-5. 
57 Ibid para 4.29, 
58 Ibid para 4.30. See also ibid xiii; 26-30. 
59 Ibid para 4.51.  See also ibid xiii-xiv; 30-6. 
60 Ibid para 4.89.  See also ibid xiv-v; 42-4. 
61 Ibid para 4.101.  See also ibid xv; 44-7. 
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question: is a marketised industry better than one not marketised?  Because the answer 
is assumed, stated the Committee, to answer it challenges competition policy itself and 
hence the Committee would not attempt it.62  However, it did mount a direct challenge 
in respect of the assessment of whether every service is susceptible of contracting out. 
 
The Committee recommended that a ‘contestability continuum’ for welfare services be 
developed by the Department of Health and Family Services, in conjunction with 
welfare organisations and providers before new welfare services are considered for 
contracting out and that all welfare services be re-assessed on it at regular intervals.63  It 
also set out a stringent set of requirements for service agreements, covering the terms, 
the tender process, and ongoing management.  This is a direct challenge to competition 
policy itself – a challenge already considered in Chapter 1.  In summary, the Committee 
doubted the preference for competition in legislation reviews.  It stated that whether a 
service should be contracted out was the first question, rather than the question of 
whether it is possible to contract out the service.  Contestability should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis on a continuum: 
 
The Committee considers that current approaches to assessing 
contestability and suitability for contracting can be significantly 
improved by looking at contestability in terms of a continuum. Under 
this approach, the contestability of an activity can range on the 
continuum from very low (not suitable) to very high (highly suitable). 
The placement of an activity on the continuum depends on how it meets 
designated criteria. For example, an activity with no or few alternative 
providers, with low incentives to enter the market, low public acceptance 
to outsourcing and assessed as central to an agency’s objectives would be 
placed at the low end of the continuum. This may be the case in some 
isolated communities. An activity with many alternative providers, 
involving a large amount of money, low overheads, not central to an 
                                                 
62 Ibid xiv; 36-42. 
63 Ibid, para 6.30-32. 
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agency’s objectives, no public objections etc would be rated at the high 
end of the continuum.64 
 
The Committee proceeded to set out a framework for assessing contestability covering 
market-specific factors, financial costs and benefits, agency-specific factors and service-
specific factors.  It recommended that a similar ‘contestability continuum’ be developed 
by the Department of Health and Human Services and that it be reviewed on a regular 
basis ‘to take account of changes in organisational objectives and practices, technology 
and service markets and that is be applied to all welfare services on a regular basis.  
Most importantly, it recommended that further contracting out not be undertaken until 
this approach was adopted. 
 
The Government’s response65 was to reject outright the call for a contestability 
continuum.  Its reason was that such a continuum did not permit assessment of the 
impact of contracting out on different communities and that the government had a much 
more rigorous approach in place.  It implied that the framework approach recommended 
by the Committee would disallow contracting out in one community where there was a 
reason for not contracting it out in another.  The Government wanted to contract out 
whenever it could.  Of course, such a critique ignores the possibility of including as a 
variable the community to which the service is delivered in a contestability continuum.  
Indeed, the response erects a straw man of contestability continuums by referring solely 
to those developed in other jurisdictions, so ignoring both the potential for innovation 
and the meaning of ‘contestability’ as defined by the Committee.  In respect of the 
latter, the Government’s existing approach as described in the response did not include 
anything remotely approaching an ‘appropriateness’ test; that is, asking ‘Should we?’ 
rather than ‘Can we?’  Commensurate with this response, the Government rejected 
independent assessments of the impacts of contracting out, claiming that its existing 
                                                 
64 Ibid 68. 
65 Commonwealth, Commonwealth Government’s Response to the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Family and Community Affairs Inquiry into Competitive Tendering of Welfare Service 
Delivery (‘What Price Competition’), Parliamentary Paper No 832, 1999, 2.  This paper is extraordinarily 
difficult to find and I must here once again thank Dennis Warren, the Law Librarian at La Trobe 
University, for digging it out for me. 
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assessment structures were doing the job quite well enough,66 and generally defending 
its existing arrangements.  In other words, it comprehensively ignored the point of the 
Committee’s report that things were not going as well as the Government’s assessment 
mechanisms appeared to demonstrate. 
 
Senate Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy 
Select Committee 2000 
 
Chapter 6 considered the last67 of the significant reports contemplating the National 
Competition Policy as whole, the report of the Socio-Economic Consequences of the 
National Competition Policy Select Committee, Riding the Waves of Change.68 In this 
report the Committee yet again considered that competition policy was on the whole 
accepted by the community.  Critique was adjudged to come out of the impact of the 
policy on individuals and that the concerns of the community were about 
implementation.  Nevertheless many of the matters stated to be of concern in previous 
inquiries resurfaced.  These included the application of the public interest test, 
inconsistencies in implementation, the lack of oversight of implementation and a 
disbelief that the economic rationales sufficiently took into account sustainability 
principles. The only issue of note that was not foreshadowed was in relation to 
‘structural adjustment and transitional arrangements’.  Within the structure of the 
National Competition Policy, this was a matter for the implementing jurisdictions, yet it 
there was considerable confusion as to whether this meant compensation or not.   
 
                                                 
66 Ibid 1, 5. 
67 Chapter 6 also considered the Productivity Commission report, commissioned by the Government as 
soon as the Senate Select Committee was commissioned: Productivity Commission, Impact of 
Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Report No 8, 1999.  As noted in Chapter 6, 
it is hard to see the Productivity Commission reference as anything other than damage control, although 
ultimately the Senate Committee report was relatively benign.  The Productivity Commission report is not 
considered here as it is not a site of critique. 
68 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000.  It released an earlier interim report: Socio-Economic 
Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth Senate, 
Competition Policy: Friend or Foe.  Economic Surplus, Social Deficit?, Interim Report, 1999. 
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While Riding the Waves of Change broke little new ground in terms of the issues noted 
and explored, it did capture much of the individual anger around the impact of the 
reforms.  After all, this was its origin, as will be demonstrated in the next section of this 
chapter.  For that reason, the reaction to the Report is of significance.  That reaction can 
be summed up by observing that the National Competition Policy did not change in 
structure or direction, but that the administering body, the National Competition 
Council was disciplined and its ambitions curtailed to the point that, once it could be 
done without loss of face, it was deprived of meaningful function.  Moreover, 
exemptions to the National Competition Policy proliferated.  This story is recounted in 
Chapter 6.   
 
Despite the observable consequences, the Government response to the Report was a 
classic ‘weave’: 
 
Much of the implementation of NCP is the responsibility of State and 
Territory governments. The Prime Minister will write to Premiers and 
Chief Ministers, asking them to give due consideration to the issues 
raised in the Report.69 
 
In respect of direct compensation for the effects of competition policy on individuals 
and regions, the Government response was to refuse any general idea of compensation, 
rather to talk in terms of adjustment assistance. This was, of course, a matter for the 
implementing government.  Later, the National Competition Council was to directly 
repudiate compensation on the basis that the possibility of reform was simply another 
risk of which every individual, whether in business or employment, should be aware.  
To provide compensation would be to privilege one form of risk over another.   
 
Parliamentary debates: Hansard 
 
Given the size and expense of the National Competition Policy, there is, with one 
exception, surprisingly little about it, or even competition policy generally, in the 
Hansard of any Parliament in Australia.  What there is falls into three categories:  
                                                 
69 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 August 2000, 16217, (The Deputy President). 
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responses to implementation, which includes both debates on relevant legislation (which 
provides the exception) and statements in respect of various specific non-legislative 
implementations, responses to inquiries – these have been considered above, and the 
series of speeches of a limited set of politicians, in particular those of Mark Latham and 
Bob Katter, although others made occasional substantial critical speeches (e.g., Senators 
Boswell, Margetts and Kernott, and Ms De-Ann Kelly).  The first and last are now 
considered. 
 
Responses to implementation 
 
The first identifiable matter in 1995 dealing with competition policy was the tabling in 
the Commonwealth House of Representatives of a petition from ‘certain residents of 
South Australia’ protesting the National Competition Policy.70  In particular they 
protested cuts in wages and conditions of public sector employees and user-pay price 
increases cutting low income people from services.   
 
On the same day, Mr Latham, then in government, gave a strong adjournment speech in 
favour of the National Competition Policy, which had not then been finalised. The main 
thrust of his argument was that the States and Territories should sign up, and that there 
‘should be no dispute about compensating the states’.71  In the years that followed there 
were many such speeches in support, so numerous that they will not be further referred 
to here.  Nevertheless, Mr Latham’s early contribution is notable by way of contrast to 
his later critique of the ideology of the Productivity Commission and his support for 
Blairite ‘Third Way’ political philosophy.   
 
The early commentary on the National Competition Policy continued on 9 February 
with another Labor Government member, Mr Griffin, asking the Assistant Treasurer 
without notice whether competition policy reforms ‘are encouraging’ state governments 
                                                 
70 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 6 February 1995, 501. 
71 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 6 February 1995, 536, (Mr 
Latham). 
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to privatise utilities.72  Mr Gear, the Assistant Treasurer, replied that there was 
‘encouragement to privatise from competition policy’.73 Clearly this was designed to 
correct media reports.  It was followed in May by the presentation of Public Business in 
the Public Interest, a report of the Joint Committee on Public Accounts.74  This report 
set out the principles under which government businesses should be commercialized 
and corporatized. There was little critical debate, neither of the report nor of the 
principle that it is a Good Thing to commercialise and corporatise.  
 
The sale of the government-owned Qantas had occupied Parliaments since the 
introduction of the original Qantas Sale Act 1992.  As an exemplar of the issues 
surrounding privatisation of government-owned businesses it has remained 
controversial even to the very day of writing these words in early 2014.  In 1995, at the 
outset of the National Competition Policy, it was the Qantas Sale Amendment Bill 1995 
which was the subject of debate.75  Nevertheless, both sides supported the Bill and the 
debate was over the details of the particular privatisation rather than whether Qantas 
should be privatised.  More critical debates over Qantas took place in the Senate in June 
1995.76  Even so, only the Democrats and Greens opposed it, with Senators Kernot77 
and Margetts78 speaking.  Moreover, their grounds of opposition were simply that it was 
wrongly done and that Qantas was something that should be kept in Government hands.   
 
                                                 
72 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 February 1995, 900, (Mr 
Griffin). 
73 Ibid (Mr Gear). 
74 Joint Committee of Public Accounts, Commonwealth Parliament, Report 336.  Public Business in the 
Public Interest: An Inquiry into Commercialisation in the Commonwealth Pubic Sector, 1995; presented 
by Mr Scott: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 May1995, 305, (Mr 
Scott). 
75 Second Reading debate commenced Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 30 May 1995, 535.  
76 As from 7 June: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 6 February 1995, 1021, Sen. Parer 
commencing on behalf of the Government). 
77 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1024. 
78 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1030. 
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Similar debates to that over Qantas were waged over changes to the status of Australia 
Post, the Commonwealth Bank, Telstra, and Airports.  Telstra, in particular was 
controversial with substantial79 debate occurring in 1996,80 1998,81 2000,82 and 2003.83  
A considerable number of petitions protesting Telstra’s privatisation were tabled in the 
Senate in the second half of 1996 and into 1997, continuing on for many years.  The 
debate was rendered more complex by questions as to structural separation, regulatory 
risk, rapid technological change and the choice to have industry-specific, rather than 
generic, regulation. 
 
Meanwhile specific industries also had their grievances and fears aired.  These included 
petrol and education.  Abolition and alteration of primary industry statutory marketing 
boards were often the subject of speeches and questions; for example, as to rice-
growers84 and the dairy industry.85  None of these contained substantial reasoned 
critique of the National Competition Policy.  Mostly the critical voices asserted the 
damage to industries and regions and that there were substantial public interests 
involved.  The response was simply that there would be economy-wide benefits, that 
implementing governments considered the public interest as a substantial part of their 
decision-making (if the Commonwealth said this in respect of State or Territory 
implementation, this constituted the defence of ‘the weave’), and that, substantial 
revenue through competition payments depended on performance of the Agreements 
                                                 
79 This does not include isolated questions and petitions. 
80 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2, 7, 8, and 9 May 1996; Senate, 8, 
21, 27, 29, 30 May, 18, 20 and 27 June, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16-19 September, 16, 18, and 28 October, 6 
November, 5, 9-11 December 1996. 
81 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 and 31 March, 2, 6, 7, and 8 
April 1998; Senate, 18- 24 March,  1997, 1 April, 28 May, 6 June, 10 and 11 July, 12 November 1998, 10 
and 22 March, 27 May, 21 June 1999. 
82 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 and 16 March, 17 August 2000; 
Senate, 8-9 and 30 October 2000.  
83 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2, 17, 25 and 26 June, 12 August 
2003; Senate, 21 August, 27- 30 October 2003. 
84 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 June 1998, 5122; 20 August 
2001, 29752 (Mrs Hull). 
85 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 March 2000, 14118 ff. 
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(the ‘duck’ defence).  If the economy-wide advantages were doubted, the ‘falling man’ 
defence86 was deployed: it was said to be too early to quantify the advantages but they 
were known by modelling to be high.  These defences become a common litany of 
response to critique especially in reaction to various inquiries. 
 
In June-July 1998, the Senate established the key inquiry into the implementation of the 
National Competition Policy, the Select Committee on the Socio-Economic 
Consequences of the National Competition Policy.87  This was the only consequence of 
any note that could be attributed directly to concerns expressed in Parliament as to the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy.  Even then Senators Margetts and 
Cook averred that the motivating factors were 
 
(a) the observation expressed in the report of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public 
Administration entitled Cultivating Competition: Inquiry into aspects of 
the National Competition Policy Reform Package , that there has been no 
major analysis of the broader socio-economic costs of the National 
Competition Policy; and 
(b) that many voters in the 1998 Queensland election indicated that they 
were disillusioned with economic reforms such as National Competition 
Policy and the broader impacts of such changes. 
 
rather than anything said in Parliament.  The report has been considered in detail above. 
 
A number of other Parliamentary inquiries, referred to above and listed in an appendix 
to this thesis, considered aspects of competition policy, although none were directed at 
the National Competition Policy.  The most wide-ranging of these was that of the 
Standing Committee on Financial Institutions and Public Administration, 
Commonwealth House of Representatives, which produced its report in June 1997.  
This, however, was commissioned on the signing of the Agreements and can’t be 
attributed to reaction to the National Competition Policy.  Otherwise there is little in 
                                                 
86 This is an allusion to a rather macabre joke about a man who, asked as to his state of mind while falling 
from a skyscraper, passing the first floor says, ‘So far, so good!’ 
87 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 1 July 1998, 4605, (Senators Margetts and Cook).  
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Parliamentary debates which can be said to have directly caused reconsideration of the 
National Competition Policy.  That is not to say that electoral results and other political 
pressures were not effective to some end, as considered in Chapter 6 and somewhat 
revealed below in media reports. 
 
Debates on Legislation 
 
Other than specific reforms as a result of legislation reviews in implementing 
jurisdictions, the National Competition Policy directly generated only one piece of 
legislation.88  This was the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995, passed in June of 
1995. Oddly enough, the three competition policy Agreements were tabled only at the 
close of debate in both houses.89  One would hope that they were available to the 
Parliament before then.    
 
In the House of Representatives, debate was somewhat stifled.  Both sides supported 
competition policy and the National Competition Policy, although there was the usual 
carping over details.  The exception was Mr Bob Katter, who crossed the floor on the 
following day to oppose the legislation.   
 
On the other hand, the Senate had referred the National Competition Reform Bill to its 
Economics Committee.  That Committee reported on 7 June 1995, acknowledging many 
concerns with the National Competition Policy and competition policy generally, 
nevertheless recommending that the Bill be passed anyway:90  the majority of its 
members were of the parties supporting competition policy.  The Democrats dissented 
and, allied to the Greens and Senator Harradine, entered into a substantial debate over 
competition policy.  The report of the Committee has been discussed above. 
 
                                                 
88 The Productivity Commission Act 1998 was also substantially debated in Parliament  It is treated here 
as context and is dealt with in Chapter 5.   
89 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives, 30 June 1995, 2793 (Mr George 
Gear); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 June 1995, 1065 (Senator Cook).  They do not 
appear in the Parliamentary Papers series.  See further n 3, Chapter 1. 
90 The Report is not available on-line in the digital record of parliamentary papers. 
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The debate in the Senate over the National Competition Reform Bill took place on 7, 
22, 26 and 27 June.  (It was then referred to Committee for clause by clause debate, 
which added little for present purposes to the main debate.)  It raised every main 
contention that was to come to the fore in the following ten years.  The defenses to be 
mounted to all critiques, including, as has been noted above, those in reports resulting 
from inquiries, were also developed.  Moreover, the Democrats, appreciating the 
essential futility of opposing the Bill, committed themselves to monitoring the progress 
of implementation of the National Competition Policy, and to forcing the establishment 
of a committee to inquire into its implementation in terms of its effects on society and 
sectors of society.91  This promise was fulfilled in 1998 with the establishment of the 
Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, 
the 2000 report of which was enormously influential and which is discussed above and 
in more detail in Chapter 6.  However, beyond the promise of a future inquiry and 
development of the terms of debate to follow, prescient though that process might have 
been, little actually followed from matters raised in Parliament. Even so, in order to 
establish what was debated and the fact of little impact, the main themes are set out 
below.  
 
Competition policy wrong in itself 
 
Senator Cooney, closing the debate over the National Competition Reform Bill, said, 
‘As far as I can see, it has not been suggested that competition in its proper context is a 
bad thing. In other words, everybody seems to agree that competition, if confined to its 
proper place, is a good thing.’92  That was an exaggeration.  Democrat participants in 
the debate in particular questioned the place of competition as a government policy.  
Senator Woodley referred to ‘mythical economic ideology’ and that there were values 
other than economic efficiency93 as did Senator Lees.94  Senator Lees had the previous 
                                                 
91 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043 (Senator Spindler); 22 June 1995, 
1697, (Senator Kernot) 
92 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1043. 
93 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1778. 
94 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1866. 
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day also talked of priorities beyond competition.95  Earlier in the debate Senator 
Spindler had characterized the ‘competition policy agenda’ as ‘a radical rethinking of 
the role of government and government services.’96  Senator Kernot put it this way, 
‘competition policy represents the victory of economics over equity, of competition 
over compassion and of accounting over accountability in the management of public 
services.’97 
 
Despite these, and other strong statements, there is some truth in Senator Cooney’s 
comment.  Senator Spindler’s statement quoted above raises the question of whether 
competition is good but later slides away into the claim that debate over whether it is 
indeed good and what effects implementation of the agenda will have had been 
inadequate.98  Senator Kernot also slid away: ‘Yet this bill, and the ramifications of this 
bill, have been the subject of very little public debate. It has been the subject of minimal 
public scrutiny. It has been debated in closed forums – not by Australian people who 
own this debate and the outcome of it.’99  They get close to examining what is good and 
bad about competition but then simply label it as narrow ideology or assert that it has in 
certain instances bad effects. 
 
Senator Coulter provides perhaps the only challenge to competition itself.  He argues 
that  
 
One cannot legislate for goodness. However, a government can, over 
time, pass a series of laws which so undermine the fabric of society that 
anti-social behaviour flourishes and the moral and cultural cement that 
binds citizens together in a society is inexorably dissolved. The bill 
before us today marks one of the stages of that dissolution – just one of 
the stages. For over 200 years Australians have built up a culture of 
tolerance and mutual helpfulness. In the few short years of this Labor 
                                                 
95 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1783.  
96 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043. 
97 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1697. 
98 The passage is quoted in full below, 316-7. 
99 Ibid. 
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government, first under Prime Minister Hawke and now under Prime 
Minister Keating, this mutual respect and support one for the other has 
been steadily eroded.100 
 
He does not claim that the intentions of the legislation and supporting policies are 
wrong, indeed he states they are ‘laudable’, merely that the ‘stupid and hazardous 
assumption that humans are driven by an insatiable material greed’ of the new economic 
orthodoxy is destructive of Australia’s humanity.101  Yet even this is muted by the 
concession that it is a characteristic of humanity that has its place:  
 
In summary, I believe that this legislation is very wrongly conceived. 
Not surprisingly, of course, it is conceived in the same context that much 
government legislation has been conceived in in recent years. It makes 
assumptions that are faulty about the nature of human beings, and it 
makes assumptions that are incomplete and damaging because of the 
importance it gives to that one characteristic of seeking to fulfil an 
endless and insatiable material greed.102 
 
Bad impacts 
 
Competition may or may not be good in itself, but the Greens and Democrats, even 
some National Party members, identified bad impacts.  These were on the regions,103 
local government,104 community services105 and the environment.106  Equity,107 the 
                                                 
100 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1772. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June, 1995, 1700 (Senator Boswell),  
104 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043 (Senator Spindler) 
105 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1866 (Senator Lees) 
106 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043 (Senator Spindler); 26 June 1995, 
1768 (Senator Chamarette); 26 June 1995, 1772 (Senator Coulter). 
107 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1768 (Senator Chamarette). 
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community,108 community services,109 and mutual respect and support110 also were 
thought to susceptible to damage.  Senator Harradine worried about utility pricing.111  
 
The impacts identified as bad were more often expressed by reference to winners and 
losers.   Winners were identified as ‘big business’112, ‘people with economic power’113 
or ‘corporate members of the Business Council of Australia’,114 and government 
Treasuries.115  There was agreement on the losers too: residents of regional and remote 
areas,116 low income users of government services,117 and public servants.118  
Consumers were not guaranteed to win, despite the purposes of the policy, according to 
Senator Lees.119   
 
The comments about the impacts of competition policy on society and people became 
the chief argument against the National Competition Policy.  It is in the course of such 
argument that Senators Spindler and Kernot committed the Democrats to pursuing an 
inquiry into the socio-economic effects of the policy.120  That inquiry eventuated in 
                                                 
108 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1778 (Senator Woodley). 
109 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1866 (Senator Lees). 
110 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1772 (Senator Coulter). 
111 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1868 (Senator Harradine). 
112 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1878 (Senator Bell). 
113 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1754 (Senator Margetts). 
114 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1783 (Senator Lees). 
115 Ibid., Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1878 (Senator Bell). 
116 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043 and 26 June 1995, 1760 (Senator 
Spindler), 22 June 1995, 1697 (Senator Kernot); 22 June 1995, 1700 (Senator Boswell); 27 June 1995, 
1878 (Senator Bell). 
117 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1697 (Senator Kernot); 26 June 1995, 
1760(Senator Spindler). 
118 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1697 (Senator Kernot); 27 June 1995, 
1878 (Senator Bell). 
119 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1783 (Senator Lees). 
120 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043 (Senator Spindler); 22 June 1995, 
1697, (Senator Kernot). 
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1998 and its findings, as discussed above, led directly to the muzzling of the National 
Competition Council and the imposition of a more rigorous ‘public interest’ test. 
 
Ill researched and insufficient information 
 
Many Senators referred to the Industry Commission Report on which much of the 
Government’s (and Opposition’s) case for proceeding with the National Competition 
Policy was based.121  They said that it was inadequate.  As Senator Margetts put it, the 
Industry Commission Report set out only the ‘outer envelope of possible benefits, not 
the real costs and benefits’. Many of the Senators referred to ‘John Quiggin’s report’, 
although none cited actually what that was.  Apparently it referred to his submission to 
the Economic Committee in its consideration of the Competition Policy Reform Bill.  
Senator Kernot provided a representative comment:122 
 
Associate Professor John Quiggin of the ANU and James Cook 
University concluded that the Industry Commission report did not add 
up. It was identified that the Industry Commission had double counted a 
range of ongoing reforms, had overestimated the flow-on effects from 
the reforms to the general economy, had assumed reforms which go 
much further than the Hilmer report ever intended and had assumed no 
negative effects from the displacement of thousands of public sector 
workers whose job losses will provide the filling for the Hilmer magic 
pudding.  
 
Dr Quiggin concluded that there would still be a benefit from the Hilmer 
reforms, but a much more modest one: 0.5 per cent of GDP—one-tenth 
of that estimated by the Industry Commission. So then the question 
becomes: if the benefits are modest, is it worth pursuing? Is there a better 
way?  
                                                 
121 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 9 June 1995, 934 and 979 (Senator Margetts); 22 
June 1995, 1697 (Senator Kernot); 27 June 1995, 1868 (Senator Harradine); 27 June 1995 1877 (Senator 
Bourne); 27 June 1995, 1878 (Senator Bell). 
122 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1697. See also 26 June 1995, 1754 
(Senator Margetts); 27 June 1995, 1878 (Senator Bourne). 
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Senator Kernot referred to the concerns raised by the Institute of Engineers as to 
‘implications for the provision of electricity and water, in relation to the carry-over of 
expertise and the possible loss of that experience with the transformation from 
government provision of utilities to private provision’ as the exemplar for unresearched 
possible implications of the Bill,123 going on to say, 
 
Whatever you believe in relation to competition policy, I believe that it is 
not responsible for this parliament to be jumping in to actually legislate 
the changes until we have looked responsibly at what the implications 
are in those places that have made those kinds of changes. So, yes, we 
have heard some of the political debate about the implications in other 
countries, but it seems that it is not responsible unless we are prepared to 
look a little deeper.124 
 
This concern that costs were not factored in was echoed later that day by Senator 
Margetts.125  Senators Boswell126 and Margetts127 saw the issue of one of the policy 
having indeterminate outcomes, the latter declaiming, 
 
The government is pushing this through without any real idea of what its 
effect will be, but, if you ask the government—as I asked recently—it 
will blithely cite the wonderful benefits according to the Industry 
Commission. This is a total assurance of the ideologue that if we do the 
right thing, somehow everything will be better. There is no analysis of 
that ‘somehow’ and no ‘how’. The simple assertion is that, by selling 
everything off, by eliminating every regulation parliaments of the past 
have brought in for some reason and by preventing parliaments of the 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
124 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 934. 
125 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 979. 
126 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 995. 
127 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1700. 
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future from making many sorts of regulations, this will automatically 
bring huge benefits.  
 
The evidence has not been presented. The studies have been started but 
have certainly not been completed. Here we are about to pass this bill. 
Why? Is this responsible? Is this sensible? The evidence from the UK is 
not good; we have been told, ‘We will do better.’ Where is the plan? 
Where are the resources? Apparently, those will be developed later and 
we should pass this bill entirely on trust – and put our stocking out for 
Santa while we are at it.128 
 
Senator Harradine took a different tack.  He sought answers to questions in Economics 
Committee and tabled the answers on 27 June.  These contained a number of admissions 
as to a lack of consideration of costs, individual losses and equity measures.129  Further 
particular issues identified as not being sufficiently thought through were access rights 
to private providers130 and the communications industry131 (although both of these were 
in fact later dealt with). 
 
Senator Cook, representing the Treasurer, answered these claims by saying that the 
Industry Commission had been asked to undertake a ‘modelling exercise to estimate the 
revenue and broader economic benefits of competition policy and those related 
reforms.’132 He conceded that it was ‘outer envelope of reforms’ which were modelled. 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1868. 
130 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043, the claim being that access rights 
to private providers would lead to cherry picking and thus higher costs for less profitable natural 
monopolies with consequent disadvantage for consumers.  It is a difficult claim to understand as the 
question is one of how to reduce the monopoly power of the resource owner and there is provision for 
National Competition Council determination of disputes: see Part IIIA of the then Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), currently Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010(Cth). 
131 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1877 (Senator Bourne).  The 
communications industry received industry specific regulation in Parts XIB and XIC of the then Trade 
Practices Act 1974, currently Part XIB and XIC of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
132 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 979. 
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Senator Margetts pursued this by referring to an assessment by Professor John Quiggin 
that ‘the Industry Commission has represented the upper bounds to possible 
achievement, rather than the likely outcomes’.133  Senator Cook’s assertion that the 
assessment remained subject ‘a range of other values – such as social, environmental, 
occupational health and industrial relations values’ and that governments were to take 
these values into account when implementing the reforms remained unanswered.  This 
was the foundation of the ‘weave’ defence discussed below.   
 
Apart from the acknowledgement that the other interests were yet to be formalized but 
that it was up to the implementing Governments within their democratic processes to 
flesh them out, the claim that the policy was ill researched and insufficient information 
was provided to decide whether it should be supported or not was met with the ‘falling 
man’ defence: it was too early to determine what the precise level of benefit was going 
to be.  This relied on the assumption that there would be some good, it was simply the 
quantum that was uncertain.  The possible rejoinders that, first, there may be no good at 
all for high cost, and, second, the precautionary or conservative principle that one 
should not act if risks are involved or, at least, until risks can be formulated, were not 
articulated. 
 
Insufficiently debated 
 
Statements that competition policy was ill or insufficiently researched or that it is a 
flawed concept were frequently followed by claims it was insufficiently debated.  Thus 
Senator Kernot: 
 
In the Democrat's view, competition policy represents the victory of 
economics over equity, of competition over compassion and of 
accounting over accountability in the management of public services. 
Yet this bill, and the ramifications of this bill, have been the subject of 
very little public debate. It has been the subject of minimal public 
                                                 
133 Ibid. 
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scrutiny. It has been debated in closed forums—not by Australian people 
who own this debate and the outcome of it.134 
 
Senator Spindler tied this into the problematics of policy driven by intergovernmental 
agreement: 
 
… The competition policy agenda incorporates a radical rethinking of 
the role of government and government services. 
 
This rethink has occurred within a narrow ideological framework based 
on the concept that competition, just like greed, is good at all times. 
There has been inadequate public debate on what this agenda means, 
where it is leading and why this narrow framework should be imposed 
on the provision of community services, the furthering of ecological 
sustainability, improving consumer protection, health and safety or the 
promotion of social equity.  
 
These issues were not being adequately debated, in public or in 
parliament, before the COAG [Council of Australian Governments] 
agreement was signed. Most of the detail of the government's agenda is 
contained in the three agreements signed at COAG in April. The 
Democrats foreshadow that, in an attempt to broaden the debate over the 
impact of the implementation of the government's agenda, we will be 
moving to set up a parliamentary inquiry to look at the agreements and 
how they will be implemented.135 
 
Senator Cooney of the Liberal Party, while defending competition policy and extolling 
its benefits, made a rather ambiguous response to the claim that it was insufficiently 
debated. He said, ‘is the case is that we are in a federal system, and this legislation 
evolves from an agreement made between the various governments in Australia. It is a 
                                                 
134 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1697; see also 26 June 1995, 1754 
(Senator Margetts) and 27 June 1995, 1868 (Senator Harradine). 
135 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 1043. 
317 
 
problem that we are going to face again and again.’136 In other words policy 
implementation by means of intergovernmental agreements sits uneasily within a 
federal parliamentary system.  Ironically, it was exactly this uneasy fit which was 
deployed in the ‘duck’ and ‘weave’ defences: between the obligations under the 
Agreements and the provinces of the various levels of government lay opportunities for 
blame-shifting. 
 
Ill defined 
 
Many liberal party members argued in favour of extending the National Competition 
Policy to the labour market.137  This was a call that resonated in a variety of ways 
through the ten years of its existence. Both the National Competition Council138 and the 
Productivity Commission139 considered, without arguing that it should be taken into the 
National Competition Policy, the benefits of extending the market philosophy into 
labour markets.  The Howard government attempted to do so in the Workplace 
Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, only to promptly lose government.   
 
Some senators called for extensions to competition with respect to coal cartage in New 
South Wales,140 postal services,141 shipping,142 Trans-Tasman markets,143 and compact 
                                                 
136 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1875 
137 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 995 (Senator Boswell); 22 June 1995, 
1704 (Senator Abetz); 26 June 1995, 1758 (Senator Calvert); 26 June 1995, 1763 (Senator Chapman); 26 
June 1995, 1775 (Senator Campbell). 
138 National Competition Commission, Annual Report 2001-2 2002, 8 (quoting the OECD); National 
Competition Commission, Annual Report 2002-3 2003, 5; National Competition Commission, Annual 
Report 2003-4 2004, 8. 
139 Productivity Commission, Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, 
Report No 8, 1999, 75, 367; Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, 
Report No 33, 2005, 349-355. 
140 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 935 (Senator Brownhill). 
141 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1758 (Senator Calvert); 26 June 1995, 
1763 (Senator Chapman). 
142 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1758 (Senator Calvert). 
143 Ibid. 
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discs.144  On the other hand, Senator Spindler raised the issue of the definition of ‘what 
government activities do or do not constitute a business activity’:145   
 
This section [Clause 75 of the Bill, seeking to insert a new section 2C 
into the Trade Practices Act 1974] may need to be amended to further 
clarify what is or is not business to ensure that core services such as 
health, education, welfare, employment and environmental protection 
programs are clearly excluded. Otherwise, we could be legitimising 
heading down the Victorian local government road, in which everything 
from library services to swimming pools is regarded as a business to be 
run on a user pays basis, without regard to the public benefit.146 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 and as raised in the Economics Legislation Committee in 
1995,147 exactly what distinguishes commercial enterprise and government function is 
problematic and extraordinarily ill-theorised.  However, Senator Spindler raised the 
issue only to allow it to slide into the assumed position castigating the then Victorian 
Government for contracting out or commercialising many services in the local 
government sphere, just as he did in relation to his challenge to competition as 
government policy.  Even to the day of writing, the distinction remains as opaque as it 
was in 1995. 
 
Relative Power of the States and the power of the National Competition Council 
 
The issue of the relationship of intergovernmental agreements and parliamentary 
democracy arose under a couple of the above headings.  In particular, Senator Cooney 
even in defending the legislation perceived that it was a fraught relationship.148  Senator 
                                                 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid.  Section 2C remains in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
147 Economics Legislation Committee, Senate, Report on the Consideration of the Competition Policy 
Reform Bill 1995, 1995. 
148 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1875 
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Margetts, supported by Senators Boswell149 and Harradine,150 was more explicit.151  She 
complained that under the scheme Parliament had no capacity to have input or review 
competition policy and that the States were subject to a non-parliamentary federal body.  
This came to be the claim that effected the most change in the National Competition 
Policy, leading to a leashing of the National Competition Council in 2000. 
 
That the National Competition Council was so powerful within the Scheme lead to little 
more than debate over who should be on it.  Senator Boswell argued for representatives 
from small business152 and Senator Spindler for one (or more) representing 
consumers.153 
 
Defences to critique 
 
During the debate over the Competition Policy Reform Bill, the defences that would 
become the mainstay of response to critique were developed.  There were three. 
 
The first was the ‘falling man’: that there was no point criticising the policy as the full 
benefits were not apparent yet.  Oddly, Senator Boswell articulated it well in criticising 
the Bill: 
 
The difficulty with this type of legislation is that the national competition 
policy bill assembles a framework to assist, review and reform anti-
competitive behaviour wherever it is found in the economy — except the 
Labor taboo area of the labour market. The bill sets in place a reform 
process, but it does not tell us what the outcome will be or exactly what 
can be expected in small business and local government sectors. The bill 
imposes an economic philosophy — if you like, across an economy — 
and as such the experts appearing before the committee were 
                                                 
149 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1700. 
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152 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1995, 1700. 
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handicapped in providing answers to specific questions about small 
business. We will not know the answer until the reform process is under 
way.154 
 
Similarly, in critique, Senator Margetts identified the ‘weave’ defence, that it was not 
the Commonwealth that was implementing it, rather the States and Territories: 
 
Unfortunately, the government's response has tended to be that it is 
providing – as Senator Boswell suggested – a carrot and stick approach 
to privatisation and competition policy through the states. However, 
when the questions are asked the response is, ‘Ah, but that is up to the 
states’. I believe that is a cop-out.155 
 
Finally, as Senators Lees156 and Bell157 pointed out, the States and Territories enriched 
by competition payments were empowered with the ‘duck’ defence, that they were 
obligated to do whatever they were doing by the Agreements or else they would lose 
billions of dollars. 
 
Other debates and speeches 
 
The debates over the Competition Policy Reform Bill present fair examples of the 
arguments that followed over the next ten years.  Thus, for example, on 18 November 
1996 in question time, Senator Cook of the Labor Party sought to exploit comments by 
Senator Boswell that competition policy was a ‘giant vacuum cleaner sucking jobs out 
of rural and regional Australia’ by asking the Assistant Treasurer, Senator Kemp, how 
many jobs had been lost in rural and regional Australia.158 Debate followed, in which 
                                                 
154 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 933.   
155 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 7 June 1995, 934.  See its exercise: 22 June 1995, 
934 (Senator Abetz) and 27 June 1995, 1875 (Senator Cooney).  
156 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 June 1995, 1783. 
157 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 1995, 1878. 
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Senator Margetts reiterated the positions spelled out above159 and Senator Boswell, 
somewhat caught between protecting his rural constituency and Coalition policy in 
favour of the National Competition Policy, relied on the ‘weave’ defence.160 
 
A new element appeared in Commonwealth Parliament with the first speech by Senator 
Len Harris of the One Nation Party.  Senator Harris attacked the National Competition 
Policy as a ‘textbook theory which has failed in practice’.161 Yet, even the, the argument 
is about implementation: 
 
Are milk, bread, electricity or local government rates any cheaper as a 
result of the national competition policy? A mixture of market forces and 
government controls in certain circumstances can operate for the overall 
public benefit. Although the economic purists hate to admit it, this 
mixture of market forces and government intervention is necessary to 
preserve an adequate level of competition and consumer choice. This 
mixture preserves the economic opportunities for the whole community, 
not just the big end of town. 
 
The main problem with the national competition policy has been its 
overzealous implementation with little or no regard to the anti-
competitive nature of unregulated markets and with little or no regard to 
the very real social costs of national competition policy. Pauline 
Hanson's One Nation supports a mixed economy that has two sorts of 
government controls: controls on big business that prevent oligopolies 
and outright monopolies forming, and measures that support small and 
medium size business to compete with big business. This 
counterbalances advantages enjoyed by the multinationals and big 
business, which include superior purchasing power, taxation advantages 
and economies of scale. This helps to ensure that the elusive level 
playing field can be achieved. The economic cost to consumers of 
                                                 
159 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 November 1996, 5405 
160 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 November 1996, 5406 
161 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 11 August 1998, 7248. 
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protecting manufacturing industry is justified by the social benefits, more 
Australian jobs and less Australian debt. Australia is resource rich. We 
should be leading world technology, not selling our intellectual resources 
overseas where multinational companies can exploit them with minimal 
benefits for Australians.162 
 
It is only with the debate over the report, Riding the Waves of Change, of the Socio-
Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee,163 that 
new arguments appear amongst the rehearsal of the ones made in 1995.  The first is 
more of a rejoinder: that the response to the Report was to redefine the ‘public interest 
test’ appearing in a couple of places in the National Competition Policy.  Senator 
Murray argued: 
 
One of the reforms being postulated is to try to form some sort of 
definition of the expression ‘public interest’. The Democrats have two 
problems with this approach. The first is that we cannot see that just 
penning a definition of ‘public interest’ is going to help all that much. 
`Public interest' is a far-reaching term that allows for consideration of 
almost anything. It is a term that has been considered by courts and is 
used in a number of pieces of legislation. By trying to redefine the term, 
you may end up limiting the matters that are considered rather than 
broadening them. Our second problem with a new definition of ‘public 
interest’ is that, quite simply, it is too little too late. The problem with 
national competition policy is not the absence of a definition of ‘public 
interest’; it is the underpinning philosophy which says that deregulation 
and free market forces always result in a better allocation of resources 
and better outcomes for society.164 
 
Accordingly, Senator Murray argued, there should be legislation protecting small 
business and regulates the market power of big business.  Even so, he conceded that this 
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Commonwealth Senate, 2000. 
164 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 March 2001, 23097. 
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is competition policy, albeit of a ‘totally different approach’.  Thus competition policy 
was still necessary, albeit being ‘about society’ as well.165 
 
Senator Cook on the same day raised two refinements of the arguments that had gone 
before. 166 The first was that the National Competition Policy was ‘being handled by 
unelected bureaucrats, with the government at arm's length saying, “Don't blame me; it's 
their fault.”’ It was about time, he said, that ‘that process was taken back by elected 
representatives’.  Senator Cook acknowledged that the Council of Australian 
Governments had agreed that control over the implementation of the National 
Competition Policy should be resumed by governments but asserted that the third 
tranche assessments indicated that that was a mere chimera.  Ultimately, however, the 
National Competition Council was stripped of any assessment role in the successor to 
the National Competition Policy post 2005. 
 
Second was the question of compensation.  The claim was that the adjustment 
mechanisms were insufficient given the pain that was inflicted.  This claim resonated 
with the National Competition Council, and considerable space was dedicated in its 
Annual Reports and Assessments to a consideration of what was required.   Its response, 
supported by the Productivity Commission, was that compensation was inappropriate, 
although adjustment assistance might be consistent with fairness.167  The reasoning was 
                                                 
165 Ibid. 
166 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 March 2001, 23101 
167 One of the clearest statements of this position is: 
Adjustment assistance should be distinguished from the payment of compensation for changes in 
government regulatory policy, particularly where people have invested largely or solely on the 
basis of regulatory restrictions. People undertake such investments knowing that government 
policies can and do change. There is also a strong argument that the adoption of the NCP in 1995 
was a clear signal from all governments that existing regulatory regimes may not endure, 
particularly given the underlying premise of the legislation review program that competition 
should not be restricted unless there is a strong public interest justification. Compensation in these 
circumstances needs to be carefully justified. 
National Competition Commission, Annual Report 2000-01, 2001, 20.  See also National Competition 
Commission, Annual Report 2001-02, 2002, 21-24; Productivity Commission, Review of National 
Competition Policy Reforms, Report No 33, 2005, 149-50, 380, 382-4; Productivity Commission, Impact 
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that residents all face risks, including risks of market changes.  Competition policy was 
simply the imposition of market mechanisms and therefore to compensate for their 
imposition was to give those who lost a benefit others who lose due to market 
mechanisms do not receive.  Surprisingly this was never challenged.  It is a facile 
deduction from economic theory and does not adhere to the very public choice theory 
which impelled the National Competition Policy in the first place.  The point is that 
although cost/benefit analysis of policy choices is justified by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
(the policy must produce a benefit that could be used to benefit the losers, but need not 
do so), the fact that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require compensation to be paid, 
does not mean it should not be paid.168 Property rights theory asserts that regulation 
creates property in the rents that regulation provides and that to take that property away 
is (in the United States constitutional framework) subject to due process.169  Australia 
has similar constitutional protection for the terms under which the Commonwealth 
acquires property,170 although it does not extend as far171 nor does it bind the States.172  
Nevertheless, the idea that regulation creates rents which are property is the foundation 
for the preference for competition,173 yet is denied by the rejection outright of 
compensation as such. 
                                                                                                                                               
of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Report No 8, 1999, ch 13; Productivity 
Commission, Annual Report 1997-8, 1998, 20-24. 
168 John Hicks, ‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics’, (1939) 49 The Economic Journal, 696; 
Nicholas Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’, (1939) 
49 The Economic Journal 549. 
169 A. K. Dragun and M. P. O'Connor, ‘Property rights, Public Choice and Pigovianism’, (1993) 16 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 127.  
170 Constitution, s 51 (xxxi). 
171 See S Evans, ‘When is an Acquisition of Property not an Acquisition of Property’, (2000) 11 Public 
Law Review 183. 
172 Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 177 ALR 436. 
173 ‘Public choice’ is a set of theories developed in James M. Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock. (1962), The 
Calculus of Consent (University of Michigan Press, 1962);  and Arrow, Kenneth J, Social Choice and 
Individual Values (Yale University Press, 1951, 2nd ed., 1963) 3.  More particularly, the idea of ‘rent 
seeking’ implies governments are the source of special privileges which market participants seek to 
garner for themselves, so reducing the efficiency overall of the economy. The privileges are provided in 
legislation and regulations: Gordon Tullock, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’, 
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The final matter referred to in the 2001 debate was a reaffirmation of the 
recommendation of the Report.  This was that one of the major issues with the 
implementation of the National Competition Policy was the misinformation that was 
being spread about the parlous state of the economy of the rural areas and some regions.  
The National Competition Policy was not responsible for much that was attributed to it.  
The solution had already been adopted: publicity.  That the populace did not understand 
was conveniently allied to the ‘falling man’ defence to say, ‘There are substantial 
benefits to come, if only you wait, and you are mistaken if you think the economic pain 
you are suffering is due to the National Competition Policy.’  This tack was taken by 
both Senators Knowles174 and McGauren.175 
 
Summary 
 
The debates over the National Competition Policy in both houses of Commonwealth 
Parliament threw up a number of arguments, some of which had effective rebuttals, 
some which did not and yet were allowed to slip away. Only some arguments lived to 
influence the carriage of the National Competition Policy.  Over the ten years of debate, 
the position adopted by the parties hardened, the debates became somewhat ritualistic 
and suborned to other political purposes. 
 
Newspaper articles 
 
As noted above, 176 some 7,400 newspaper articles deal with or mention ‘competition 
policy’. Of those articles, some 234 were substantial considerations of competition 
policy and not mere mentions en passant.177  Amongst the chaos of reportage and 
                                                                                                                                               
(1967) 5 Western Economic Journal 224; Anne Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society’. (1974) 64 American Economic Review 291. 
174 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 March 2001, 23104. 
175 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 March 2001, 23108. 
176 Above, n 3.   
177 For example, there were numerous about Alan Fels, Fred Hilmer and Graeme Samuels, in which their 
part in the National Competition Policy was mentioned as a biographical fact. 
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critical conversations in the 234 and as is apparent in the speeches made in Parliament, a 
number of themes are discernible.  However, in the case of the print media there is 
greater diversity of topic and less focus within each topic.  There is, accordingly, an 
increased danger of the observer finding amongst them what they are looking for.  
Nevertheless, the purpose here is to distil a ‘thick description to the immediate 
surrounding sphere of prompted reaction and its consequential action’; it can be merely 
hoped that only the irrelevant has been evaporated off by the researcher to leave a sense 
of the reaction to the National Competition Policy.178 
 
The identifiable issues in competition policy dealt with by newspapers are set out 
below.179  Some articles merely represent reporting of or reflections on Parliamentary 
debates, reports from inquiries (although there were none doing either in respect of 
submissions to inquiries), public speeches, various books and reports, and other 
academic writings.  Some were contributions to the debate in themselves; in particular 
Dr John Quiggin conducted a strong critical campaign through the media, and various 
competition policy supporters, such as Dr David Clark contributed articles and 
commentary.  That the articles were contributions to the debate in themselves or 
                                                 
178 Communications studies is a burgeoning field.  It looks at both the antecedent conditions of 
communication content and the effects of the communication, as well as of nature of the content itself, to 
deploy the analysis in Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy and Frederick Fico, Analysing Media Messages 
(Routledge, 3rd ed, 2014) 11.  The study undertaken here is not of this ilk.  It is a study of media reports as 
evidence of what happened.  In other words here the study is to gain some sort of idea of the signified not 
of the signifier.  Once we have that idea we may quibble over it in terms of the signifier but the range of 
possible meanings is too small to have discernible effect of the description here mounted. 
179 Referencing such a volume of material is problematic.  Does one note every single time a particular 
topic appears, in which case one must be extraordinarily confident that the research process was 
sufficiently exact and that the categorisation process sufficiently accurate, both of which propositions are 
doubtful?  Or does one simply give exemplars, in which case one is left open to the (unfair) accusation of 
argument by anecdote?  The choice here leans more to the latter with a numerical backing to the 
proposition that a certain issue was frequently considered.  In this some discrimination between articles 
can be made, with the force of citation lying in the quantum.  Of course, the quantum is approximate, as 
errors in attribution of articles to certain issues (and some are to more than one issue) and in identification 
of an article as dealing with a certain issue are inevitable.  (And also in counting.)  Nevertheless, the 
quantum is a rough measure of importance.  Where a claim is made hereafter that the references are 
representative of all articles written on the point, they will be simply cited.  If they are merely exemplars, 
the words ‘For example’ will proceed the citations. 
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reporting of such contributions does not need to be distinguished in this context: it is, 
after all, an exercise in observation as to what was debated, the critiques that were 
mounted and the reactions to them rather than an account of the debate as such. 
 
Narratives of the course of the National Competition Policy 
 
That governments in Australia had developed a joint competition policy and that it was 
being implemented, and that it came to an end with a form of replacement was reported 
on as significant in itself in more than 30 of the articles.  
 
The early development of the National Competition Policy was the focus of most of the 
articles under this heading, which is to be expected since once a policy is being effected 
its existence is not particularly newsworthy.  The first report identified here was in the 
Sydney Morning Herald on 14 August 1993, some two weeks before the Hilmer 
Committee reported.180  From then until April 1995, when the Agreements were signed, 
there were reports of the progress of their negotiation.181  Another ten or so of these 
were about the federal context.182  
 
Later, as interest in the fact of the National Competition Policy waned, so also did the 
number of articles simply describing it.  There were a couple of useful summaries of 
                                                 
180 Anne Davies, ‘Competition Laws Face Comprehensive Reform’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 
August 1993, 38. 
181 For example, Elisabeth Sexton, ‘Hilmer Seeks Public-Sector Shake-up’, The Australian Financial 
Review, 19 August 1993, 1; Maximilian Walsh, ‘Unions Prove Smith Right 200 Years Later’, Business, 
The Age, 27 August 1993, 17 (also Sydney Morning Herald); Geoff Kitney, ‘Biggest Hurdle Jumped’, 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1994, 1; Bruce Donald, ‘Big Change is the national 
management of competition, The Australian Financial Review,18 April 1995, 18; Bruce Carmody, ‘States 
Mug Hilmer Reforms’, The Australian Financial Review, 22 August 1994, 21; ‘Hilmer after COAG’, The 
Australian Financial Review,22 August 1994, 20; Michael Millett, ‘Competition To Rise As Hilmer 
Reforms Passed’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 March 1995, 6; Michelle Grattan, ‘Final Plank Placed 
in National Competition Platform’, The Age, 12 April 1995, 4. 
182 For example, ‘The Weakness in Hilmer’s Plan’, The Australian Financial Review, 26 August 1993, 
16; Louise Dodson, ‘States to Bow to PM on Competition – At a Price’, The Australian Financial 
Review, 25 February 1994, 3; Anna Bernasek, ‘Cracks Appear in Deal with States’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald,28 February 1994, 6. 
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progress.183  Mostly, however, the commentary was more focussed on and critical of 
particular application, events and people.  Nevertheless, towards the end of the period of 
the National Competition Policy, there was some interest in what was to happen on its 
expiry,184 although much of that concentrated on the fate of the National Competition 
Council.185 
 
Overall, then, newspapers did not show much interest in the National Competition 
Policy as a thing in itself.  The particular issues, controversies and the politics of its 
implementation, as summarised below, are far better represented in the record. 
 
Technical Critique 
 
Particular elements of the policy and certain competition law rules as aspects of the 
National Competition Policy were subject to a little commentary, more towards the 
beginning of the process.   Commentary as to competition law as amended in 1995 
included articles as to mergers,186 access,187 and the structure of administration of 
                                                 
183 Anne Davies and Brad Norrington, ‘Prices May Rise, Warns Consumer group’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 April 1995, 4; Glenda Korporaal, ‘Wonderful New World of Competition’, Business, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 1995, 41; Katherine Murphy, ‘Crushing Competition’, The 
Australian Financial Review, 8 July 1998, 14; Dr David Clark, ‘Microeconomic reform pros and cons’, 
The Australian Financial Review, 5 August 1998, 22. 
184 For example, David Uren, ‘Costello orders more competition reform’, The Australian, 24April 2004, 
8; Morgan Melish and Annabel Hepworth, ‘States urge competition shake-up’, The Australian Financial 
Review, 9 August 2004, 1; Laura Tingle, ‘Reform agenda sinks in federal-state mire’, The Australian 
Financial Review, 5 November 2004, 83; David Uren,’ Howard’s big bogy’, The Australian, 25 
November 2004, 11; James McCullough, ‘Lifestyle changes loom in review’  The Courier-Mail, 7 
February 2005, 17; David Uren, ‘Competition policy tops reform agenda’, The Australian, 2 January 
2006, 2. 
185 Tom O’Loughlin, ‘Call for abolition of competition council’, The Australian Financial Review, 27 
April 2004, 3; David Uren, ‘Competition council wants wider policy reach’, The Australian, 23 June 
2004, 28; Stephen Bartholomeusz, ‘When it comes to success, it’s hard to compete against the National 
Competition Policy’ Business, The Age, 18 October 2005, 10. 
186 ‘”Competition” Still an Enigma’, The Canberra Times, 11 November 1999, 11; ‘Competition policy 
still hits hard at small business’, The Canberra Times, 6 February 1994, 13. 
187 Henry Ergas, ‘Hilmer Pluses and Minuses’, The Australian Financial Review, 26 August 1993, 17; 
Helen Meredith, ‘Trouble ahead with competition law, say experts’, The Australian Financial Review, 11 
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competition law.188 Oddly, given the emphasis on the elements as such in the 
Agreements, few articles were about or even used the terminology of legislative 
reviews, competitive neutrality, prices oversight and structural reform, and those about 
access were purely descriptive.189  Privatisation received more attention,190 although the 
treatment was somewhat conditional and equivocal presumably because the Hilmer 
Committee’s lack of support for it191 and the explicit statement in the Competition 
Principles Agreement that the National Competition Policy was ‘neutral’ with respect to 
privatisation192 removed it as a critical target.  Moreover, in their discussions there was 
little distinction between ‘commercialisation’ and ‘corporatisation’, and privatisation,193 
which casts some doubt on the understanding of the journalists concerned.  
                                                                                                                                               
April 1995, 10; John M. Legge, ‘Get rid of this unnatural monopoly’, The Australian Financial Review, 
10 April 1996, 17; David Foreman, ‘Baxt Hammers Competition Policy’, The Australian, 15 October 
1997, 26; Brook Turner, ‘ACCI says access regime unworkable’, The Australian Financial Review, 18 
April 1995, 9. 
188 Ergas, above n. 187. 
189 As to contracting out (even though it is not an explicit element): Chris Aulich, ‘Ideology Built on 
Shifting Sands’, The Canberra Times, 31 July 1997; Geoffrey Newman, ‘Weighing the pros and cons of 
deregulation’, The Australian, 20 September 1997, 48; ‘Public or private? Confusion must be resolved’, 
The Australian Financial Review, 23 September 2000, 20. As to competitive neutrality: ‘Competition 
Policy Gone Mad as ACT Shelves Belconnen Pool’, The Canberra Times, 23 May 1998, 1. As to access, 
see above n. 187. 
190 ‘Michael Gill, ‘Why the $25BN Prvatisation Party is Over’, The Australian Financial Review, 25 
November 1993, 1; Rowan Callick, ‘Victoria’s A-G lists criteria for privatisation’, The Australian 
Financial Review, 23 November 1995, 10, John Quiggin, ‘Competition policy takes a nosedive’, The 
Australian Financial Review, 14 September 2001, 79. 
191 Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, 
National Competition Policy (1993), 226, 234-237. 
192 Clause 1(5): ‘This agreement is neutral with respect to the nature and form of ownership of business 
enterprises.  It is not intended to promote public or private ownership’. 
193 ‘Corporatisation’ is the process of changing the structure of governance of a government activity to 
that of a corporation, although the OED conflates them in defining ‘corporatisation’: ‘The introduction or 
imposition of the practices or values associated with a large business corporation; commercialization; the 
loss of independence or individual character, homogenization.’  Comp.: Australian Law Dictionary 
(OUP, 2013): ‘Transformation of state-owned enterprises into incorporated entities that carry out the 
functions at arm’s length from the government’; Encyclopaedic Australian law Dictionary (LexisNexis, 
online accessed 3 January 2014): ‘An approach to improving the performance of State enterprises by 
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Some commentary went a little further, dealing with risk194 and the international 
dimension of the applicability of competition laws.195  Overall, there was no discernible 
impact from the technical critique, even that revealing some expertise.  However, much 
of the critique of impacts on particular regions and industries, of the party political 
discussions and of federalism was about the impact of particular elements and the 
structure of the National Competition Policy itself, yet this was not reflected in the 
media discussions.  The point is that it was not seen as a matter of the elements or the 
National Competition Policy, rather of competition policy generally and there was little 
discussion of the technical detail of what was supposed to be happening. 
 
Impacts on particular industries and regions 
 
More than fifty of the articles in newspapers identified here as substantially about the 
National Competition Policy reflected the concerns expressed in Parliament as to the 
effect of implementation on particular industries and regions.  This probably understates 
the amount of media discussion as the newspapers surveyed were the major Australian 
periodicals, thus excluding those where one would expect that most of the more local 
matters would be recognised: when an impact is on a particular region or industry, it is 
                                                                                                                                               
creating managerial forms and structures similar to those of large private enterprises. The aim is to ensure 
that State enterprises perform in the interests of the owners, in this case the public. Managers are assigned 
full authority to manage the day to day affairs of State enterprises in accordance with a statement of 
commercial intent negotiated annually with the responsible Minister’; Stephen Bottomley, Government 
Business Enterprises and Public Accountability through Parliament, Research paper 18 1999-2000, 
Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Canberra, 2000: ‘the adoption of private sector management models and legal structures’.  The 
definition of ‘corporatisation’ adopted here focusses on the result of a ‘corporation’, not that which was 
changed.   ‘Commercialisation’ is prior and somewhat similar, although not so frequently referred to in 
competition policy debates; it involves setting commercial activities for the organisation whatever its 
form.  ‘Privatisation’, in this context, is the transferral of ownership of the consequent corporation away 
from the government.  The other, and contradictory, context is the transformation of a widely or publicly 
held (usually listed) corporation to a closely held one, usually with ownership by management. 
194 Roger Hogan, ‘Hilmer reforms could increase project risks’, The Australian Financial Review, 23 
February 1995, 35; Bina Brown, ‘Hilmer reforms reveal dangers’, The Australian, 19 July 1996, 27. 
195 Ergas, above n. 187. 
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not of significance to a wider audience.  In any event, some of the articles noted here are 
reports of speeches and protests about such effects and others were direct arguments for 
or against particular implementations of elements of the National Competition Policy in 
themselves.196  They were spread relatively evenly throughout its currency.   
 
Going from the general to the particular, concern about differential effect was expressed 
in seven articles,197 about the differential regional impact on rural regions in six,198 on 
agriculture as such in only two.199  However, the impact on particular rural industries 
was well documented: statutory marketing of various products,200 wheat,201 sugar,202 
                                                 
196 While the search term was ‘competition policy’ and it picked up a large number of articles, it is clear 
that a number of articles escaped the net.  For example, the application to prisons produced just one ‘hit’ 
(Katherine Murphy, ‘Private jails raise key questions’, The Australian Financial Review, 17 June 1997, 
28) yet the privatisation of prisons was highly controversial.  The net was not broadened in response 
because such articles were not about the National Competition Policy, rather about privatisation as a thing 
in itself.  Nevertheless, the search produced a broadbrush picture of what was discussed and intuitively 
that picture seems representative.   
197 ‘The Weakness in Hilmer’s Plan’, The Australian Financial Review, 26 August 1993, 16; Anna 
Bernasek, ‘Cracks Appear in Deal with States’, The Sydney Morning Herald,28 February 1994, 6; 
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199 Linda McSweeney, ‘Farmers warn on competition’, The Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1999, 25; Cathy 
Bolt, ‘Revolution in the wide, brown land’, Agribusiness Supplement, The Australian Financial Review, 9 
August 2000, 19. 
200 Stephen Wyatt, ‘Loopholes threaten marketing reform’, The Australian Financial Review, 18 April 
1995, 58, and ‘Why reform may be still-born’, The Australian Financial Review, 24 April 1995, 66; Craig 
Thomas, ‘Coalition Vows to Retain Wheat Board Monopoly’, Business, The Age, 22 November 1995, 31. 
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rice,203 forestry,204 dairy,205 and chickens206 are examples.  Other sectors about which 
there was comment included newsagents,207 prisons,208 welfare supply,209 
pharmacies,210 airlines,211 education212 and some local government services213 
                                                                                                                                               
201 ‘Keeping Coalition Cool’, Business, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 January 1996, 84; ‘Keeping 
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(especially the Belconnen swimming pool in Canberra214).  The professions, especially 
the legal profession215 also received some comment.216 
 
Most of the articles reported on various speeches by public figures arguing against the 
application of competition policy to the industry or region.  The argument was generally 
that it was not a Good Thing for the industry or would devastate the region.  In other 
words, there was a public interest in not applying competition policy.  Some articles 
reported on government decisions not to apply the policy and others on what happened 
when it was applied; for example, reductions in airline safety or corporate collapses.  
Certainly the sheer number of these articles demonstrates the concern felt in the 
community.  It was this concern which prompted at least two major government 
reports217 and was referred to in most of the others dealing with the National 
Competition Policy 
 
The commentary also highlighted some issues not otherwise apparent in the literature 
on the National Competition Policy.  In particular, the decisions not to apply National 
Competition Policy procedures to particular industries, such as newsagents, 
pharmaceuticals and lawyers, do not figure largely in the official literature or even in 
Hansard. Yet they evidence the fact the application of the National Competition Policy 
was subject to political influence.  Journalists treated this as obvious; however, it was a 
substantial derogation from the design of the National Competition Policy. This was 
that States and Territories chose what legislation to subject to legislation reviews and 
had the role of weighing the public interest but that the National Competition Council 
                                                 
214 ‘Competition Policy Gone Mad As ACT Shelves Belconnen Pool’, The Canberra Times, 23 May 
1998, 1, and many articles in the same newspaper in the following days.  Five years later: ‘A Ripple 
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had the role of determining whether competition payments should be made by assessing 
the degree of compliance with the intentions of the policy.  Certainly the National 
Competition Council railed against exemptions and attempted to spread the coverage 
wider, making deductions from the competition payments accordingly but it was just 
this attempt by the National Competition Council which brought criticism in the late 
1990s and its eventual demise as an arbiter of progress in the regime which replaced the 
National Competition Policy.  Moreover, the Commonwealth was not subject to the 
competition payments regime; as the National Competition Council noted in its final 
assessments, the Commonwealth was a laggard in application.   
 
Assessments of the National Competition Policy 
 
About twenty articles posed the question of whether the National Competition Policy 
was working or, later, whether it had worked.  The first ones appeared in May 1996218 
and they continued until 2005.219  Some reported defences220 others criticisms, either 
that it was good and not being well enough implemented,221 or that it bad in its present 
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form should be reformed222 or not implemented at all;223 most of these accepted that 
there was a question in the first place.  Quite a number of further articles suggested it 
would work better if the public understood it and that substantial effort should be put 
into making them do so.224  These reflected a major concern reflected in the official 
documentation that criticism arose from ignorance and therefore as much as possible 
should be done to educate the public.  This was discussed in Chapter 6; it is not 
surprising that newspaper articles complied. 
 
A notable aspect of critique directed at the National Competition Policy was the 
engagement of the National Competition Council in defending it.  This was particularly 
so after the suggestions, noted immediately above, that the real problem with the 
National Competition Policy (insofar as one was admitted) was the explanation of it.  
Indeed the Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select 
Committee recommended as much in 2000. Even before that recommendation, the then 
President, Graeme Samuel, directly replied225 to a John Quiggin critique.226  Another 
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exchange was prompted by an Australian Financial Review editorial.227  A letter was 
published the next day criticising the editorial,228 to which Ed Willett, the executive 
director of the National Competition Council replied in defence of the editorial.229   
 
Whatever the imperative to communicate, the assessments and critiques are notable for 
their lack of detail.  It is a matter of polemic rather than reason.  There is little 
assessment of the assessments.  This goes to support the point frequently made in earlier 
chapters that assessment was all but impossible and that debate was therefore ill-
informed.  For these reasons even the early arguments that competition policy was 
necessary230 are evidence of a debate but have little otherwise to add to that debate.231  
They are statements of a position rather than reasoned arguments.  At most they assert 
the ‘falling man’ defence to the criticism that there was no evidence the National 
Competition Policy was working.  This was that there would be no evidence until the 
completion of the program so there was no point criticising it now. 
 
Political context 
 
Politics is the stuff of newspapers, especially national ones.  Thus numerous articles 
were published about the politics of the National Competition Policy: thirty-four of the 
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articles surveyed for this analysis directly commented in terms of party politics and 
another 16 in terms of the state politics and election results.   
 
The extent of discussions of the politics of the National Competition Policy represents 
direct evidence of another matter not obvious in the official literature, although its 
existence can be inferred from some decisions and comments, and the emphasis in the 
media on the effects of implementation on rural regions and industries.  This was the 
deep unpopularity of the National Competition Policy in rural and regional areas, and 
more generally in the states of Western Australia, Queensland and, to a less obvious 
extent, South Australia.  This various politicians seized upon to bolster, or perhaps 
simply to maintain, their electoral chances. Most notably, Pauline Hanson made the 
National Competition Policy one of her chief targets for polemic and its extinguishment 
became one of the chief planks in her One Nation Party platform.232   While this is 
commonly commented on in the literature about the National Competition Policy,233 it 
was also true of elements in the National Party, putting great strain on the coalition with 
the Liberal party, a coalition that was in power for most of the currency of the National 
Competition Policy.  Some of this has already been dealt with in the context of 
Parliamentary proceedings. 
 
The unpopularity of competition policy generally has been a feature of its 
implementation in many places around the world since the 1980s.  There have been 
innumerable articles in the media and academic literature from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives written about it as well as plays,234 books235 and even musicals.236 
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233 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003); see, for example, 
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However, it is important to distinguish that literature from the topic of this thesis.  Here, 
for reasons set out in Chapter 1, the account is restricted to the National Competition 
Policy and hence the interest is in political reaction specifically to it.  Of course, the 
reaction might have been to something else yet naming the National Competition Policy 
as the responsible policy.  These reactions are also of interest here because, even if the 
attribution is erroneous, the National Competition Policy itself might have altered in 
consequence.  Moreover, continual and futile efforts were made to disentangle the 
effects of the National Competition Policy from other developments of the time, 
culminating in the Productivity Commission’s final assessment where the impossibility 
of doing so was conceded.   If the Productivity Commission in defending its position 
that the National Competition Policy was a very Good Thing could not distil out the 
effects of the National Competition Policy, one can hardly expect anyone else to be able 
to do so. 
 
As adverted to above, the most famous political reaction to the National Competition 
Policy was the rise of One Nation.  The abolition of the National Competition Policy 
was one of its major party platform planks.  This is easily traced through the newspaper 
articles, from mid-1998237 when it won 11 seats in Queensland’s 1998 election.  The 
impact of the One Nation’s meteoric rise was felt in the policies of the National Party238 
and in a lessening commitment to the policy by the Commonwealth Government239 and 
the Opposition.240  As mentioned before, the National Competition Council as well as 
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other bodies attempted rebuttal241 but, in the words of Robert Manne in 2001, One 
Nation’s attack on the National Competition Policy was too inarticulate to be rationally 
argued.242  Oddly enough, after 1998 the commentary died away, to be replaced with 
dissection of the National Party’s reaction.  Perhaps this was perceived by editors to be 
more interesting as it reflected on the unity of the Government. 
 
The National Party had already suffered from reactions to the National Competition 
Policy.  This came particularly in the form of attacks on it by Senator Boswell243 and Mr 
Bob Katter,244 most of which are recorded above under Speeches in Parliament.  In 
1995, in the final stages of negotiation of the Agreements and in response to them, there 
even was talk of splits in the Coalition, if not the National Party itself.245 These tensions 
continued for the remainder of the National Competition Policy.246  In 2001 Bob Katter 
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left the National Party to form his own party, substantially over the debate over the 
National Competition Policy.247 
 
The consequence of the ‘hostility’ of many National Party members to the National 
Competition Policy led to a ‘wobbly’ commitment to it by their Coalition partners, the 
Liberal Party.248  This appears to be the cause of the exemptions and exceptions 
provided by the Government from 1996 on, as detailed above under ‘Impacts on 
particular industries and regions’ above.  Labor also diluted its commitment, apparently 
in response to vigorous urging by the Party in Queensland.249 
 
Most attention was paid to attacks on the National Competition Policy in Queensland250 
and, to a lesser extent, in Western Australia.251 That there was focus on Queensland is to 
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be expected as One Nation originated in that State.  Little was said about the National 
Competition Policy directed specifically at other states and territories.  In respect of 
Victoria, this is unsurprising as its Government, until it changed in 2001, was stridently 
pro-competition policy and hence most discussion was internally directed.  South 
Australia received little mention although some of the earliest protests were from there.  
Nor did New South Wales receive much consideration.  There was a little media 
commentary on the impact of the National Competition Policy on election results, 
asserting that elections were lost on the issue of electricity and privatisation in New 
South Wales and Tasmania,252 but this is far less than the commentary elsewhere which 
was about changes in government in South Australia, Western Australia and 
Queensland.253 
 
Perhaps the most egregious gap in the coverage was in relation to local government.  
This, as was seen when the elements of National Competition Policy were discussed in 
Chapter 7, was the cutting edge of the implementation of the policy yet the national 
newspapers said little about it.   
 
Overall, then, the media coverage of the politics of the National Competition Policy 
overwhelmingly focussed on the reaction represented by One Nation and the consequent 
impacts on the policies of other parties.  That there were such impacts is clear, as the 
Commonwealth Government wobbled in its commitment, especially by granting 
exemptions.  Other Governments deployed the public interest criterion of legislation 
reviews to escape electoral impact, a process well documented by the National 
Competition Council as detailed in Chapters 6 and 7 above. 
 
Particular critiques 
 
A number of issues and critiques received just a few comments.  This is not to say they 
are any less important or cogent, merely that newspapers did not see them as such in 
relation to competition policy.   
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Equity 
 
One of the issues which for an economist is peripheral, if not irrelevant to competition 
policy, is equity. Efficiency for them is one thing, equity is another.  Equity, in the 
design of the National Competition Policy was to be a matter of the public interest and 
was a mediation of the impact of its elements.254  In other words, the pursuit of 
competition might derogate from equity, but this was a choice that had to be made in 
each case.  Thus the question of who was to benefit from the National Competition 
Policy was not a matter of critique of competition, but of implementation actions, 
including exemption or Community Service Obligations.255  Nevertheless, who 
benefitted from the National Competition Policy and whether overall equity in the 
community was affected and to what extent was a matter of contention.256  The most 
pointed of these critiques were that consumers were not benefitting257 and that it was 
directed at serving big business258 – a proposition the Business Council of Australia 
                                                 
254 The Hilmer Committees put it this way (Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred 
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encouraged by bewailing lack of progress.259  On the other hand, complaints of lack of 
equity were met with the claim that competition leaves everyone better off,260 a 
proposition about averages of little comfort to individuals who lost employment or 
towns and regions that lost services. 
 
Social Costs 
 
Related to equity are the social costs of implementing competition policy. Just as with 
equity, these are defined as outside what competition does.  The social costs in relation 
to particular regions and industries are dealt with above, but a couple of articles 
explicitly considered social costs in general terms.261 
 
Ideological Biases 
 
That the Productivity Commission and the National Competition Council had particular 
theoretical orientation has been considered in Chapter 5.  That this was so was 
commented on but rarely, particularly considering the degree to which such biases were 
the stuff of Parliamentary debate.  Nevertheless, both the Productivity Commission and 
the National Competition Council were accused of lack of objectivity, although all but 
one article were written by just one journalist, Ian Henderson.262   
                                                 
259  Nick Tabakoff,  ‘Bosses Unhappy with Pace of Micro-economic  Reform: Study’, The Australian 
Financial Review, 3 February 1995, 9; Michelle Grattan, ‘Coalition Warned Not to Weaken Policy’, The 
Age, 18 January 1996, 6; Steve Lewis and Katherine Murphy, ‘Reform credentials under attack’ The 
Australian Financial Review, 29 January 1996, 3; Richard Gluyas, ‘BCA takes a shot at Hanson’, The 
Australian, 22 July 1998, 24. 
260 Geoff Carmody, ‘States Mug Hilmer Reforms’, The Australian Financial Review, 22 August 1994, 21; 
Ross Gittins, ‘Let’s Just Get on with Micro-economic Reform’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 
1995, 38; Michael Stutchbury, ‘Clean policy, dirty political word’, The Australian Financial Review, 7 
August 1998, 35; James Chessell, ‘National Competition Policy A Hot Potato’, The Age, 26 October 
2001, 2. 
261 Stuart Washington, ‘Social costs of competition “outweigh economic benefits”’ The Australian 
Financial Review, 16 November 1998, 8; Paul Robinson, ‘Mateship Victim of Economic Trends’, The 
Age, 2 July 1999, 7 
262 As to the Productivity Commission, see Jane Nicholls, ‘Beware fight-back of market panacea’, The 
Australian, 24July 1996, 18; Ian Henderson, ‘Disquiet on the Economic Front’, The Australian, 23 
344 
 
 
Overweening Power of the National Competition Council 
 
Much more obviously than the Parliamentary debates reveal but often mentioned in 
reports of inquiries, the power of the National Competition Council was also a frequent 
topic of newspaper discussion.  The National Competition Council was given the power 
of assessment by the Implementation Agreement, but the question that exercised many 
articles was whether its intended power was exceeded;263 indeed, some of these 
explicitly asked whether such power as it had was appropriate.264  Some, of course, 
defended its powers or viewed them complacently.265  The main ground upon which the 
National Competition Council was argued to be illegitimate was its power over 
Governments. 
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Theory of Competition 
 
Just occasionally, journalists ventured into either direct critique of the economics of 
competition policy or, more frequently, reporting of such critiques.  Such matters the 
contest between co-operation and competition,266 contestability theory,267 and what 
competition really is,268 can be added to the particular technical critiques mentioned 
above.  John Quiggin added the problem of measurement: even if you accept the theory, 
was it as effective as the figure assessments generally derived?269  Despite these 
interventions, little of the economics was critically considered.   
 
Bureaucrats in Charge 
 
A feature of accounts, including that in Chapter 4, of the development, negotiation and 
drafting of the Agreements at the core of the National Competition Policy is the 
centrality of bureaucrats to the policy.  This became a political issue in 1999 which was 
picked up in three articles.270  Generally it was somewhat allied to the arguments about 
the ideological biases of the Productivity Commission and the National Competition 
Council, but there is a hint of Pusey’s ‘economic rationalism’271 about at least the 
reporting, if not that reported on.  Thus it is a broader point and one worth noting that 
there was a challenge to the discursive structure of the way the National Competition 
Policy was developed and implemented.  That being said, it is also worth noting that the 
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issue of the discursive structure of policy formation and implementation is only one of 
many issues that arise from a study of the National Competition Policy and it is one 
which had the least impact on that implementation.  Moreover, if there was bureaucratic 
influence it does not follow that there was some sort of plot or bureaucratic self-interest 
at work: it is wiser to assume incompetence.  There was at least one report of the lack of 
bureaucratic expertise, particularly at the State, Territory and especially local 
government level, to do the sorts of things expected of them by the Agreements,272 
although one could make the tart remark that lack of expertise does not militate against 
undue influence. 
 
Federalism 
 
A core feature of the National Competition Policy is that it operated in a federal 
environment: the Agreements were between governments and were formulated in the 
context of the federal/state vertical fiscal imbalance.  Many of the articles in the 
newspapers reflected this by discussing the relations between the Commonwealth 
government and those of the States and Territories.  Some were about the differential 
impact between economies, others about the politics of the situation.   
 
Early articles were about the making of the Agreement.273 Indeed most of the discussion 
of the formulation of competition policy was in terms of the impact on federation.  This 
supports the argument that the National Competition Policy was an articulation of 
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competition policy more generally within the Australian federation, although that still 
leaves open the possibility that in doing so competition policy itself was reformulated.  
In any event, the early descriptions of federalism culminated in (surprisingly few) 
reports on the eventual structure of relations as set out in Chapter 2.274  
 
Later articles began to see the federal aspect of the National Competition Policy as an 
inhibition or distortion of competition policy.275 There were reports of National 
Competition Council frustration with the progress of States and Territories (and later the 
Commonwealth) in implementing the various elements of the National Competition 
Policy.276  By 2000, the compact represented by the Agreements was thought to be 
fraying but there was little agreement on alternative directions.277  Few of these drilled 
down into the public interest test, which circumscribed the freedom of governments to 
deviate from the competition principle enunciated in the Agreements.278   
 
Political Economy 
 
In as much as Bab Katter and Mark Latham gave speeches in Parliament espousing 
political philosophies of differing varieties, the newspapers picked up two major 
discussions of the place of competition in the pantheon of policies available to 
governments.  These were as to the nature of ‘civil society’ and the promotion of a 
                                                 
274 Mike Nahan, ‘Reform not bound to competition policy’, The Australian Financial Review, 28 April 
1995, 24 
275 Tom Connor, ‘Old, opaque and oblique hit reform’, The Australian, 19 July 1996, 29; Ian Henderson, 
‘Hilmer policy provokes anxiety over State powers’, The Australian,  28 November 1996, 34; David 
Foreman, ‘States bear brunt of competition reform costs, The Australian, 3 November 1997, 6. 
276 Ian Henderson, ‘Play fair, competition watchdog warns States’, The Australian, 17 February 1998, 4; 
Katherine Murphy, ‘Qld challenge to Howard competition policy’, The Australian Financial Review, 13 
November 1998, 8 
277 ‘Real challenge of government’, The Australian Financial Review, 2 November 2000, 50; Morgan 
Mellish and Annabel Hepworth, ‘States urge competition shake-up’, The Australian Financial Review, 9 
August 2004, 1; Laura Tingle, ‘Reform agenda sinks in federal-state mire’, The Australian Financial 
Review, 5 November 2004, 83; David Uren, ‘Howard’s big bogy’, The Australian, 25 November 2004, 
11; ‘State parochialism hampers nation’, The Australian Financial Review, 30 April 2005, 62. 
278 An exception was Cathy Bolt, ‘Revolution in the wide, brown land’, Agribusiness Supplement, The 
Australian Financial Review, 9 August 2000, 19. 
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‘third way’ between welfarism and neo-liberalism.  Neither appeared to have the 
slightest effect on the National Competition Policy, although that is not to say that the 
intellectual legitimisation, or the possibility of it, of countering the hegemony of the 
goodness of competition did not foster the controversy over the Victorian Auditor-
General or the recasting of the public interest test and the constraints placed on the 
National Competition Council in 2000.  
 
In 1995 Eva Cox delivered the Boyer Lectures, entitled A Truly Civil Society.279 In these 
speeches, she argued that the quality of life, human needs and the social system itself 
were undervalued compared to the emphasis placed on wealth creation.  Trust, goodwill 
and co-operation were being undermined.  This is in contrast to competition, which in 
the National Competition Policy is the default when no positive public interest can be 
shown.280  These lectures were extensively reported, Eva Cox herself contributing,281 
and the connection with competition policy made.282 However, there was little rigorous 
analysis, in terms of the civil society philosophy, of the National Competition Policy as 
an articulation of competition policy.283  This provided a space for defenders, even 
proselytizers, of competition to argue against notions of civil society, which they did it 
surprisingly strong terms.284   
                                                 
279 ABC Books, 1995.  Eva Cox drew her inspiration from the political philosophy of Robert Putnam. 
280 For a more recent similar essay, see Tony Judt, ‘What is Living and What is Dead in Social 
Democracy?’, The New York Review of Books, 17 December 2009. 
281 Eva Cox, ‘Rationalism Devours Social Capital’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 1995, 15; 
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November 1995, 
282 Rachel Gibson, ‘Try Trust, If Marx and Markets Fail’, The Age, 3 November 1995, 19; 18; Mark 
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Stephen Long, ‘Finding another way’, The Australian Financial Review, 6 February 1999, 27 
283 The only attempt seems to have been Geoff Davies, ‘The crumbling of competitive ideals, The 
Canberra Times, 5 October 2001, 9, and this was a commentary by an academic. 
284 David Clark, ‘Taking stock of Eva’s lolly shop’, The Australian Financial Review, 29 November 
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12 January 2001, 15; Mike Nahan, ‘Stand up for capitalism’, The Australian, 4 April 2001, 13; Simon 
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In the 1990s, the sociologist Anthony Giddens coined the term ‘the Third Way’ to 
describe attempts by governments and theoreticians to develop approaches that lay 
between left and right, between statism and neo-liberalism.285  These ideas were rapidly 
adopted by politicians such as Tony Blair in the United Kingdom286 and, relevantly, 
Mark Latham in Australia.287  The former was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
between 1997 and 2007, and the latter was the Leader of the Opposition in the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia between December 2003 and January 
2005.  Both these politicians published books espousing the Third Way in 1998 and 
accordingly there was much media discussion (albeit mostly written by Mark Latham 
himself), in this case extending to 2006.288  Again, there is no traceable direct impact, 
although the impact on the regions and rural industries received more attention from 
that time.  It is noticeable that Mark Latham did not resile from promoting the benefits 
of competition, taking an approach very similar to that implicit in the National 
Competition Policy.  Although Latham did not explicitly make the connection, the 
National Competition Policy itself is an excellent example of the Third Way in practice 
as it provided for competition mediated by the public interest. 
 
                                                 
285 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way, The Renewal of Social Democracy (Polity, 1998). Discussion of 
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Conclusions 
 
While the themes and topics in each of the main data sources (inquiries, Hansard and 
print media) for this chapter are reasonably obvious, there is a surprising diversity in the 
topics each covered.  Inquiries are directed by terms of reference and accordingly their 
reports are confined to the topics at which they are directed. Even the submissions to the 
inquiries are limited, despite there being no requirement for them to be so.  In the three 
here reviewed, only the Senate Select Committee Inquiry into the Socio-Economic 
Consequences of the National Competition289 was appointed in reaction to rather than in 
support of the National Competition Policy.  Even then the recommendations were 
tempered by the bi-partisan responsibility for the National Competition Policy.  
Speeches in Parliament were mostly similarly confined, although Democrat, Green, One 
Nation and independent members of Parliament repeatedly denounced it on a number of 
grounds.  Newspaper articles dealt with a different yet discernibly related set of themes, 
mainly focussing on the politics of the National Competition Policy. 
 
Despite assertions to the contrary in numerous reports and speeches, there was 
considerable opposition on clear grounds to the National Competition Policy.  These 
grounds were that it: 
 implemented competition policy, which is wrong in itself. 
 was ill thought out in terms of  
- competition policy as a thing in itself and in terms of the way 
competition policy was pursued; 
- as enabling the implementation of certain elements of competition policy 
in a federal state; and 
- in its administrative arrangement, particularly the power of the National 
Competition Council over sovereign governments and the conferral of 
power on bureaucrats. 
 challenged notions of parliamentary democracy both in respect of the 
administration as detailed above, but also in relation to governance of 
governments by agreements made by prior governments; 
                                                 
289 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000.   
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 had devastating impacts on individuals, regions and industries and that 
compensation was ruled out; and 
 caused disruption to the fabric of Australian society. 
 did not do what was claimed it would do are that it did do. 
 
Governments developed defences to critique. These defences if not persuasively 
effective, were sufficient to enable them to ignore the critique.  They were the ‘duck’, 
the ‘weave’ and the ‘falling man’.   
 The ‘duck’: this was deployed by implementing governments. It was to the 
effect that since the implementing Government was required by the 
Commonwealth to do these things and because huge amounts of money 
depended on it, complaints should be taken to the Commonwealth. 
 The ‘weave’: this was deployed by the Commonwealth.  It was to the effect that 
that the National Competition Policy only set up a structure which enabled the 
decisions of implementing governments to be effected without the distortions of 
the federal/state vertical fiscal imbalance.  Implementing governments still had 
the capacity and were required to take into account the public interest. If the 
public, individual, regional or industry interests were insufficiently regarded, it 
was a matter for the processes of the implementing government and not the 
Commonwealth. 
 The ‘falling man’: this was deployed by all governments.  It was that at any 
point in time it was too early to ascertain whether the benefits that would flow 
from the implementation of the National Competition Policy.  That benefits 
would flow was the best advice that governments had. 
 
It was not only explicit defences that fended off opposition.  The very structure of the 
National Competition Policy confined critique.  The terms of reference of inquiries were 
controlled by Governments and to the extent that they were not the composition of the 
Committee was sufficient.  Moreover, it had been put in place by the major parties 
acting together and with the implementing governments by agreement.  Accordingly 
party politics in Parliament precluded sustained debate.  In the House of Representatives 
there was virtually none; in the Senate a little, with the same protagonists for the 
decade.  Further, substantial money flows bound governments to the National 
Competition Policy and bureaucracies adhered to rationalities that made it incontestable.  
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In the media, a substantial campaign, explicitly encouraged by every Parliamentary 
report and most National Competition Council reports of various types, argued strongly 
against any doubt cast on the National Competition Policy.  All critique was viewed as 
the product of ignorance and thus to be combatted by education and commentary. 
 
Competition policy is clearly about the political economy of society. It also, as various 
submissions argued, is about the nature of society. The Standing Committee on Family 
and Community Affairs of the Commonwealth House of Representatives in 1998 
identified in explicit terms that not enough was known about the impact of competition 
policy on the welfare system and society generally.290 Yet it was rebuked by the 
Government of the day.  Debate, or even discussion, about competition policy in these 
terms was not joined during the currency of the National Competition Policy.291  The 
most that can be said of the media is that it picked up on the Civil Society movement, 
mainly due to the Boyer Lectures by Eva Cox in 1995, and the Third Way, although this 
was not so much critical as supportive of the formulation of competition policy in the 
National Competition Policy.   
 
This is not to say there were not many possible ways to locate the National Competition 
Policy in a sociology of Australia or even within economic theory.  Critical discourses 
substantially ignored in all data sources reviewed here included: 
 The debate over the nature of the person within neo-liberalism;292 
 Intimate citizenship as the other of the consumer-citizen;293 
 The ethics of competition;294 
                                                 
290 Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs, Commonwealth House of Representatives, 
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292 See above n 36. 
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Washington Press, 2003). 
294 See generally David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (1965); Howard Chang, ‘A Liberal 
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 The public choice economics as justifying the preference for competition;295 
 Problems of measurement;296 and 
 Economics itself  
- Transaction cost economics;297 
- Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and compensation;298 
- Feminist economics;299 
- The problem of second best;300 
- Property rights economics as precluding the taking of rents;301 and 
- Epistemology.302 
All of these were available to reporters, parliamentarians and committees, yet none of 
them had any discernible effect on discussion, let alone on implementation of the 
policy.  What confined the debate is both epistemologically and evidentially difficult to 
ascertain.  It might have been the hermeneutic nature of economic theory, the lack of 
knowledge and expertise of those involved, the power of government and bureaucracy 
ranked against it, or the lack of interest of the public in more difficult topics. 
 
                                                 
295 See above n 169. 
296 This was substantially the points made repeatedly, but to little effect by John Qiggin; see above nn 
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297 Ian R Macneil: ‘Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neo 
Classical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 854; Oliver E 
Williamson, for example, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 233. 
298 See, again, above n 169 
299 Gillian Hewitson, Feminist Economics: Interrogating the Masculinity of Rational Economic Man 
(Edward Elgar, 1999). 
300 Usefully summarised in Ted Kolsen, ‘Microeconomic Reform and National Competition Policy: 
Misconceptions and Problems’, (1996) 55 Australian Journal of Public Administration, 83, 84-5.. 
301 Above n 168. 
302 See the discussion in David A Wishart, ‘Arguing Against the Economics of (say) Corporations Law’, 
(2003) 26 The University of New South Wales Law Journal 540. 
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In the circumstances of a profoundly circumscribed debate, opposition took the form of 
irrationality.  There was no underlying logic to the One Nation platform or even Bob 
Katter’s agrarian protectionism. Yet of critiques, irrationality was the most effective.  
The response was a weakening of the administrative arrangements and an increase in 
exemptions.  Paradoxically, heightened efforts to educate and inform were made, to 
little discernible effect. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
The story of the National Competition Policy, in so far as this thesis relates it, is now 
complete.  This Chapter makes sense of that story and in so doing establishes the 
arguments of this thesis, thereby concluding it.  It does so by taking up the hypotheses 
and questions posed in Chapter 1 and testing and answering them.  It also makes 
observations on matters thrown up by that story in terms of (in order of generality) the 
National Competition Policy, policy studies and the epistemology of research.  Finally, 
it reflects on the thesis, considering its limitations in achieving its aims.  However, 
before it moves to those matters, it summarizes the story and how it was narrated. 
 
A Thick Study 
 
Chapter 1 develops out the idea of thick studies. It is a way of minimizing theory 
contingency.  It focusses on the transactions that take place and demands that as detailed 
a description of those transactions as possible be set out.  From that observations are 
made.  It represents a direct challenge to the scientific method of hypothesis and 
refutation, reverting to the older tradition of conclusion from observation.  It also takes 
up where governmentality leaves off, focussing on discourses constituting power and 
techniques of exercising it as encapsulating and making possible the transactions of 
government. Unlike, perhaps even despite, governmentality, it does not abjure 
evaluation. 
 
The thick approach was adopted here because to date the study of the National 
Competition Policy has generally been undertaken from particular theoretical 
standpoints and the conclusions reached have inevitably been confined in relevance to 
those respective standpoints.  Even the obvious question, ‘Was the National 
Competition Policy worth doing?’ has never been asked from a perspective other than 
economics and the answer has always been conditioned by the measurements that 
economics carries out.   
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On the other hand the volume of material dealing with the National Competition Policy 
is enormous; this necessitates condensing and abstracting the data.  Yet any process by 
which the data is distilled so that the important remains prejudices the idea of thick 
study.  Even the choice between what is ‘data’ and what is not involves a discourse 
about epistemology which distorts the study.  There is, therefore, a Scylla of theory 
contingency and a Charybdis of an unbounded volume of material.  The path chosen 
between them was to summarise with current theory contingencies in mind as 
abstractions to be avoided, to describe the National Competition Policy as multiple 
stories and to spend ten years looking at the material. 
 
If a thing is to be examined in a thick study – indeed, in any study – it is best to 
commence by defining it as exactly as possible.  This is especially true when looking at 
matters of human society.  However, to do so is fraught with issues; for example, the 
definition chosen might predetermine the analysis, or the matter might have no fixed 
boundary.  Yet those are not reasons to avoid the task; they are merely reasons for care.  
Chapter 2 defined the National Competition Policy as certain agreements between the 
governments of Australia, although not including local government. Those agreements 
contained a set of prescription, an institutional structure and a set of mutual promises.  
The necessary care was to ensure that taking those agreements as representing the 
National Competition Policy did not preclude the examination of other ways of thinking 
about the National Competition Policy. 
 
Taking the National Competition Policy to be the terms of a set of agreements has the 
advantage of providing a fixed point for the study, both in time and in terms of contents, 
in a situation where there is no unanimity as to what ‘National Competition Policy’ 
means yet the term is bandied about as if it did indeed have a fixed meaning.  
Accordingly, a story could be developed which, after describing the thing itself, would 
deal with its context, history and implementation.  It is this that is developed in Chapters 
3 to 7 and presented in digestible form immediately below.  ‘Implementation’, dealt 
with in Chapters 5 and 6, is divided into an overall timeline and a more detailed 
focussed timeline for each of the elements of the policy.  This story represents the major 
achievement claimed for this thesis: through it the National Competition Policy is 
‘made known, analysed and assessed’ in ways heretofore not possible. 
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The Story in Brief 
 
In the 1980s there was a Western world-wide movement, variously described, away 
from state-centred governance to a greater reliance on market mechanisms, 
contestability of service provision, and strong competition laws. We can call the 
movement as one implementing competition policy. There was little intellectual 
challenge to these ideas nor to their foundation in economics.  Some argued that 
government bureaucracies were captured by the ideas of economics; there is very little 
evidence against that proposition. 
 
Competition policy was evident in most parts of Australia and most particularly in 
Victoria. However, certain projects were stymied by the federal arrangements obtaining 
in Australia.  These projects included a national electricity market and water reform.  
Were State and Territory governments to give up revenue flows from government 
business enterprises any tax revenues deriving from advantages to the community 
would flow to the Commonwealth, not to the State and Territory government and thus 
revenues would be compromised.  Moreover, there was no established forum in which 
such matters could be negotiated.  
 
In the early 1990s, a number events coalesced into the development of the National 
Competition Policy.  The first of these was that governments for the most part 
(Queensland and Western Australia being more reluctant) were keen to keep 
implementing competition policy, albeit with varying emphases.  The Commonwealth, 
with the agreement of State and Territory governments, set up an inquiry to formulate a 
universally applicable notion of what competition policy entailed and how it should be 
implemented.  The result of this inquiry was the Hilmer Report.1  In it competition 
policy was formalised into a number of elements, procedures for implementation in the 
federal environment were suggested and a programmatic approach recommended.  It 
strongly, even axiomatically argued that competition was good and that it should 
displace other ways of doing government business to the extent possible given the 
public interest.  It threw doubt on even that concept, warning against ‘rent-seeking’ in 
                                                 
1 Committee of Inquiry into National Competition Policy (Fred Hilmer, Chairman), Commonwealth, 
National Competition Policy 1993. 
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government.  It thus drew a boundary on government: that it should do nothing that 
could be done in a competitive process and monopoly should be constrained wherever 
possible.  No rigorous counterargument to these propositions were made either to the 
inquiry or later, apart from union and church-based argument that cooperation was to be 
valued. The economic ideas were not challenged. 
 
The second major circumstance involved in the development of the National 
Competition Policy was the development of a forum for meetings of Heads of 
Australia’s Commonwealth, State and Territory governments.  This was the Council of 
Australian Governments.  Prior to its establishment there had been considerable 
discussion about the federal arrangements in Australia and some structural issues that 
they were seen to create in relation to policy and governance generally.  A forum for 
negotiation and agreement of the issues by governments was a way of compromising 
between the separate sovereignties of the State and Commonwealth (or federal) polities 
and the need for national coordination.  The National Competition Policy was one of the 
earliest matters considered within the Council of Australian Governments.  It took the 
form of a set of agreements between the Governments.  Indeed, their negotiation 
comprised much of the early business of the Council, arguably playing a formative and 
legitimating influence on its structure and functioning. 
 
The third major influence on the development of the National Competition Policy was a 
change in the institutional structure of policy advice within the Commonwealth 
government.  Consultative bodies set up in the 1980s were transformed into expert 
bodies.  Out of this process arose the Productivity Commission, the function of which 
was to research facts, for which consultation was data-gathering or theory testing, rather 
than consultation as a process of eliciting views.  While still sub nom. the Industry 
Commission, the Productivity Commission produced a legitimating assessment of the 
benefits of implementing some form of national competition policy.  This was an 
indication of what a particular model of the economy calculated as the best possible 
outcome, although until about 2000 it was taken to be the probable outcome.  Later the 
benefits were revised down by more than 50%. 
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The ultimate form of the National Competition Policy was of three agreements (the 
‘Agreements’2) between the States and Territories, and the Commonwealth.  The first 
(the Conduct Code Agreement’) dealt with extensions to competition law made possible 
by legislative techniques for multi-jurisdictional applicability of laws.  Competition law 
was extended to various State and Territory government instrumentalities and non-
corporate firms outside federal jurisdiction. The second agreement, (the ‘Competition 
Principles Agreement’) set out the elements of competition policy: competitive 
neutrality, structural reform, legislation reviews, prices surveillance, and a regime as to 
access to essential facilities.  It also provided for the application of the Policy to local 
government – a matter to remain within the competence of the States and Territories.  
The final agreement (the ‘Implementation Agreement’) provided for the payment to the 
States and Territories of substantial money on achievement of the goals of the Policy as 
assessed by a National Competition Council to be established in the then Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth.). 
 
In terms of competition policy as obtaining prior to the Agreements, the National 
Competition Policy defined as the Agreements made the following changes.  It: 
 Extended the existing competition laws to cover State government business and 
non-corporate firms. 
 Provided a regime for access to essential facilities where interstate issues had 
defeated previous intra-jurisdictional attempts. 
 Removed impediments to and encouraged the development of national markets 
for various utilities, including water, electricity and gas, and also for various 
modalities of transport. 
 Provided States and Territories (but not the Commonwealth) with incentives to 
engage with certain well established but newly defined elements of competition 
policy, including competitive neutrality and structural reform.   
 Altered and confined the existing system of prices control to one of surveillance 
of government monopolies.  
 Created a process of legislation reviews in which competition was preferred but 
also in which the public interest was recognised, if somewhat subordinated. 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 1, n 12. 
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Of these, only the last can be considered as a development of competition policy and 
that only in respect of its programmatic nature and explicit preference for competition.  
However, at a more theoretical level, it could be said to have attempted to extend 
competition to a generalised policy position, on the level of human rights, rule of law, 
financial cost, social welfare and so forth. 
 
In terms of its effects on the procedures and structures of government, the National 
Competition Policy had more profound implications. It: 
 Exemplified the new institutional arrangements for federalism in the form of the 
Council of Australian Governments. 
 Developed the practice of intergovernmental agreements into both more binding 
and extensive forms. 
 Built on the federal/state vertical fiscal imbalance to establish new forms of 
intergovernmental control; namely that of payment on condition of performance 
assessed by bureaucratic process.  Nevertheless, it did not derogate from the 
sovereign nature of the States, being careful to retain State and Territory consent 
to the implementation of the various elements.  There was no compulsion, 
merely financial consequences. 
 Reinforced the growing influence of expert institutions at the expense of 
consultative bodies. 
 
Reaction to the Hilmer Report and subsequently the National Competition Policy as set 
out in the Agreements was initially somewhat muted.  There was political bi-partisan 
support, hence political challenge was limited to that from minority parties and 
independents. More generally, there was little perception of the National Competition 
Policy as different from or even a development of competition policy generally (given 
that it was so).  Mostly responses represented little more than manoeuvring for 
exemption.  The Australian Council of Trade Unions pursued a critique asserting that 
cooperation and community were suffering under competition policy and there was a 
brief flaring of a civil society movement.  Professions such as the medical profession or 
lawyers maintained that their activities fell outside the idea of business, those concerned 
with welfare – particularly charities and churches – were worried about 
contractualisation, and regions and rural industries continued their long war on 
privatisation, contracting out and other policies leading to a withdrawal of governmental 
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presence.  Producer boards foresaw the impact of legislation reviews and commenced 
arguing against restructuring.  These reactions remained atomised, no political or 
intellectual links between them being forged.  There was, however, a growing body of 
literature describing competition policy in terms of ‘neo-liberalism’ (or its softer cousin, 
‘economic rationalism’).  It did not take the form of evaluation or make serious attempts 
at alternative policy formation; this was a consequence of the roots of these analyses in 
postmodernism.  There were, however, attempted critiques of competition policy as 
altering community values, especially in defining the aspirations of society, but these 
fell on deaf ears.  There was no response to such critique from any quarter of the policy 
process. 
 
From this point, the story turns to what was done to implement the National 
Competition Policy as set out in the Agreements, changing as it proceeded, and 
provoking reaction; finally to end in a flurry of assessments.  However, this story is not 
set in an unchanging context: during that ten years, Australian society was also 
changing.   Of particular relevance to assessment of the impact of the National 
Competition Policy were three forces.  First, advances in computer power and memory, 
and the development of the internet all of which enabled increases in productivity 
impossible to disentangle from impacts of competition policy.  Second, demographic 
and population movements meant that it was difficult to ascertain the differential impact 
of competition policy on regions.  Finally, ongoing competition policy implementation 
apart from that undertaken under the National Competition Policy, let alone simple 
changes in the modalities of government action, also meant that the impact of the 
National Competition Policy itself is difficult to discern.  
 
Within a short space of time and despite demographic and population changes, 
particular places and industries quickly claimed to be more severely affected than others 
by the implementation of the National Competition Policy. Governments succumbed to 
pressure and rapidly legislated exemptions, these being threatened by the National 
Competition Council with punishment by competition payment deduction if by the 
States or Territories but this was of no effect on the Commonwealth. However, 
exemption and wavering was not sufficient to restrain community anger.  The One 
Nation political party included resistance to the National Competition Policy as one of 
its platform planks, capitalising on the situation.  Member of the National Party, despite 
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being from 1997 in government coalition with the Liberal party, also expressed 
uneasiness with the societal changes allegedly wrought by the National Competition 
Policy.  Ultimately this resistance joined with that of the Democrats and the Greens to 
enable the appointment of a far-reaching and influential Senate inquiry into the socio-
economic consequences of the National Competition Policy.   
 
Meanwhile, the National Competition Council had set about its business.   The 
Agreements set out programs of action, calling for statements of intention in relation to 
legislation reviews and competitive neutrality.  The National Competition Council 
formulated its criteria for assessment of progress against these statements, as well as in 
relation to the other elements of the Policy.  However, it took its role not merely to be 
one of assessing against agreed criteria, but also of facilitating competition policy in the 
form of the National Competition Policy.  This raised some suspicions amongst the 
States and Territories that they would not be paid promised monies despite compliance 
with what they had considered to be their obligations.  It also drew the National 
Competition Council down the road of persuasion of the populace to acceptance of 
competition policy.  It threw considerable resources to countering what it saw as dissent 
or at least a misinformed populace.  This became extreme around 2000 as the Senate 
responded to the Report of the Socio-Economic Consequences of the National 
Competition Policy Select Committee.3   
 
In Parliament, various Government-commissioned reports occasioned responses, as did 
critiques flowing from a few members.  These responses settled down into formulae: the 
‘duck’, the ‘weave’ and the ‘falling man’.  In the first, a State or Territory government 
would assert that it had little choice but to implement an element of the National 
Competition Policy because substantial income flows depended on so doing.  The 
‘weave’ was a statement by the Commonwealth that what was done was done by the 
relevant State or Territory and it was up to them and therefore they should bear the 
responsibility. The ‘falling man’ was the deferral of critique until the National 
Competition Policy was complete, as the benefits would not flow until then.  In any 
case, usually averred the Government, the Productivity Commission had assessed the 
                                                 
3 Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000 
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benefits to come to be over 5% of Gross Domestic Product. That this was a best 
possible scenario founded in a very limited study was not mentioned, even though it 
was repeatedly drawn to the public’s attention.   
 
Defences mounted by the National Competition Council and also inferentially by the 
Productivity Commission and various other government bodies were economic.  These 
were that markets produced efficiency and that this process was simply one of 
introducing competition. Where differential effects were claimed, the response was a 
utilitarian one: that the benefit of all was worth the detriment to the few.  Early 
responses allowed for compensation, but as the National Competition Council hardened 
its views, compensation was considered to be unfair.  This counter-intuitive argument 
was founded in the idea that markets always involved risks. If bad things happened as a 
result of the exigencies of a market to one person, this was a risk they had taken on, 
presumably being compensated for it.  This included changes in the nature of the 
market.  The exigencies of the implementation of competition policy are no different 
from any other exigency, ran the argument. Accordingly, sums should be made 
available, if implementing governments saw the necessity, only for adjustment 
assistance in the normal run of welfare payments.   
 
Challenge to the economic arguments was little heeded, despite the availability of many 
intellectual arguments against them.  Indeed, there was little debate at a more than 
populist level.  Even Giddens’ Third Way, popularised by Tony Blair and Mark 
Latham, had little impact, although that might have been because the National 
Competition Policy already had taken up the framework of competition and public 
interest in opposition.  Church groups and trade unions made repeated submissions to 
early inquiries about the place and function of competition in society, to little avail 
mainly, it appears, because such arguments were not directed against the economics; 
indeed they generally conceded the economic argument. 
 
Despite the absence of coherent or rational argument against the National Competition 
Policy or even competition policy generally, dissent had become vigorous by 2000.  The 
One Nation Party was vociferous and the Report of the Senate Select Committee had 
highlighted real harm being done in some communities.  2000 was also the supposed 
end of applicability of the Agreements, even though the National Competition Policy 
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was far from complete.  The Commonwealth Government dealt with this by extending 
the Agreements with the consent of the States and Territories, by reigning in the 
National Competition Council, demanding an articulation of the public interest test in 
greater detail, and further persuasive publicity of the benefits of competition policy and 
its moderation by the public interest. 
 
Beyond 2000, the National Competition Policy ran its course. Success in imposing 
competitive neutrality can only be said to have been partial although legislation review 
programs were concluded mostly to the satisfaction of the National Competition 
Council.  Progress was made on the major structural changes of the development of a 
National Electricity Market, and a national gas market.  Reform of the 
telecommunication industry cannot be considered otherwise than a failure in terms of 
competition policy and the Water industry reforms were started but failed to progress 
beyond partial State and Territory initiative.  The National Competition Council 
continued to proselytise its version of competition policy.  It articulated detailed 
arguments as to equity, compensation and the environment.  In relation to equity, 
mainly in the form of community service obligations, it retreated to competition policy 
as one plank in a platform of reforms, despite its claim that competition should be 
supreme.  It refused the idea of compensation for harm, rather asserting that adjustment 
assistance was appropriate.  In so doing it misstated the report of the Socio-Economic 
Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select Committee, Commonwealth 
Senate, Riding the Waves of Change.   
 
At its close, in 2005, the National Competition Policy was acclaimed as a great success.  
Both the National Competition Council and the Productivity Commission published 
assessments concluding great things had been done.  Most of the work for these 
assessments had been carried out by the Productivity Commission and, despite its 
Executive Summary and reports of its findings, it could not distinguish any real 
evidence of achievement.  It could only state that, given that economic theory said that 
there would have had to have been good effects, and as the economy had done well 
during the period 1995-2005, that there no doubt was a causal affect. It could not 
demonstrate that causal effect.  However, it could demonstrate that the harm done to 
regions was not as widespread as was claimed; even so, it resiled from quantifying 
harm.  It did not nominate how much the reforms had cost. 
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The Productivity Commission has continued as one of the premier policy advice and 
assessment institutions in Australia. The National Competition Council made a claim 
for continued relevance in competition policy, however its role was confined to 
providing assessments as to access arrangements.  Competition policy is not now 
conducted under the terms of overriding agreements about what it is and how it is to be 
implemented. Inter-jurisdictional applications are considered on a case-by-case basis in 
the normal course of intercourse between the governments of Australia.  The 
federal/state vertical fiscal imbalance is accommodated in those negotiations.   
 
Hypotheses and Questions from Chapter 1 
 
The above is a description of the National Competition Policy distilled from the detail 
set out in the previous chapters.  It is a very different story to that otherwise available.  
What that story means for the questions posed and hypotheses identified in Chapter 1 is 
now explored.  The story also allows for some new observations about the National 
Competition Policy, which follow.  The last section of this concluding chapter and, 
indeed, of the thesis itself considers where this study leaves research into the National 
Competition Policy and competition policy, and what it says about policy studies in 
terms of substance and epistemology.  
 
Chapter 1 commences with an argument that the National Competition Policy was an 
important part of Australia’s history.  It asserts that there is so far no comprehensive 
description, let alone analysis, of it: the map is blank.4  Yet there is a substantial 
literature about aspects of it.  This is reviewed in a literature review.  The upshot of the 
literature review is a series of unanswered questions.  Answering those questions, each 
in detail, must, however, be left to the future because they each depend on disciplinary 
perspectives often incompatible with those inherent to other questions.  Some 
metatheoretical understanding of the way it worked is required.  Thus the work of this 
thesis turns to making the National Competition Policy analysing and assessing that 
made known by the description.   
 
                                                 
4 The best kind of map, asserts the Bellman in The Hunting of the Snark by Lewis Carroll. 
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This thesis renders the National Competition Policy thinkable by describing it in as 
value-free a way as possible.  Three core questions, preliminary to those resulting from 
the literature review in Chapter 1 arise from this description: Did the National 
Competition Policy achieve what it set out to do for the Australian economy?  Was it 
simply the imposition of an ideology, here called neo-liberalism? Did it rewrite 
federalism?  These are now considered.  Answers to the questions are presented as 
defensible conclusions. 
 
Question 1: Did the National Competition Policy achieve change? 
 
A consistent claim by governments and in the media, and also in specific literatures, has 
been that the National Competition Policy achieved efficiency gains in the Australian 
economy.  This claim is unwarranted.5  It was not demonstrated in assessments.  
Moreover price falls in various utilities, the main claim by the Productivity 
Commission, have been more than reversed since 2005.6  Even if change between 1995 
and 2005 is demonstrable, that it is attributable to the National Competition Policy is 
not.  Even the Productivity Commission admitted as much.   
 
If the claim is simply that it achieved restructuring, without the claim that this was for 
the good of the economy, there is some truth to the statement.  However, a distinction 
should be made between change that would have happened anyway due to the 
prevailing implementation of competition policy, and what the National Competition 
Policy itself achieved.  Most of the requirements of the Competition Principles 
Agreement were simply a summary of what was already being done.  Exceptions to this 
were legislation reviews and matters requiring inter-governmental negotiation. 
 
Legislation reviews, in particular, changed many ways of doing government business.  
There is no evidence of a procedure for the review of legislation existed in any 
government prior to the inception of the National Competition Policy.  Moreover, the 
preference for competition instilled into the concept by the Hilmer Committee was quite 
                                                 
5 The difficulty of assessing the benefits of restructures is reinforced by Michael Di Francesco, ‘Do state 
sector restructures deliver?’ (2010) 10 Public Sector 10. 
6 Michael West, ‘Regulated returns guarantee price rises’, Business, The Age,  17 September 2012, 1. 
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novel.  However, to the extent they can be disentangled from other elements, legislation 
reviews occasioned the most vociferous response from the community. The Agreements 
were amended as a result of political concerns.   The public interest test had to be 
clarified to discipline States and Territories in their application of it. Governments and 
instrumentalities resorted to propaganda to convince voters.  Hence while change 
happened, limits to change were rapidly found.  Governments could not be pushed too 
far in the implementation of competition policy due to voter backlash.  To the extent 
that the National Competition Policy resulted in change, it also resulted in the drawing 
of lines of resistance to competition policy. 
 
The National Competition Policy can be said to have enabled things to be done which 
would otherwise have been stymied by Australia’s federal nature.  The National 
Competition Policy provided a mechanism to overcome the federal/state vertical fiscal 
imbalance.  Assets could be sold by States and Territories without fear that the loss of 
revenue would not be offset by capitalised tax gains.  Inter-jurisdictional utility 
interconnections and market mechanisms could be negotiated with lessened fear of 
game-playing.  Nevertheless, it was a flawed instrument.  It was over-ambitious in 
conception and as a result extended far too long for comfortable implementation.  
Inherent to its design was a supra-governmental agency which misconceived its role and 
had to be restrained. Designedly extending beyond the period of any government, the 
National Competition Policy took little regard of changes in philosophy and voter 
opinion and thus lost legitimacy. The flaws were such that the mechanism was not 
renewed beyond 2005.  Case-by-case negotiation is now the accepted procedure for 
resolving such inter-governmental matters.  On the other hand, it could be said that such 
case-by-case negotiation only works because the ground work and principles of transfer 
payments were set by the National Competition Policy. 
 
Question 2: Did the National Competition Policy implement neo-liberalism?  
 
As discussed in the Literature Review in Chapter 1, most literature critical of trends in 
Australian government cite the National Competition Policy as a case of the 
implementation of neo-liberalism.  This is particularly true of the sociological literature 
surrounding changes to the social welfare apparatus.  Indeed, Morgan argues that the 
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National Competition Policy institutionalised competition as a metaregulatory ideal in 
parallel to the Rule of Law.7 
 
The study of the National Competition Policy undertaken in this thesis indicates a more 
complex reality: while it is undeniable that competition policy is a matter of neo-
liberalism, the particular instance of it in the National Competition Policy was an 
articulation of the Third Way, of a path between neo-liberalism on the one hand and 
statism on the other.  It did lean more to neo-liberalism than erstwhile competition 
policy in that in legislation reviews competition was preferred yet the public interest 
was still conceded to have a place. That concession was more precisely articulated than 
previous incarnation of competition policy and during the continuance of the Policy was 
ever more precisely articulated. Nevertheless, the precise delineation of the rationality 
of that path remains debateable at the same time as its processes crystallise. 
 
To add to the complexity of the relation between the National Competition Policy as 
implemented and neo-liberalism as a discourse of government, the fixing of competition 
policy in the Agreements provided a target for resistance where previously only 
particular instances were sufficiently identifiable.  Competition policy is a matter of 
considerable technicality and the economics it represents is robustly argued.  However, 
few writers, if any, familiar with the sociology are also adept at arguing the economics. 
The economics remains hegemonic, neoliberalism unassailable.  As Eagleton describes, 
in such situations the only resort of those who would disagree is to irrationalism, as 
defined in the hegemonic discipline.8  In relation to the National Competition Policy, 
the emotion of despair and frustration was expressed in the rise of One Nation. It was 
also expressed in other fora, for example in the violence of protest at G20 international 
meetings.  The success of irrational politics has thereafter resonated in Australia.  
Moreover, the claim made early that competition should be metaregulatory, a discourse 
defining an element essential to good governance, failed in the face of those politics.  
 
While neoliberal politics in Australia has conceded both a place for the public interest 
and the power of the irrational, the institutional structure of policy has shifted but little.  
                                                 
7 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003); for a discussion 
see above 15-16. 
8 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Blackwell, 1996) ch 1. 
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Pusey’s characterisation of the public service as seized by ‘economic rationalism’ 
remains unfalsified.9  Competition already had a place as a metaregulatory ideal, 
although to be fair to Morgan it was expressed in less compelling form. The 
Productivity Commission is also a partial exception to this.  It has taken a central 
position in policy advice yet advocates a single hegemonic view.  It does not concede 
either the public interest or the legitimacy of its perception of the irrational.  In this it 
ignores its charter.  It should either be constrained to allow alternative conceptions of 
society either internally or by the establishment of a social policy advice commission, or 
it should be abolished. 
 
Question 3: Did the National Competition Policy rewrite federalism? 
 
The story of the National Competition Policy as related above suggests there would 
have been little need of it were it not for Australia’s federal structure.  Compounding the 
problem of a non-unitary state, States (but not the Territories) have separate 
sovereignties.  The absence of Commonwealth power to compel the States was the 
raison d’etre for the Agreements.  Those Agreements established governance of 
Parliaments by the executive, in this case in the form of the National Competition 
Council.  The regime of competition payments provided a binding power to its 
bureaucratic decisions. In addition, the development of the National Competition Policy 
legitimised the development of the Council of Australian Governments as a continuing 
forum for the development of national programs beyond the power of any single 
government.  
 
Despite continuing participation in the National Competition Policy itself and the 
Council of Australian Governments both being voluntary, together they represented a 
development of the relation between governments in the Australian polity. Yet they 
could hardly be said to be foundational developments, as the Australian Constitution as 
federation of separate sovereignties remained unchallenged; indeed, they were enhanced 
by effective resistance – even strategic use, in the case of the Victorian Government and 
the Auditor-General – by State governments to National Competition Council strictures, 
and by deploying the duck and weave defences to political attack, those defences being 
                                                 
9 Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra (Cambridge University Press, 1991).  See, in 
particular, the diagram reproduced above, 102. 
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essentially reaffirmations of several sovereignties. Moreover, attempts to include local 
government within the scheme as equivalent to signatories failed; the States asserted 
their sovereignties and local government remained subordinate. 
 
Yet even such changes to federal structures as occurred came at a cost.  The technique 
of intergovernmental agreement enabled the National Competition Policy to bind 
governments beyond their terms of office.  It thus represented a threat to democracy: 
payments were contingent on implementation no matter if a government was or was not 
elected to implement that which had been agreed but not to implement represented a 
large loss of income. However, there are a number of arguments to suggest that this is 
not a real threat.  First, under the Agreements in respect of every element of competition 
policy governments nominated what they would do in Statements and were supposed to 
be held only to that.  On the other hand, by way of rejoinder, the National Competition 
Commission judged the Statements and negotiated their contents, threatening the 
withholding of competition payments.  This is to say that that the idea of competition as 
held by the bureaucrats in the National Competition Commission overrode what 
governments thought they had agreed to.  
 
The second argument to say that the National Competition Policy did not threaten 
democracy is that Parliaments were always free to disregard their commitments.   In 
1997, the National Competition Commission almost went so far as to say that 
Parliaments were bound but it rapidly resiled from that position, no doubt having been 
informed of its unacceptability.  The public interest test in legislation reviews, 
community service obligations and the status of local government proved most divisive. 
 
Intergovernmental agreements in general are not legally enforceable and there seems 
little in the Agreements to suggest that they fall into an exception.  Their legal 
enforcement was not attempted.  Yet the competition payments were designed to bind 
governments in a federation where the purse strings are held at the centre.  While 
special payments and other techniques for tying States and Territories to certain policies 
have long been a feature of Australian intergovernmental relations, the National 
Competition Policy agreements took those techniques to a new level.  Not only did they 
extend for a long time, but also they bound States and Territories to legislate in certain 
ways in almost every field of State and Territory competence.  Commonwealth 
371 
 
government adherence to competition policy is a test of the proposition that the 
competition payments were the binding force because it was not a recipient; the 
Commonwealth (as well as the wealthy Western Australia) were laggards.  
 
The changes to the manner of working of Australia’s federation also came at the cost of 
accountability.  The defences to critique deployed the intergovernmental structure of the 
National Competition Policy to escape scrutiny.  Both the duck and the weave were 
ways of asserting responsibility lay elsewhere, and the falling man defence temporally 
shifted responsibility to final assessments.  Moreover, the structure of the National 
Competition Policy in shifting assessment to a bureaucratic body, informed by an expert 
body in the Productivity Commissions, with responsibility de facto to the Council of 
Australian Governments excluded political responsibility.   
 
The third cost to the proper functioning of the Australian polity was the above-described 
reconstruction of institutional advice structures to reflect a single expert view.  The 
National Competition Commission, having the power to assess governments was 
constrained to a particular view of governance in which competition was raised to be a 
vital, even the most important or best in some way, component of the means by which 
policy should be implemented. The Productivity Commission was stripped of 
consultative processes and became a body whose task was to view the world and assess 
it through particular disciplinary lenses.  There was no consent given to the adoption of 
this way of thinking, there was little debate on the net value of competition.   
 
Observations 
 
In this set of ‘Observations’ matters which are observable in the description but are not 
obvious in prior literature are indicated. Some of these are mentioned above, but are not 
there fully articulated.  Others arise out of the study itself.  They are set out in order of 
increasing generality: first as to the National Competition Policy, then as to policy 
studies, and finally as to epistemology.  As observations they are refutable by reference 
to the evidence.  They are thus invitations to further, albeit structuralist, research. 
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As to the National Competition Policy 
 
A constant theme in the story as narrated above is the absence of debate about 
competition itself.  The extent to which competition is wrong, evil or bad is not 
challenged.  That it might be so is hardly a novel thought.  At its initial showing in 
1840, a poem was placed next to Turner’s famous painting, the Slave Ship, reproduced 
below: 
 
Aloft all hands, strike the top-masts and belay; 
Yon angry setting sun and fierce-edged clouds 
Declare the Typhon's coming. 
Before it sweeps your decks, throw overboard 
The dead and dying – ne'er heed their chains 
Hope, Hope, fallacious Hope! 
Where is thy market now? 
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The picture depicts a real event, the throwing overboard of 133 slaves for the purpose of 
claiming insurance.  Turner places human beings above the market, saying that there are 
things in which markets should not deal.10  It is more than a matter that perhaps slaves 
should not be bought and sold, it is that the market is intrinsically evil – a point also 
made by Thomas Hobbes.11  The debate that has not been had is about the balance 
between the alleged good of competition and its certain bad.  The mantra of competition 
leading to efficiency (in three varieties), so often repeated in government reports, is 
simply not challenged.  There is ample critique of the lack of reality of micro-
economics and there are responses in the development of workable competition as a 
principle that is supposed to capture the benefits of markets without being unreal.   
 
Critique of economics was not carried over into the consideration of Australian 
competition policy.  Indeed, the economic principles deployed by the National 
Competition Council and the Productivity Commission in their considerations of 
competition policy were poorly constructed, simplistic and contingent, especially in 
respect of compensation and in the characterisation of the public interest, yet they 
escaped the critique which should have been laid against them.   
 
The absence of articulation of critique against the principles of competition policy 
might have been benign were it not for the resentment that their implementation 
brought.  Again, as Terry Eagleton eloquently demonstrates,12 without a reasonable 
voice resentment spreads into irrational anger.  As with Turner, plays, musicals and 
novels expressed this in terms not accepted within policy debates.  From the anger also 
arose the politics of legitimated irrationality.   
 
The second observation here made about the National Competition Policy itself is that it 
set a dangerous precedent.  Long-term intergovernmental agreement secured by 
payment allowed the development of methodologies of responsibility evasion.  The 
fiscal imbalance between governments worked to the advantage both States and the 
                                                 
10 See also Michael J Sandel, ‘What Isn’t for Sale?’, The Atlantic, April 2012. 
11 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (ed C B MacPherson, Penguin, 1968), 184. 
12 Eagleton, above n 8. 
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Commonwealth. It allowed for the subversion of democratic processes and the raising 
of the executive over the legislature.   
 
The third observation, one already made in a slightly different context, is that through 
the National Competition Policy the Productivity Commission cemented its position as 
the premier policy advice institution in the Australian polity.  All disputation with its 
biases and methodology has faded.  No alternative institutionalised view is supported.   
 
As to Policy Development 
 
If the National Competition Policy did not achieve change or even if change was only 
partial, 2.5% rather than 5.9%, and not the far-reaching alteration in the balance 
between government activities and the private sector which may have been sought, a 
consequential question is, why not?  The implication of Lindblom’s ‘Muddling 
Through’ is that far-reaching change is beyond the capacities of a single policy.  
Sparrow would argue that all that is possible is focussed change: pragmatic solutions to 
identifiable problems.13  In this sense the National Competition Policy was about 
federalism, although clothed in grand ambition. To the extent it was about more than the 
particular, it was destined to fail.  It was for this reason that the National Competition 
Commission resorted to propaganda: as the practicalities of change on a national scale 
across institutions, laws and regulatory formations undermined the purity of its 
conception of competition policy and its role within it, it could only conceive that the 
world was wrong and should change to fit.  In the same way, the Productivity 
Commission could not concede that the impact of the National Competition Policy was 
unmeasurable: the grandness of the plan simply meant that aggregation with all its 
defects was all the more necessary.14  Thus impacts other than those sought were 
rendered invisible in the interstices of the data. It was a matter of policy hubris and 
represents a warning for policy development generally – a conclusion at complete odds 
                                                 
13 Malcolm K Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems and Managing 
Compliance (Brookings Institute, 2000). 
14 This is more than the commonplace point that ‘Not everything that counts can be counted’ (James 
Spigelman, ‘Quality in an Age of Measurement’, (2002) Quadrant 9, 13), or even that that something is 
measurable means that it is therefore worth doing, rather it is that it was unable to concede the point that 
the benefits of competition were unmeasurable. 
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with the governmental representation of the National Competition Policy.  Certainly 
that lesson appears not to have been heeded in respect of the Competition Policy 
Review announced on 4 December 2013.15 
 
Second, the claim that the Australian National Competition Policy is an excellent model 
for other countries16 should be regarded with scepticism.  This is so even if all that is 
contemplated is the particular element of legislation reviews.  There is simply too much 
about the National Competition Policy that is unique to Australia. First, the history 
leading up to any definition of the National Competition Policy is in contrast to that of 
many of the jurisdictions contemplating or implementing a programmatic competition 
policy.  Some, such as Vietnam or China, are economies in transition from communist 
or socialist regimes where the private sector was not acknowledged to exist, let alone be 
regulated;17 others, such as Hong Kong, are in transition from hyper-capitalist regimes 
where government was not interested in the conduct of the private sector.  Yet each 
place has a unique history.  Unique histories should surely impact on competition 
policy.  So also should the consequence of unique histories: unique societies in which 
the way individuals are constructed differ. Competition policy, unthinkingly applied, 
may well lead to unintended consequences; in particular in relation to the values 
inherent in citizenship and community plurality.  Second, competition policy is often 
deployed as a device to attack corruption – the public choice argument writ larger.  
However, the process of change is as susceptible of corruption as government control in 
the first place.18  Thus, for example, rigorous definition of ‘the public interest’ is 
essential to the implementation of competition policy, especially for legislation reviews 
and community service obligations in structural reform.  It is easy for governments to 
carve out areas in this guise, just as did the Commonwealth for newsagents, lawyers and 
so forth in the early years of the National Competition Policy.  Third, the process in 
Australia was made possible by the constitutional vertical fiscal imbalance, without it 
                                                 
15 http://bfb.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/014-2013/ (accessed 23 April 2014).  See 
<http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/terms-of-reference/>  (last accessed 22 July 2014). 
16 See above Chapter 1, n 4. 
17 See Vito Tanzi, Transition to Market.  Studies in Fiscal Reform (IMF, 1993). 
18 See, for example, Ting Gong and Nan Zhou, ‘Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules 
in Chinese public procurement’, (2014) Regulation and Governance 1. 
376 
 
there was no reason for implementing governments to risk the opprobrium of interest 
groups.  The non-compliance by the Commonwealth and the reform of the Victorian 
Audit Act 1994 are instances of this.  Fourth, those countries for which competition 
policy is most frequently proselytised often lack the institutions necessary for its 
implementation.  Competition policy requires an independent national institution 
applying trustworthy objective standards. It also must not overreach itself.  Especially in 
previously communist or socialist countries, a separation from the Party is necessary but 
is often unattainable. 19  Indeed such an institution can easily be thought of as above 
current governments and this may be anathema in countries placing a high value on 
democracy, as is exemplified by the fate of the National Competition Council in 
Australia. 
 
As to Policy Studies 
 
Analyses of the National Competition Policy as a policy, one amongst many others, fail 
to deploy a coherent approach to its evaluation. There appears to be no general 
framework by which a policy can be judged other than within the terms of its own 
presuppositions.  Hence the National Competition Policy was assessed in terms of 
whether it created an increase in Gross Domestic Product.  It has been considered to be 
solely a matter of the economy regardless of whether the impact was otherwise social.  
 
That disciplinary approaches fail to break out of their silos is to be expected.  Yet for the 
National Competition Policy the disciplinary approaches more than failed, they were 
deployed to defeat each other.  When political critique, that it was turning voters away 
or that it was not considered to be good for the community, was attempted, economics 
was called into action to say that the theory was so well established that it was reality, 
or at very least that the burden of proof lay upon the critique to say why the economics 
was wrong.  Where economic effects were produced which showed that particular 
places were suffering, utilitarianism was deployed to show how the whole community 
would benefit more than the costs to the smaller one.    Agreement was used to defeat 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Thang Long Tran, The Applicationof Competition Law to Vietnam’s State 
Monopolies: A Comparative Perspective (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2011). 
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political pressure. Missing is some sense of how the disciplines work in relation to each 
other.  If policies are to be analysed, such work is crucial. 
 
Policy studies also fail to account for the manner in which the National Competition 
Policy came to exist.  It doesn’t fit either Lindblom’s ‘Muddling through’20 or the other 
extreme of Simeon’s ‘Funnel of Causality’.21  As competition policy it was foundational 
in the sense of formulating a set of prescriptions (the elements of competition policy) 
founded in a particular theory (economics) to achieve a particular end (greater 
efficiency of three kinds). It was not designed to be incremental.  It did not rely on a 
succession of comparisons.  Yet it also did not rely on detailed analysis of all 
alternatives.  The theory and approach were chosen with little consideration of what 
other way might achieve what was wanted, or even whether what was defined as the 
objective was wanted.  Lindblom accounts for the incremental nature of political change 
in the United States as a function of its system of democracy and interest group support.  
In relation to competition policy in Australia there was little argument against it.  It 
could be said to be hegemonic.  From this perspective, as it continued, the defences 
were little challenged; they were sufficient in the circumstances.   
 
The National Competition Policy was, however, about more than competition policy.  It 
was about federalism, achieving particular changes across jurisdictions.  In this respect 
it better fits the idea of incremental change, with State and Territory sensitivities and 
interests representing the interest groups in Lindblom’s analysis.   If the ideas of 
competition policy were hegemonic, their formulation in the Agreements was of minor 
concern, more important was the fact of the Agreements, the formulations or techniques 
to reward and bind, the institutional structures of negotiation, the bureaucracies of 
implementation and so on.  The defences take central stage here as they reinforce the 
Agreements and the necessity of muddling through the exigencies of federalism.   
 
The National Competition Policy was about both federalism and competition policy.  
Each reinforced and made possible the other.  Without federalism the defences could 
not be mounted to defer examination of consequences to other places and times.  
                                                 
20 Charles E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”, (1959) 19 Public Administration Review 
79. 
21 R Simeon, ‘Studying Public Policy’, (1976) 9 Canadian Journal of Political Science 548. 
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Without the hegemony of competition policy, the developments of federalism could not 
occur.  The National Competition Policy, then, throws up the challenge of multiple 
purposes, of concealed agendas, of the impossibility of pinning down just what a policy 
is, even in a situation where the policy was so precisely defined.  A public choice 
theorist might say that this is of no concern because it is a matter of interest group rent 
seeking, that the policy merely shows the diverse impacts of exercises of power.  Yet 
that is to assume away the point of policy analysis and government itself.  The irony of 
that position is that the public choice theorist denies any public interest other than the 
public interest that they themselves recognise, that of market efficiency and 
materialism. 
 
The Funnel of Causality is more concerned with the discursive influences on the 
singular policy formulation and less on the outcome.  The National Competition Policy 
does not fit into this schema either.  There is no sense of progression from the domains 
of ideology to pragmatism.  The National Competition Policy arose out of the demands 
of an inadequate constitutional framework, through the personality politics of the early 
1990s and into reconstructions of the pragmatics of federalism.  At the same time it is a 
gathering together of ideological principles, mediated by public service mentalities.  Its 
form is hammered out not in policy circles but in intergovernmental fora.   
 
The conclusion from both these accounts is the same: the development and continuance 
of the National Competition Policy was unique in process but the elements of that 
process are identifiable.  For policy study generally it means that there is no easy way 
out: policies have to be studied in detail by polymaths. In particular, economics should 
not permitted to be used as a shield, impenetrable to all but the initiated.22 
 
As to Epistemology 
 
That previous examinations of the National Competition Policy were theory contingent 
is amply borne out in the foregoing chapters.  The solution adopted in this thesis is to 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Lasse F Henriksen, ‘Economic models as devices of policy change: Policy 
paradigms, paradigm shift and performativity’. (2013) 7 Regulation and Governance 481 where it is 
argued that ‘seemingly microscopic’ model design changes can induce huge changes in can induce large 
policy change.  There is a possibility that models in this way can be understood as devices used by actors. 
379 
 
undertake a ‘reflexive thick’ study.  The questions that remain are whether it works, 
what its limitations are and whether it is useful in other contexts. 
 
Whether it works depends on what is meant by ‘works’.  Certainly, the thick study 
reveals far more than studies hitherto, including those testing various hypotheses and 
assumptions. However, the claim here is only that it does better than prior studies, not 
that it reveals everything or that it removes all theory contingency. It may still contain a 
hidden structuration; after all, Kant would claim that all knowledge is the product of 
theory.  The volume of material, both primary and secondary, is such that choices had to 
be made, culling has to be performed, abstraction allowed a place.  
 
Subject to the qualification that it involves enormous work for few words of publishable 
content, that it is simple hard graft, as a technique for policy studies and legal studies 
thick studies is useful.  It is de rigueur in fields such as anthropology, whence it 
originated.  Perhaps most usefully, it throws up further hypotheses for testing and 
observations for investigation.  Thus a more detailed examination of the development of 
the National Competition Policy might have much more to say about  policy 
development, investigation of the bureaucracies of the National Competition Council 
and Productivity Commission might test Pusey’s approach23 as supported here, 
Morgan’s conclusions about competition as metaregulation challenging the rule of law24 
might be susceptible to testing through data about the processes of legislation drafting, 
detailed analysis of the Hansards of States and Territories might reveal different stories 
about the implementation of the National Competition Policy.   
 
Reflection 
 
The aim of this thesis is to make known, analyse, and assess the National Competition 
Policy.  The final words of this thesis are a reflection on how well and the extent to 
which it achieves this.   
 
                                                 
23 Pusey, above n 9. 
24 Bronwen Morgan, Social Citizenship in the Shadow of Competition (Ashgate, 2003). 
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Certainly and despite its claims to being a thick study, it is an incomplete study.  Vast 
amounts of material are ignored and avoided, and will probably remain unknown.  Most 
particularly, detailed transactional accounts of implementation are missing, as are 
interview material of people involved.  There are defences to this – space in the first 
place, and that interviews require detailed prior knowledge and are subject to 
confabulation – but that is beside the point in assessing how well the aims are met.  
However, at every point care has been taken to be aware to the extent possible of the 
matters that the material might have shown.  There seems little room for unknown 
unknowns. 
 
As noted repeatedly in the body of the thesis, maybe it predetermines its conclusions.  
Particular ways this might have happened might be in the choice of the Agreements as 
the articulation of the National Competition Policy or in the perspectives (context, 
development, periodisation, competition policy element, and responses and defences) 
from which the story was told. This is for others to determine; at this point here the 
possibility is exposed. 
 
Despite these qualifications, this thesis describes the National Competition Policy in a 
level of comprehensiveness and detail not available elsewhere. It has proffered a 
language for the study of the National Competition Policy: that a policy, fortuitously 
expressed in a determinate form, with express and implicit purposes formulated within a 
context of knowledge and technique, is a program for government action which can be 
assessed in in terms of whether it achieved its purposes and what the unintended effects 
were.  The National Competition Policy thus has been made known.  The story 
accordingly told avoided the theory contingency elsewhere displayed.  The National 
Competition Policy has been found to have been multifaceted, developing a particular 
version of competition policy in which the public interest is itself formulated and 
located against in varying positions competition; further, the chief impact of the policy 
was to achieve some implementations of competition policy and extensions of 
competition law otherwise denied by Australia’s federal structure.  It also created a 
process of legislation reviews and an access regime.  Moreover, quite apart from being 
an expression of competition policy, the National Competition Policy provided the 
impetus for developments within Australia’s federal arrangements and facilitated the 
substitution of expertise for consultation within policy development circles.  It impacted 
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heavily on Australia’s politics, legitimating irrational polemic and rewriting ideas of 
how negative impact on regions and people are to be treated.  It also resulted in a great 
deal of unhappiness, destruction of livelihoods and disruption.25   
 
This thesis has rendered problematic the idea of evaluation of a policy and demonstrates 
how evaluative frameworks suggested for the National Competition Policy are 
inadequate due to confused epistemologies or, at least, were isolated and treated as 
insignificant.  Pusey,26 and Lindy Edwards later,27 had prior to the National Competition 
Policy found the public service to be imbued with economic rationalism, yet that 
economic rationalism survived even the demise of the National Competition 
Commission.  Kain, in response to the Hilmer Report questioned the impact on 
individuals and the conception of the public interest as the other of competition yet, 
while the public interest continued to be refined as a concept, its definition remained 
problematic.28  Kain also challenged the impact on Parliamentary democracy of the 
National Competition Policy, an argument taken up by Rix in 199929 (only to receive 
swift rebuke from a project manager for the National Competition Council30).  
Governmentalists identified neo-liberalism as the prevailing discourse constituting the 
techniques of governance represented by competition yet resistance was well 
articulated, the discourse was rendered problematic and alternatives were expressed.  
Bell, similarly, identified economic rationalism as a prevailing ideology formative of 
the processes of competition policy yet other ways of thinking imbued the policy from 
the very start.31 Geoff Edwards questioned the use to which the notion of competition 
                                                 
25 Amply explored in Socio-Economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy Select 
Committee, Commonwealth Senate, Riding the Waves of Change, 2000 and in the submissions to it. 
26 Pusey, above n 9. 
27 Lindy Edwards, How to Argue with an Economist (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
28 John Kain, National Competition Policy: Overview and Assessment, Research Paper No 1, 
Parliamentary Research Service, Department of Parliamentary Library, Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Canberra, 1994. 
29 Stephen Rix, ‘National Competition Policy: Parliamentary Democracy, Public Policy and Utilities’, 
(1999) 7 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 170 
30 Simon Cohen, ‘National Competition Policy: Parliamentary democracy, public policy and utilities – a 
response to Stephen Rix’, (2000) 7 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 281. 
31 Stephen Bell. Ungoverning the Economy (Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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was put and yet no official doubt was ever cast on the proposition that competition is 
good whenever it can be applied.32  Church groups and the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions submitted that competition encouraged as a prevailing societal process resulted 
in a loss of good in society through rampant self-serving activity,33 the proper province 
of business and of government was repeatedly questioned, the impact on democracy of 
the techniques by which implementation of the National Competition Policy was 
required was noted by Quiggin34 and others.  The place of competition policy in the 
platform of social policies was repeatedly questioned in Parliament.  Hugh Stretton has 
again and again questioned public policy made in the absence of the goals and 
aspirations of social democracy.35 None of these impacted of the thrust of the policy.  
To be sure, irrationalism was responded to, but not reason.   
 
On a simple evaluative framework of whether the National Competition Policy did 
harm, clearly and admittedly it did.  Indeed, compensation for that harm was rejected.  
A democratic outlook would note the subversion of democratic values implicit in the 
structure of the Agreements and the referral of assessments to the National Competition 
Council.  A Habermasian outlook suggests that communities should govern themselves 
through reflective debate, and that the core reflection as to the nature of competition 
was absent.  And equally there is no suggestion that a Rawlsian approach would come 
to a different conclusion.  As Jonathan Wolff puts it, ‘[a] society that has a tendency to 
create ruthless egotistical exploiters is worse than one with a tendency to produce 
charitable altruistic co-operators, even if, in formal terms, both societies can be 
                                                 
32 Geoff Edwards, ‘Competition: Useful Means or Invariable End’, (2001) 100 Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration 32. 
33 See also Peri O’Shea, Rosemary Leonard and Michael Darcy ‘Does “Competition’ Kill “Social 
Capital”’, (2007) 13 Third Sector Review 2. 
34 John Quiggin, ‘Social democracy and market reform in Australia and New Zealand’, (1998) 14 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 76 
35 Hugh Stretton, Australia Fair (UNSW Press, 2005).  See for an overview of Hugh Stretton’ social 
theory, Peter Gibilisco, ‘Hugh Stretton and his Social Theory’, (2000) 5(1) Journal of Economic and 
Social Policy Article 5.  Interestingly, Stretton does not mention the National Competition Policy in his 
work.  But then, perhaps he said it all by the end of 1996: see Hugh Stretton, Political Essays, (Georgian 
House, 1987); Hugh Stretton, and Lionel Orchard, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice (St 
Martins, 1994).  See also Fred Argy, Australia at the Crossroads: Radical Free Market or a Progressive 
Liberalism (Allen and Unwin, 1998). 
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described as just’.36  The core moral question of whether it should have been done was 
and is simply assumed.  This thesis, then, ends as it should with another question:  What 
is it about the Australian polity that allows policy ideas to remain unsullied by reason? 
 
 
  
                                                 
36 Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Revised ed., 2006) 
199. 
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